Judgment: 1. Heard shri s. G. dessai, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and shri v. B. nadkarni, learned senior counsel and shri p. A. kamat, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.1. 2. The petitioner has filed the above petition praying inter-alia for a writ of certiorari or a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction under article 227 of the constitution of india and quash and set aside the impugned order at exhibit p-1 and the impugned judgment at exhibit p-2 whereby an election petition filed by the respondent no.1 came to be allowed by the learned tribunal and the respondent no.1 has been declared to be elected member of the village panchayat of socorro. 3. Briefly the facts of the case are that on 02.04.2007 the elections were notified for the village panchayat of socorro by the election commission. The ward no. Viii of the said village was notified as reserved ward for obc candidate. On 11.4.2007 the petitioner was certified by the gomantak bhandari samaj as belonging to bhandari naik community (obc) and a certificate was accordingly issued by the dy. Collector of mapusa, and sub divisional magistrate to that effect. The petitioner thereafter filed his nomination on 13.04.2007 to contest the election in the said ward no.viii which was reserved for obc category. The elections were held on 05.05.2007 and results came to be declared on 07.05.2007 when the petitioner was declared as elected from the ward no.viii. The petitioner polled 138 votes, respondent no.1 polled 119 votes, respondent no.2 polled 72 votes and respondent no.3 polled 28 votes. 4. It is also the contention of the petitioner that an objection came to be raised to the nomination of the petitioner which came to be rejected by the returning officer. The respondent no.1 filed panchayat election petition no.14/2007 before the administrative tribunal, panaji, challenging the election of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner was not belonged to the obc community. In the meanwhile, on 18.06.2007, the dy. Collector issued a show cause notice to the petitioner calling upon him as to why obc certificate issued to him should not be revoked. A report came to be filed by the learned mamlatdar to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to the said community on 25.06.2007. In the meanwhile, on 18.06.2007, the dy. Collector issued a show cause notice to the petitioner calling upon him as to why obc certificate issued to him should not be revoked. A report came to be filed by the learned mamlatdar to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to the said community on 25.06.2007. Accordingly, on 25.06.2007 the petitioner had applied to the scrutiny committee for verification of his obc certificate issued by the dy. Collector. In the meanwhile, a complaint came to be lodged on 06.08.2007 to the scrutiny committee by the respondent no.1 objecting to the verification of the said certificate. The respondent no.1 also filed the petition before this court challenging the certificate issued in favour of the petitioner on 21.09.2007 by preferring a writ petition no. 460 of 2007. By order dated 22.10.2007, the said petition came to be disposed of on the basis of the statement made by the learned advocate general that the scrutiny committee shall re-verify the caste claimed of the petitioner. By order dated 29.01.2008 the certificate issued in favour of the petitioner came to be cancelled by the scrutiny committee. The petitioner thereafter preferred a writ petition before this court bearing writ petition no. 111/2008 challenging the said order of the scrutiny committee. By judgment dated 16.07.2008, the order was set aside and the matter came to be remanded to the scrutiny committee with specific directions. By order dated 26.11.2008, the certificate issued in favour of the petitioner came to be rejected by the scrutiny committee. Another writ petition was filed which was disposed of by order dated 15.06.2009 whereby the petition was allowed and the scrutiny committee was inter-alia directed to consider the application of the petitioner a fresh. In the meanwhile, the election petition filed by the respondent no.1 was kept in abeyance by the learned tribunal on 11.11.2009 subject to the decision before the scrutiny committee. Another writ petition came to be filed by some other persons and by order dated 01.07.2010 this court directed the scrutiny committee to dispose of the caste claimed by the petitioner by 13.8.2010 which was thereafter extended. By order dated 05.04.2011, the scrutiny committee rejected the caste claimed by the petitioner. Thereafter, a petition came to be filed before this court being writ petition no. 359/2011 challenging the order dated 05.04.2011 passed by the scrutiny committee. By order dated 05.04.2011, the scrutiny committee rejected the caste claimed by the petitioner. Thereafter, a petition came to be filed before this court being writ petition no. 359/2011 challenging the order dated 05.04.2011 passed by the scrutiny committee. By order dated 05.12.2011 rule came to be issued in the said writ petition but however no interim reliefs were granted. In the meanwhile, on 29.07.2011 the election petition filed by the respondent no.1 came to be disposed of by the impugned judgment. The petitioner thereafter preferred the above writ petition challenging the said order. The respondent no.1 filed his affidavit in reply