Pandi, S/o. Naagu Agaali v. State, through Inspector of Police, C-1 Teppakulam Police Station, Madurai
2012-12-17
M.Jaichandren, S.Nagamuthu
body2012
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT S. NAGAMUTHU, J. 1. The appellant is the sole accused in S.C. No. 292/2000 on the file of the IV-Additional Sessions Judge (P.C.R.), Madurai. By judgment, dated 2.1.2002, the trial Court has convicted him under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. Challenging the said conviction and sentence, the appellant is before this Court with this appeal. 2. This appeal was preferred before this Court on 5.3.2003, through a learned counsel, by name S.Manjula. Subsequently, another learned counsel, by name A.Thiruvadikumar, entered appearance for the appellant. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant was granted suspension of substantive sentence of imprisonment, by order dated 5.4.2005, on the ground that there was no possibility of the appeal being taken up in near future and that the accused had been in jail for about three years. After the grant of bail, as of now, the appellant is on bail. 3. Though the matter was listed before this Court, for final hearing, on several occasions, he did not choose to appear. Therefore, this Court had to issue a non-bailable warrant for the arrest of the accused on 23.11.2009. But, the said warrant could not be executed by the Police. When this appeal was listed on 8.3.2011, a Division Bench, which heard the appeal, directed the police to execute the non-bailable warrant by 22.3.2011. On 22.3.2011 also, it was reported to this Court that warrant could not be executed. It was further reported to the Court that a Special Team of Police had been constituted to nab the appellant. After repeated adjournments, since it was reported that warrant could be executed, as the appellant is absconding, this Court thought it fit to appoint a legal aid counsel, at the cost of the State, so as to provide legal aid to the appellant. Accordingly, Ms.S.Venhalakshmi, learned counsel, was appointed as legal aid counsel. She was given enough time to go through the papers and to make her submissions. 4. Today, when the appeal was taken up, the accused is not present. But, we have heard the learned legal aid counsel for the appellant and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and we proceeded to dispose of the appeal. 5.
She was given enough time to go through the papers and to make her submissions. 4. Today, when the appeal was taken up, the accused is not present. But, we have heard the learned legal aid counsel for the appellant and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor and we proceeded to dispose of the appeal. 5. The case of the prosecution is briefly as follows: (a) The appellant/accused is the brother of the deceased. The deceased was one Rakku. P.w.1 is her son. There is a common ancestral property owned by the accused and the deceased. Without the knowledge of the deceased, the accused sold away the said property. The deceased questioned the same. This developed into a motive in the mind of the accused to do away with the deceased. (b) On 18.3.2000, at about 12.30 p.m., P.W.1 and the deceased were returning to their house, through Sebastian Temple Street, in the occurrence village. At that time, the accused came from the opposite direction, armed with an iron rod (M.O.1). On nearing the deceased, he started attacking the deceased on her head. The deceased, on sustaining bleeding injuries, fell down. The accused, leaving the weapon there itself, ran away from the scene of occurrence. P.Ws.2, 3 and 4 also witnessed the occurrence. (c) Thereafter, P.W.1 went to Teppaklam Police Station, Madurai City, and preferred Exhibit P-1 complaint, at 1.15 p.m. on 18.3.2000. The Sub-Inspector of Police, then attached to the said Police Station, registered a case in Crime No. 426 of 2000 under Section 302 IPC. Exhibit P-8 is the FIR. Then, he forwarded Exhibit P-1 and Exhibit P-8 to the Judicial Magistrate No. I, Madurai, through P.W.11. P.W.11, accordingly, handed over the same to the learned Judicial Magistrate at 3.30 p.m. (d) P.W.13, taking up the case for investigation, proceeded to the place of occurrence at 1.30 p.m. and prepared an observation mahazar and a rough sketch, in the presence of P.Ws.9 and 10. He recovered bloodstained earth (M.O.3), and sample earth (M.O.2) from the place of occurrence, under a mahazar. He also recovered M.O.1 Iron Rod from the place of occurrence, under Exhibit P-11 mahazar. Then he conducted inquest on the body of the deceased and prepared Exhibit P-12 Inquest Report. During investigation, P.W.13 examined P.Ws.1 to 3 and few more witnesses. Then he forwarded the body of the deceased for postmortem.
