1. All the five petitioners (hereinafter referred to as the 'accused') are facing trial in case FIR No. 101/2009 registered at Police Station, Udhampur under Sections 302/34/452/212/109/120-B RPC and 3/25&4/2S of Indian Arms Act forallegedly causing the death of one Sanjay Jandial. Through the instant Criminal Revision, they seek setting aside of order dated 10-11-2010 passed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, whereby application moved by the State through Special Public Prosecutor u/s 540 of Cr.P.C read with Section 154 of Indian Evidence Act, for recalling/re-examining the witnesses, namely Surjit Singh, Sumit Khajuria, Raj Mathur and additionally summoning PW Kewal Jandial, the brother of the deceased who is not figuring in the list of witnesses furnished with the final report (challan) has been allowed. 2. It needs to be mentioned here that accused Rajesh Pandoh, who is also known as Raju as one finds from the evidence on record was initially booked under Section 212 RPC only for harbouring the offenders and granted bail. Subsequently, he was rearrested as the Police has allegedly found him to be involved for the offence punishable u/s 302 read with Section 120-B RPC. The evidence of the aforesaid witnesses sought to be reexamined by the prosecution is primarily with regard to the involvement of the accused Rajesh Pandoh only. 3. Another important fact, which needs to be mentioned here, is that the trial of the present case had initially started before learned Sessions Judge, Udhampur, before whom, five prosecution witnesses were examined including the aforesaid three witnesses. At that time, one Mr. Anil Vijay, Advocate was representing the State after being appointed as Special Public Prosecutor at the request of father of the deceased. However, the complainant questioned the fairness of the trial including the bona fides and competence of the said Special Public Prosecutor conducting the trial at Udhampur and sought appointment of Mr. R.K.Kotwal, Advocate (Jammu) as Special Public Prosecutor which request was acceded to by the Home Department, as such appointed him as Special Public Prosecutor vide SRO No.232/2010. 4. After appointment of Mr. R.K.Kotwal, Advocate (Jammu) as Special Public Prosecutor which request was acceded to by the Home Department, as such appointed him as Special Public Prosecutor vide SRO No.232/2010. 4. After appointment of Mr. R.K. Kotwal as Special Public Prosecutor, the complainant moved an application through him bearing Cr.T. A. No.04/2010 before High Court seeking withdrawal of the case from the files of Sessions Court, Udhampur and its transfer to any other Court of competent jurisdiction at Jammu, inter alia on the grounds that after noticing that two of the prosecution witnesses, namely Sumit Khajuria and Raj Mathur, resiled from their earlier statements during their cross-examination and also from their, statements recorded under Section 164-A CrPC, the Special Public Prosecutor conducting the trial did not make any effort to subject these witnesses to cross examine. Even the learned trial Court did not control the proceedings to ensure that the true facts are brought on the file. 5. Another ground taken in the aforesaid transfer application was that one of the PWs, namely Surjit Singh, turned hostile before the trial Court who was subsequently contacted by Kewal Jandial son of the complainant on a cell phone so as to know the circumstances, in which the said witness had resiled from his earlier statement upon which he (Surjit Singh) informed Kewal Jandial that he was threatened of dire consequences by the accused. The threat was also extended to the lives of his children. The complainant claimed that his son Kewal Jandial had recorded the conversation and placed the same on Compact Disc (CD). In addition to it, the complainant also voiced his reservation with regard to the fairness of the trial. 6. The High Court ultimately noticing all the facts in detail and the manner in which the proceedings were controlled by the learned trial Judge found it to be a fit case for transfer, as such the file of the present case was withdrawn from Sessions Court, Udhampur and transferred to the Court of Principal Sessions Judge, Jammu vide order dated 30th of April, 2010. It was subsequently assigned to 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu for trial. The order dated 30th of April, 2010 also forms part of the record. 7. It is thereafter an application under Section 540 Cr.P.C was filed by the Special Public Prosecutor before the trial Court at Jammu which now stands allowed vide impugned order dated 10-11-2010. It was subsequently assigned to 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu for trial. The order dated 30th of April, 2010 also forms part of the record. 7. It is thereafter an application under Section 540 Cr.P.C was filed by the Special Public Prosecutor before the trial Court at Jammu which now stands allowed vide impugned order dated 10-11-2010. 