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2012 DIGILAW 504 (PAT)

ASHOK KUMAR SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR

2012-03-23

VIKASH JAIN

body2012
ORDER : 1. The present application has been filed for quashing the ORDER :dated 19.02.2009 by which the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhojpur at Arrah has taken cognizance under Section 498(A) of the I.P.C. against the petitioner in Tier P.S. Case No. 56 of 2007 dated 17.12.2007. 2. According to the informant, Sandhya Kumari, her marriage was solemnized with the petitioner at village Uttardaha, district Bhojpur, being her paternal home. About two months after her marriage she accompanied her father-in-law to Bokaro to her matrimonial home where her husband, father-in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law (Nanad) started torturing and assaulting her with their demands for Rs. 4,00,000/-, colour T.V., fridge, mobile and other articles, which had not been given at the time of marriage. It is further alleged that her father and brother accompanied by other persons also went to Bokaro and repeatedly tried to resolve the matter with her in-laws but to no avail. Thereafter in November 2006, it is stated that her in-laws even attempted to kill her by leaving the gas stove on, as a result of which she suffered burn injuries but was saved on the intervention of neighbours. Finally about six months ago all the accused persons assaulted her and shut the door after throwing her out of the house. As a result she became helpless and came back to her paternal home in village Uttardaha, where she has since been living with her parents. It is alleged that her in-laws are still torturing her for dowry and continue to make attempts on her life. 3. In course of hearing of the case, the parties were physically present pursuant to ORDER :s of this Court. It appears that differences between the couple continues and the husband has expressed his inability to keep his wife with him. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner challenges the maintainability of the First Information Report at Bhojpur, on the ground that even on a plain reading of the written report of the informant, it is evident that all the acts of torture and cruelty have been alleged to have been committed at Bokaro and no part thereof is alleged at Bhojpur, so as to give the Trial Court any jurisdiction in the matter. He therefore submits that the entire proceeding is wholly without jurisdiction and continuance thereof would be an out and out abuse of process of the Court. He therefore submits that the entire proceeding is wholly without jurisdiction and continuance thereof would be an out and out abuse of process of the Court. In support of his submissions he has relied on the following decisions (i) 2009 (1) PLJR 111 (Md. Kalim & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr.); (ii) 2004 (8) SCC 100 (Y. Abraham Ajith & Ors. Vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr.); (iii) (2008) 3 PLJR 367 (SC) (Bhura Ram & Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.). 5. Learned counsel for the informant on the other hand resists the submissions of the petitioner and submits that the proceedings are very much maintainable and ought not to be quashed. He points out that the unambiguous allegations as contained in the written statement of the informant are sufficient to invest the Trial Court with jurisdiction, as it has been clearly alleged therein that the informant’s in-laws are continuing their acts of torture and making attempts on her life, even after she has returned to her parental home in Bhojpur. He thus submits that these clearly constitute cause of action at Bhojpur, which are triable at that place. 6. He submits that the offence under Section 498 (A) is by its very nature, and moreso on the specific allegations in the instant case, a continuing one. There can be little doubt that it was solely by reason of the acts of cruelty and torture meted out to her and culminating in throwing her out of the house and closing the doors upon her, which led to the consequence of her returning to Bhojpur. As stated above, the acts of torture and cruelty are said to be continuing at Bhojpur. 7. In this regard, learned counsel for the informant has supported his submissions placing reliance on the following decisions (i) 1994 (1) PLJR 513 (Arun Khanna Vs. State of Bihar); (ii) 1997 (1) PLJR 590 (Girdhari Lal Jatana & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Anr.); (iii) (2011) 11 SCC 301 (Sunita Kumari Kashyap Vs. State of Bihar and Anr.). The last mentioned decision has been rendered after considering Y. Abraham Ajith’s case as well as Bhura Ram’s case which were relied upon by the petitioners. 8. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the materials on record. State of Bihar and Anr.). The last mentioned decision has been rendered after considering Y. Abraham Ajith’s case as well as Bhura Ram’s case which were relied upon by the petitioners. 8. I have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the materials on record. On the question of territorial jurisdiction, considering the provisions of Sections 177, 178 and 179 Cr.P.C., I am of the view that the Trial Court has acted well within its jurisdiction in taking cognizance in the facts and circumstances of the case. There are specific allegations in the written report of the informant with regard to the acts of torture and cruelty in relation to demand of dowry having continued also at Bhojpur, and as such there can be no gainsaying that a part of the cause of action has arisen at Bhojpur as well. Besides, even on the principles underlying the decision in Sunita Kumari Kashyap’s case (supra), the ongoing threats received by the petitioner at Bhojpur would amount to a consequence of the continuing offence of harassment thus attracting the provision of Section 178(c) Cr.P.C. 9. Yet another reason why the jurisdiction of the Trial Court at Bhojpur may be upheld is to be found in Section 460(e) Cr.P.C. which provides that if any Magistrate not empowered by law to take cognizance of an offence under clause (a) or clause (b) of Section 190 (1), erroneously in good faith does so, his proceedings shall not be set aside merely on the ground of not being so empowered. 10. On a perusal of the impugned ORDER :of cognizance, I find that the learned Magistrate has duly taken note of the charge sheet and the case diary and on that basis he has found a prima facie case to have been made out against the petitioner and accordingly taken cognizance. 11. For the above reasons, I have no hesitation in holding that no fault can be found in the impugned ORDER :of cognizance and I am not inclined to interfere with the same at this stage. 12. The petition accordingly stands dismissed.