disputing the contentions raised by the petitioner in the petition. A preliminary objection came to be raised by the respondent no.1 that the present writ petition cannot be considered before the learned single judge. It was further his case that the order passed by the learned tribunal on 29.07.2011 has already been implemented and as such the petitioner is not entitled for any relief. It was also brought on record that there is no stay granted by this court while admitting the writ petition filed by the petitioner challenging the order of the scrutiny committee. Another contention raised by the respondent no.1 is that the petitioner cannot be considered to be an aggrieved person. An affidavit in rejoinder also came to be filed by the petitioner to the reply filed by the respondent no.1. In the rejoinder filed by the petitioner, he has disputed the claim of the respondent no.1 that he has no locus standi to challenge the declaration in the election petition. 5. Shri v. B. nadkarni, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 has raised a preliminary objection and pointed out that the above petition is to be heard by the division bench of this court. It is the contention of the learned senior counsel that under the provisions of the high court of bombay ( extension of jurisdiction to goa, daman and diu) act 1981, especially section 4 thereof, it provides that from the appointed day, the high court at bombay shall have in respect of the territories included in the union territory of goa, daman and diu, all such jurisdictions, powers and authority as, under the law in force immediately before the appointed day, were exercisable in respect of the territories by the court of judicial commissioner. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that the appellate side rules were in force on the day on which the said act of 1981 came into force and that only the jurisdiction and powers exercisable by the court of the judicial commissioner in relation to the union territory of goa were vested in the bench of this court which was established in terms of section 9 of the act of 1981. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that in the year 1982 an order was passed by the hon'ble chief justice providing for allocation of the business amongst the judges sitting at panaji with effect from 31.10.1982 and the said order came to be modified from time to time. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that in terms of the clause 2 of the order dated 22.10.1982, the petition ought to be decided by the division bench. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that this itself shows that provisions of the appellate side rules have no application to this court at panaji. The learned senior counsel further pointed out to section 20 of the goa, daman and diu re-organization act, 1987 ( hereinafter referred to as 'the said act of 1987' ) and submitted that in view of the said provision, the high court at bombay is made a common high court for the state of maharashtra and state of goa and, therefore, seat at panaji was called as bench of the bombay high court. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that as the appellate side rules,1960 have not been extended the same are not applicable to the state of goa, and the above writ petition has to be disposed of by the division bench of this court. The learned senior counsel further taken me through the rule 17 of the appellate side rules and pointed out that the tribunal is not an authority subordinate to the high court and as such the question of challenging the order passed by the administrative tribunal before the single judge of this court does not arise. The learned senior counsel as such submitted that the above petition deserves to be rejected. 6. On the other hand, shri s. G. dessai, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has disputed the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent no.1. The learned senior counsel as such submitted that the above petition deserves to be rejected. 6. On the other hand, shri s. G. dessai, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has disputed the contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent no.1. The learned senior counsel pointed out that the appellate side rules are extended to the state of goa and are made applicable to the proceedings before this court. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that after reorganization act 1987, there is a common high court for the state of maharashtra and state of goa and as such the contention of the learned senior counsel that the appellate side rules are not applicable to the proceedings before this court are totally misplaced. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that impugned order passed by the learned tribunal are judicial orders and as such the same can be challenged in the petition under article 227 of the constitution of india before the single judge. The learned senior counsel in support of his submission has relied upon a judgment reported in 2006(1) bombay c.r. 694 in the case of principal, micky school, english medium v/s state of maharashtra and others, and the judgment of the single judge passed in writ petition no. 107 of 2005 dated 01.04.2005. In reply to the said contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent no.1, shri nadkarni, learned senior counsel has pointed out that the judgment passed by the learned single judge of this court dated 01.04.2005 was challenged before the apex court and whilst disposing of the special leave petition, the issues raised in the said petition were left open. 7. I have carefully considered the contentions of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and respondent no.1 with regard to the preliminary objection raised by the respondent no.1. The points canvassed by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 have been dealt with by another learned single judge of this court by judgment dated 06.08.2010 in civil application ( review ) no. 22 of 2008. The learned single judge of this court has held at para 6 thus : “6. The points canvassed by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 have been dealt with by another learned single judge of this court by judgment dated 06.08.2010 in civil application ( review ) no. 22 of 2008. The learned single judge of this court has held at para 6 thus : “6. For dealing with the objection raised by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, it is not necessary to go into the wider question of the nature of jurisdiction and powers conferred by the said act of 1987 on the common high court for maharashtra and goa in relation to the territory forming part of erstwhile union territory of goa, daman and diu. The only limited aspect which needs to be examined is as regards the applicability of the appellate side rules to the common high court. Sub-section (1) of section 20 of the said act of 1987 reads thus : “(1) on and from the appointed day,- (a) there shall be a common high court for the states of maharashtra and goa, and for the union territories of dadra and nagar haveli and daman and diu, to be called the high court of bombay ( hereinafter referred to as the common high court); (b) the judges of the high court of bombay ( hereinafter referred to as the existing high court), holding office immediately before that day shall, unless they have elected otherwise, become, on that day the judges of the common high court.” the section establishes a common high court for the states of maharashtra and goa, and for the union territories of dadra and nagar haveli as well as daman and diu called as the high court of bombay. The said high court of bombay has been referred to as a common high court. The high court of bombay which was in existence prior to the commencement of the said act of 1987 has been referred to therein as the existing high court. In this context, section 22 of the said act will have to be considered which reads thus :- “22. The high court of bombay which was in existence prior to the commencement of the said act of 1987 has been referred to therein as the existing high court. In this context, section 22 of the said act will have to be considered which reads thus :- “22. Practice and procedure in the common high court.- subject to the provisions of this part, the law in force immediately before the appointed day with respect to practice and procedure in the existing high court shall, with the necessary modification, apply in relation to the common high court.” what has been provided in section 22 is that the law in force immediately before the appointed day with respect to practice and procedure in the existing high court shall, with the necessary modifications, apply in relation to the common high court. Thus, section 22 expressly makes applicable the law in force with respect to the practice and procedure in the existing high court to the common high court. The law in force with respect to the procedure in the existing high court ( as defined in clause (b) of section 20) was in the form of the appellate side rules. Hence, the appellate side rules are applicable to the common high court established under section 20. Even assuming that the rules of procedure applicable to the permanent bench at panaji established under the said act of 1981 apply to the common high court in relation to the territories falling in former union territory of goa, daman and diu, in the matters in which procedure applicable to the court of judicial commissioner is silent, the appellate side rules were applicable.............” in view of the said judgment of the learned single judge of this court, the contention of the learned senior counsel shri nadkarni appearing for the respondent no.1 to the effect that the appellate side rules are not applicable to the state of goa cannot be accepted. 8. With regard to the next contention of the learned senior counsel to the effect that the impugned order passed by the learned tribunal is not an order passed by the court subordinate to the high court, the same also cannot be accepted. The impugned order is an order passed by the judicial authority and as such under rule 18 of the bombay high court appellate side rules of chapter no. The impugned order is an order passed by the judicial authority and as such under rule 18 of the bombay high court appellate side rules of chapter no. Xvii, the learned single judge of this court can consider a challenge to such order under article 227 of the constitution of india. The division bench of this court in the judgment in the case of principal, micky school, english medium v/s state of maharashtra and others ( supra ) has held at para 11 thus : “11. In our opinion, the position in regard to hearing of writ petitions under bombay high court appellate side rules, 1960 is clear. All writ petitions under articles 