Judgment 1. This appeal, preferred by the State, is directed against the judgment and order dated 17.11.2005 rendered by the Sessions Judge, Mandya in Sessions Case No.4/1999, acquitting all the accused who were charged and tried for the offence punishable under Sections 143, 147, 148, 114, 448, 302 and 506 r/w. Section 149 of IPC. 2. The factual matrix, that is necessary for deciding this appeal, is as follows:- Admittedly, since 1995 a civil dispute was pending in Court, between the complainant - M.H. Ramakrishnegowda and accused Nos.2 and 7, in respect of a land bearing survey No.61, known as garden land, situate at village Maradahalli. They were having agricultural lands adjacent to each other. In January 1998, the persons of accused Nos.2 and 7 entered the garden land of the deceased - Honnegowda and attempted to destroy and ransack coconut garden, for which, the complainant had lodged a complaint with the Krishnarajapet Police Station. After this complaint, a proceeding under Section 107 Cr.P.C., was initiated against the accused. This is the alleged motive for committing the offence of murder. All the accused are related to each other. Accused No.1 is a son of accused No.2, accused No.7 is a brother of accused No.2, accused Nos.4 and 5 are sons of accused No.9, whereas, accused Nos.3 and 6 are brothers and accused No.8 is a son of accused NO.7. Thus, all the accused are members of one and the same family. Even the deceased, the complainant and some of the witnesses are also distant relatives of the accused persons. 3. On 10.05.1998, the deceased - Honegowda (for short 'the deceased') had returned from Bangalore and as usual gone to the farmhouse, in garden land, for sleeping. PW.2 Boralingegowda and PW.3 Thimmegowda were also with him in the intervening night of 10/11.05.1998. In the morning (on 11.05.1998), at about 6.00 - 6.30 a.m., PWs.2 and 3 went in the garden for collecting coconuts. At about 7.00 to 7.30 a.m., they heard cry of the deceased coming from the direction of the farmhouse. They immediately rushed to the farmhouse. Accused Nos.1 to 4 and 6 and 8 were inside the farmhouse, whereas, accused Nos.5, 7 and 9 were waiting outside. At about 7.00 to 7.30 a.m., they heard cry of the deceased coming from the direction of the farmhouse. They immediately rushed to the farmhouse. Accused Nos.1 to 4 and 6 and 8 were inside the farmhouse, whereas, accused Nos.5, 7 and 9 were waiting outside. When PWs.2 and 3 reached and tried to enter the farmhouse, accused Nos.5, 7 and 9 prevented them and hence, they saw through the window as to what was happening inside the farmhouse. They witnessed accused Nos.1, 2 and 4, were assaulting the deceased with choppers, whereas, accused Nos.3, 6 and 8 were assaulting him with clubs. PWs.2 and 3 again made two-three attempts to enter the house with a view to rescue the deceased, but every time they were prevented by accused Nos.5, 7 and 9. After the brutal assault, all the accused fled from the scene of offence. Thereafter, PWs.2 and 3 went inside the farmhouse and after having seen the deceased, PW.3 went to K.R. Pet to inform his brother PW.1. PWs.1 and 3, returned to the farmhouse and after seeing the deceased, PW.1 rushed to the police station and at 11.00 a.m. lodged a complaint against the accused - persons. On the basis of the complaint lodged by PW.1, an offence was registered by PW.13, bearing crime No.62/1998 against all the accused. PW.13, then set an investigation in motion. During the investigation, he sought help of a dog squad. He recorded statements of several witnesses, drew different panchanamas, summoned photographer to take photographs of the deceased and the scene of offence and after having completed the investigation, submitted a charge sheet. In the course of investigation, he arrested accused Nos.7 to 9 on 13.05.1998. Accused No.1 was arrested on 19.05.1998, whereas accused Nos.2 to 4 were arrested 27.06.1998. Insofar as accused No.6 is concerned, he was granted anticipatory bail. Before the Sessions Court, the accused pleaded not guilt and claimed to be tried. In the course of trial, the prosecution examined 14 witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, namely PWs.2 and 3. The accused also examined 8 defence witnesses. The prosecution placed several documents and 11 material objects on record, to bring home guilt of the accused. The Sessions Court after considering the entire materials/evidence on record, convicted only accused No.1 - Manjunath for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. The accused also examined 8 defence witnesses. The prosecution placed several documents and 11 material objects on record, to bring home guilt of the accused. The Sessions Court after considering the entire materials/evidence on record, convicted only accused No.1 - Manjunath for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. Accused No.1 had filed appeal in this Court which he ultimately withdrew. Thus, this appeal is against original accused Nos.2 to 9. 4. We have heard learned Counsel for the parties at great length and perused the entire evidence placed on record by the prosecution. We would make reference to the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties at appropriate stages. 5. We have carefully considered the contentions canvassed on both sides. We are also not unmindful of the fact that we are dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal. As a matter of fact, recently in Crl.A.518/2007 we considered the entire case law to find out the circumstances, in which this court, while exercising the powers under Section 378 Cr.P.C. can interfere with the order of acquittal. We considered the judgments right from SHEO SWARUP VS. KING EMPEROR REPORTED IN AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) until BASAYYA PRABHAYYA HALLUR VS. STATE OF KARNATAKA REPORTED IN 2009 17 SCC 55 . The principles laid down in those Judgments, which need to be borne in mind, while dealing with the criminal appeals against acquittal, were carved out by us in Crl. A.518/2007 decided on 7.6.2012, which read thus:- "(i) The findings of trial Court which had an advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence, can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons; good and sufficiently cogent reasons; and for strong reasons. (ii) The substantial and compelling reasons for reversing judgment of acquittal should not be construed as a formula which has to be rigidly applied in every case and so it is not necessary that before reversing Judgment of acquittal, the High Court must necessarily categorise the findings recorded therein as perverse; (iii) The powers of High Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal are as wide as those which it has while dealing with an appeal against conviction. However, while dealing with an appeal against