JUDGMENT Dev Darshan Sud,J. The appellant challenges his conviction under Sections 333 and 353 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred to as `IPC’) for which he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years under Section 333 IPC and fine of Rs.1000/-, in case of default in the payment of fine to undergo imprisonment for three months. He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and fine of Rs.500/-under Section 353 IPC. Both the sentences are directed to run concurrently. 2. The case of the prosecution is that two accused Sanjay Kumar and Mehar Chand acted in concert in assaulting and using criminal force against Shri Duni Chand PW-1, a lecturer in Senior Secondary School Bhambia, Tehsil Sarkaghat, District Mandi, who was discharging duties during the examination on 9.3.2000. The allegations are that the complainant was repeatedly assaulted by these two people. If the facts as accepted by the trial Court are established, it pains me to note that assaulting teachers supervising examinations has now become rampant practice and needs to be curbed with a heavy hand. Sullying the education system with professional hooliganism cannot be tolerated under any circumstance. 3. Proceeding with the case further the prosecution case is that the complainant Duni Chand PW-1 was performing duties as Supervisor in Senior Secondary School, Bhambla at which point of time examinations for the plus two were being conducted by the H.P. Board of School Education. On 9.3.2000 when the complainant had distributed question papers to the students, accused Sanjay Kumar barged into the room and ordered the complainant to get out. When the complainant refused, accused resorted to abusive language and slapped the complainant. At this point of time Dinesh Kumar PW-2, who was in other room, rushed to the complainant’s room and when both Dinesh Kumar and the complainant tried to nab the accused, he managed to flee from there. The case further proceeds that the complainant narrated the entire incident to Vijay Kumar PW-3, Principal of the School, who advised him to report the matter to the police after the examination was over. The complainant left the school at about 5.15 P.M. alongwith Shri Dina Nath PW-4 and boarded the bus to report the matter at Police Station, Hatli. They alighted from the bus at `Kainchi Mour”. In the meantime, accused Sanjay Kumar and Mehar Singh came there. The complainant left the school at about 5.15 P.M. alongwith Shri Dina Nath PW-4 and boarded the bus to report the matter at Police Station, Hatli. They alighted from the bus at `Kainchi Mour”. In the meantime, accused Sanjay Kumar and Mehar Singh came there. The accused was incensed and punched the complainant on his nose which caused serious injuries and blood started oozing from his nose. The other accused punched the complainant and rained fist blows on him. When the complainant cried for help, Dina Nath PW-4 and Ashwani Kumar PW-12 rescued them from the clutches of the accused. Complainant Duni Chand and Dinesh Kumar PW-2 went to the Principal at Baldawara and apprised him of the entire incident, whereafter report Ex.PL was registered and sent to the Police Station, Sarkaghat, on the basis of which FIR Ex.PM was registered. The complainant was examined by Dr.Ankush Ghai, PW-5 and was sent for radiological examination when it was found that injury No.1 on the complainant, which was abrasion measuring .5cm x .5cm on the nose, was grievous in nature on the opinion by the radiological examination. 4. The accused was charged for offences under Sections 333 and 353 IPC. On the points formulated by the learned trial Court for consideration, it was found that the involvement of Mehar Chand could not be established, but it was the appellant who was guilty for the offences as charged. 5. In order to arrive at this conclusion the learned appellate Court relied upon the evidence of Duni Chand PW-1, Dinesh Kumar PW-2, Vijay Kumar PW-3, Dina Nath PW-4 and Ankush Ghai PW-5. The other witnesses are the police officials who deposed with respect to recoveries/investigation etc. 6. The testimony of Duni Chand PW-1 as well as Dinesh Kumar PW-2, Vijay Kumar PW-3, who was principal of Senior Secondary School, Bhambla and Dina Nath PW-4, corroborates each other on material particulars. It was established from their evidence that on the fateful day, the accused forcibly entered the classroom when the complainant was performing duties as a supervisor. He asked the accused to leave the room, but he refused to do so and was involved in a scuffle with the complainant described as `Dhaka Mukki’. In the meantime, Dinesh Kumar PW-2, who was in the adjoining room, rushed to the complainant’s room and then both of them managed to oust Sanjay Kumar. He asked the accused to leave the room, but he refused to do so and was involved in a scuffle with the complainant described as `Dhaka Mukki’. In the meantime, Dinesh Kumar PW-2, who was in the adjoining room, rushed to the complainant’s room and then both