8. Heard Mr. Sunil Sethi, learned Sr. Advocate assisted by Mr. Ravi Abrol, Advocate, appearing for all the accused and Mr. R.K.Kotwal, learned Special Public Prosecutor, representing the State. I have also gone through the impugned order, allowing the application. 9. Mr. Sethi submits that the order impugned is clearly contrary to the provisions of Section 540 Cr.P.C and the learned trial Judge has allowed the prosecution to fill up the lacunae in its case, there being no justification for recalling of the aforesaid witnesses. It appears that the application is allowed on mere asking of the Special Public Prosecutor without any substance in it after the earlier Special Public Prosecutor conducting the trial at Udhampur was substituted. He further submits that the evidence of the witnesses, which has been finally recorded by the trial Court, cannot be lightly brushed aside without any convincing and cogent reasons. He contends that if the witnesses, who have already been examined-in-chief and cross-examined by the defence counsel at length as happened in this case, are brought in the witness box once again for the same purpose on asking of the complainant party, it would be sheer abuse of the process of the Court. According to Mr. Sethi, so far as witness Surjit Singh is concerned, he did not support the prosecution case and was declared hostile. He was thoroughly cross-examined by the Special Public Prosecutor. It is after he stepped into the witness box, some fresh development took place when Kewal Jandial, the real brother of the deceased, contacted him (PW Surjit Singh) on his mobile phone, asking him as to why he had resiled from his earlier statement recorded by the police during investigation for which he tendered some explanation. These grounds can not be made available to the prosecution to ask for recalling the witnesses once examined and cross examined at length. This would amount to extending an unlimited rope to the prosecution to overcome its weaknesses which is legally not permissible. These grounds can not be made available to the prosecution to ask for recalling the witnesses once examined and cross examined at length. This would amount to extending an unlimited rope to the prosecution to overcome its weaknesses which is legally not permissible. Learned counsel then contends that even otherwise factually the plea taken by the complainant is incorrect for the reason that Surjit Singh had lodged report against the complainant for forcibly extracting the statement from him. It is the complainant side which, in fact, was threatening Surjit Singh to resile from his earlier statement and depose against the accused. For this reason only, a prayer was made not only for re-examination of Surjit Singh witness, but additionally another witness namely Kewal Jandial with whom conversation on mobile phone had taken place, despite being out of the list of prosecution witnesses. According to learned senior counsel, there cannot be any better case than the presen t one in which Special Public Prosecutor has made an attempt to fill up the lacunae in the prosecution case. With regard to the other two witnesses, namely Sumit Khajuria and Raj Mathur, Mr. Sethi submits that they have virtually toed the prosecution case in toto in-examination-chief. May be in their cross examination, some part of their evidence causes dent to the prosecution case, but that part of evidence is by way of explanation sought by the defence counsel to arrive at the truth. The prosecution thus cannot be allowed to take the shelter of Section 157 of Evidence Act in this situation. Had these witnesses said a word about non-participation of accused Rajesh Pandoh in their examination-in-chief, the learned Special Public Prosecutor was within his right to seek the permission of the Court to declare him hostile for the purposes of cross-examination in order to elicit the truth, but not in the manner now adopted by moving an application under Section 540 CrPC. Allowing the said application on this ground would prejudice the case of the accused gravely and cannot be said to be for just decision of the case. Just decision does not mean a decision in favour of prosecution only and to prejudice the case of the accused. Mr. Allowing the said application on this ground would prejudice the case of the accused gravely and cannot be said to be for just decision of the case. Just decision does not mean a decision in favour of prosecution only and to prejudice the case of the accused. Mr. Sethi, thus, prays for setting aside of the impugned order dated 10-11-2010 with a further prayer to issue direction to the learned trial Court to conclude the trial expeditiously preferably within fixed time frame as all the accused are languishing in the jail since long. 10. Per contra, Mr. R.K.Kotwal, learned Special Public