acquittal the appellate Court has to bear in mind that there is a general presumption in favour of the innocence of an accused in criminal case and that presumption is only strengthened by the acquittal; (iv) Though the appellate Court has the same powers as the trial Court on appreciating evidence and coming to its own conclusion on questions of fact, it should not interfere with an acquittal, unless it finds that the view taken by the trial Court is unreasonable and perverse; (v) If the view taken by the trial Court, on its appreciation of evidence, is a reasonably plausible view, the appellate Court should not disturb an acquittal merely because it thinks that another view is better or more preferable. Unless the approach made by the trial Court to the consideration of the evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest illegality or the conclusion recorded by it is such which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously; (vi) If it is found that two views are possible, the one as held by the trial Court for acquitting the accused, and the other which the appellate Court is inclined to take, the appellate Court should not disturb the order of acquittal made by the trial Court; (vii) the appellate Court in appeals against acquittals has to proceed more cautiously and only if there is absolute assurance of the guilt of the accused upon the evidence on record, that the order of acquittal is liable to be interfered with or disturbed." 6. Keeping the aforesaid principles in view, we have gone through the evidence adduced by the prosecution and examined the contentions urged by learned counsel for the parties. 7. Before we deal with the submissions, it would be advantageous to look into the evidence laid by the prosecution to bring home guilt of the accused persons. The prosecution examined PWs.2 and 3 as eyewitnesses to the occurrence. PW.2 was a labourer, working in the farm of the deceased, whereas, PW.3 is a son of the deceased. PW.2 has stated that he used to sleep in the farmhouse with the deceased. In the intervening night of 10 - 11.05.1998 also he along with the deceased and PW3 was sleeping in the farmhouse. PW.2 was a labourer, working in the farm of the deceased, whereas, PW.3 is a son of the deceased. PW.2 has stated that he used to sleep in the farmhouse with the deceased. In the intervening night of 10 - 11.05.1998 also he along with the deceased and PW3 was sleeping in the farmhouse. He has stated that in the morning, he and PW.3 woke-up at 6.00 - 6.30 a.m., for taking round in the garden land. When they left, the deceased continued to sleep. While taking round, they were collecting coconuts. At that time, they heard cry of the deceased coming from the direction of farmhouse. They immediately rushed to the farmhouse. He has stated that accused Nos.5, 7 and 9 were standing outside the farmhouse and they were instigating the accused inside the farmhouse stating "not to leave, kill him and we would see whatever happens". (The utterances in Kannada were “KANNADAM”). Then, he states that he and PW.3 made attempt to enter the farmhouse and since accused Nos.5, 7 and 9 prevented him and PW.3 they saw through the window of the farmhouse. He saw accused Nos.1 to 4, 6 and 8 were inside the farmhouse. Out of them, he states that accused Nos.1, 2 and 4 were assaulting the deceased with choppers after dragging him on the ground. The deceased on that night was sleeping on the cot. They were assaulting the deceased on head, face, neck, etc. He, then states that accused Nos.3 and 8 were assaulting the deceased with clubs whereas, accused No.6 had pressed the deceased with a club. PW.2 further states that on seeing the assault they cried loudly and once again made an attempt to enter the farmhouse. They were again prevented by accused nos.5, 7 and 9. After the assault accused Nos.1 and 8 threw the weapons in their hand, namely chopper and club respectively, at the scene of offence. The other accused fled from the scene of offence with the weapons. PW.3 tried to chase the accused persons, when they threatened him saying that they would do the same thing which they did to his father. Thereafter, PWs.2 and 3 entered the farmhouse and saw the deceased dead with bleeding injuries. Apart from the actual incident, PW.2 has also stated about the enmity between the two families. PW.3 tried to chase the accused persons, when they threatened him saying that they would do the same thing which they did to his father. Thereafter, PWs.2 and 3 entered the farmhouse and saw the deceased dead with bleeding injuries. Apart from the actual incident, PW.2 has also stated about the enmity between the two families. He then states that PW3 went to K.R.Pet to inform PW1, the other son of the deceased. PW3 and PW1 came back to the farmhouse at about 9.00 - 9.30 a.m. Then PW1 lodged an FIR at 11.00 a.m. Thereafter, police visited the farmhouse at 11.30 a.m. and drew panchanamas, collected Mos.1 to 8 from the scene of offence. In the cross-examination, we did not find anything worth elicited from this witness so as to discard his testimony. We have not noticed a single contradiction/omission having been brought on record in the course of cross-examination of this witness. On the contrary, the case put to the witness and the suggestions, adverse to what he had stated in his examination-in-chief, made to him in the course of cross-examination were denied by him stoutly. He also confirmed in the cross-examination, more particularly in paragraph 30 of the evidence, whatever he had stated before police. The manner in which P.W.2 has deposed, we find, that his presence at the relevant time was not only probable but it was natural. P.W.2 was cross-examined to show that he was hardly 4½ feet in height and therefore, through the window, which was at the height of 5 feet 3 inches, he could not have seen the incident. But, all the suggestions to that effect were denied by the witness stating that he had seen the occurrence standing on a stone near the window. Since the photograph on record did not show any stone, PW2 explained that he saw through the window standing on the foundation stone below the window. At the end of the cross-examination, defence put its case to this witness, which he denied stoutly. The relevant portion from his evidence in para-45 read thus: "It is false to suggest that neither Thimmegowda nor myself were present in the farmhouse on that night. It is false to suggest that deceased Honnegowda did not take meals on that night. It is false to suggest that on the relevant night soon after Honnegowda attended the nature call he was killed. It is false to suggest that deceased Honnegowda did not take meals on that night. It is false to suggest that on the relevant night soon after Honnegowda attended the nature call he was killed. When the police visited the farmhouse, no cattle was tied in the farmhouse. I had not taken out any cattle from the farmhouse on that day." The line of cross-examination was to demonstrate that PWs.2 and 3 were not in the farmhouse on that night/at the relevant time and that they did not see the incident. But all the suggestions were denied. 