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2012 DIGILAW 503 (PAT)

Daroga Gope v. Sheodhari Mahto

2012-03-23

MUNGESHWAR SAHOO

body2012
MUNGESHWAR SAHOO, J.:–This First Appeal has been filed by the defendants 1st Set against the Judgment and Decree dated 28th February, 1977 passed by Sri Achyutanand Sahay 2nd Addl. Subordinate Judge, Barh in title suit No.15 of 1973/8 of 1977 decreeing the plaintiff-respondent’s suit. 2. It appears that the High Court file was lost and, thereafter with the consent of the parties, the records have been reconstructed and the appeal is being heard. 3. The plaintiff-respondents filed the suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession with respect to 56 decimals of the suit property. The plaintiffs also claimed a sum of Rs.725/- deposited in the criminal Court in 145 Cr.P.C. proceeding and also prayed for mesne profit during the pendency of the suit. The amount of Rs.725/- has been withdrawn by the defendants. 4. The plaintiff-respondent claimed the aforesaid relief alleging that the plaintiffs are the karta of their respective families. A genealogical table has been mentioned giving the details of the family of the plaintiffs. There is no dispute about this genealogy. According to the plaintiffs, the disputed property was recorded in the name of B.B. Kolsum in the finally published record of rights in the year 1910. The same was within the Jamindari of ex-landlord Sheikh Gulam Kutubuddin Ahmad and Ors. In the remark column, it was shown as Bakabze Bhattu Gope since 8 years. Bhattu Gope remained in possession being temporary lessee till 1910 and, thereafter, he gave up his possession. The ex-landlord filed rent suit No.172 of 1915 for realization of arrears of rent against B.B. Kolsum in the Court of Munsif, Barh and obtained a decree. Then he filed execution case No.231 of 1916 in which the entire land including the suit land was auctioned sold. The decree holder purchased the suit property on 16.04.1917. After obtaining delivery of possession, the ex-landlord Sheikh Gulam Kutubuddin Ahmad permanently settled the suit land on 20.10.1924 along with other lands with one Mostt. Rasulan wife of Warsalli Miya of village Salimpur under a registered sale deed for agricultural purpose and put them in possession. She used to pay rent to the ex-landlord and was obtaining rent receipt. She executed registered mortgage deed on 12.04.1944 and then subsequently she redeemed it. She died in 1957 and her husband Warsali Miya inherited the property. He was mutated in the ex-landlord Sirista. She used to pay rent to the ex-landlord and was obtaining rent receipt. She executed registered mortgage deed on 12.04.1944 and then subsequently she redeemed it. She died in 1957 and her husband Warsali Miya inherited the property. He was mutated in the ex-landlord Sirista. For one year, he had given thika to Bado Ram. Warsali Miya died in1948 and, thereafter, his pre-deceased daughters son Wali Mohammed inherited the suit property and came in possession. The heirs of Warsali Miya mortgaged the suit land in favour of plaintiff No.1 through registered mortgage deed dated 04.09.1961 for Rs.1,000/- and subsequently they sold the property by registered sale deed dated 10.08.1962 and since then the plaintiffs are continuing in joint possession of the suit property as owner thereof. 5. According to the plaintiff’s, the Sikmi interest of Bhattu Gope extinguished long ago. Bhattu Gope died in 1923 and his Sikmi interest automatically came to an end. Thus, the defendants had no interest or concerned with the suit property. For the first time, after enactment of Bataidari Act, they without any right title and interest started creating trouble in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff and in 1965 they got a proceeding started claiming falsely that suit property has been partitioned between the 3 sons of Bhattu Gope and the suit land has been allotted in the share of Baiju Gope, the father of defendant No.1. In the said proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. wrongly and illegally possession of the defendant 1st party was declared on 25.09.1965 and the revision against said order filed by the plaintiff was dismissed on 30.08.1967. On the basis of aforesaid Judgment and Orders, the defendant 1st party dispossessed the plaintiff from the suit land on 01.09.1967 and, therefore, the suit was filed. 