226 and/or 227 or under article 226 or under article 227 are to be heard by learned single judge of this court. Exceptions having been provided by clause 2-b of chapter 1 and ratio laid down by supreme court in relation to articles 323-a and b. Therefore, writ petitions covered by clause 2-b, writ petitions arising out of orders made by administrative tribunals established under 1985 act and orders passed by such special tribunals as are created under the constitution and all other matters are required to be heard by the learned single bench. The order impugned in the present petition is passed under the provisions of persons with disabilities ( equal opportunities protection of rights and full participation ) act, 1995 which is a special law enacted for protection of persons mentioned therein. It is therefore a special enactment or law and the order made thereunder is squarely covered by the provisions of clause 3 of rule 18 of chapter xvii being the order made by an authority under special act. The registry is therefore directed to place the matter before the appropriate bench. Interim order already granted to continue. Order accordingly.” considering the said judgment of division bench of this court there can be no doubt that the single judge of this court can decide the petition under article 227 of the constitution of india challenging the impugned judgment. As such, the preliminary objection raised by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 deserves to be rejected. 9. On merits of the petition, shri s. G. dessai, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised two contentions. As such, the preliminary objection raised by the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 deserves to be rejected. 9. On merits of the petition, shri s. G. dessai, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has raised two contentions. First contention is that the learned tribunal was not justified to dispose of the election petition filed by the respondent no.1 merely on the basis of order passed by the scrutiny committee. The learned senior counsel has taken me through the provisions of law applicable and pointed out that it was incumbent upon the learned tribunal to record the evidence as according to him, the petitioner was entitled to disclose that the order passed by the scrutiny committee is an erroneous order and that the same cannot support the plea put forward by the respondent no.1 that the petitioner does not belong to the obc class. The learned senior counsel has pointed out that the learned tribunal has failed to exercise its jurisdiction in directing the parties to lead evidence and as such the impugned order passed by the learned tribunal is vitiated and cannot be sustained. The learned senior counsel as such submitted that on this ground alone the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside and the matter be remanded to the learned tribunal to decide the election petition a fresh after giving an opportunity to the parties to lead evidence. The learned senior counsel has further pointed out that the learned tribunal whilst holding that the election of the petitioner is void under section 20 of the goa panchayat raj act, 1994, has proceeded to hold that as the respondent no.1 has secured 119 votes which are highest votes obtained after the petitioner, the respondent no.1 has to be declared as elected from the ward no. Viii of village panchayat socorro. The learned senior counsel has pointed out that the said portion of the order is in excess of jurisdiction as according to him, the learned tribunal has no jurisdiction to pass such order. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that the contest of the applicant is multicornered contest and as such the question of proceedings under section 21(b) of the goa panchayat raj act, 1994 would not arise. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that the contest of the applicant is multicornered contest and as such the question of proceedings under section 21(b) of the goa panchayat raj act, 1994 would not arise. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that the election of the petitioner was not declared as null and void on account of any corrupt practice and as such the question of invoking the provisions of section 21(1)(b) of the said act, 1994 is totally misplaced. The learned senior counsel further pointed out that in any event, the learned tribunal whilst passing the said direction has not at all appreciated the evidence on record nor given reasons as to how the learned tribunal came to the conclusion that the respondent no.1 had a majority of the valid votes. The learned senior counsel as such submits that without prejudice to his first submission the impugned order to that extent deserves to be quashed and set aside. 