8. We have also gone through the evidence of PW3 and noticed that he has also stated as to how the incident occurred. This witness supports/corroborates the deposition of PW2 in all respect and no inconsistency/discrepancy was pointed out by learned counsel for the defence between the evidence of P.Ws.2 and 3. We, therefore, avoid repetition of what PW3 stated in his examination-in-chief. We did not find in the cross-examination of P.W.3 anything worth so as to discredit his testimony. He has corroborated the evidence of P.W.2 on all material aspects, such as actual occurrence/overt act attributed to each of the accused, enmity between the two families, subsequent event, etc. Even in the cross-examination of this witness we have not noticed a single contradiction/omission having been brought on record. This witness denied the case put to him in the form of defence and so also suggestions made contrary to what he had stated in his examination-in-chief. The only contradiction/omission that has been brought on record by confronting P.W.3 is regarding the utterances by accused nos.5, 7 & 9. He has admitted in the cross-examination that he did not tell the police that these accused were telling the accused inside that "courtininda courtige hoguthane ivanannu bittare munde bittukodolla" (he is going from Court to Court, if left he will not spare us in future). Then he has confirmed as to what he had stated before the police. If the deposition of this witness is taken as a whole, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears to us truthful and trustworthy. It lends support to the ocular evidence of P.W.2. Minor innovations, contradictions and omissions need to be overlooked and no importance could be attached in a lengthy cross-examination conducted after 4 years from the date of incident. 9. It lends support to the ocular evidence of P.W.2. Minor innovations, contradictions and omissions need to be overlooked and no importance could be attached in a lengthy cross-examination conducted after 4 years from the date of incident. 9. It is well settled that the discrepancies/contradictions/omissions by themselves would not render testimony of the witness untruthful/untrustworthy. In considering whether the deposition of any witness passed the test of reliability, one would have to consider whether such testimony taken as a whole and in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, it is credible version. Minor innovation/discrepancy/contradiction/omission need to be overlooked and no importance could be attached. In other words, every discrepancy/contradiction/omission may not necessarily be fatal but it all depends on the facts and circumstances of the case and they need to be examined in the background of probabilities of the prosecution case and veracity of the witnesses. In the evidence of eyewitnesses, we did not find any discrepancy/contradiction/omission, that has been brought on record, to discard their version or to hold that they did not witness the occurrence. 10. Insofar as accused Nos.5, 7 and 9 are concerned, P.W.3 as stated by PW2, states that they were instigating the accused inside the farmhouse to kill the deceased. However, there is some variance in the utterances attributed by these witnesses to accused Nos.5, 7 and 9. According to P.W.3, accused Nos.5, 7 and 9 were instigating the accused inside the farmhouse stating that "the deceased had grabbed their land and he goes from Court to Court and if they leave him, he would not leave the land in future". The utterances in Kannada, read thus: "O namma jameenannnu apaharisiddane, kortininda kortige houguthane ivanannu bittare munde bittukodolla" These utterances undoubtedly differ from the utterances attributed by P.W.2. 11. There also exist some minor discrepancies in the evidence of PWs.2 and 3 in respect of the role attributed and played by accused Nos.5, 7 and 9. The discrepancy/inconsistency in the evidence of P.Ws.2 & 3 insofar as accused nos.5, 7 & 9 are concerned, they are mainly in respect of the way they were instigating the accused inside the farmhouse for killing the deceased. As observed earlier, the utterances attributed by this witness to accused nos.5, 7 & 9 differ. The discrepancy/inconsistency in the evidence of P.Ws.2 & 3 insofar as accused nos.5, 7 & 9 are concerned, they are mainly in respect of the way they were instigating the accused inside the farmhouse for killing the deceased. As observed earlier, the utterances attributed by this witness to accused nos.5, 7 & 9 differ. That apart, even there is no consistency in respect of the manner in which P.Ws.2 & 3 were prevented from entering the farmhouse to rescue the deceased. P.W.2 stated that they pushed him and P.W.3 when they made attempt to enter the farmhouse, whereas P.W.3 stated that they simply prevented him from entering the farmhouse. These inconsistencies, assume importance in view of the fact that no other material/evidence is on record to corroborate the ocular evidence in respect of A-5, 7 & 9. Similarly, insofar as accused Nos.3, 6 and 8 are concerned, PW2 has stated that accused Nos.3 and 8 were assaulting the deceased with clubs and accused No.6 had pressed the deceased with a club. PW3, on the other hand, has stated that accused Nos.3, 6 and 8 had pressed the deceased with clubs. Our attention was specifically invited to these discrepancies to contend that evidence of these two witnesses insofar as accused Nos.3, 6 and 8 is concerned, must be discarded. It was further submitted that there is no other evidence supporting/corroborating the testimony of PWs.2 and 3, in respect of accused Nos.3, 6 and 8. This also creates doubt about their (A-3, 6 & 8) presence at the time of occurrence or their participation. Learned Counsel for the defence, therefore, submitted that evidence of PWs.2 and 3 deserves to be discarded out right, they being "interested witnesses". We would deal with this aspect little later. 