JUDGMENT By the Court.—Heard Sri N.L. Srivastava, learned Advocate who appeared in support of this petition and Sri Rajendra Prasad Misra, learned Advocate who appeared for the respondents. 2. This writ petition has been filed for quashing the order dated 1.9.2009 passed by respondent No. 2 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition) as well as judgment dated 9.10.2009 passed by respondent No. 6 (Annexure23 to the writ petition) and to provide all consequential benefits. 3. For disposal of the writ petition the facts in brief will suffice. 4. Petitioner was appointed and posted as Store Keeper-cum-Accounts Clerk in the office of respondent No. 3 in the year 1978 and thereafter he was posted as Store Keeper-cum-Accounts Clerk at Carpet Weaving Training Centre, Gorhara, District Azamgarh. On the direction of Carpet Training Officer petitioner went to the office of respondent No. 4 and received a sum of Rs. 43,842/= on account of salary of the staff, stipend of the trainees and rent for disbursement in the said training center. Petitioner claims that while he was waiting at Bus Stand for going to his training centre at Goraha, then at about 6.00, p.m. some unknown person developed intimacy with the petitioner and gave him some fruit to eat eating upon which petitioner became unconscious and it was at 3.00 a.m. on 4.12.1992 itself that he regained his consciousness and he found himself to be in the garden of village Lakhanpur, District Mirzapur and at the same time the bag containing the money etc. which was all with him was missing and he sustained a leg injury and was unable to move and ultimately family members of the petitioner were informed and they got the petitioner treated in the Primary Health Center, Gopiganj on 4.12.1992. Petitioner claims to be hospitalized in the aforesaid hospital of Gopiganj on 4.12.1992 and after taking fitness certificate from the Doctor concerned petitioner went to Police Station Chill, District Mirzapur for lodging First Information Report about incidentce of 3.12.1992, which was refused upon which petitioner sent telegram to the Superintendent of Police on 10.12.1992. In respect to the charge of embezzlement of the amount, noted above a charge-sheet was issued by the disciplinary authority on 16.6.1998. Under protest, petitioner deposited an amount of Rs. 43,842/- in the department. The Inquiry Officer submitted report on 14.2.2003 holding the charges against the petitioner as proved. In respect to the charge of embezzlement of the amount, noted above a charge-sheet was issued by the disciplinary authority on 16.6.1998. Under protest, petitioner deposited an amount of Rs. 43,842/- in the department. The Inquiry Officer submitted report on 14.2.2003 holding the charges against the petitioner as proved. Respondent No. 2 sent a letter to the petitioner with the inquiry report calling upon him to respond. Reply was given by the petitioner upon which respondent No. 2 passed the impugned order dated 3.11.2003 directing his compulsory retirement and for recovery of an amount of Rs. 43,482. Petitioner filed O.A. No. 1521 of 2003 before the Central Administrative Tribunal in which on 20.2.2008 a direction was given to the petitioner to file an appeal before the appellate authority as provided in Service Rules. The appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed on 19.12.2008 upon which another O.A. was filed by the petitioner i.e. O.A. No. 15/2009 which was allowed on 22.1.2009 and disciplinary authority was directed to pass fresh orders taking the objection of the petitioner into consideration. As matter was being lingered petitioner filed a contempt petition upon which notices were issued and it is thereafter a fresh order dated 1.9.2009 was passed by respondent No. 2. The order passed by respondent No. 2 compulsorily retiring the petitioner was again challenged before the Central Administrative Tribunal by filing O.A. 1156 of 2009 and this time Tribunal dismissed the O.A. On 9.10.2009.Thus the impugned judgment of respondent t No. 6 dated 0.10.2009 (Annexure-23 to the writ petition) and impugned order passed by the respondent No. 2 dated 1.9.2009 (Annesure-1 to the writ petition) are under challenge before this Court. 5. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that in the inquiry proceeding no proper opportunity to present his case has been given and in fact there was charge against the inquiry officer but even then he was not changed and thus various documents and the oral evidence so entertained by the inquiry officer in absence of the petitioner, not being in accordance with law has resulted in denial of opportunity to the petitioner and therefore conclusions based on consideration of the material so collected is vitiated. It is further submitted that the certificate given by the Superintendent of the Government Hospital, Gopiganj dated 1.9.1997 was not before the Inquiry Officer and was not in the documents so provided and therefore, the decision based on that document also suffers. 