Prosecutor submits that as per the prosecution case, it is the accused Rajesh Pandoh alias Raju only, who had the motive in his bosom to eliminate Sanjay Jandial. He was initially booked for the offence punishable under sections 212 RPC only and thereafter re-arrested for the charge of Section 302/120-B RPC. In order to connect him with the commission of offence, Sumit Khajuria and Raj Mathur are the material witnesses, who had supported the case of the prosecution in examination-in-chief. They, in their cross examination, however, resiled from their statements recorded on oath during examination-in-chief and also from their statements recorded under Section 164-A CrPC. According to Mr. Kotwal, it was virtually a complete go-bye to the statement recorded during the investigation, that too, under Section 164-A Cr.P.C. and it should have prompted the Special Public Prosecutor to make an effort to seek the permission of the Court to put questions to these witnesses by way of cross examination resorting to Section 154 of Evidence Act. He submits that there was no legal impediment in it. According to Mr. Kotwal, even the learned trial Judge did not control the proceedings properly in this case at Udhampur, so as to ensure that the true facts surface on record. Had the learned trial Judge resorted to Section 165 of Evidence Act to elicit the true facts by putting Court questions on these vital aspects from the aforesaid two witnesses, perhaps the entire complexion of the case would have been otherwise and the situation for moving an application under Section 540 CrPC would have not arisen. Had the learned trial Judge resorted to Section 165 of Evidence Act to elicit the true facts by putting Court questions on these vital aspects from the aforesaid two witnesses, perhaps the entire complexion of the case would have been otherwise and the situation for moving an application under Section 540 CrPC would have not arisen. This primarily was the reason that the father of the deceased moved High Court seeking transfer of the trial from Udhampur to Jammu by filing Cr.T. A No.04/2010 in which all these aspects have been minutely dealt with by the High Court and ultimately transferred the case to Jammu which order has attained finality. He has drawn the attention of the Court to the relevant observations made in this regard in the order dated 30th of April, 2010 passed in the aforesaid Cr.T.A No.04/2010. Supporting the impugned order, Mr. Kotwal submits that even the trial Judge has also dealt with this aspect in detail while considering the scope of Sections 154/155 & 165 of Evidence Act. With regard to the evidence of Surjit Singh, Mr. Kotwal submits that he too requires to be recalled for the reason that after the hostile statement of this witness was recorded by the trial Court, he was enquired by Kewal Jandial, the real brother of the deceased on his mobile phone and the conversation held between these two persons on their respective mobile phones was placed in the Compact Disc. This witness, in fact, was threatened by the accused, which resulted into his resiling from his previous statement recorded u/s 164-A CrPC. In case, he is brought in the witness box once again for the purposes of re-examination, the true facts will come to light which would be very essential for just decision of the case. Therefore, his examination has also become essential under the present set of circumstances. Kewal Jandial in turn also becomes an important witness to unfold this story, as he is one who had prepared the Compact Disc with regard to the conversation held between him and Surjit Singh. Therefore, his examination is equally important despite the fact that he does not figure in the list of witnesses, as the power to summon material witness under Section 540 CrPC is not confined only to the list of witnesses prepared by the prosecution along with the charge sheet. Therefore, his examination is equally important despite the fact that he does not figure in the list of witnesses, as the power to summon material witness under Section 540 CrPC is not confined only to the list of witnesses prepared by the prosecution along with the charge sheet. It is for the Court to see that if the evidence of any person as a witness relating to the enquiry/trial of any criminal case appears to be essential to the just decision of the case, the Court can summon that person as a witness. According to the learned counsel, the powers under Section 540 CrPC are very wide for summoning any person though not already summoned, provided it advances the cause of justice. Mr. Kotwal then submits that may be it is out of context, but all the accused have now filed writ in the High Court seeking quashment of SRO No.232/2010, by virtue of which, he has been appointed as Special Public Prosecutor to conduct the criminal trial at Jammu inter alia on several grounds, in which, they have gone to the extent of levelling the allegation against him of demonstrating inclination towards the family of the deceased. He submits that unbaffled by what all is said in the said writ petition against him, he considers that he has assumed the charge of a Special Public Prosecutor to conduct the present trial by a special order and therefore, would render all his fair assistance to the trial Judge so as to avoid failure of justice. He submits that it is an attempt by the accused to see that he does not conduct the trial at Jammu. Mr. Kotwal, thus, prays for upholding the impugned order dated 10-11-2010. 