12. PW1 is a son of the deceased and brother of PW3. PW3 informed him about the alleged incident. On getting the information, he first went to the farmhouse, saw his father lying in a pool of blood and thereafter, went to the police station and lodged compliant at about 11.00 a.m. On the basis of the complaint lodged by him, he states that police went to the farmhouse at about 12.00 or 12.15 p.m. and started investigation. On getting the information, he first went to the farmhouse, saw his father lying in a pool of blood and thereafter, went to the police station and lodged compliant at about 11.00 a.m. On the basis of the complaint lodged by him, he states that police went to the farmhouse at about 12.00 or 12.15 p.m. and started investigation. He was cross-examined on several aspects at length, to which we would make reference in the latter part of our judgment, while dealing with the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. It would be necessary to mention, at this stage, the suggestion made to PW.1, that "PWs.2 and 3 had not seen the incident, they did not know the assailants, and since they all were in inimical terms with the accused, they prepared a list of the accused and named them as assailants of their father falsely". This suggestion was however stoutly denied by the witness. 13. PW4 was examined to prove presence of the accused persons near the garden land at about 8.00 a.m. on the date of incident. He has made a general statement in examination-in-chief in respect of all the accused, without naming them, and then named only accused Nos.2, 3, 4 and 6 stating that he had seen them at about 8.00 a.m. holding weapons used by them in the alleged incident. 14. PW5 also made a general statement, without naming anyone, that he had seen the accused persons near the pump-set house of accused No.6. However, he was declared hostile since he did not support the prosecution any further. 15. PW6 was examined to prove recovery of weapons at the instance of accused Nos.2, 3 and 4. He acted as panch witness. M.O.8-Machu was recovered at the instance of accused No.2 (Ex.P8). M.O.1-Club was recovered at the instance of accused No.3 (Ex.P9) and M.O.9-Machu was recovered at the instance of accused No.4 (Ex.P10). Admittedly, none of the weapons were having bloodstains. They were recovered at the instance of these accused on 27.6.98 i.e., after more than 1½ month of the alleged incident. It is true, that ordinarily finding of human blood on the weapons, discovered at the instance of accused, is incriminating and it lends support as a corroborative piece of evidence. Admittedly, none of the weapons were having bloodstains. They were recovered at the instance of these accused on 27.6.98 i.e., after more than 1½ month of the alleged incident. It is true, that ordinarily finding of human blood on the weapons, discovered at the instance of accused, is incriminating and it lends support as a corroborative piece of evidence. But in a case where there is a direct evidence, such as testimony of an eye witness, merely because blood stains are not found on the articles discovered after about a month or more, does not mean that recovery/discovery is of no avail to the prosecution. In the present case so far as accused nos. 3, and 5 to 9 are concerned though they were also named by both the eye witnesses, still their evidence and the evidence in nature of recovery, the weapons without blood stains need to be examined with all care and caution in view of the fact that the eyewitness are close to the deceased. Even the medical evidence does not support ocular evidence in respect of the allegations against accused Nos.3 and 5 to 9. 16. PW8-Dr.Krishnaswamy, performed autopsy and in his evidence, narrated the injuries sustained by the deceased. According to the doctor, the deceased sustained 20 injuries and all were incised/cut wounds and were possible with the choppers, recovered at the instance of accused. Insofar as the time of death is concerned, the doctor opined that the death occurred before three hours and within 24 hours from the time of post mortem. 17. Mr. Jadhav, learned counsel for the respondents- accused submitted that PWs.2 and 3 are not genuine eyewitnesses. He submitted that they were not in the farmhouse at the relevant time and they did not see the occurrence as claimed by them. In support of his contention, he invited our attention to the fact that the police had secured dog squad. On the basis thereof, he submitted that if PWs.2 and 3 had seen the occurrence, there was no need of securing dog squad. He then submitted, it has also come in the evidence of PW2 that the police had prepared a list of enemies of the deceased. If the assailants were known, he submitted, there was no need of preparing the list of enemies. He then submitted, it has also come in the evidence of PW2 that the police had prepared a list of enemies of the deceased. If the assailants were known, he submitted, there was no need of preparing the list of enemies. He then submitted that delay in lodging FIR also creates doubt about the presence of PWs.2 and 3. After inviting our attention to the evidence of PW3, he submitted PW3 went to inform PW1 about the incident and from there they both came to the scene of offence. He submitted that, as admitted by PW3, the police station was on the way to house of PW1 but still PW3 did not go to police and give information about the occurrence. Even after informing PW1 about the incident, without going to the police station they both went to the farmhouse and from there at 11.00 a.m. PW1 went to the police station and lodged the complaint. This conduct, he submitted, of PW1 & 3 creates doubt whether PWs.3 and 2 had seen the incident. They could have approached police immediately but they did not do so because they did not know the assailants. He submitted that the sons of deceased after discussing at the farm house concocted the story against the accused and implicated them falsely. He submitted, this needs to be examined in the light of the defence theory developed in the course of cross-examination of the eye witnesses. Then, it was submitted, so far as PW2 is concerned, his height was hardly 4½ feet, whereas height of the window was 5 feet 3 inches, and, therefore, it cannot be accepted that he had seen the incident through the window. 18. We would like to consider the submissions of learned counsel for the accused that securing a dog squad clearly supports the defence theory that the occurrence was not witnessed by any one. PW2 in his cross-examination has stated that dog squad came to the farmhouse between 11.30 a.m. and 12.00 noon. Admittedly, the complaint was lodged by PW1 at 11.00 a.m. and in the complaint, names of all the accused were disclosed. This witness was not supposed to have knowledge as to who called the dog squad and why it was called. PW3 in the cross-examination has stated that the dog squad came to the farmhouse at about 11.00 a.m. or 12.00 noon. This witness was not supposed to have knowledge as to who called the dog squad and why it was called. PW3 in the cross-examination has stated that the dog squad came to the farmhouse at about 11.00 a.m. or 12.00 noon. PW1, in his cross-examination has stated that he does not remember when the dog squad arrived at the scene of offence. He has also stated that he did not know from where the dog squad was secured. He has further stated, when the dog squad arrived the