Hon'ble S.S. Chauhan, J. This second appeal has been filed challenging the judgment dated 22.8.1988 and decree dated 6.9.1988 passed by the lower appellate court allowing the appeal with cost throughout arising out of the judgment and decree dated 4.5.1987 passed by the IVth Additional Munsif, Hardoi dismissing the Regular Suit No.106 of 84. 1. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are that a suit for permanent injunction along with mandatory injunction was filed by the plaintiff alleging therein that the plaintiff was the owner of property shown in the site map by letters 'A, B, C, C1, D and D1'. The plaintiff has purchased the disputed property by a registered sale deed dated 7.3.1983 from Fakire S/o Vijayee. The defendants were not having any right in respect of the land shown by letters "K, F, G and J" and the defendants no.3 to 6 were residents of Shahjahanpur and they were not having any right to sell the land in dispute. Fakire has given the land shown by letters "E, I, G and F" to defendants no.3 to 6 for residing therein. The sale deed dated 8.7.1980 executed in favour of the defendants no.1 and 2 by defendants no.3 to 6 was illegal and without authority of law and was void. The plaintiff belongs to the family of Fakire and the defendants no.1 and 2 with bad intention were trying to take possession of the disputed land shown by letters "K, A, B, C, C1, D and D1" and they have opened a door shown by letters "M, N. O and P" from one kothari and have also started making construction of a wall on north-south side. During the pendency of the suit, the defendants have demolished the old kothari shown by letters "M, N, O and P" and have raised a new kothari. The plaintiff claimed relief that the defendants may be restrained from interfering in the disputed land and a decree of mandatory injunction be issued against them, so that they may vacate the disputed land. 2. The plaintiff claimed relief that the defendants may be restrained from interfering in the disputed land and a decree of mandatory injunction be issued against them, so that they may vacate the disputed land. 2. Written statement was filed by the defendants no.1 and 2 denying the assertions made in the plaint and in the additional pleas and it was stated that Fakire was not the owner of the entire land shown by letters "K, F, G and J" and in fact Fakire was the owner of house situated on the northern side of land shown by letters "E, D1 and D" and to the western side of the land shown by letters "A, N, M and D" and he was residing in the said house and in respect of the rest of the land, house of the defendants no.3 to 6 was existing along with sahan and they were in possession over the said land. Since before the date of abolition of zamindari Khayali, father of the defendants no.3 to 6 was the owner of the house and the land along with sahan vested in the defendants under Section 9 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act (for short the 'Act'). The defendants no.3 to 6 executed the sale deed in favour of defendants no.1and 2 on 8.7.1980 and on the basis of the said sale deed, defendants no.1 and 2 were in possession and the Fakire was never the owner of the disputed land and after possession was delivered to the defendants, they constructed one kothari on the western side along with one room and is residing in it and on the eastern side defendant no.2 has constructed two rooms facing each other i.e. north and southern side and he put a thatch before that room and is residing in it. 3. On the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed four issues and after considering the evidence led by the parties, dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs feeling aggrieved with the said judgment and decree, preferred an appeal before the appellate court and the lower appellate court after appreciating the arguments of the respective parties, allowed the appeal and found that the trial court has misconstrued and misrepresented the evidence on record, which has resulted in erroneous findings. Hence the present appeal. 4. The plaintiffs feeling aggrieved with the said judgment and decree, preferred an appeal before the appellate court and the lower appellate court after appreciating the arguments of the respective parties, allowed the appeal and found that the trial court has misconstrued and misrepresented the evidence on record, which has resulted in erroneous findings. Hence the present appeal. 4. Counsel for the appellants has argued one substantial question of law i.e. whether the injunction could have been granted by the appellate court without there being any prayer for possession in the suit by the plaintiff. Counsel for the appellants in support of his contention placed reliance upon the judgment reported in the case of Asha Ram vs. Ghasita and others, 1991 All CJ 246. This Court while considering the aforesaid question relied upon the case of Bhramar Lal v. Nand Lal, AIR 1915 Cal 23, where the question was whether a suit was maintainable by a plaintiff who was out of possession and who sought relief for injunction only and it was found by this Court that Calcutta High Court relying upon various English cases laid down the law in the form that the court will not interfere by way of injunction when the plaintiff was out of possession unless there was some privity between the parties. This Court has further relied upon a Full Bench decision of the Lahore High Court in the case of Masjid Shahid Ganj v. Shromani Gurdawara Prabhandhak Committee, Amritsar, AIR 1938 Lah 369 wherein it was held that where suit was filed on behalf of the Mohammadan Community, which could have sued for possession of a mosque in possession of non-Muslim even though the individual of that community could not sue for such relief as the relief asked for was for a mere declaration and injunction and the suit was not maintainable. It was further observed that it was well established that when it was open to a person to sue for possession, he cannot be granted any relief in the shape of a mere injunction. It was further observed that it was well established that when it was open to a person to sue for possession, he cannot be granted any relief in the shape of a mere injunction. The Court again relied upon a decision in the case of Hashmat Husain and others vs. Inayatullah and others, AIR 1958 Alld 706 and it was again reiterated that where the defendants are sued as a trespasser, relief can be obtained by the usual proceeding in ejectment and Section 56 of the Specific Relief Act which provides for exceptional relief by injunction, would come in the way of granting a decree for mere injunction. Thereafter, the Court after perusal of the aforesaid judgments came to the conclusion that the decree of injunction could not be granted. 