10. On the other hand, shri p. A. kamat, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 has supported the impugned judgment. The learned counsel has taken me through the roznama dated 03.07.2009 in the election petition and pointed out that the learned tribunal has passed an order to the effect that the matter was based on caste certificate and the issue of the caste certificate is to be decided by this court. He further pointed out that the learned tribunal after hearing the learned counsel for the respective parties has passed an order that no evidence has to be led and the matter has to be heard on two law points and, therefore, the matter was fixed for final arguments. The learned counsel further pointed out that the two points referred to therein were one whether the petitioner was qualified to contest the election in the reserved category and other was whether the petition filed by the respondent no.1 was maintainable in law. The learned counsel shri p. Kamat for the respondent no.1 further pointed out that the said order was passed after hearing the learned counsels and the petitioner has not challenged the said order and in any event the petitioner has acted upon the said order and advanced arguments before the learned tribunal without any objection to such order. The learned counsel as such submitted that the petitioner is now estoped from raising such contention. The learned counsel as such submitted that the petitioner is now estoped from raising such contention. The learned counsel further pointed out that in any event, ground on which the nomination of the petitioner was challenged by the respondent no.1 was on the ground that the caste certificate obtained by the petitioner is null and void and as the scrutiny committee had invalidated the said certificate, the question of relying upon the said certificate to contend that the petitioner was duly qualified on the relevant date to contest such election would not arise at all. The learned counsel further submitted that any evidence if at all recorded would be an exercise in futility as the validity of the order passed by the scrutiny committee cannot be the matter which can be adjudicated before the civil court. 11. With regard to the next contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, learned counsel shri p. A. kamat for the respondent no.1 has pointed out that caste certificate obtained by the petitioner has been invalidated by the scrutiny committee and as such the right to hold the post does not subsist as this court has refused to grant any stay of the order of the scrutiny committee and as such, the petitioner cannot be considered to be an aggrieved person. The learned counsel further pointed out that the petitioner having no interest in the matter and not being an aggrieved person cannot challenge the impugned judgment in the present petition. The learned counsel has pointed out that the petition has become infructuous at the instance of the petitioner as the impugned order has already been acted upon and the respondent no.1 is functioning as a panch member of ward no. Viii of the concerned village panchayat. The learned counsel as such submitted that on this ground also the petition deserves to be rejected. 12. With regard to the other contention of the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 has pointed out that the remaining respondent nos. 2 and 3 were contesting candidates in the election who have not at all raised any objection to the order passed by the learned tribunal declaring the respondent no.1 as duly elected member of the panchayat. 2 and 3 were contesting candidates in the election who have not at all raised any objection to the order passed by the learned tribunal declaring the respondent no.1 as duly elected member of the panchayat. As such, the learned counsel submits that as the contesting respondents have not raised any objection and the petitioner has no subsisting interest in the election petition, the question of setting aside the said portion of the order would not arise at all. Shri kamat, learned counsel further pointed out that considering the provisions of section 21(1) (b) of the goa panchayat raj act, 1994, it cannot be disputed that the learned tribunal has such powers to declare the defeated candidate as elected member of the panchayat and as the learned tribunal had acted in exercise of its jurisdiction, the question of interference by this court in a petition under article 227 of the constitution of india would not arise at all. The learned counsel as such submits that there is no case made out for any interference in the impugned judgment at the instance of the petitioner. 13. Dealing with the first contention of the learned senior counsel shri dessai appearing for the petitioner, i find that shri kamat learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 is justified to contend that the petitioner is not entitled to now raise the contention that the evidence ought to have been recorded by the learned tribunal before passing impugned judgment. On perusal of the roznama dated 03.07.2009 the learned tribunal has categorically held that no evidence had to be recorded and the matter would be disposed of on law issues raised by the parties. The petitioner has acted upon the said order and advanced their arguments before the learned tribunal without any objection and it is not open to the petitioner to now contend that there was any infraction on the part of the learned tribunal in disposing of the election petition on the basis of oral submissions of the respective parties without recording any evidence. In any event, an order passed by the scrutiny committee cannot be challenged in a civil court. The apex court in the recent judgment reported in (2012) 1 scc 333 in the case of dayaram v/s sudhir batham and others has held at para 27, 28, 29 thus : “27. In any event, an order passed by the scrutiny committee cannot be challenged in a civil court. The apex court in the recent judgment reported in (2012) 1 scc 333 in the case of dayaram v/s sudhir batham and others