JUDGMENT : K. Kannan, J. The point that arises for consideration is the entitlement of the petitioner to a claim salary during the period when he was removed from service and later reinstated on account of a criminal court conviction that was current during the period of his termination and the reinstatement having been ordered when the criminal court judgment was reversed in the higher forum. The issue has an immediate relevance to the principle that comes up for consideration time and again, namely, the principle of 'no work, no pay' and the exceptions that are recognized by the judicial principles. The petitioner had been an officer in a Bank and a criminal case had been instituted against him for some alleged offences u/s 5(2) read with Section 5(1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. During all the time when the case was pending before the trial Court, the petitioner continued in service, but when the criminal court entered the conviction, the Bank served a notice against him to show cause against termination and despite the fact that the petitioner had obtained suspension of sentence and had been on bail, the Bank proceeded to terminate him from service. On the criminal court rendering a judgment on 23.11.2002 acquitting him, the petitioner was reinstated in service with continuity of service. However, his claim for salary during the entire period had been denied to him which the counsel for the petitioner contends as unreasonable. The Learned Counsel would point out to the fact that the petitioner had sought for continuation in service and expressed his willingness to continue on the basis of bail order obtained at the higher forum even when the case was pending and would further point out that during all the time when the trial was in progress, he had not been suspended or removed from service. Therefore, according to him, there was no justification for proceeding with the termination order when he had been convicted and when he had obtained a suspension of sentence. 2. The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would refer to the interim order passed in the criminal appeal on 14.08.1996 where the petitioner had sought for suspension of conviction itself, for certain observations contained therein. 2. The Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner would refer to the interim order passed in the criminal appeal on 14.08.1996 where the petitioner had sought for suspension of conviction itself, for certain observations contained therein. It is seen from the text of the order that he had contended, that a mere suspension of sentence would not be sufficient, for, if the criminal court judgment were to go in his favour, it would cause serious financial loss. In that context, the Court had observed that if he succeeded in appeal or other proceedings, the matter could always be reviewed in such a manner that he suffered no prejudice by dismissal from service. The Court had observed that once conviction and sentence awarded against him were vacated, the petitioner would be entitled to all the consequential service benefits, like reinstatement, pay and other benefits. These observations, according to the Learned Counsel, would secure to him the benefit of his entitlement for full salary during the period when termination order was in force. The Learned Counsel would also refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. K.V. Jankiraman, etc. etc., AIR 1991 SC 2010 when the Court held that where an employee had been completely exonerated of the charge and when the employee had not been allowed to continue in service, despite the employee expressing his willingness to work, it would bar the employer from denying to the employee the full wages from the time when he was prevented from working. The counsel also refer to the decision in Burn Standard Company Ltd. vs. Tarun Kumar Chakraborty, (2002) 10 SCC 585 ), that held that a person, who had been initially prevented from joining by virtue of a Court order obtained at the instance of yet another person, could have been later inducted in the service when the Court order had been vacated and in such a situation, the Court found non-employment by the employer of prospective candidate, who had been previously selected, had no reasonable justification and found him entitled to full salary and allowances for the period from the day when the Court order was vacated till the date when the person had been actually allowed to join. In yet another decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Principal, Ayurvedic College and others Versus Sushil Chandra Misra and another- (2006) 12 SCC 703 , while examining the issue of the principle of 'no work, no pay', the Hon'ble Supreme Court had allowed for payment of 50% of salary. In a Division Bench ruling of this Court in Sunder Singh Versus State of Haryana and others, 2001 (2) SLR 270, this Court held that if an employee had been suspended from service during criminal proceedings, the acquittal by the criminal court will restore to the employee all the arrears of salary including allowances of suspension period forthwith. 3. The entitlement of a person to claim salary for the period when he was kept out of employment would always require to be seen in the context of not merely the fact of whether the employee was willing to work during the period when the case was pending but also from the point of view of whether the employer was unreasonable in keeping the person out of employment. If one exists, it may not be sufficient but both factors must go exist. The fact that the petitioner was prepared to work answers only one side of the story. The other crucial aspect was whether the Bank was unjustified in keeping him out of employment. In this case, I notice that the Bank had not adopted any hasty action of even suspending him from service or terminating him, when a CBI case had been instituted against him for alleged offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The petitioner had actually continued in service but the show cause notice had been issued to him only after he had been convicted by the criminal court. Again, it can be noticed that the termination at that time was made only after serving a notice. The petitioner himself knew that there was a difference between how a stay of conviction and a stay of sentence and a mere stay of sentence would still operate against the prospect of continuation in employment. It was not without any reason that he had filed a CM No. 12854 of 1996 and made an issue about the fact that not merely the suspension of sentence must be given but even the conviction