6. The defendant No.1 to 3 filed contesting written statement. Besides taking various legal please, mainly it was contended that the recorded tenant Bibi Kolsum had permanently settled the suit land orally 8 years prior to the survey with their ancestor Bhattu Gope. Bhattu Gope was paying rent and he continuously remained in khas possession over the suit land as Sikmidar till his death in 1934. At that time he had already acquired occupancy right in respect of the suit land and after his death his sons and grand sons remained in actual cultivating possession over the same. 7. Bhattu Gope was paying rent and he continuously remained in khas possession over the suit land as Sikmidar till his death in 1934. At that time he had already acquired occupancy right in respect of the suit land and after his death his sons and grand sons remained in actual cultivating possession over the same. 7. The further case of the defendant is that the rent suit No.172 of 1915 is illegal and execution case No.831 of 1916 is also bad and are only paper transaction. Sheikh Kutubuddin had only a fractional share in tauzi No.8283 and, therefore, he had no right to institute the rent suit on behalf of all the co-sharer landlord. The suit was not framed in accordance with Section 148 A of the Bihar Tenancy Act. Consequently, it was not a rent decree but only a money decree. In the said execution case, the provisions of Section 158 A of the B.T. Act. were not complied with. No steps were taken for obtaining delivery of possession over the suit land from the Court and in fact, it was a collusive suit. The processes were not served at the spot and the alleged shall merely remained as paper transaction. The purchaser never came in possession and the Sikmi right of Bhattu Gope was never affected. Bibi Kolsum never came in possession over the suit land by virtue of the sale in her favour. The rent receipts and the mortgage bonds filed by the plaintiffs are fraudulent and collusive. The alleged Thika by Warsali Miya to a Bando Ram is false. Bibi Rasulan was not the married wife of Warsali Miya as she was a Hindu women. She was of immoral character. She had no issue and the daughters and sons of Warsali Miya had no connection with Bibi Rasulan, therefore, they did not inherit any property or the suit land. The mortgage deed dated 04.09.1961 and the sale deed dated 10.07.1963 in favour of the plaintiff are sham, inoperative, without considering and void. The defendants have dug a well after partition amongst them. The defendants are appropriating the usufruct of the palm trees, barhar trees, bamboo and are exercising different types of possession over the same with the knowledge of all concerned and, therefore, they have also perfected their right over the suit land by adverse possession. 8. The defendants have dug a well after partition amongst them. The defendants are appropriating the usufruct of the palm trees, barhar trees, bamboo and are exercising different types of possession over the same with the knowledge of all concerned and, therefore, they have also perfected their right over the suit land by adverse possession. 8. On the basis of the aforesaid pleadings, the following issues were framed :– (i) Is the suit as framed maintainable? (ii) Have the plaintiffs got any cause of action for the suit? (iii) Is the suit under valued and the court fee paid insufficient? (iv) Is the suit barred by limitation? (v) Is the suit bad for misjoinder of parties and causes of action? (vi) Have the plaintiffs got right title and interest to the suit land? Were they in possession over it, on the date of institution of the proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. Were they dispossessed from the suit land on 01.09.67? (vii) Was Bhattu Gope the permanent settlee over the suit land. Have defendants first party been continuously in possession over it since the date of settlement in favour of Bhattu Gope Are the defendants first party acquired title to it by adverse possession? (viii) Are the Rehan deed dated 04.09.61 and the sale deed dated 10.07.62 sham, collusive and without consideration? (ix) Are the plaintiffs entitled to a decree if so to what extent? (x) To what other relief or reliefs if any, are the plaintiffs entitled? 9. After trial, the learned Court below came to the conclusion that there is no material available on record to rely the defendant’s contention that Bhattu Gope died in the year 1934 and even if it is relied upon then also the sons will not inherit the property as the amendment act came in 1938. The learned trial Court also found that the plaintiffs have got right title and interest to the suit land and that they were in possession over it till the date of their dispossession. The mortgage bond and the three sale deeds in their favour were actually acted upon and are genuine, valid and for consideration. Bhattu Gope was not the permanent settle over the suit land and that the defendants 1st party have not been continuously in possession over the suit land since the date of settlement and the defendants did not acquire any title by adverse possession. Bhattu Gope was not the permanent settle over the suit land and that the defendants 1st party have not been continuously in possession over the suit land since the date of settlement and the defendants did not acquire any title by adverse possession. On the basis of all these findings, the learned Court below decreed the plaintiff suit. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Sikmi right is heritable but the learned Court below failed to consider this fact and gave a wrong finding that it is not heritable. According to the learned counsel there are overwhelmingly evidence adduced on behalf of the appellant to prove their possession over the suit land but the learned Court below has not properly considered the evidences. The plaintiffs could not prove the manner of their dispossession. In fact the defendants are continuously in possession of the suit property. The learned Court below also found that there is no paper regarding delivery of possession but then only on presumption recorded a finding that the delivery of possession was affected in execution case. According to the learned counsel, the suit and the execution case of the year 1915 and 1916 are collusive and the appellants have no knowledge about the said suit. In spite of the said suit, the defendants-appellants continued in possession of the suit property and the plaintiffs have failed to prove obtaining of delivery of possession in the execution case. The documents filed by the plaintiffs are all forged document and did not affect the right title and possession of the defendants. After the death of Bhattu Gope, the defendants continued in possession without any interruption to the knowledge of all concerned and, therefore, they have also acquired title by adverse possession. The plaintiff’s suit is barred by law of limitation. The learned counsel further submitted that even the defendants have partitioned the suit property between themselves and the learned executive Magistrate in 145 Cr.P.C. proceeding, considering all these aspects of the matter has categorically declared the possession of the defendants and, therefore, the trial Court has wrongly decreed the plaintiff’s suit without considering the order passed in 145 Cr.P.C. proceeding. On these grounds, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned Judgment and Decree are liable to be set aside. 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel, Mr. On these grounds, the learned counsel submitted that the impugned Judgment and Decree are liable to be set aside. 11. On the other hand, the learned counsel, Mr. Trivedi appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent submitted that the plaintiffs have produced the documents showing the institution of the suit in the year 1915 and also the execution case in the year 1916 and have also produced registered mortgage deeds and sale deeds. There is presumption of correctness attached to the Court proceeding as well as the registered documents and the affect of the Court proceeding and the registered deeds will not go away only on saying of the defendant that they continued in possession of the suit land. They did not institute any suit or proceeding for declaration that the proceeding of rent suit is illegal or it is void and it is nullity and, therefore, now in the present suit as defence cannot raise the same as it is well settled principle of law that in co-lateral proceeding, the Judgment or decree or any document cannot be held to be void and illegal. Here, in the present case after such a long period, for the first time, in the written statement they are challenging the legality or otherwise of the Court proceeding and the sale deeds. No documentary evidences even the rent receipts have been filed on behalf of the defendants to show that any rent was ever paid by either Bhattu Gope or his descendant to the ex-landlord or even after vesting they ever paid rent to the State of Bihar. Considering all these aspects of the matter, the learned Court below has decreed the plaintiff’s suit. In view of the above facts when the defendants failed to prove their possession continuously since after execution case, there is no question of presumption of title by adverse possession arises. On these grounds, the learned counsel submitted that the First Appeal is liable to be dismissed with cost as the defendants dragged the plaintiffs-respondents by taking false and frivolous defence and have been able to deprive the plaintiffs from the possession of their property. 12. In view of the above rival contentions of the parties, the points arises for consideration in this Appeal are as follows :– (i) Whether the plaintiffs have been able to prove their right title and interest and possession over the suit property? 12. In view of the above rival contentions of the parties, the points arises for consideration in this Appeal are as follows :– (i) Whether the plaintiffs have been able to prove their right title and interest and possession over the suit property? (ii) Whether the defendants-appellants were in continuous possession of the property as claimed by them on the ground that Bhattu Gope was permanent settlee and was in continuous possession and whether the defendants-appellants have been able to prove title by adverse possession? 13. Point No.