has held at para 27, 28, 29 thus : “27. It is therefore clear that the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain any suit of a civil nature arising under a statute can be excluded only when cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred by the statute which gives rise to such suits. In this case, the creation of the scrutiny committee is by the judgment of this court. The procedure and functioning of the scrutiny committee is also in accordance with the scheme formulated by the said judgment. Thus if a suit is to be filed in a civil court in regard to the decision of the scrutiny committee, the cause of action for such suit would not arise under any statute, but with reference to an order of a committee constituted in pursuance of a scheme formulated by this court, by way of a stopgap quasi-legislative action. 28. The principle underlying section 9 is that cognizance of any category of suits arising under a statute, can be barred ( either expressly or impliedly) by that statute. But in regard to cognizance of the category of suits arising from the scheme formulated by a decision of this court ( and not under a statute), the scheme formulated by the decision of the court is the “statute”, and therefore, the scheme can expressly or impliedly bar cognizance of such suits. This is because the “statute” which gives rise to a cause of action referred to in the aforesaid decisions in v. Venkata subba rao, bal mukund bairwa (2) and dhulabhai, in this case is substituted by the “quasilegislative” stopgap scheme created by the decision of this court. 29. As the scrutiny committee is a creature of the judgment in madhuri patil and the procedure for verification and passing of the appropriate orders by the scrutiny committee is also provided for in the said judgment, there is nothing irregular or improper in this court directing that the orders of the scrutiny committee should be challenged only in a proceeding under article 226 of the constitution and not by way of any suit or other proceedings. Section 9 of the code and plethora of decisions which considered it, state that the civil court will have the jurisdiction except where the cognizance of suits of civil nature is either expressly or impliedly barred.” 14. Considering the said judgment of the apex court, the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain any dispute with regard to the order passed by the scrutiny committee is expressly barred. Hence, the contention of the learned senior counsel shri dessai appearing for the petitioner to the effect that the petitioner would be in a position to demonstrate that the order passed by the scrutiny committee is vitiated cannot be accepted, as such investigation is barred as held in the said judgment of the apex court. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case and taking note of the fact that the parties themselves had acceded that the election petition be kept in abeyance until the disposal of the proceedings before the caste scrutiny committee, it is not open to the petitioner to now contend that the learned tribunal ought to have recorded the evidence before disposing of the election petition. The said contention of the learned senior counsel shri dessai appearing for the petitioner to that extent deserves to be rejected in the peculiar facts of this case and the nature of the ground on which the election petition was filed by the respondent no.1. As such, as the caste certificate of the petitioner is invalidated, and as the said order is in operation, the learned tribunal was justified to declare the election of the petitioner as null and void. 15. With regard to the contention of shri kamat, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 to the effect that the petitioner ceased to be an aggrieved person, i find that it is not in dispute that the order passed by the caste scrutiny committee has been challenged by the petitioner before this court and the writ petition preferred by the petitioner has already been admitted. The apex court in the said judgment ( supra ) has held that an order passed by the caste scrutiny committee can only be challenged by fling a writ petition under article 226 of the constitution of india. The apex court in the said judgment ( supra ) has held that an order passed by the caste scrutiny committee can only be challenged by fling a writ petition under article 226 of the constitution of india. Taking note of the fact that the order passed by the scrutiny committee is under challenge before this court, it cannot be said that the petitioner ceased to be an aggrieved person. In any event, it is not in dispute that the petitioner is a voter of the ward where he was elected and as such it cannot be said that the petitioner has no locus standi to file the above petition challenging the impugned judgment. The said contention of shri kamat to the effect that the petitioner ceased to have locus standi cannot be accepted, taking note of the fact that the petition before the division bench challenging the order of the scrutiny committee is still under consideration. 16. Dealing with the next contention of shri dessai, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner to the effect that the learned tribunal whilst passing the impugned order has exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the respondent no.1 as elected member of the ward no.viii, it would be appropriate to consider the said aspect after dealing with the relevant provisions of law. Section 21 of goa panchayat raj act, 1994 provides as under : “21. Grounds on which a candidate other than the returned candidate may be declared to have been elected.