5. Counsel for the respondents in support of his contention has relied upon the following decisions:- C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa and others, AIR 1961 SC 808 , Kothapalli Satynarayana v. Koganti Ramaiah and others, (1984) 2 SCC 439 , Sachidanand Dubey and others v. Committee of Management, Shri Sant Ram Raj Goswami Junior High School, Daulatpur, Ballia and others, 1995 (13) LCD 1046, Muni Lal v. The Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. And another, ALR 1996 (27) 91, Jai Dayal and others v. Krishan Lal Garg and another, (1996) 11 SCC 588 , Gunwantbhai Mulchand Shah and others v. Anton Elis Farel and others, (2006) 3 SCC 634 , Gurunath Manohar Pavaskar and others v. Nagesh Siddappa Navalgund and others, (2007) 13 SCC 565 , and Dharmarajan and others v. Valliammal and others, (2008) 2 SCC 741 . 6. The Court has perused the aforesaid case laws and find that the aforesaid case laws are not applicable to the present case. 7. The relief which has been sought for in the present case, according to the plaint allegation, is that a decree of mandatory injunction was prayed for that after removing the constructions made by the defendants, they may vacate the land in question and in case it is not done, the court may do it at the expenses of the defendants. The aforesaid prayer made in the suit goes to indicate that a relief for vacating the land and mandatory injunction was prayed for. 8. The aforesaid prayer made in the suit goes to indicate that a relief for vacating the land and mandatory injunction was prayed for. 8. The apex Court while considering the similar issue in the case of Joseph Severance and others v. Benny Mathew and others, (2005) 7 SCC 667 arising out of the judgment of the Single Judge of the Kerala High Court passed in Second Appeal proceeded to decide the issue relying upon two earlier decisions of the apex Court in the cases of Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad and others, AIR (1951) SC 177 and Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh, (1985) 2 SCC 332 that where a relief for possession is not claimed, even then that relief of injunction can be granted. The said appeal was decided in the factual background that a plaint schedule property originally belonged to Francis Severance, the father of appellants 1 to 3 and grand-father of appellants 4 and 5. Francis Severance had four children and one of the sons, Joseph Severnce, died in the year 1970. His widow was Hilda Severance. Said Francis Severance died in the year 1966. After the death of Francis Severance the plaint schedule property devolved on appellants 1 to 3. Shri K.V. Mathew, the husband of the 2nd respondent and father of respondents 1 and 3 and the 4th respondent entered into an agreement of licence with appellants and Hilda Severance with respect to the plaint schedule property under which permission was granted to Mathew to construct a cinema theatre for a period of five years. The licence was renewed from time to time and on 11.2.1991 by Ext. A1 agreement, the licence, was renewed for a period of five years. In the meantime, Hilda Severance also died. The condition in Ext. A1 agreement was that on the expiry of five years from 11.2.1991, the licensee had to surrender vacant possession of the plaint schedule property on demolishing the building and the structures thereon. Before the expiry of five years mentioned in Ext. A1 agreement, the licensee, Mathew died on 24.5.1994. After that Ext. A2 notice was sent to respondents which yielded no result. The suit was filed on 12.2.1996. Before the expiry of five years mentioned in Ext. A1 agreement, the licensee, Mathew died on 24.5.1994. After that Ext. A2 notice was sent to respondents which yielded no result. The suit was filed on 12.2.1996. The trial court as well as the First Appellate Court found that on the death of Mathew, the licence came to an end and thereafter the possession of all the four defendants were as trespassers. After finding that their possession was as trespassers both the trial court and the First Appellate Court held that mandatory injunction can be granted as prayed for by the plaintiffs. The High Court accepted the plea and held that the suit as framed was not maintainable. It was held that where an ex-licensee is in possession, the licensor can only seek recovery of possession from him, which is the legal remedy, whereas the remedy of injunction is an equitable remedy. It was however held that licensee's occupation does not become hostile possession or possession of trespasser the moment the licence comes to an end. But for maintaining a suit against his licensee for mandatory injunction directing him to vacate the property the suit has to be filed without delay and with promptitude. On these findings the High Court set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court as well as by the first appellate court. The apex Court after considering the respective pleadings of the parties and the law settled, set aside the order of the High Court and while doing so, the apex Court relied upon judgments reported in the cases of Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar (supra) and Sant Lal Jain (supra). The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under: 9. In Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar (supra) it was noted as follows : "As regards the other point, however, we are of the opinion that the decision of the trial court was right and that the High Court took an undoubtedly rigid and technical view in reversing this part of the decree of the subordinate judge. It is true that it was no part of the plaintiff's case as made in the plaint that the sum of Rs.80,000 was advanced by way of loan to