of them managed to oust Sanjay Kumar. When Sanjay Kumar was leaving, he holdout threats stating to both the complainant and Dinesh Kumar would be taught a lesson at an appropriate time and place. The matter was reported to PW-3 Shri Vijay Kumar, Principal of the School. The complainant then proceeded to state in his evidence that he was advised by the Principal PW-3 Vijay Kumar that the matter should be reported to the police immediately after the examination is over. 7. He then narrates that when he left school in the evening at about 5.15 P.M. alongwith PW-4 Dina Nath and when they reached at `Kainchi Mour’, the accused also alighted from the bus and started abusing both of them. Sanjay accused assaulted the complainant by punching him on the nose as a result of which it became bloodied. The other accused caught hold of him and started assaulting him with fist blows. At that point of time PW-4 Dina Nath and one of the students Ashwani Kumar PW-12 rescued him. Thereafter they rushed to the Police Station and reported the matter. He was cross- examined at length by the prosecution where he has been contradicted with the detail stated by him in Court as having not been mentioned in the FIR. It was suggested that he was beaten up and kicked. He denied that he fell down and sustained injuries. 8. To similar effect is the evidence of Dinesh Kumar PW-2 who stated that at around 2.00 P.M., when he was discharging duties as a supervisor in the plus two examination in the same School where the complainant was discharging duties, both the accused entered that room. He pushed them out. Thereafter they went to the adjoining room where the complainant was supervising the examination. When Duni Chand complainant tried to evict them from the room, he also went there and saw that accused Sanjay was engaged in a scuffle with Duni Chand. He alongiwth the complainant caught hold of Sanjay, but he managed to escape and ran away and then the matter was reported to the Police. When Duni Chand complainant tried to evict them from the room, he also went there and saw that accused Sanjay was engaged in a scuffle with Duni Chand. He alongiwth the complainant caught hold of Sanjay, but he managed to escape and ran away and then the matter was reported to the Police. He also sought to be contradicted on the point that he has not stated to the police that both of the accused person entered his room. There is nothing in the cross-examination which effaces the veracity of his statement in examination-in-chief. 9. PW-3 Vijay Kumar, Principal of the School, corroborates both these witnesses when he states that at around 2.15 P.M. both complainant and Dinesh Kumar came to his room and reported that Sanjay Kumar had slapped Duni Chand. He advised them to report the matter to the police. In the evening at around 6.00 P.M. when he was returning to his residence, he met both of them at Baldwara and he noticed that the face of the complainant was swollen and blood was oozing out from the nose. They narrated the incident which took place at `Kainchi Mour’. Then he took them to the police station and reported the entire incident. 10. PW-4 Dina Nath, who is also working as Lecturer in Hindi at Senior Secondary School, Bhambla, corroborates both the complainant Duni Chand and PW-2 Dinesh Kumar. He states in clear terms and corroborates the prosecution case to the extent that the complainant and PW-2 Dinesh Kumar, who were discharging duties as Supervisors in the School, around 5.15 P.M., asked him to accompany them to the police post because complainant had been advised by the Principal to lodge a report about the incident which had occurred in the School. They boarded the bus together and alighted at `Kainchi Mour’. The accused present in Court also alighted from the bus and started quarreling with Duni Chand. Both of them started beating Duni Chand with fist blows. He states that both the accused assaulted complainant Duni Chand by assaulting with punches and kicks. He states:- “Dono doshigan Duni Chand ko laton mukkon se marne lage”. He states that at this he became perplexed. One man, thereafter, started saying loudly as to what they were looking at (waiting for) on which 7-8 persons gathered on the spot and continued with the assault. He states:- “Dono doshigan Duni Chand ko laton mukkon se marne lage”. He states that at this he became perplexed. One man, thereafter, started saying loudly as to what they were looking at (waiting for) on which 7-8 persons gathered on the spot and continued with the assault. He was declared hostile since he had resiled from his original statement. He has been cross-examined as to how complainant was hurt. I will advert to the statement later. 11. Dr.Ankush Ghai PW-5 states that he was posted as Medical Officer at CHC in Baldwara. Injured Duni Chand was examined by him and he found injuries as recorded by him in MLC Ex.PB. 12. I am not considering the evidence of the other witnesses who are the police personnel as they are not relevant for the purposes of determining the innocence of the appellant. 