dead body was still in the farmhouse. To one question, in the cross- examination, he replied stating that he did not remember whether the dog squad was there in the farmhouse when his brother came from Mysore? To the next question, he answered stating that his brother came to the farmhouse at about 9.30 a.m. Therefore, in defence, it was suggested that the dog squad reached the farmhouse by 9.30 a.m. i.e., even before the complaint was lodged and till then, nobody knew who the assailants were. This witness has however denied the suggestion that they were not knowing the assailants and they prepared a list of the accused persons who were in inimical terms with them. PW13 in his deposition has stated that he sent a message to send dog squad. He also states, he recorded an FIR and registered a crime against the accused. He sent the FIR to Court through PC No.469 (PW-12). From his testimony, it clearly appears to us that after recording the FIR, he sent message to send dog squad to the farmhouse. In the cross-examination, he denied the suggestion that before he visited the scene of offence, the dog squad had its presence there. He also denied the suggestion that the dog squad would be secured only when an identity of the accused is not known. He also denied the case put to him that since identity of the assailants was not known, they requisitioned the dog squad at 9.30 a.m. Further, in the cross-examination, he has specifically stated that after he reached the spot around 12.40 p.m., the dog squad was at the spot. He also denied, in the cross-examination that long before registration of the offence, he had addressed a requisition to send dog squad to the scene of offence. He also denied, in the cross-examination that long before registration of the offence, he had addressed a requisition to send dog squad to the scene of offence. Similarly, PW15-I.O., has stated that the dog squad was secured to examine scene of offence and that it entered the farm house at about 1.00 p.m. and by that time he knew who the assailants were and he only wanted to find out to which direction the appellants had fled. From the evidence of these witnesses, we have no doubt and we are satisfied that the dog squad was secured only after filing of the FIR. The defence theory that PWs.2 and 3 had not seen the incident and they were not knowing names of the assailants and hence the dog squad was secured, in our opinion, must be rejected. 19. Having regard to the manner in which PWs.2 and 3 have stated about the occurrence in their depositions and the sequence given by them, it cannot be stated that they did not witness the incident and the entire case was concocted by them, as alleged by the defence, against the accused persons. The incident occurred sometime around 7.30 - 8.00 a.m. From there, PW3 went to inform his brother PW1 and both PWs.1 and 3 went back to the farmhouse around 9.30 a.m. Thereafter, PW1 went to the police station and lodged a complaint. Time mentioned on the complaint shows that it was recorded at 11.00 a.m. We do not find anything unnatural in this sequence of events. It cannot be accepted that all the four brothers came together at the farmhouse after the alleged incident and since they did not know the assailants they concocted the story and accordingly PW1 lodged the complaint. PW3 in the cross-examination has stated that after the police arrived and noted the injuries on the dead body, they prepared a list of persons who were not in good terms with them. It is on the basis of this admission given in the cross-examination, it was vehemently argued that none of the eyewitnesses are genuine eyewitnesses. In other words, PWs.2 and 3 had not seen the occurrence as claimed by them and that they were not knowing the names of the assailants. It is on the basis of this admission given in the cross-examination, it was vehemently argued that none of the eyewitnesses are genuine eyewitnesses. In other words, PWs.2 and 3 had not seen the occurrence as claimed by them and that they were not knowing the names of the assailants. It is true that this witness in the cross-examination has made such statement but this by itself in our opinion cannot be a ground to discard their ocular version. Why police asked the names of the persons who were not in good terms with them is not explained. On the basis of a bald statement made in the very lengthy cross-examination, it is not possible to accept the defence theory that the complainant and his brothers were not knowing the names of the appellants and therefore, in order to book the culprits the names of persons who were not in good terms with them were asked by the police. It may be a part of investigation in all such cases, as was stated by the Investigating Officer in case of dog squad. 20. We would like to consider the submission that the police station was between the house of PW1 and the farmhouse, still P.W.1 & P.W.3 did not choose to approach police immediately which conduct creates doubt whether P.W.3 had witnessed the occurrence. In criminal cases the Court cannot proceed to consider the evidence of the witnesses in a mechanical way. It is well settled that the broad features of the prosecution case, the probabilities and the normal course of human conduct of a prudent person are some of the factors which are always kept in mind while evaluating the merits of the case. Merely because PW3 or PW1 did not go to police station immediately, it cannot be stated that the whole prosecution case is false and/or PWs.1 and 3 concocted the case against the accused persons. The FIR, admittedly, came to be lodged within less than 3 hours from the time of occurrence, which cannot be termed as delay so as to doubt veracity of the contents thereof. That apart, how one would react to the situation depends upon the psychology of that person at the relevant time. The FIR, admittedly, came to be lodged within less than 3 hours from the time of occurrence, which cannot be termed as delay so as to doubt veracity of the contents thereof. That apart, how one would react to the situation depends upon the psychology of that person at the relevant time. It is quite possible that instead of approaching the police immediately, PW3 thought it proper to approach his brother first and inform him about the alleged incident and that PW1 after knowing about the occurrence thought it fit to go to the farmhouse to see his father. We do not find anything unnatural in this conduct of PWs.1 and 3. Moreover, we cannot overlook the fact that this all happened within a span of about three hours. 