11. Section 540 Cr.P.C. (State Code) corresponding to Section 311 Cr.P.C (Central Code) is in two parts. The first part deals with the discretionary power of the Court, whereas the second part imposes upon the Court an obligation of summoning or recalling and re-examining any witness. So far as the first part is concerned, the Court can use its discretion at any stage during the trial till the judgment is pronounced, whereas according to the second part, the need of recalling or summoning the witness would arise when the Court feels the evidence of a particular witness is essential to the just decision of the case. So far as the first part is concerned, the Court can use its discretion at any stage during the trial till the judgment is pronounced, whereas according to the second part, the need of recalling or summoning the witness would arise when the Court feels the evidence of a particular witness is essential to the just decision of the case. In this context, it would be profitable to reproduce para Nos.9 & 16 of the Supreme Court Judgment handed down in case Mohan Lal Shamji Soni v. Union of India & another reported as 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271:- "9. The very usage of the words such as 'any Court', 'at any stage', or 'of any enquiry, trial or other proceedings', 'any person' and 'any such person' clearly spells out that this section is expressed in the widest possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the Court in any way. However, the very width requires a corresponding caution that the discretionary power should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the Code. The second part of the section does not allow for any discretion but it binds and compels the Court to take any of the aforementioned two steps if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case." "16. The second part of Section 540 as pointed out albeit imposes upon the Court an obligation of summoning or recalling and re-examining any witness and the only condition prescribed is that the evidence sought to be obtained must be essential to the just decision of the case. When any part to the proceedings points out the desirability of some evidence being taken, then the Court has to exercise its power under this provision-either discretionary or mandatory-depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, having in view that the most paramount principle underlying this provision is to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts in order to meet the requirements of justice. In this connection, we would like to quote with approval the following views of Lumpkin, J. in Epps v. S., 19 Ga 118 (Am), which reads thus: "it is not only the right but the duty of the presiding judge to call the attention of the witness to it, whether it makes for or against the prosecution; his aim being neither to punish the innocent nor screen the guilty, but to administer the law correctly Counsel seek only for their client's success; but the judge must watch that justice triumphs." 12. The crux of the ratio of the aforesaid judgment is that only the test for exercising the jurisdiction under Section 540 Cr.P.C., is the exigency of the situation and fair play. Legally, there is no limitation on the power of the Court arising from the stage to which the trial may have reached for examination of a particular witness under this section, but the note of caution is that the examination of a particular witness should be for just decision of the case. 13. It is also well settled and accepted principle that a Court must discharge its statutory function whether discretionary or obligatory, according to law, in dispensing justice because the duty of a Court is not only to do justice but also to ensure that the justice is being done. If there is any negligence laches or mistake by not examining any material witness, the Court's function to render just decision is not in any way impaired at any stage of the trial till the judgment is pronounced. After all, function of the Criminal Court is administration of criminal justice and not to count errors committed by the parties or to find out and declare who among the parties performed better. 14. Let us test the present case on the aforesaid rationale. 