13. Adverting to the evidence of PW-4 Dina Nath, who has been declared hostile, it was urged that he disproves the entire case of the prosecution as the identity of the person who joined in assault has not been established on the record. According to learned counsel appearing for the appellant, the case is that the complainant was set upon by 7/8 persons at `Kainchi Mour’ where he sustained injuries and it was not the two accused who were responsible. It is now well established beyond any doubt that the testimony of the hostile witness cannot be rejected outright. The principle of falsus in uno and falsus in omnibus is not applicable to the criminal trials in India. It is inherent consistency of the evidence which has to be examined. Adverting to the evidence, as I noted above, he is clear about three facts; (a) that he traveled with the complainant and got down at `Kaichi Mour’ (b) that both he and the complainant were going to the police station to report the earlier incident which had occurred in the school (c) that he and the complainant alighted at `Kaichi Mour’ where the accused also got down and punched and kicked the complainant, (d) that at this juncture somebody shouted as to what they were waiting for and 7/8 people set upon the complainant. Leaving the last portion out that there were 7/8 people who were assaulting the complainant, the other part of the case of the prosecution is corroborated in all material particulars up to the extent that the complainant was infact assaulted by the accused at `Kainchi Mour’. In this eventuality, his evidence cannot be discarded as a whole as being unworthy of credence. 14. I advert to the well settled principle as laid down by the Supreme Court in Shakila Abdul Gafar Khan (Smt) vs. Vasant Raghunath Dhoble and another, 2003(7) SCC 749 holding:- “25. It is the duty of the court to separate the grain from the chaff. Falsity of a particular material witness or a material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. The maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has not received general acceptance nor has this maxim come to occupy the status of rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule of evidence”. (See Nisar Ali v.State of U.P., AIR 1957 SC 366 ). 26. The doctrine is a dangerous on especially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because the witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the court considers the same to be insufficient for placing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be sifted with care. The evidence has to be sifted with care. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate an exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment. (See Sohrab v. State of M.P. (1972)3 SCC 751 and Ugar Ahir v. State of Bihar AIR 1965 SC 277 .) An attempt has to be made to, as noted above, in terms of felicitous metaphor, separate the grain from the chaff, truth from falsehood. Where it is not feasible to separate the truth from falsehood, because grain and chaff are inextricably mixed up, and in the process of separation an absolutely new case has to be reconstructed by divorcing essential details presented by the prosecution completely from the context and the background against which they are made, the only available course to be made is to discard the evidence in toto. (See Zwinglee Ariel v. State of M.P. AIR 1954 SC 15 and Balaka Singh v.State of Punjab (1975)4 SCC 511 .) As observed by this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki, (1981)2 SCC 752 normal discrepancies in the evidence are those which are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence and those are always there, however, honest and truthful a witness may be . Material discrepancies are those which are not normal, and not expected of a normal person. Courts have to label the category to which a discrepancy may be categorized. While normal discrepancies do not corrode the credibility of a party’s case, material discrepancies do so. These aspects were highlighted recently in Krishna Mochi v.State of Bihar (2002)6 SCC 81 , Gangadhar Behera v.State of Orissa (2002)8 SCC 381 and Rizan vs.State of Chhatisgarh (2003)2 SCC 661 .” (pp.764-765) 15. Earlier the Supreme Court had in Sayed Akbar vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 stated:- “12. As a legal proposition, it is now settled by the decisions of this Court, that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected wholesale, merely on the ground that the prosecution had dubbed him 'hostile' and had cross- examined him. Earlier the Supreme Court had in Sayed Akbar vs. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 stated:- “12. As a legal proposition, it is now settled by the decisions of this Court, that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected wholesale, merely on the ground that the prosecution had dubbed him 'hostile' and had cross- examined him. We need say no more than reiterate what this Court said on this point in Sat Paul v. Delhi Administration (1976) 2 SCR 11 : AIR 1976 SC 294 : "Even in a criminal prosecution when a witness is cross-examined and contradicted with the leave of the Court, by the party calling him, his evidence cannot, as a matter of law, be treated as washed off the record altogether. It is for the Judge of fact to consider in each case whether as a result of such cross-examination and contradiction, the witness stands thoroughly discredited or can still be believed in regard to a part of his testimony. If the Judge finds that in the process, the credit of the witness has not been completely shaken, he may, after reading and considering the evidence of the witness, as a whole, with due caution and care, accept, in the light of the other evidence on the record, that part of his testimony which he finds to be credit-worthy and act upon it. If in a given case, the whole of the testimony of the witness is impugned, and in the process, the witness stands squarely and totally discredited, the Judge should, as a matter of prudence, discard his evidence in toto." 13. The instant case is not one where the whole of the testimony of these witnesses was impugned in cross- examination by the prosecution. Their credit, on material points, was hardly shaken. The courts below, therefore, were not justified in brushing aside their testimony.“ (p.1851) 16. This principles has been further reiterated in Balu Sonba Shinde vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002)7 SCC 543 . I cannot but quote from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Radha Mohan Singh vs. State of U.P. 2006 Cri.L.J., 1121 holding:- “7 … … … … … … … it is well settled that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. I cannot but quote from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Radha Mohan Singh vs. State of U.P. 2006 Cri.L.J., 1121 holding:- “7 … … … … … … … it is well settled that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witness cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent his version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. (See Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana, AIR 1976 SC 202 ; Rabinder Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, AIR 1977 SC 170 , Syed Akbar v. State of Karanataka AIR 1979 SC 1848 and Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh 1991 AIR SCW 2038, AIR 1991 SC 1853 ) … … … … … …” (pp 1124 & 1125) (Emphasis supplied) 17. The Supreme Court aptly sums up the entire law in Vikramjit Singh alias Vicky vs. State of Punjab 2007 Cri.L.J. 1000 holding:- “21. Furthermore, as noticed hereinbefore, the prosecution witnesses have turned hostile. It may be an act of dishonesty on their part as contended by Mrs. Kochar but by reason thereof only we cannot hold the appellant guilty of commission of a heinous offence. In view of their statements in the cross- examination giving a complete go bye to what had been stated in the examination-in-chief, it is not possible to rely even upon a part of their statement.” (p.1006) 18. In the present case, the cross-examination as noticed by me, does not exonerate the accused rather, the major part of two prosecution witnesses stands corroborated. In these circumstances, the statement of the hostile witness, having corroborated the prosecution in all material particulars, cannot be rejected solely on the ground that he has been declared hostile. 19. On the question of contradictions, I note that the evidence of the injured cannot be lightly brushed aside as held by the Supreme Court in Appabhai and another vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1988 SC 696 and in State of U.P. vs. Brahma Das, AIR 1986 SC 1769 . In Malkhan Singh and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 12 , the Supreme Court holds that it would not be appropriate to disbelieve an injured person. In Malkhan Singh and another vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 12 , the Supreme Court holds that it would not be appropriate to disbelieve an injured person. To similar effect is the law laid down in Surendra Singh Rautela @ Surendra Singh Bengali vs. State of Bihar (Now State of Jharkhand), AIR 2002 SC 260 . 20. I also find that the law for assessing the evidence has been settled by the Supreme Court in more than one case. In C.Magesh and others vs. State of Karnataka, (2010)5 SCC 645 , the Supreme Court holds that in criminal trial evidence has to be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the narration of the entire facts being consistent with the account of other witnesses etc. This was based on the law laid down by Supreme Court in Suraj Singh vs. State of U.P.(2008)16 SCC 686. The Court holds that in a criminal trial careful assessment of the evidence is required on the principle that no man is guilty until it is so proved. 