He also recovered M.O.1 Iron Rod from the place of occurrence, under Exhibit P-11 mahazar. Then he conducted inquest on the body of the deceased and prepared Exhibit P-12 Inquest Report. During investigation, P.W.13 examined P.Ws.1 to 3 and few more witnesses. Then he forwarded the body of the deceased for postmortem. (e) P.W.8 Dr.Thiagarajan conducted postmortem on the body of the deceased on 19.3.2000 at 10.15 a.m. He found the following external injuries, on the body of the deceased. “1) An oblique antero-posterior incised like wound 5 cm above and backwards from the right ear 10 cm x 1 cm x bone deep with depressed fracture 8 cm x 0.5 cm x brain deep extending with crack fracture, anteriorly to right temporal and right middle cranial fossa, posteriorly to the occipital underlying subdural haemorrhage and subarachnoid haemorrhage with laceration of brain 6cm x 2cm x 1 cm with intracranial haemorrhage. Cerebrospinal fluid increased, blood stained. Brain cut Section oedematous. 2) Oblique incised like wound 8 cm above the wound No. 1 – 8 cm x 1 cm x bone deep.”. Exhibit P-6 is the postmortem certificate. He opined that the deceased would appear to have died of external injury No. 1 and its corresponding internal injuries. (f) Continuing the investigation, P.W.13 arrested the accused on the same day at 4.00 p.m. and he sent the accused for judicial remand. He examined few more witnesses, collected medical records and finally laid charge sheet against the accused, on 26.3.2000, under Section 302 IPC. 6. Based on the above materials, the trial Court framed a lone charge under Section 302 IPC and since he denied the same, he was put on trial. In order to establish the charge against the accused, on the side of the prosecution, 13 witnesses were examined and 12 Exhibits were marked, beside six material objects. 7. Out of the 13 witnesses, P.Ws.1 and 4 are the eye-witnesses to the occurrence. P.W.6 is the Doctor who conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased. 8. When the incriminating materials were put to the accused under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he denied the same as false. However, he did not choose to examine any witness or mark documents, on his side.
P.W.6 is the Doctor who conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased. 8. When the incriminating materials were put to the accused under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code, he denied the same as false. However, he did not choose to examine any witness or mark documents, on his side. Having considered the above materials, the trial Court found the accused guilty under Section 302 IPC, convicted him thereunder and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to undergo rigorous for six months. That is how the appellants are before this Court with this appeal. 9. We have heard the learned Legal Aid counsel for the appellant and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State and we have also perused the records, carefully. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the Sub-Inspector of Police, who recorded Exhibit P-1 complaint from P.W.1, has not been examined at all. This, according to the learned counsel, creates enormous doubt in the case of the prosecution. But, the evidence of P.W.13 would go to show that Exhibit P-1 was recorded by then Sub-Inspector of Police, by name Natarajan, attached to Teppakulam Police Station and based on the same the Sub-Inspector registered the case. It is the evidence of P.W.13 that the said Natarajan was not available for examination during trial, as he was on long leave due to ill-health. Thus, there is sufficient explanation offered for the non-examination of the said Sub-Inspector. 11. Now, the question as to whether the entire case of the prosecution is to be disbelieved, simply because the prosecution has not chosen to examine the said Sub-Inspector of Police, who recorded the statement of P.W.1 and registered the case. In our considered opinion, the answer is an emphatic “No”. If there is any prejudice caused to the accused on account of non-examination of a particular witness, then that matters. But, in this case, non-examination of the Sub-Inspector of Police, who recorded the statement of P.W.1 and registered the case, has not caused any harm to the interest of the accused. Therefore, though the then Sub-Inspector of Police who registered the case has not been examined, on that score, the entire case of the prosecution cannot be rejected.
But, in this case, non-examination of the Sub-Inspector of Police, who recorded the statement of P.W.1 and registered the case, has not caused any harm to the interest of the accused. Therefore, though the then Sub-Inspector of Police who registered the case has not been examined, on that score, the entire case of the prosecution cannot be rejected. From the records, it could be seen that FIR was received by the learned Judicial Magistrate at 3.30 p.m. itself. According to P.W.1, FIR was registered at 1.15 p.m. and the occurrence was at 12.30 p.m. Thus, there is no delay in preferring the complaint, in registering the case and in forwarding the FIR to the Court. In general, prompt lodging of the FIR, registration of the case and prompt forwarding of the same, without any delay, to the Court, would, to some extent, guarantee the truth of the allegations contained in the FIR. In this case, as we have pointed out, absolutely there is no delay and this further strengthens the case of prosecution, about its truthfulness. 12. Coming to the evidence of P.W.1 to 4, P.W.1 states that he was accompanying the deceased at the time of occurrence. Admittedly, he is the son of the deceased. Learned counsel for the appellant made an attempt to discredit the evidence of P.W.1, by submitting that he was not present at the time of occurrence. But, nothing has been brought on record, through cross-examination, to discredit the evidence of P.W.1. Very strangely, a suggestion has been made to P.W.1 by the defence that while walking on the road the deceased fell suddenly, sustained injuries and died. This defence taken by the accused would only go to show that a false plea has been taken by the accused. This false plea is an added point in favour of the prosecution. 13. The other three eye-witnesses, namely P.Ws.2 to 4 have vividly spoken to about the occurrence. Though an attempt is made to say that they are all interested witnesses, there is no reason to ignore their evidence. P.W.4 has stated that all the three used to move together on occasions. He has further stated, during the relevant time, all the three were going together and witnessed the occurrence. Though these witnesses have been subjected to lengthy cross-examinations, nothing could be brought on record to discredit their evidences also.