must be suspended. It was not without any reason that he had filed a CM No. 12854 of 1996 and made an issue about the fact that not merely the suspension of sentence must be given but even the conviction must be suspended. When the Court observed that such a leave cannot be granted, it made an observation referred to above, which I would characterize as only gratuitous that if he had come by favourable consideration, he would also be entitled to all the benefits. It was not a case where the Bank was a party, when the Court was making such an observation to be used against a Bank, subsequently. The question of entitlement of wages during the period when he had lost service could be determined only at an appropriate time when the party, who had a stake, could raise its objection. I would, therefore, discard these observations as not in any way binding for this Court to immediately accede to the petitioner's request that the observation made was sufficient to secure to him all the monetary benefits. 4. Regulation 11 of the Punjab National Bank Officer Employees (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations empowers the Bank to impose a penalty specified in Regulation 4 that sets out major penalties for an employee being convicted on a criminal charge or on the strength of the facts or conclusion arrived at by a judicial trial. The only condition imposed is that the employee should be given an opportunity to make a representation on the penalty proposed before an order was made. I have already observed that such a notice had been earlier given before the decision was taken. I cannot see, therefore, under the circumstances, that the employer was unjustified in keeping him out of employment during the time when he had undergone a conviction. In the Division Bench ruling of this Court in Sunder Singh's case, referred to above, the employee was a Diesel Pump Attendant in Haryana Roadways. A case had been registered against him for alleged offences under Sections 407, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. The case ended in acquittal and the judgment delivered on 04.02.1998. The witnesses of the prosecution had not come in spite of the case pending for nearly 10 years and only some witnesses had been examined and even those witnesses had given no evidence against the petitioner. The case ended in acquittal and the judgment delivered on 04.02.1998. The witnesses of the prosecution had not come in spite of the case pending for nearly 10 years and only some witnesses had been examined and even those witnesses had given no evidence against the petitioner. The situation was that the Magistrate would not even think it necessary to question the accused u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under the circumstances, the petitioner had been reinstated without prejudice to any action that could be taken by the Roadways department. The employer did not take up any departmental action. The situation of a Diesel Pump Operator in a Transport Depot is not same thing as an officer in a Bank being punished by the criminal court after a full-fledged trial under the Prevention of Corruption Act. A Bank officer is expected to possess higher level of integrity, for, he deals with public money. A conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act which is definitely one that involves moral turpitude cannot be treated as equivalent to a situation of a Pump Operator being proceeded against and let off, even without being questioned u/s 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The benefit which the Division Bench was prepared to extend for what period when he was kept out of employment, I would hold as relevant for the particular facts of the case and would not find it necessary to transport that proposition to the present case. 5. In yet another Division Bench ruling of this Court in Shashi Kumar Versus Uttri Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam and another, 2005 (1) SCT 576, the Court held that if termination on the basis of conviction is made and reinstatement is ordered subsequently when there was an acquittal from the appellate Court, a removal from service which was only on the basis of conviction without considering other materials or circumstances would require the employee to be not merely reinstated, but also be entitled to all consequential benefits. The Court went on to hold that once the charge was not proved, the acquittal was always honourable for all purposes. I cannot see this again as inviolable principle for all situations, where a criminal case was the cause for termination and a reinstatement that followed an acquittal must also result in a full restoration of all the monetary benefits. The Court went on to hold that once the charge was not proved, the acquittal was always honourable for all purposes. I cannot see this again as inviolable principle for all situations, where a criminal case was the cause for termination and a reinstatement that followed an acquittal must also result in a full restoration of all the monetary benefits. The Court's observation was in the context of removal without considering “other material circumstances” as operating against the employer to deny the benefit to the employee. What I have observed while dealing with the decision in Sunder Singh's case (supra), I would reiterate again that an officer in a Bank that could not have been retained in service after his conviction cannot be treated the same way as in Shashi Kumar's case (supra). 6. I would not find, therefore, that there was anything improper or unjustified for the employer to deny to him the wages during that period. The only benefit, however, which I would provide to the petitioner is that he shall be entitled to the continuity of service and the entire period of his absence shall be treated as on leave of the kind due. All the terminal benefits should also accrue in his favour by treating the said period as aggregating to his total length of service and to the extent to which it will have a bearing to his claim for gratuity. It is stated by the counsel that the gratuity has been made by excluding the number of years when he had remained out of job due to his termination and even the pensionary benefits have not been calculated on such a basis. All the pensionary benefits including pension and gratuity would be reworked and the arrears shall be paid within a period of 8 weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order with interest at 6% from the date when he retired from service till date when the payment was made. The writ petition is disposed off with above observations.