- (1) if any person who has filed an election petition has, in addition to calling in question the election of the returned candidate claims a declaration that he himself or any other candidate has been duly elected and the prescribed authority is of opinion.- (a) that in fact the petitioner or such other candidate received a majority of the valid votes; or (b) that but for the votes obtained by the returned candidate by corrupt practices the petitioner or such other candidate would have obtained a majority of the valid votes; the prescribed authority shall after declaring the election of the returned candidate to be void, declare the petitioner or such other candidate, as the case may be, to have been duly elected. (2) the decision of the prescribed authority shall be final.” 17. The said provisions are pari materia to section 101 of the representation of the people act, 1951. (2) the decision of the prescribed authority shall be final.” 17. The said provisions are pari materia to section 101 of the representation of the people act, 1951. The apex court in the judgment reported in air 1969 sc 604 in the case of vishwanatha reddy, v/s konappa rudrappa nadgouda and another, has held at para 12 thus : “12. …................... This is not to say that where there are more than two candidates in the field for a single seat, and one alone is disqualified, on proof of disqualification all the votes cast in his favour will be discarded and the candidate securing the next highest number of votes will be declared elected. In such a case, question of notice to the voters may assume significance, for the voters may not, if aware of the disqualification have voted for the disqualified candidate.” 18. In another judgment of the apex court in 1977(3) scc 540 in the case of thiru john v/s the returning officer and others, the apex court has held at para 55 thus : “55. Again, the answer to this question, in our opinion, must be in the negative. It is nobody's case that the electors who voted for shri john, had at the time of election, knowledge or notice of the statutory disqualification of this candidate. On the contrary, they must have been under the impression that shri john was a candidate whose nomination had been validly accepted by the returning officer. Had the electors notice of shri john's disqualification, how many of them would have voted for him and how many for the other continuing candidates, including sarvshri subrahmanyam and mohana rangam, and in what preferential order, remains a question in the realm of speculation and unpredictability.” 19. The division bench of this court in the judgment reported in 2001(1) goa l.t. 333 in the case of shri francisco fernandes v/s the administrative tribunal & others has held at para 14 thus : “14. In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner has scored majority of votes i.e. 192 valid votes as against that, the respondent no.2 has scored only 85 valid votes. It is, therefore, apparent that respondent no.2 has not received majority valid votes. In the instant case, admittedly, the petitioner has scored majority of votes i.e. 192 valid votes as against that, the respondent no.2 has scored only 85 valid votes. It is, therefore, apparent that respondent no.2 has not received majority valid votes. Similarly, there is no corrupt practice alleged in the election petition against the petitioner and, therefore, the tribunal was not justified in declaring the respondent no.2 elected from ward no.9 after setting aside the election of the petitioner. The learned advocate for the respondent no.2 conceded to the legal position stated hereinabove and has not disputed that the tribunal could not have given such declaration in law.” 20. The apex court in the judgment reported in (2002) 5 scc 568 in the case of prakash khandre v/s dr. Vijay kumar khandre and others, has held at para 14 thus : “14. However, in an election where the elected candidate is declared to be disqualified to contest election and there are more than two candidates contesting electing, there is no specific provision under the act under which the person who has secured the next highest number of votes could be declared as elected. The act is silent on this point. Further, it cannot be presumed that the votes secured by the disqualified elected candidates would have been wasted or would have been secured by the next candidate who has secured more votes. If disqualified candidate was not permitted to contest the election then how the voters would have voted in favour of the candidate who has secured more votes than the other remaining candidates would be a question in the realm of speculation and unpredictability. In such a situation, declaring the election of the returned candidate on the ground of his initial disqualification to contest the election by itself would not entitle the election petitioner or any other candidate to be declared elected.” 