the defendant's second party. It is true that it was no part of the plaintiff's case as made in the plaint that the sum of Rs.80,000 was advanced by way of loan to the defendant's second party. But it was certainly open to the plaintiff to make an alternative case to that effect and make a prayer in the alternative for a decree for money even if the allegations of the money being paid in pursuance of a contract of sale could not be established by evidence. The fact that such a prayer would have been inconsistent with the other prayer is not really material. A plaintiff may rely upon different rights alternatively and there is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code to prevent a party from making two or more inconsistent sets of allegations and claiming relief thereunder in the alternative. The question, however, arises whether, in the absence of any such alternative case in the plaint it is open to the Court to give him relief on that basis. The rule undoubtedly is that the Court cannot grant relief to the plaintiff on a case for which there was no foundation in the pleadings and which the other side was not called upon or had an opportunity to meet. But when the alternative case, which the plaintiff could have made, was not only admitted by the defendant in his written statement but was expressly put forward as an answer to the claim which the plaintiff made in the suit, there would be nothing improper in giving the plaintiff a decree upon the case which the defendant himself makes. A demand of the plaintiff based on the defendant's own plea cannot possibly be regarded with surprise by the latter and no question of adducing evidence on these facts would arise when they were expressly admitted by the defendant in his pleadings. In such circumstances, when no injustice can possibly result to the defendant it may not be proper to drive the plaintiff, to a separate suit. As an illustration of this principle, reference may be made to the pronouncement of judicial committee in Mohan Manucha v. Manzoor Ahmad, 70 IA 1AIR 30 (1943) PC 29. This appeal arose out of a suit commenced by the plaintiff- appellant to enforce a mortgage security. The plea of the defendant was that the mortgage was void. As an illustration of this principle, reference may be made to the pronouncement of judicial committee in Mohan Manucha v. Manzoor Ahmad, 70 IA 1AIR 30 (1943) PC 29. This appeal arose out of a suit commenced by the plaintiff- appellant to enforce a mortgage security. The plea of the defendant was that the mortgage was void. This plea was given effect by both the lower courts as well as by the Privy Council. But the Privy Council held that it was open in such circumstances to the plaintiff to repudiate the transaction altogether and claim a relief outside it in the form of restitution under Section 65 of the Contract Act. Although no such alternative claim was made in the plaint, the Privy Council allowed it to be advanced and gave a decree on the ground that the respondent could not be prejudiced by such a claim at all and the matter ought not to be left to a separate suit. It may be noted that this relief was allowed to the appellants even though the appeal was heard ex party in the absence of the respondent." 10 .In Sant Lal Jain (supra) in paragraph 7 & 8 of the judgment it was observed as follows: "7. In the present case it has not been shown to us that the appellant had come to the court with the suit for mandatory injunction after any considerable delay which will disentitle him to the discretionary relief. Even if there was some delay, we think that in a case of this kind attempt should be made to avoid multiplicity of suits and the licensor should not be driven to file another round of suit with all the attendant delay, trouble and expense. The suit is in effect one for possession though couched in the form of a suit for mandatory injunction as what would be given to the plaintiff in case he succeeds in possession of the property to which he may be found to be entitled. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant should not be denied relief merely because he had couched the plaint in the form of a suit for mandatory injunction. 8. The respondent was a licensee, and he must be deemed to be always a licensee. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the appellant should not be denied relief merely because he had couched the plaint in the form of a suit for mandatory injunction. 8. The respondent was a licensee, and he must be deemed to be always a licensee. It is not open to him, during the subsistence of the licence or in the suit for recovery of possession of the property instituted after the revocation of the licence to set up title to the property in himself or anyone else. It is his plain duty to surrender possession of the property as a licensee and seek his remedy separately in case he has acquired title to the property subsequently though some other person. He need not do so if he has acquired title to the property from the licensor or from someone else lawfully claiming under him, in which case there would be clear merger. The respondent has not surrendered possession of the property to the appellant even after the termination of the licence and a institution of the suit. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to recover possession of the property. We accordingly allow the appeal with costs throughout and direct the respondent to deliver possession of the property to the appellant forthwith failing which it will be open to the appellant to execute the decree and obtain possession." 11. The aforesaid proposition of law laid down by the apex Court goes to indicate that the relief for possession can be granted where relief for mandatory injunction has been prayed for and it has further been prayed that by way of mandatory injunction the defendant's may be directed to remove the constructions standing therein which have been constructed during the pendency of the appeal and vacate the same and if it is not done, then it should be done through the court at the expenses of the defendants. 12. Considering the aforesaid dictum of law laid down by the apex Court, I do not find any merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed. _