21. The submission that there was a delay in sending FIR to the Court supports the defence theory also deserves to be rejected outright. From the evidence of PW12, it is clear that there was no delay at all on the part of the police to send the FIR to CJM Court at 3.15 p.m. This witness has stated that he was on duty at about 11.45 a.m. when he received FIR in CR No.62/98 from PSI-CW27- Nagappa. He immediately went to K.R. Pet Court and since PO was on leave he returned to the police station and after obtaining bus warrant, he went to Mandya and submitted FIR at 3.15 p.m. In the cross-examination, he has stated that the distance between K.R. Pet and Mandya is about 70 Kms. and to cover this distance it takes 1-2 hours in car. He has also specifically stated that he took bus warrant at about 1.00 p.m. and then, left for Mandya. He reached Srirangapatna at about 2.30 p.m. and after 10 minutes he took bus to Mandya and reached at 3.05 p.m. Having regard to the sequence of events narrated by this witness (PW12), we do not find that there was any delay in sending the FIR to CJM Court and the delay, that was caused, in any case cannot be attributed to contend that PWs.1 to 3 concocted the whole story against the accused and lodged FIR on the basis of imagination to settle score with the accused persons. 22. Insofar as motive is concerned, an enmity between the two families is an admitted fact. 22. Insofar as motive is concerned, an enmity between the two families is an admitted fact. Enmity, as is well known, is a double edged weapon whereas existence of a motive on the part of an accused may be held to be the reason for committing crime, the same may also lead to false implication. Suspicion, therefore, against the accused on the basis of motive to commit the crime cannot by itself lead to a judgment of conviction. The evidence of inimical eyewitnesses, indubitably, needs sufficient corroboration from other evidence including medical evidence. The Courts are required to scrutinise their testimony with anxious care to find out whether their testimony inspire confidence to be acceptable notwithstanding the existence of enmity. Once enmity is proved to be the motive for the commission of the crime, the accused cannot urge that despite proof of the motive of the crime, the witnesses proved to be inimical should not be relied upon. In other words, the testimony of eyewitnesses, which is otherwise convincing and consistent, cannot be discarded simply on the ground that the eyewitnesses were related to the deceased. There could be the finding of conviction and sentence on the basis of ocular testimony of the eyewitnesses, irrespective of the fact they are interested witnesses, if it is corroborated by other circumstances/evidence such as recovery of weapons, the existence of enmity between the accused and the deceased, the medical evidence, etc. 23. In the present case, we find that the accused cannot urge that since witnesses proved to be inimical with them should not be relied upon. The ocular testimony of the inimical eyewitnesses coupled with recovery of weapons and medical evidence consistent with the overt- act attributed to each of the accused, in our opinion, would be sufficient to hold such accused guilty. We would, therefore, like to examine whether the allegations stand proved against all the accused beyond all reasonable doubt. 24. We would also like to consider the submission of learned counsel for the accused that PWs.2 and 3 both being interested/inimical witnesses, their evidence deserves to be discarded outright, apart from the fact it is not corroborated by other circumstances and evidence. 24. We would also like to consider the submission of learned counsel for the accused that PWs.2 and 3 both being interested/inimical witnesses, their evidence deserves to be discarded outright, apart from the fact it is not corroborated by other circumstances and evidence. He submitted that so far as accused Nos.3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are concerned, there is absolutely no other evidence on record to support the ocular evidence in respect of their participation in commission of crime. He submitted that even medical evidence does not support the prosecution insofar as the alleged role attributed and played by accused Nos.3, 6 and 8 is concerned. These three accused according to the prosecution were inside the farmhouse and were armed with clubs. Out of them, accused Nos.3 and 8, as stated by PW2, were actually assaulting the deceased with clubs, whereas accused No.6 was pressing the deceased with club, perhaps to prevent his movements. PW3, however, does not state that accused Nos.3 and 8 were assaulting the deceased. According to this witness, all the three accused (accused Nos.3, 6 and 8) were pressing the deceased with clubs in their hands to prevent his movements. He, therefore, submitted that there is absolutely no other material on record to support the allegations against accused Nos.3, 6 and 8. He then submitted that insofar as accused Nos.5, 7 and 9 are concerned, the role attributed to them by PWs.2 and 3 is that they were standing outside the farm house in order to prevent any other person to enter the farm house in order to rescue the deceased. He invited our attention to the inconsistencies/discrepancies in the evidence of PWs.2 and 3 and submitted that they create doubt about their presence at the scene of offence. PWs.4 and 5 also did not specifically name them to state that they had seen these three accused (Accused Nos.5, 7 and 9) after the incident. In the circumstances, he submitted that having regard to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in dealing with the appeal against acquittal, it cannot be stated that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt, the charge against accused nos.3, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9. 25. In the circumstances, he submitted that having regard to the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in dealing with the appeal against acquittal, it cannot be stated that the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt, the charge against accused nos.3, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9. 25. Before we consider the submissions advanced by learned counsel on the aforementioned submissions, we deem it appropriate to make reference to the Judgment of the Supreme Court, dealing with the question of interested witnesses, in DHARNIDHAR vs. STATE OF U.P. & OTHERS (2010) 7 SCC 759 .The Supreme Court in paragraphs 12, 13 & 14 observed thus: 12. There is no hard-and-fast rule that family members can never be true witnesses to the occurrence and that they will always depose falsely before the court. It will always depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. In Jayabalan v. UT of Pondicherry', this Court had occasion to consider whether the evidence of interested witnesses can be relied upon. The Court took the view that a pedantic approach cannot be applied while dealing with the evidence of an interested witness. Such evidence cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from a person closely related to the victim. The Court held as under : (SCC p. 213, paras 23-24) "23. We are of the considered view that in cases where the court is called upon to deal with the evidence of the interested witnesses, the approach of the court, while appreciating the evidence of such witnesses must not be pedantic. The court must be cautions in appreciating and accepting the evidence given by the interested witnesses but the court must not be suspicious of such evidence. The primary endeavour of the court must be to look for consistency. The evidence of a witness cannot be ignored or thrown out solely because it comes from the mouth of a person who is closely related to the victim. 