(i) :- According to the plaintiffs Bhattu Gope was Sikmidar since 8 years which has been recorded in the record of right in the year 1910. Thereafter, he gave up the possession. The ex-landlord filed rent suit in the year 1915 and to execute the decree filed execution case in the year 1916 wherein the entire suit land was auction sold. The decree holder purchased the same on 16.04.1917 and after obtaining delivery of possession, the ex-landlord permanently settled the suit land on 20.10.1924 to Mostt. Rasulan. She was paying rent to the ex-landlord and then she mortgaged the property in 1944. Her husband Warsali Miya was mutated and then he gave in thika to Bado Ram. The heir of Warsali Miyan mortgaged the property in favour of plaintiff No.1 through registered mortgage deed dated 04.09.1961 and then sold the property by registered sale deed dated 10.08.1962. On the contrary, according to the defendant’s case Bhattu Gope was permanent settlee and never gave up possession rather he continued in possession. He died in 1934 and his heir came in possession of the property and continued in possession thereof. They have also acquired title by adverse possession. 14. In support of their respective cases, the parties have adduced respective evidences. The witnesses of the plaintiffs P.W.10 who is plaintiff No.1 P.W.2 P.W.4 P.W.5 P.W.6 P.W.7 and P.W.11 have supported the case of the plaintiff as made out in the plaint. Ext.D/1 is sikmi Khatian filed by the defendants which shows that Bhattu Gope was the sikmidar since 8 years prior to the final publication in the year 1910. In view of Section 85 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, the lease granted by the tenant without the permission of the landlord will not be for more than 9 years. Although the defendants have stated that Bhattu Gope was permanent raiyat, no paper have been produced. In view of Section 85 of the Bihar Tenancy Act, the lease granted by the tenant without the permission of the landlord will not be for more than 9 years. Although the defendants have stated that Bhattu Gope was permanent raiyat, no paper have been produced. Only oral evidences have been adduced by the defendant. The plaintiffs have produced ext.’6’, the original certificate of sale of land dated 19.06.1917. It shows that the ex-landlord filed rent suit land 1702 of 1915 and obtained the decree against Bibi Kolsum, the tenant. To execute the said decree, they filed execution case No.831 of 1916 and the suit property was auctioned sold. The decree holder purchased the property, i.e., entire holding of Khata No.106 by sale deed on 19.05.1917. According to the plaintiff’s case after obtaining the sale deed, the decree holder-purchaser came in actual possession of the suit property. 15. On the contrary, the defendant’s case is that the defendant’s ancestor Bhattu Gope continued in possession. It may be mentioned here that except this statement there is nothing on record to prove this fact. Ext.1(d) is a registered settlement executed by the ex.landlord in favour of Bibi Rasulan dated 20.10.1924. On the basis of this deed Bibi Rasulan came in possession and her name was mutated. The plaintiffs have produced ext.3 to 3/d which are rent receipts granted by the ex.landlrod in the name of Bibi Rasulan. The plaintiffs have also produced ext.2/A, i.e., mortgage bond dated 13.01.1944 which shows that she executed a mortgage bond in favour of Deo Nandan Sah and it is the case of the plaintiff that subsequently she redeemed it. The plaintiff have examined P.W.7, the brother of Deo Nandan Sah who has fully supported this fact and stated that Bibi Rasulan had redeemed the mortgage. After death of Bibi Rasulan in the year 1947, her husband Warsali Miya inherited and came in possession of the property. The plaintiffs have produced ext.4 series which are municipal receipts granted by Barh Municipality in the name of Warsali Miya since 1955-56. The entire assessment register of the Municipality for the year 1944 has been produced by the plaintiffs which has been marked as ext.’5’ and for the year 1960 which has been marked as ext.5/A. The plaintiffs have further produced ext.8 which is unregistered kabuliat through which he had given thika for one year to Bado Ram. The entire assessment register of the Municipality for the year 1944 has been produced by the plaintiffs which has been marked as ext.’5’ and for the year 1960 which has been marked as ext.5/A. The plaintiffs have further produced ext.8 which is unregistered kabuliat through which he had given thika for one year to Bado Ram. After death of Warsali Miya, his heir came in possession and they got their name mutated in the office of Shresta of State of Bihar. To prove this mutation, the plaintiffs have produced the rent receipts granted by the State of Bihar dated 31.03.1961 and 2nd January, 1959 which have been marked as ext.3/D and 3/F. 16. It appears that the plaintiffs have also produced ext.2 which is registered mortgage deed dated 04.09.1961 by which the heirs of Warsali Miya mortgaged the property in favour of plaintiff No.1 and possession was delivered. Ext.1, ext.1/A and 1/B are the registered sale deeds by which the said heirs of Warsali Miya sold the suit property to the plaintiffs on 10.08.1962. The defendants have filed ext. ‘C’ which is khewat which shows that Sheikh Gulam Kutubuddin was a co-sharer along with his brothers with other co-sharers regarding Tauji No.8283. These are the documentary evidences produced on behalf of the plaintiffs since the year 1915 till the registered sale deed of the year 1962 in favour of plaintiffs. On the contrary, the D.W.23 who is one of the defendant has stated that the decree in rent suit No.1702 of 1915 and the sale held in execution case No.831 of 1916 were fraudulent and collusive because all the co-sharers-landlords were not made parties. It appears that in support of this fact there were other co-shares the defendants have produced ext. ‘C’, kewat. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Bhattu Gope died in the year 1934 and he was in possession of the suit property till his death. So far this submission is concerned, I find no reliable evidence adduced by the parties. ‘C’, kewat. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Bhattu Gope died in the year 1934 and he was in possession of the suit property till his death. So far this submission is concerned, I find no reliable evidence adduced by the parties. Even if it is held that Bhattu Gope died in 1934 then also there is no evidence to show that Bhattu Gope continued in possession of the suit property even after auction sale in the execution case except the statement of D.W.23 or the other witnesses that the defendants are continuing in possession not a single chit of paper has been produced on behalf of the appellant to prove their possession. D.W.23 although stated that rent was being paid to the landlord but no rent receipts had been produced. Likewise there is no paper showing mutation either in the shresta of the State of Bihar or in the Municipality after vesting. No rent receipt granted by the State of Bihar has been produced. Therefore, only because Bhattu Gope died in 1934, the heir will not be given benefit of the amendment in the Bihar Tenancy Act in 1938 by which it was provided that the under raiyat who were in the occupation of the property for more than 12 years will acquire occupancy right. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it was the burden of the plaintiff to prove that in fact delivery of possession was given after auction sale in the year 1917. According to the learned counsel, the plaintiff did not file any chit of paper showing delivery of possession but the learned Court below wrongly presumed that the decree holder came in possession. So far this submission is concerned, it may be mentioned here that the plaintiff have produced the ext.6 which is sale certificate and it is act of Court, i.e., judicial record and there is presumption of correctness of the fact stated in it. We have discussed the various documentary evidences produced by the plaintiffs in support of the possession. On the contrary, there is no documentary evidences even rent receipts in the name of the defendants. Therefore, only mere saying that the documents are collusive, no reliance can be placed on the submission. 18. The learned counsel next submitted that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the manner of dispossession. On the contrary, there is no documentary evidences even rent receipts in the name of the defendants. Therefore, only mere saying that the documents are collusive, no reliance can be placed on the submission. 18. The learned counsel next submitted that the plaintiffs have failed to prove the manner of dispossession. According to the learned counsel in the 145 Cr.P.C. proceeding, after considering the evidences, the Magistrate record a finding of possession in favour of the appellant. Therefore, the plaintiffs were required to prove the manner of their dispossession alleged by them. In my opinion, this submission has got no force. It may be mentioned here that in civil cases pre-ponderance of probabilities is to be seen. So far declaration of possession in 145 Cr.P.C. is concerned, the possession is declared with respect to 2 months prior to initiation of proceeding and not prior to that. The plaintiffs have categorically stated that being embolden with the decision in 145 Cr.P.C. proceeding, they dispossessed the plaintiffs which gave the cause of action to the plaintiff so the suit was filed. 19. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the rent suit or the execution case or the sale certificate all are collusive and sham transaction. So far this submission is concerned also, I find no force because the suit was filed in the year 1973 wherein the plaintiff clearly stated about the decree and execution case of the year 1915-16. Even prior to institution of the suit in the 145 Cr.P.C. proceeding also, this case was pleaded by the plaintiff but the appellant did not take any step to set aside or pray for declaration as such with regard to the aforesaid suit decree and execution case. 20. In the case of Inderjit Singh Grewal Vs. State of Punjab and Anr. 2012 (1) BLJ, S.C.42, the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraph 12, 13 and 14 has held as follows :– “12. However, the question does not arise as to whether it is permissible for a party to treat the judgment and order as mull and void without getting it set aside from the competent court. The issue is no more res integra and stands settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. For setting aside such an order, even if void, the party has to approach the appropriate forum. (Vide : State of Kerala Vs. The issue is no more res integra and stands settled by a catena of decisions of this Court. For setting aside such an order, even if void, the party has to approach the appropriate forum. (Vide : State of Kerala Vs. M.K. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth, Naduvil (dead) & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 906 ; and Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla & Anr. Vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd., AIR 1997 SC 1240 ). 13. In Sultan Sadik Vs. Sanjay Raj Subba & Ors., AIR 2004 SC 1377 , this Court held that there cannot be any doubt that even if an order is void or voidable, the same requires to be set aside by the competent court. 14. In Meenakshi & Ors. Vs. Metadin Agarwal (dead) by Lrs. & Ors., (2006) 7 SCC 470 , this Court considered the issue at length and observed that if the party feels that the order passed by the Court or a statutory authority is non-est/ void, he should question the validity of the said order before the appropriate forum resorting to the appropriate proceedings. The Court observed as under :– It is well settled principle of law that even a void order is required to be set aside by a competent Court of law, inasmuch as an order may be void in respect of one person but may be valid in respect of another. A void order is necessarily not non-est. An order cannot be declared to be void in collateral proceedings and that too in the absence of the authorities who were the authors thereof.” Similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Sneh Gupta Vs. Devi Sarup & Ors., (2009)6 SCC 194 . From the above, it is evident that even if a decree is void ab initio, declaration to that effect has to be obtained by the person aggrieved from the competent court. More so, such a declaration cannot be obtained in collateral proceedings.” 21. In view of the above settled proposition of law held by the Apex Court, the appellant cannot be allowed to say that the decree passed by the Court in rent suit in the year 1915 or 1916 or the sale certificate issued in the year 1917 are collusive or void documents, particularly when no steps were taken by the appellants. No such declaration can be given at this stage in the present proceeding. 22. No such declaration can be given at this stage in the present proceeding. 22. The learned counsel next submitted that the sale deed are sham transaction and without consideration and no possession was delivered. In fact the appellants continued in possession. So far this submission is concerned also I find no force. 23. In the case of Vimal Chand Gewarchand Jain Vs. Ramakant Eknath Jadu, 2009 (5) SCC 713 , the Apex Court has held that a registered deed of sale carries presumption that the transaction was a genuine one. If execution of sale deed is prove, onus is on defendant to prove that the deed was not executed and it was sham transaction. In the present case not only the registered sale deed but also the registered mortgage deeds have been produced by the plaintiffs. The correctness thereof is presumed in view of the Apex Court decision. Therefore, it is for the defendant-appellant to prove that it was not executed or that it is sham transaction. It may be mentioned here that except the bald statement of the defendant and the submission of the learned counsel, there is nothing on record in support of this Fact. Merely saying that the documents are sham, the presumption of correctness cannot be rebutted. 24. The learned counsel for the respondent next submitted that the Sikmi right is heritable, therefore, the defendants-appellant inherited that right after the death of Bhattu Gope. So far this question is concerned, there is no dispute about this fact that sikmi right is heritable. However, merely on the ground that sikmi right is heritable, it cannot be said that the defendants inherited the said right from Bhattu Gope because there is no evidence to prove that the sikmi right of Bhattu Gope continued even after expiry of 9 years, i.e., after 1911. When he was not in possession after the year 1911, in other words, he seized to be a sikmi raiyat how the heir of Bhattu Gope will inherit the said right, which had already been seized to exist. 25. In view of my above discussion, I find that the plaintiffs-respondents have been able to prove their right title, interest and possession over the suit property till they were dispossessed. The finding of the lower Court record on this point is, therefore, confirmed. 26. 25. In view of my above discussion, I find that the plaintiffs-respondents have been able to prove their right title, interest and possession over the suit property till they were dispossessed. The finding of the lower Court record on this point is, therefore, confirmed. 26. Point No.