15. The entire controversy revolves around the statement of three witnesses only, namely Sumit Khajuria, Raj Mathur and Surjit Singh, because these three witnesses are the main witnesses of the prosecution vis-'-vis the role ascribed to Rajesh Pandoh, who is allegedly shown to be the person having motive in his bosom to commit the murder of the deceased. 15. The entire controversy revolves around the statement of three witnesses only, namely Sumit Khajuria, Raj Mathur and Surjit Singh, because these three witnesses are the main witnesses of the prosecution vis-'-vis the role ascribed to Rajesh Pandoh, who is allegedly shown to be the person having motive in his bosom to commit the murder of the deceased. As stated above, Surjit Singh did not support the prosecution case and declared hostile, whereas the other two witnesses, namely Sumit Khajuria and Raj Mathur, supported the case of the prosecution in their examination-in-chief, but as per the public prosecutor, in their cross-examination conducted by defence, they in order to help accused Rajesh Pandoh, intentionally made a statement giving complete go by to their statements recorded during examination-in-chief. Admittedly, the statements of these witnesses were also got recorded under Section 164-A Cr.P.C during the investigation. 16. I have gone through the statements on oath of Sumit Khajuria and Raj Mathur, as they are available on the trial Court record. It is in vernacular (urdu), translated copy thereof supplied to me for my convenience. 17. Sumit Khajura in his examination-in-Chief states that about one month prior to the murder of Sanjay Jandial, accused Rajesh Pandoh alias Raju had an altercation with him in connection with the vehicle filled of fruit known as 'Kinoo'. The vehicle had come from Pathankot. He in his examination-in-chief states that altercation had taken place in front of him, as accused Rajesh Pandoh and Sanju were into the business of fruit. In the said altercation, Sanju Jandial had beaten accused Rajesh Pandoh and Suresh Kumar. Both had admitted their fault and had left to their respective shops situated in the Fruit Market itself. Thereafter, Sanjay Jandial started abusinghim. It is then stated that accused Ankush Pandoh had come to the shop of Rajesh Pandoh where he disclosed everything to him upon which Ankush said that Sanju Jandial would not allow them to continue their business, therefore, some arrangement was to be made in this regard. Ankush said that he would make the arrangement in this regard. In vernacular, it is said, "Ankush ne iss par kaha ki woh Sanju ka bandobast kar dega". Sumit Khajuria further states that he had disclosed this fact to Sanju Jandial who stated that the accused are just kids before him, as such, they can not cause any harm to him. In vernacular, it is said, "Ankush ne iss par kaha ki woh Sanju ka bandobast kar dega". Sumit Khajuria further states that he had disclosed this fact to Sanju Jandial who stated that the accused are just kids before him, as such, they can not cause any harm to him. In cross-examination this witness states that when he reached Sabzi Mandi (Fruit Market), the occurrence was already over and Sanjay Jandial and accused Rajesh Pandoh had gone to their respective shops. He further states that he had not gone to the shop of Raju and did not disclose any fact to him as to what had happened about this altercation. He categorically states that he did not listen to the talk between the accused Rajesh Pandoh and Ankush Pandoh, rather heard it from other persons. In vernacular, it is said, "Logo se suni thi". He categorically states that whatever had transpired between accused Ankush Pandoh and accused Raju, this all happened before he reached the spot and when he reached Sabzi Mandi, witness Raj Mathur was already there and Raj Mathur disclosed to him that the people gathered there were saying that accused Rajesh Pandoh and Ankush Pandoh had talked something and Sanjay alias Sanju (since deceased) and Raju alias Rajesh Pandoh had an altercation. In vernacular, it is said, "Muzhar ko Raj Mathur ne bataayaa tha ki log yeh bataa rahe hain ki Raju aur Ankush ke bich baat hui aur Sanju ka aapas main jagra hua hai." PW-Raj Mathur when stepped into the witness box, he in his examination-in-chief virtually toed the same as already said by Sumit Khajuria in his examination-in-chief. In his cross-examination he virtually disowns his statement recorded in examination-in-chief and states that he reached Mandi after the occurrence was over. He categorically states that he did not hear any talk between accused Rajesh Pandoh and accused Ankush Pandoh, who is his nephew, as he (Raj Mathur) was not present at the spot. After going through the evidence of aforesaid two main prosecution witnesses, namely Sumit Khajuria and Raj Mathur, one aspect is very clear that whatever is stated by them in their cross-examination conducted by the defence counsel, cannot be said to be the explanation put forth