P.W.4 has stated that all the three used to move together on occasions. He has further stated, during the relevant time, all the three were going together and witnessed the occurrence. Though these witnesses have been subjected to lengthy cross-examinations, nothing could be brought on record to discredit their evidences also. The learned counsel for the appellant is not able to point out any infirmity in the evidences of these witnesses, except to point out one or two minor contradictions. One such contraction pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant is that P.W.4 has stated that the accused came from behind and attacked the deceased, whereas according to P.Ws.1 to 3, the accused came from the opposite direction. We have bestowed our attention to this argument, only to find that there is no substance in the same. What all that P.W.4 has stated is that the accused attacked the deceased from behind. It does not mean that the accused came from behind and not from the opposite direction. Thus, we find no contradiction at all in the evidence of this witness. 14. Nextly, the learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that there was no chemical examination conducted on the weapon seized from the place of occurrence. In our considered view, there is no need to forward the weapon for chemical examination, because the weapon was found near the place of occurrence. Apart from that, the weapon was duly identified. In a case, where the weapon of crime was discovered from a hidden place on any disclosure statement made by the accused, to create a definite link, normally the property is sent for chemical examination. But, in this case, the property was not recovered from the possession of the accused but, it was seized from the place of occurrence itself, even at the time of inquest. Therefore, this ground deserves only to be rejected. 15. Learned counsel for the appellant would further submit that there is contradiction in respect of number of blows caused by the accused. From the records, it could be seen that P.Ws.1 to 4 are rustic poor villagers. When sudden attack was made on the deceased, by her own brother, it would not have been possible for these witnesses to meticulously count the number of blows made.
From the records, it could be seen that P.Ws.1 to 4 are rustic poor villagers. When sudden attack was made on the deceased, by her own brother, it would not have been possible for these witnesses to meticulously count the number of blows made. Therefore, the so-called contradiction pointed out by the learned for the appellant, in this regard, deserves only to be rejected. 16. Coming to the medical evidence, it clearly states that the apparent nature of the injury was cut injury. This is relatable to the nature of the weapon used. M.O.1 is not a blunt weapon. It is like a thick plate (pattai) The Doctor has clearly opined that the injuries could have been caused by that weapon. We do not find any reason to reject the said opinion offered by medical expert. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the medical evidence does not corroborate the eye-witness account deserves only to be rejected. 17. From the foregoing discussions, we have no hesitation to hold that the death of the deceased was caused only by the accused. The weapon used, the number of injuries caused, the motive and all other attending circumstances would clearly go to prove that the accused had the definite intention to cause the death of the deceased. Thus, the act of the accused falls within the first limb of Section 300 IPC and in turn liable to be punished under Section 302 IPC. Equally, the act of the accused does not fall under any of the special Exceptions appended to Section 300 IPC. Now coming to the quantum of punishment also, no infirmity was pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant. Thus, we do not find any merit at all in this appeal. 18. In the result, the appeal fails and the same is accordingly dismissed. The conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant, by the trial Court, is confirmed. The appellant is on bail. The bail bonds executed by the appellant shall stand cancelled. The trial Court is directed to take necessary steps to secure the appellant/accused and commit him to jail to undergo the sentence imposed on him. 19. Before parting with the judgment, we would like to record our appreciation for the service rendered by the learned counsel, who has been appointed as a Legal Aid counsel.
The trial Court is directed to take necessary steps to secure the appellant/accused and commit him to jail to undergo the sentence imposed on him. 19. Before parting with the judgment, we would like to record our appreciation for the service rendered by the learned counsel, who has been appointed as a Legal Aid counsel. We direct the Legal Services Authority to pay her remuneration, as per the existing regulations. Appeal dismissed.