13. Similar view was taken by this Court in Ram Bharosey v. State of U.P. where the Court stated the dictum of law that a close relative of the deceased does not, per se, become an interested witness. 13. Similar view was taken by this Court in Ram Bharosey v. State of U.P. where the Court stated the dictum of law that a close relative of the deceased does not, per se, become an interested witness. An interested witness is one who is interested in securing the conviction of a person out of vengeance or enmity or due to disputes and deposes before the court only with that intention and not to further the cause of justice. The law relating to appreciation of evidence of an interested witness is well settled, according to which, the version of an interested witness cannot be thrown overboard, but has to be examined carefully before accepting the same. 14. In the light of the above judgments, it is clear that the statements of the alleged interested witnesses can be safely relied upon by the court in support of the prosecution's story. But this needs to be done with care and to ensure that the administration of criminal justice is not undermined by the persons, who are closely related to the deceased. When their statements find corroboration by other witnesses, expert evidence and the circumstances of the case clearly depict completion of the chain of evidence pointing out to the guilt of the accused, then we see no reason why the statement of so-called "interested witnesses" cannot be relied upon by the court". (emphasis supplied) Similarly, in SEEMAN vs. STATE, BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE, Supreme Court in paragraph 4 observed thus: "It is now well settled that the evidence of witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground that he is a related witness or the sole witness, or both if otherwise the same is found credible. The witness could be a relative but that does not mean to reject his statement in totality. In such a case, it is the paramount duty of the court to be more careful in the matter of scrutiny of evidence of the interested witness, and if, on such scrutiny it is found that the evidence on record of such interested sole witness is worth credence, the same would not be discarded merely on the ground that the witness is an interested witness. Caution is to be applied by the court while scrutinzing the evidence of the interested sole witness. Caution is to be applied by the court while scrutinzing the evidence of the interested sole witness. The prosecution's non - production of one independent witness who has been named in the FIR by itself cannot be taken to be a circumstance to discredit the evidence of the interested witness and disbelieve the prosecution case. It is well settled that it is the quality of the evidence and not the quantity of the evidence which is required to be judged by the court to place credence on the statement." 26. Thus, the position of law is clear that a statement of the interested witnesses can be relied upon by the Court in support of the prosecution case with care. If the statements of such witnesses find corroboration by other witnesses, expert evidence and the circumstances of the case clearly depict completion of the chain of evidence pointing out to the guilt of the accused, their evidence can be relied upon by the Court. 27. Keeping the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments in view and considering the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in dealing with an appeal against acquittal, we have carefully considered the contentions canvassed by learned counsel for the parties. We are not prepare to concede to the submission advanced by learned counsel for the defence that P.Ws. 2 & 3 being interested/inimical witnesses, they have falsely and deliberately involved the accused in the case. 28. In the present case, we find presence of P.Ws. 2 & 3 at the time and place of the murder probable. Therefore, we proceed to consider how far their evidence could be safely accepted against each of the accused. It is well settled that no fixed formula can be adopted that in case some of the accused persons implicated by the eyewitnesses have been acquitted, therefore, others must also be necessarily acquitted nor that whatever be the facts and circumstances of the case, but in case an eyewitness states to have seen the occurrence, sans discrepancies/contradictions in his own statement, must always be believed and acted upon. More particularly, where the circumstances warrant application of due care and caution in appreciating the statements of the witnesses, coupled with the fact that all the witnesses with no exception are related inter se and to the deceased. 29. More particularly, where the circumstances warrant application of due care and caution in appreciating the statements of the witnesses, coupled with the fact that all the witnesses with no exception are related inter se and to the deceased. 29. In this case, both the witnesses are related to the deceased and as such could be termed as interested witnesses. The relation between deceased and P.W.2 is that of master and servant, whereas relation between the deceased and P.W.3 is that of father and son. However, mere relationship with the deceased, in our opinion, is not a good ground for discarding their evidence, when, we have already observed that their presence at the scene of occurrence was probable. All that is necessary is to scrutinise their evidence with more than ordinary care and circumspection with reference to the part or role assigned to each of the accused. As observed by the Supreme Court in STATE OF PUNJAB vs. WASSAN SINGH AIR 1981 SC 697 , in such cases an effort should be made to sift the grain from the chaff; accept what appeared to be true and to reject the rest. 30. Apart from finding out as to what should be accepted as true and reject the rest, in this case, we would have to bear in mind the principles laid down by the Supreme court, to be kept in view while dealing with the appeal against acquittal. In other words, we would have to proceed more cautiously and see whether there is absolute assurance of the guilt of the accused upon the evidence on record and that the order of acquittal is liable to be interfered with or disturbed. The case of the prosecution as disclosed from the evidence of P.Ws. 2 & 3, is that all the accused, including original accused no.1, had participated in commission of the crime. We therefore, need to examine whether the evidence on the basis of which the trial court convicted accused no1, would be sufficient to convict all other accused/respondents and whether other evidence lends support/corroborate the ocular evidence of PW's 2 & 3 against all accused and, if not, whether evidence on record proves beyond all reasonable doubt case of the prosecution atleast against some of the accused. 