by them to certain facts as said by Mr. Sethi, learned senior counsel. After going through the evidence of aforesaid two main prosecution witnesses, namely Sumit Khajuria and Raj Mathur, one aspect is very clear that whatever is stated by them in their cross-examination conducted by the defence counsel, cannot be said to be the explanation put forth by them to certain facts as said by Mr. Sethi, learned senior counsel. Showing all restraints on commenting further vis-'-vis their evidence on record, lest it is construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case prejudicing the case of either side, in my considered view, this vital aspect requires to be appreciated within the ambit of Chapter-X of Evidence Act which relates to the examination of a witness. 18. In case Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat, reported as 1964 CrLJ (SC) 472, the Apex Court while dealing with the scope of examination of a witness and his re-examination, has observed as under: "Section 137 of the Evidence Act gives only the three stages, in the examination of a witness, namely examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination. This is a routine sequence in the examination of a witness. This has no relevance to the question when a party calling a witness can be permitted to put to him questions under Section 154 of the Evidence Act: that is governed by the provisions of Section 154 of the said Act, which confers a discretionary power on the Court to permit a person who calls a witness to put any questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. Section 154 does not in terms, or by necessary implication confine the exercise 'of the power by the Court before the examination-in-chief is concluded or to any particular stage of the examination of the witness. It is wide in scope and the discretion is entirely left to the Court to exercise the power when the circumstances demand. To confine this power to the stage of examination-in-chief is to make it ineffective in practice. Clever witness in his examination in chief faithfully conforms to what he stated earlier to the police or in the committing court, but in the cross-examination introduces statements in a subtle way contradicting in effect what he stated in the examination-in-chief. To confine this power to the stage of examination-in-chief is to make it ineffective in practice. Clever witness in his examination in chief faithfully conforms to what he stated earlier to the police or in the committing court, but in the cross-examination introduces statements in a subtle way contradicting in effect what he stated in the examination-in-chief. If his design is obvious, we do not see why the Court cannot, during the course of his cross-examination, permit the person calling him as a witness to put questions to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. To confine the operation of Section 154 of the Evidence Act to a particular stage in the examination of a witness is to read words in the section which are not there. We cannot also agree with the High Court that if a party calling a witness is permitted to put such questions to the witness after he has been cross-examined by the adverse party, the adverse party will not have any opportunity to further cross-examine the witness on the answers elicited by putting such questions. In such an event the Court certainly, in exercise of its discretion, will permit the adverse party to cross-examine the witness on the answers elicited by such questions. The Court, therefore, can permit a person, who calls a witness, to put questions to him which might be put in the cross examination at any stage of the examination of the witness, provided it takes care to give an opportunity to the accused to cross-examine him on the answers elicited which do not find place in the examination-in-chief. 19. Provisions of Section 165 of Evidence Act also regulates the relevancy and admissibility of the evidence before the trial Court. 19. Provisions of Section 165 of Evidence Act also regulates the relevancy and admissibility of the evidence before the trial Court. It reads: "Judge's power to put questions or order production The Judge may, in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant facts, ask any question he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any witness, or of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant; and may order the production of any document or thing: and neither the parties nor their agents shall be entitled to make any objection to any such question or order, nor, without the leave of the Court, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in reply to any such question: Provided that the judgment must be based upon facts declared by this Act to be relevant, and duly proved: Provided also that this section shall not authorize any Judge to compel any witness to answer any question or to produce any document which such witness would be entitled to refuse to answer or produce under Sections 121 to 131, both inclusive, if the question were asked or the document were called for by the adverse party; nor shall the Judge ask any question which it would be improper for any other person to ask under Section 148 or 149: nor shall be dispense with primary evidence of any document, except in the cases hereinbefore excepted." 