21. In Pamma vs. State of Uttarakhand, (2010)10 SCC 439 , in standard of proof, the Supreme Court has laid down exhaustive guidelines holding that a criminal trial is not a fairy tale wherein one is free to give flight to one’s imagination and fantasy. The trial in real life would require a final analysis of the facts before the Court. To similar effect is the law laid down in Sanjiv Kumar vs. State of Punjab, (2009)16 SCC 487 . I need not reiterate further principles of assessment of the evidence which have been considered in detail in Aher Raja Khima vs. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1956 SC 217 . In passing I may refer only two more judgments i.e. Vadivelu Thevar vs. The State of Madras, AIR 1957 SC 614 laying down the principle that evidence has to be considered on the touchstone of (a) wholly reliable, (b) wholly unreliable (c) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. On the first two categories, the Court rules that there is no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion. It is in the third category of cases in which the Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration on material particulars by reference to reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. On the first two categories, the Court rules that there is no difficulty in arriving at a conclusion. It is in the third category of cases in which the Court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration on material particulars by reference to reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial. Lastly, in R.V.E. Venkatachala Gounder vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and another, (2003)8 SCC 752 , the Court analyzes the principle applicable for assessment of evidence under Section 3 of the Indian Evidence Act. Precedent need not be multiplied any further. 22. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that since the witnesses have been contradicted on major points and there is no corroboration of the witnesses on these facts, there can only be one result which is acquittal. 23. Adverting to the evidence on record what I find is that there is no difficulty in holding that so far as the first part of the incident is concerned which is the accused Sanjay Kumar entering the room, obstructing the complainant from performing his duties, engaging in a scuffle with him and abusing him, there is no difficulty as the complainant is corroborated on particular material facts including the fact that both he and Dinesh Kumar PW-2 were threatened with dire consequence. Adverting to the incident on the other assault which took place at `Kainchi Mour’, it is established that both the complainant and the accused were travelling by the same bus and so far PW-4 Dina .Nath, who was travelling with the complainant, is concerned, there is also no contradiction of the fact that when the complainant PW-4 Dina Nath and the accused alighted from the bus, the accused also alighted from that very bus and assaulted the complainant which according to him (PW-4) was carried out with fist and kicks blows. He only tried to fudge the incident by introducing some other unknown persons who arrived there when called by some unknown person when according to this witness 7/8 people rushed and assaulted the complainant. 24. All that I can say about the last bit is that PW-4 himself is supposed to be a lecturer in Hindi and should have displayed an exemplary respect for the law when he was travelling, surely he could identify both the accused. I need not say anything further. 24. All that I can say about the last bit is that PW-4 himself is supposed to be a lecturer in Hindi and should have displayed an exemplary respect for the law when he was travelling, surely he could identify both the accused. I need not say anything further. In any event, even if the last portion of the statement is discarded, the assault on the complainant stands established. In these circumstances, adverting to Vadivelu Thevar’s case (supra), the statements of the witnesses, the quality of the evidence can be considered as a `wholly reliable’ till the time when the complainant was assaulted at `Kainchi Mour’. 25. Submissions made on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellant that the medical evidence does not corroborate the evidence of the complainant or support the case of the prosecution cannot be accepted and is rejected. 26. The learned Sessions Judge acquits the second accused. The second accused Mehar Chand as well as PW12 Ashwani Kumar, who totally resiled from his statement and stated that he was not present at the place of the incident. He is a plain and simple liar who has resiled from his statement for some motivated reasons that he was a student in the school. On this aspect, all that I need say is that even presence of this accused was established on the spot by PW-4 Duni Chand though he may have been declared hostile. In these circumstances, I find no merit in this appeal which is accordingly dismissed. 27. On the question of sentencing, it would be in the fitness of things that the report of the Probation Officer, Sarkaghat is called for before proceeding with the case further.