6. Submission is that petitioner the had clearly established his stand that the incidence of 3.12.1992 and thereafter on 4th December, 1992 when he was taken for treatment and upon becoming fit he went to lodge the F.I.R. which was refused. In respect of the fact that petitioner was hospitalized, now stand taken is that he was treated as an outdoor patient as is clear from the certificate given by the Radiologist dated 11.2.1993 which has been wrongly disbelieved. In the last it has been submitted that inquiry proceeding not being fair, inquiry officer having not been changed and material documents having not been supplied, decision taken by the disciplinary authority as confirmed by the appellate authority and the Central Administrative Tribunal are vitiated, and therefore, they are liable to be quashed by this Court. 7. In support of the submission that on account of non supply of the document and the copy of the statement of the witnesses and inquiry not being fair, proceeding will be vitiated, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the decisions given in case of Kashinath Dikshita v. Union of India and others, AIR 1986 SC 2118 ; State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal and another, AIR 1998 SC 3038 and State of U.P. and others v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772 . 8. Sri Misra, learned Advocate for respondents refutes the aforesaid submission and argued that the complaint of lack of opportunity and not providing of some documents and otherwise in respect to the findings based on the certificate dated 1.9.1997 issued from the Community Health Centre and the letter dated 25.3.1995 cannot be raised as these are not factually correct and in any view of the matter unless any prejudice is demonstrated or is said to have taken place, neither inquiry proceeding nor decision based thereupon can be argued to be vitiated. 9. 9. Submission is that various facts against the petitioner are borne out from admitted facts and the record itself, and therefore, if the finding about misconduct of the petitioner has been arrived on available materials and then no exception can be taken. Here is a case where there is no dispute that on 3rd of December, 1992 petitioner received an amount of Rs. 43,842/- for salary of the staff, stipend of the trainees and rent for the training center and it is alleged that at the Bus Stand Bhadohi at 6.00 p.m. some unknown person offered some eatables to the petitioner and took him away to some field where he became unconscious and it is at 3.00 a.m. of 4.12.1992 only that he regained consciousness. The mischief which is alleged by the petitioner has taken place at the bus stand which is a public place. In the morning of 4.12.1992 when petitioner became conscious he claims to be in a field of village Lakhanpur. 10. In para 7 of the writ petition there is a clear statement that petitioner was hospitalized in the Government Hospital, Gopiganj on 4.12.1992 and was under treatment upto 9.12.1992 and it is thereafter he went to the police station Chill, District Mirzapur on 9.12.1992 to lodge the F.I.R. The averment in this respect as contained in para 7 of the writ petition is hereby quoted- “That, the petitioner was hospitalized in the above said Government Hospital Gopiganj on 4.12.1992 and he was under the treatment of Government Hospital Gopiganj up to 9.12.1992. Just after taking the fitness certificate from the Government Hospital, Gopiganj, the petitioner went at Police Station Chill District Mirzapur for lodging the First Information Report on 9.12.1992 with regard to the incident which was taken place on 3.12.1992.The Station Officer of Police Station Chill, District Mirzapur refused to lodge the First information report then on 10.12.1992 the petitioner sent a telegram to the Senior Superintendent of Police Mirzapur and requested therein that the Station Officer of Police station Chill has refused to lodge the above said First Information Report, for the incident dated 3.12.1992, therefore he requested him to lodge the First Information Report and take necessary action against the accused persons. A true coy of the medical certificate issued by the Medical Officer Primary Health Centre Gopiganj, dated 9.12.1992 and telegram dated 10.12.1992 sent by the petitioner to the Senior Superintendent of Police Mirzapur are being filed herewith and marked as Annexures 2 and 3 to this writ petition.” (Emphasis supplied by us) 11. Now petitioner has taken a stand that he was not hospitalized rather he was treated as an outdoor patient which clearly runs contrary to the specific averment as made in the writ petition itself. 