(ii) :–The learned counsel for the defendant-appellant submitted that the suit is barred by law of limitation because the defendants are continuously in possession and they acquired title by adverse possession. So far this submission is concerned, in my opinion, it is not acceptable at all. 27. In the case of P.T. Munichi Kkanna Reddy & Ors. Vs. Revamma & Ors., 2007 (6) SCC 59 , the Apex Court has held that the possession must be open continuous and hostile to constitute adverse possession. There must be positive intention to dispossess the owner distinguishing from intention to possess the property. Therefore, there must not only be carpous possidendi but must also be animus possidendi. In the present case, the case of the plaintiff is that on the basis of decision in 145 Cr.P.C. proceeding is the cause of action for the suit. In such circumstances during the pendency of the suit, the defendant will never prescribe title. So far prior possession, i.e., possession of Bhattu Gope and after his death, the possession of his heirs are concerned, as discussed above, there is nothing on record to show that Bhattu Gope continued even after the auction sale in the year 1917. In other words, the defendants have failed even to prove their possession. The defendants failed to prove that Bhattu Gope continued in possession even after the auction sale. When the defendants failed to prove the possession of Bhattu Gope and their possession after death of Bhattu Gope, no question of adverse possession arises. In other words, here both the ingredients corpus possidendi and animus possidendi are absent. I, therefore, find that the defendants have failed to prove acquisition of title by adverse possession. This point is answered in favour of the plaintiff-respondents and against the defendant-appellant. 28. From the above facts and circumstances of the case discussed above, it appears that except the statement in the written statement and the deposition of the witnesses, there is nothing on record to show any semblance of title or possession of the defendants. This point is answered in favour of the plaintiff-respondents and against the defendant-appellant. 28. From the above facts and circumstances of the case discussed above, it appears that except the statement in the written statement and the deposition of the witnesses, there is nothing on record to show any semblance of title or possession of the defendants. It appears that by mere show of force, they forcibly dispossessed the plaintiffs on the basis of 145 Cr.P.C. proceeding and the defendants-appellants managed to deprive the plaintiff’s from the suit property for such a long period on the basis of the aforesaid frivolous defence. It appears that the learned Court below has observed that the defendants are trying to take advantage of the amendment in Batiadari Act. In my opinion also, it appears that the defendants have taken a frivolous defence for the sake of defence only in face of the overwhelming documentary evidences produced by the plaintiff. 29. In the case of Salem Advocate Bar Association Vs. Union of India, 2005 (6) SCC 344 , the Apex Court has held that Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that many unscrupulous parties take advantage of the fact that either the costs are not awarded or nominal costs are awarded against the unsuccessful party. Unfortunately, it has become a practice to direct parties to bear their own costs. In a large number of cases, such an order is passed despite Section 35(2) CPC. Such a practice also encourages the filing of frivolous suits. It also leads to the taking up of frivolous defences. Further, wherever costs are awarded, ordinarily the same are not realistic and are nominal. When Section 35 (2) provides for costs to follow the event, it is implicit that the costs have to be those which are reasonably incurred by a successful party except in those cases where the court in its discretion may direct otherwise by recording reasons therefore. The costs have tobe actual reasonable costs including the cost of the time spent by the successful party, the transportation and lodging, if any, or any other incidental costs besides the payment of the Court fee, lawyer’s fee, typing and other costs in relation to the litigation.” 30. The costs have tobe actual reasonable costs including the cost of the time spent by the successful party, the transportation and lodging, if any, or any other incidental costs besides the payment of the Court fee, lawyer’s fee, typing and other costs in relation to the litigation.” 30. In view of the above settled proposition of law held by the Apex Court, in the facts and circumstances of the case, in my opinion, this is a fit case whether the appellant is liable to pay cost to the plaintiff-respondent. 31. In the result, this First Appeal is dismissed with cost of Rs.25,000/- to be paid by the defendant-appellant to the plaintiff-respondents in the Court below within one month failing which the plaintiff-respondents shall be at liberty to realise the cost through the process of the Court.