20. In case Himanshu Singh Sabharwal v. State of M.P. & Others, reported as AIR 2008 Supreme Court 1943, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that; if a Criminal Court is to be an effective instrument in dispensing justice, the presiding Judge must cease to be a spectator and a mere recording machine by becoming a participant in the trial evincing intelligence, active interest and elicit all relevant materials necessary for reaching the correct conclusion to find out the truth and administer justice with fairness and impartiality both to the parties and to the community it serves. Courts administering criminal justice cannot turn a blind eye to vexation or oppressive conduct that has occurred in relation to proceedings even if a fair trial is still possible, except at the risk of undermining the fair name and standing of the Judges as impartial and independent adjudicators. 21. It is profitable to note para 16 of Himanshu Singh Sabharwal's case (supra). 21. It is profitable to note para 16 of Himanshu Singh Sabharwal's case (supra). It reads: "The Courts have to take a participatory role in a trial. They are not expected to be tape recorders to record whatever is being stated by the witnesses. Section 311 of the Code and Section 165 of the Evidence Act confer vast and wide powers on Presiding Officers of Court to elicit all necessary materials by playing an active role in the evidence collecting process. They have to monitor the proceedings in aid of justice in a manner that something, which is not relevant is not unnecessarily brought into record. Even if the prosecutor is remiss in some ways, it can control the proceedings effectively so that ultimate objective i.e truth is arrived at. This becomes more necessary where the Court has reasons to believe that the prosecuting agency or the prosecutor is not acting in the requisite manner. The Court cannot afford to be wishfully or pretend to be blissfully ignorant or oblivious to such serious pitfalls or dereliction of duty on the part of the prosecuting agency. The prosecutor who does not act fairly and acts more like a counsel for the defence is a liability to the fair judicial system and Courts could not also play into the hands of such prosecuting agency showing indifference or adopting an attitude of total aloofness." 22. In the aforesaid Judgment itself, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with Section 311 CrPC (Central Code) corresponding to Section 540 CrPC (State Code), has held in para 17 as under: "The power of the Court under Section 165 of the Evidence Act is in a way complementary to its power under Section 311 of the Code. The section consists of two parts i.e (i) giving a discretion to the Court to examine the witness at any stage and (ii) the mandatory portion which compels the Court to examine a witness if his evidence appears to be essential to the just decision of the Court. Though the discretion given to the Court is very wide the very width requires a corresponding caution. Though the discretion given to the Court is very wide the very width requires a corresponding caution. In Mohan Lal v. Union of India 1991 Supp (1) SCC 271 this Court has observed, while considering the scope and ambit of Section 311 that the very usage of the word such as 'any Court' 'at any stage' or 'any enquiry or trial or other proceedings' 'any person' and 'any such person' clearly spells out that the Section has expressed in the widest possible terms and do not limit the discretion of the Court in any way. However, as noted above, the very width requires a corresponding caution that the discretionary powers should be invoked as the exigencies of justice require and exercised judicially with circumspection and consistently with the provisions of the Code. The second part of the section does not allow any discretion but obligates and binds the Court to take necessary steps if the fresh evidence to be obtained is essential to the just decision of the case 'essential' to an active and alert mind and not to one which is bent to abandon or abdicate. Object of the Section is to enable the Court to arrive at the truth irrespective of the fact that the prosecution or the defence has failed to produce some evidence which is necessary for a just and proper disposal of the case. The power is exercised and the evidence is examined neither to help the prosecution nor the defence. If the Court feels that there is necessity to act in terms of Section 311 but only to subserve the cause of justice and public interest. It is done with an object of getting the evidence in aid of a just decision and to uphold the truth". 