12. Apart from the aforesaid in the letter written to the Superintendent of Police Mirzapur dated 10/11.12.1992 petitioner has clearly stated that his family members hospitalized the petitioner in Gopiganj Hospital where he was treated upto 9.12.1992. 13. From the aforesaid facts it is clear that petitioner initially claims to have been hospitalized from 4.12.1992 to 9.12.1992 but at the same time he filed certificate dated 11.2.1993 issued by Radiologist of Community Health Centre wherein it is mentioned that petitioner was not admitted in the hospital and he was just treated as an outdoor patient. In the certificate some joint pain/problem was stated but at the same time there is a clear endorsement in the left hand side that petitioner has not come in an intoxicated state. The note written by the Radiologist who gave certificate to the petitioner on 11.2.1993 being heavily relied is hereby quoted- “He is not come to me as a case of intoxication” 14. The certificate dated 1.9.1997 was given by the Superintendent of the Community Health Centre, Gopiganj wherein it has been clearly mentioned that in the record maintained by the Centre no patient in the name of Devi Shanker Tiwari is registered and no treatment has been given to him as an outdoor patient. 15. The inquiry officer recorded evidence of several witnesses namely Sri J.M. Prasad, Assistant Director (A &C), Sri H.B. Singh, Junior Investigator & Ex-CTO, Sri Niaz Ahmad Khan, SK and Sri Amannath, Junior Accountant. 16. Sri J.M. Prasad clearly stated that in the night of 3/4.12.1992 he saw the petitioner in the wine shop drinking wine. Sri H.B. Singh has clearly stated that petitioner was going in a different direction and in fact no incident has taken place and the intention of the petitioner was to embezzle the money. 16. Sri J.M. Prasad clearly stated that in the night of 3/4.12.1992 he saw the petitioner in the wine shop drinking wine. Sri H.B. Singh has clearly stated that petitioner was going in a different direction and in fact no incident has taken place and the intention of the petitioner was to embezzle the money. It is not a case where inquiry officer has not fixed date, time and place of inquiry proceeding. In fact date, time and place was under intimation to the petitioner which has been clearly stated by the petitioner in paras 11 to 13 of the writ petition where petitioner accepted fixing of the dates and the adjournment of the proceedings at his request. It may be certainly a case of there being some complaint by the petitioner against the inquiry officer or otherwise but on that ground petitioner cannot claim immunity from participating in the inquiry proceeding, from cross-examining the witnesses so examined and therefore, if petitioner choses not to cross-examine the witnesses and not to meet the papers so available with the inquiry officer then he does so at his own peril and fault in the inquiry proceedings or violation of principle of natural justice cannot be argued and on that ground decision taken by the disciplinary authority cannot be faulted. 17. It is a case where on its face, stand of the petitioner of the incident having taken place with him on 3.12.1992 and his theory of hospitalization on 4.12.1992 and treatment upto 9.12.1992 has been found to be incorrect specially on account of change in stand by him of taking treatment as an outdoor patient, which on its face is established to be concocted. Receipt of money by the petitioner is admitted and thus his silence with the money for quite long can be said to be a misconduct on his part. 18. The Central Administrative Tribunal has rightly taken into account the own document on which heavy reliance has been placed by the petitioner (certificate dated 11.2.1993) issued by the Radiologist about treatment of the petitioner as an outdoor patient from 4.12.1992 to 9.12.1992 and has given reason on consideration of the facts in para 3 of the judgment. 18. The Central Administrative Tribunal has rightly taken into account the own document on which heavy reliance has been placed by the petitioner (certificate dated 11.2.1993) issued by the Radiologist about treatment of the petitioner as an outdoor patient from 4.12.1992 to 9.12.1992 and has given reason on consideration of the facts in para 3 of the judgment. So far non supply of the certificate dated 1.9.1997 issued by the Superintendent Community Health Centre from which it was clear that petitioner was not even treated as outdoor patient has never been stated/objected by the petitioner in any of the grounds in the memo of appeal and at the same time in the letter dated 25.3.1995. This aspect has also clearly noticed by the Tribunal in para 4 of its judgment. 