21. Considering the said judgments of the apex court and division bench of this court, referred to herein above, i find that in view of the fact that the election of the petitioner was not declared as null and void on the ground of corrupt practice, the question of invoking provisions of section 21(1) (b) of the goa panchayat raj act,1994 to declare the respondent no.1 as elected cannot be sustained. There is no evidence on record nor such evidence has been adduced to establish that all the votes cast in favour of the petitioner can be considered to be invalid votes. As such, declaring the respondent no.1 as elected member in the impugned judgment merely because he had polled second highest votes cannot be sustained. Admittedly, the respondent no.1 had not polled majority of votes of all the valid votes in the concerned election. Hence, considering that there were another two contestants in the election and it was multicontested election, the question of invoking section 21 (1)(b) of the goa panchayat raj act,1994 to declare the respondent no.1 as elected is without any jurisdiction. The contention of the learned counsel shri kamat to the effect that the other contesting candidates had not challenged the order declaring the respondent no.1 as a elected member and as such no interference is called for in the said portion of the impugned order cannot be accepted. It is also to be noted that apart from the power under section 21 of the goa panchayat raj act, 1994, the learned tribunal has no power to declare an unsuccessful candidate as duly elected and undoubtedly such powers can be exercised in case the requirements of section 21 are fulfilled. The judgment of the learned tribunal declaring the respondent no.1 as duly elected without considering whether the requirements of section 21 of the said act of 1994 are satisfied cannot be sustained. The pleadings of the respondent no.1 in the election petition did not satisfy that the respondent no.1 had polled a majority of the valid votes and as such the respondent no.1 could not be declared elected as per the said provisions of law. The election of the panchayat is a democratic process and the elected person should be the person who carries with him the majority of the valid votes. As such, the said part of the impugned judgment would result in the interference in the democratic process. The impugned judgment to that extent is without jurisdiction and cannot be sustained. 22. The next contention of the learned counsel shri kamat for the respondent no.1 to the effect that this court should not interfere in the judgment passed by the learned tribunal in exercise of its jurisdiction and no interference is called for under article 227 of the constitution of india cannot be sustained. 22. The next contention of the learned counsel shri kamat for the respondent no.1 to the effect that this court should not interfere in the judgment passed by the learned tribunal in exercise of its jurisdiction and no interference is called for under article 227 of the constitution of india cannot be sustained. Once the judgment passed by the learned tribunal is found to be in flagrant breach of the fundamental principles of law, the question of allowing such judgment to continue does not arise at all. The tribunal is bound to function within the bounds of the statute and it is the duty of this court to keep the tribunal within the bounds of their authority as provided by law. The power under article 227 of the constitution includes the power of judicial review. The power and duty of the high court under article 227 is essentially to ensure that the tribunals have done what they are required to do in accordance with the law. Hence, the high court can interfere in case of erroneous assumption or acting beyond its jurisdiction or error of law apparent on record by the tribunals. 23. Dealing with the contention of shri kamat learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 to the effect that in view of the fact that the respondent no.1 has already taken charge no interference is called for in the impugned judgment, i find that as the respondent no.1 has taken charge pursuant to the directions passed in the impugned judgment which have been held to be contrary to the statutory provisions of law, the respondent no.1 who was very well aware that the petitioner would challenge the impugned order cannot claim any equity in his favour as the said direction was at his own instance. Hence, the said contention is devoid of any merits and is rejected. 24. In view of the above, i pass the following : o r d e r (i) the petition is partly allowed. (ii) the impugned judgment dated 29.07.2011 to the extent that the respondent no.1 is declared as elected from the ward no.viii of village panchayat of socorro is quashed and set aside. (iii) earlier part of the judgment declaring the election of petitioner as null and void is upheld. (iv) rule is disposed of in above terms. (v) the petition stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. (iii) earlier part of the judgment declaring the election of petitioner as null and void is upheld. (iv) rule is disposed of in above terms. (v) the petition stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs. 25. At this stage, shri kamat, learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.1 seeks stay of the order passed by this court today for a period of 15 days. 26. Shri pavithran a. V., learned counsel appearing for the petitioner opposes the said request. 27. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the operation of the above judgment passed today is stayed for a period of 15 days subject to the condition that the respondent no.1 shall not vote in any meeting of the concerned panchayat.