23, Following the ratio of Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar's case (supra), it can be said that there cannot be any bar in confining the operation of Section 157 of Evidence Act to a particular stage, i.e., only up to the stage of recording of exami-nation-in-chief of the witness in terms of Section 137 of Evidence Act. Undoubtedly, if the party calling a witness is permitted to put such questions to the witness after he has been cross-examined by the adverse party, the adverse party will have an opportunity to further cross-examine the witness on the answers elicited by putting such questions. Undoubtedly, if the party calling a witness is permitted to put such questions to the witness after he has been cross-examined by the adverse party, the adverse party will have an opportunity to further cross-examine the witness on the answers elicited by putting such questions. The present case, in fact, is at that stage only. 24. What disturbs the Court is that even the Trial Judge at Udhampur had detached himself from the proceedings. Section 165 of Evidence Act authorizes the trial Judge with very wide and un-bridled power and therefore, he, in fact, in this case should have taken a participatory role in the trial. Even if the Special Public Prosecutor conducting the trial at Udhampur was showing some remissness in some way, the trial Judge should have controlled the proceedings so as to arrive at the truth by putting certain Court questions once it came to his notice that aforesaid two main witnesses were totally loosing the track. What would have been the effect of those Court questions is not the issue before this Court. 25. I agree with the submissions advanced by Mr. Kotwal that if the trial Court had resorted to Section 165 of Evidence Act and not remained oblivious to some serious pitfalls, perhaps the situation of moving application under Section 540 CrPC would have not arisen. 26. Testing the case on hand on its own facts on the touchstone of the aforesaid rationale, in my considered view, required to be re-examined, as it would be in aid of just decision of the case and to uphold the truth. In no way, it would amount to filling up the lacunae by the prosecution in its case. Rather, in my view, it becomes imperative to permit the prosecution to re-examine the aforesaid two witnesses finding the aforesaid defect in conducting the trial. Therefore, the resistance shown by Mr. Sethi in this regard is unfounded and deserves to be rejected. 27.1, however, find substance in the opposition raised by Mr. Sethi with regard to examination of PW Surjit Singh, who did not support the case of the prosecution and declared hostile by the Spl. Public Prosecutor and subsequently cross-examined also by the State counsel, and additionally calling another witness, namely Kewal Jandial, the real brother of the deceased. 27.1, however, find substance in the opposition raised by Mr. Sethi with regard to examination of PW Surjit Singh, who did not support the case of the prosecution and declared hostile by the Spl. Public Prosecutor and subsequently cross-examined also by the State counsel, and additionally calling another witness, namely Kewal Jandial, the real brother of the deceased. In my view, if they are allowed to be re-examined, it would amount to filling up the lacunae in the prosecution case for a very simple reason that re-examination of PW Surjit Singh is sought on the premise of subsequent development surfaced on the basis of conversation held between him and Kewal Jandial. If the prosecution is allowed to adduce the evidence in such like situation, it would be an unending process, which cannot be permitted under the garb of Section 540 CrPC. 28. The net result is that the instant Criminal Revision Petition is partly allowed. The impugned order dated 10-11-2010 passed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, whereby allowing the application for recalling PWs, Sumit Khajuria and Raj Mathur is upheld, whereas with regard to PW Surjit Singh and additionally PW Kewal Jandial, who is not figuring in the list of witnesses, is set aside. Needless to say that the accused shall have the opportunity to further cross-examine the aforesaid two witnesses after they are re-examined. Resultantly, Cr. Rev. No.81/2010 stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms along with Cr.M.A No. 56/2010. 29. Since the accused are languishing in the jail since long, trial Court is requested to wrap up the trial at the earliest preferably within four months' time from the next date fixed, in case the index is maintained. 30. Trial Court record along with copy of the order be sent to the Court concerned without any delay. 31. Registrar Judicial to ensure compliance of the order.