19. The Tribunal also considered the aspect as to whether any prejudice has been occasioned to the petitioner and has recorded a clear finding that petitioner has not made any attempt to demonstrate any prejudiced caused on this score and has opined that non supply of document even if is there, is not to vitiate the proceedings unless it is shown that delinquent has suffered some prejudice. 20. To sum up it is clear that petitioner went with the money which admittedly he received and embezzled the same and theory of mischief on 3.12.1992 at the bus stand and his treatment from 4.12.1992 to 9.12.1992 has not been substantiated by any positive material whatsoever. It was for the petitioner to have adduced documentary evidence and at the same time to have examined some witness to corroborate/strengthen his version which he failed to do. Only certificate about his outdoor patient treatment dated 11.2.1993 is found to be clearly contrary with his own averment/stand as taken in the writ petition as well as in the complaint made to the Superintendent of Police on 10/11.12.1992. 21. So far decision on which reliance has been taken by the learned counsel for the petitioner, we can just observe that they have no application to the facts of the present case and they are to apply only when no effective opportunity has been given to the petitioner and at the same time it is found that inquiry officer has acted as a prosecutor as well as a judge. 22. 22. At this stage we can refer to recent decision given by the Apex Court wherein it has been clearly ruled that petitioner is to demonstrate the prejudice on account of non supply of certain material or otherwise and if this is not shown/demonstrated then this kind of argument is not to sustain and inquiry proceedings and the decision based thereupon will not be vitiated. 23. In case of Union of India and others v. Bishamber Das Dogra, (2009)13 SCC 102 , following observations were made by the Apex Court- “11. In Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines v. Ramjee, this Court has observed that: (SCC p. 262, para 13) “13. ... Natural justice is [not an] unruly horse, no lurking landmine, nor a judicial cure-all. If fairness is shown by the decision-maker to the man proceeded against,the form, features and the fundamentals of such essential processual propriety being conditioned by the facts and circumstances of each situation, no breach of natural justice can be complained of.” (emphasis supplied) 12. In Umrao Singh Choudhary (Dr.) v. State of M.P., this Court held (SCC p. 331, para 4) that the principles of natural justice do not supplant the law, but supplement the law. 13. In Syndicate Bank v. Venkatesh Gururao Kurati, it was held: (SCC p. 159, para 18) “18. ... To sustain the allegation of violation of principles of natural justice, one must establish that prejudice has been caused to him for non-observance of principles of natural justice. 14. It is settled legal position that an order is required to be examined on the touchstone of doctrine of prejudice. A Constitution Bench of this Court in ECIL v. B. Karunakar, considered the issue at length and after taking into consideration its earlier judgment in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, came to the conclusion that (B. Karunakar case, SCC p. 755, para 28) furnishing the copy of the enquiry report and consideration of the employee’s reply to the same by the disciplinary authority constitute an integral part of the enquiry. “28. ... Ramzan Khan, came to the conclusion that (B. Karunakar case, SCC p. 755, para 28) furnishing the copy of the enquiry report and consideration of the employee’s reply to the same by the disciplinary authority constitute an integral part of the enquiry. “28. ... The second stage follows the enquiry so carried out and it consists of the issuance of the notice to show cause against the proposed penalty and of considering the reply to the notice and deciding upon the penalty.” Thus, it is the right of the employee to get the opportunity to make a representation against the findings in the enquiry report. 15. However, the Court further held that: (B. Karunakar case, SCC p. 757, para 30) “30. (v) ... The theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights.” The Court further observed as under: (B. Karunakar case, SCC pp. 757-58, paras 30-31) “30. (v) ... They are not incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of the denial to him of the report, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. Where, therefore, even after the furnishing of the report, no different consequence would have followed, it would be a perversion of justice to permit the employee to resume duty and to get all the consequential benefits. It amounts to rewarding the dishonest and the guilty and thus to stretching the concept of justice to illogical and exasperating limits. It amounts to an ‘unnatural expansion of natural justice’ which in itself is antithetical to justice. 31. ... It is only if the Court/tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report would have made a difference to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment.” (emphasis added) 16. In Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja, this Court applied the law laid down in B. Karunakar case and observed as under: (SCC pp. 38-39, para 21) “21. ... It is also clear that non-supply of report of the inquiry officer is in the breach of natural justice. In Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja, this Court applied the law laid down in B. Karunakar case and observed as under: (SCC pp. 38-39, para 21) “21. ... It is also clear that non-supply of report of the inquiry officer is in the breach of natural justice. But it is equally clear that failure to supply a report of the inquiry officer to the delinquent employee would not ipso facto result in the proceedings being declared null and void and the order of punishment non-est and ineffective. It is for the delinquent employee to plead and prove that non-supply of such report had caused prejudice and resulted in miscarriage of justice. (emphasis supplied) If he is unable to satisfy the Court on that point, the order of punishment cannot automatically (emphasis in original) be set aside. 17. In State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, this Court emphasised on the application of doctrine of prejudice and held that unless it is established that non-furnishing the copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent employee has caused prejudice to him, the Court shall not interfere with the order of punishment for the reason that in such an eventuality setting aside the order may not be in the interest of justice rather it may be tantamount to negation thereof. 18. This Court in S.K. Sharma case held as under: (S.K. Sharma case, SCC p. 389, para 32) “32. ... Justice means justice between both the parties. The interests of justice equally demand that the guilty should be punished and that technicalities and irregularities which do not occasion failure of justice are not allowed to defeat the ends of justice. Principles of natural justice are but the means to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counterproductive exercise.” (emphasis added) Similar view had been reiterated in S.K. Singh v. Central Bank of India and State of U.P. v. Harendra Arora. 19. Principles of natural justice are but the means to achieve the ends of justice. They cannot be perverted to achieve the very opposite end. That would be a counterproductive exercise.” (emphasis added) Similar view had been reiterated in S.K. Singh v. Central Bank of India and State of U.P. v. Harendra Arora. 19. In Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan, this Court considered the judgment in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, wherein it has been held that an order passed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside in exercise of the writ jurisdiction unless it is shown that non-observance has caused prejudice to the person concerned for the reason that quashing the order may revive another order which itself is illegal or unjustified. 20. This Court in Mansoor Ali Khan case also considered the judgment in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379 : AIR 1981 SC 136 , wherein it has been held that in a peculiar circumstance observance of the principles of natural justice may merely be an empty formality as if no other conclusion may be possible on admitted or indisputable facts. In such a fact situation, the order does not require to be quashed if passed in violation of natural justice. The Court came to the conclusion that a person complaining of non-observance of the principles of natural justice must satisfy that some real prejudice has been caused to him for the reason that there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice.” 24. For the reasons given above, we are not satisfied that there is any inherent flaw in the inquiry proceedings and the disciplinary authority has committed any error in finding misconduct against the petitioner as confirmed by Appellate Authority. The tribunal has also not committed any error in approving the decision of the disciplinary authority and that of the appellate authority. 25. Accordingly, writ petition fails and it is dismissed. ——————