31. From the testimonies of P.Ws.2 & 3, it appears to us that the set of 3 accused each played different roles. 31. From the testimonies of P.Ws.2 & 3, it appears to us that the set of 3 accused each played different roles. Accused nos.1, 2 & 4 were armed with choppers and they allegedly assaulted the deceased on different parts of the body. Accused nos.3, 6 & 8 were allegedly armed with clubs. Out of them, accused nos. 3 & 8, as stated by P.W.2, assaulted the deceased with clubs, whereas accused no.6 pressed the deceased with club, may be to prevent his movements. P.W.3 however, has stated that all the 3 accused (A-3, 6 and 8) pressed deceased with clubs, may be to prevent his movements. In other words, P.W.3 has not attributed any blows to these accused. Accused nos.5, 7 & 9 were outside the farmhouse and were instigating the accused inside the farmhouse to kill the deceased and they also prevented P.Ws. 2 & 3 from entering the farmhouse whenever they made attempt to enter to rescue the deceased. 32. Apart from the ocular evidence, the prosecution has placed medical evidence on record in the form of P.M. report and the deposition of P.W.8 - Dr. Krishnamurthy. The prosecution has also placed on record 2 more circumstances in support of its case, viz. motive and recovery of the weapons at the instance of accused. We would like to examine whether evidence in the form of motive, recovery and post mortem notes coupled with testimony of PW8 lend support to the prosecution case unfolded by P.Ws. 2 & 3 in their depositions. P.W.8 - Dr. Krishnamurthy in his examination-in-chief has given details of the injuries sustained by the deceased. According to the doctor, the deceased sustained 20 wounds. It is pertinent to note that all the wounds sustained by the deceased were incised wounds except two injuries which are described as cut wounds. Most of the injuries, sustained by the deceased, were on his vital parts of body. The deceased also suffered fractures. The doctor, while in the witness box, was shown the weapons M.Os.8 & 9, which are described by the witnesses as machus (choppers), and he opined that the injuries sustained by the deceased were possible by those weapons. The doctor was cross-examined at length. He conducted the post mortem between 3.15 p.m. to 6.15 p.m. on 11.5.1998. The doctor, while in the witness box, was shown the weapons M.Os.8 & 9, which are described by the witnesses as machus (choppers), and he opined that the injuries sustained by the deceased were possible by those weapons. The doctor was cross-examined at length. He conducted the post mortem between 3.15 p.m. to 6.15 p.m. on 11.5.1998. He has stated, the death occurred before 3 hours and within 24 hours from the time of post mortem. It is true that he was cross-examined at great length by the defence to bring on record that the deceased died sometime during the intervening night of 10.5.1998 and 11.5.1998. To be more precise, according to the defence theory the deceased died at midnight at 12 o'clock. This suggestion to the doctor was on the basis of rigor mortis developed in the dead body of the deceased doctor however has opined that setting of rigor mortis depends upon several factors such as condition of that day, the tropical weather etc. He has not expressed any opinion about the exact time of the death. While replying the questions, in the cross-examination, he has only expressed opinion that it was possible that death might have taken place at about 12.00 in the night. However, he has also stated that he could not say the exact time of the death. He was asked general questions and on the basis thereof his opinion was extracted. It is well settled that when ocular evidence is cogent, credible and trustworthy, some variance, if any, with the medical evidence is not of any consequences. It would be erroneous to accord undue primacy to the hypothetical answers of doctor to exclude such eyewitnesses account. It is well said that "witnesses are eyes and ears of justice" and that if their evidence stands to tests and found to be truthful, trustworthy and credible, can be relied upon even if opinion of the doctor/expert is not consistent with ocular evidence. After considering the medical evidence, including deposition of the doctor coupled with the ocular evidence, the trial Court has rightly observed that the death occurred in the morning on 11.5.1998 and we do not find any reason to disturb the said finding. 33. Having regard to the nature of injuries suffered by the deceased, they can definitely be attributed to accused nos.1, 2 & 4 who were armed with sharp edged weapons, viz. choppers. 33. Having regard to the nature of injuries suffered by the deceased, they can definitely be attributed to accused nos.1, 2 & 4 who were armed with sharp edged weapons, viz. choppers. Both the eyewitnesses have stated that these accused assaulted the deceased with the choppers. They were arrested on 27.6.1998 and on the very same date the weapons were recovered at their instance under panchanama bearing Ex. Nos.P-9 & P-10. It is true that there were no bloodstains on these weapons. However, we cannot overlook that their arrest was after about 1½ months. Recovery of weapons is not a substantive evidence but it can only be used as corroborative evidence. In view thereof, insofar as accused nos.2 and 4 are concerned, merely because no blood stains were found on those weapons, it cannot be stated that recovery of the weapons is not incriminating, more particularly, in the light of doctors opinion and ocular evidence. The doctor after having looked at the weapons has clearly stated that the injuries sustained by the deceased were possible by those weapons. 34. P.W.6 was the panch witness for recovery of weapons at the instance of accused nos.2 & 4. He has stated in detail in his examination-in-chief as to how those weapons were produced by the accused in the cross-examination. In our opinion nothing worth, discarding the evidence of this witness was elicited by the defence in the cross-examination. 35. Insofar as motive is concerned, we have already observed that it is admitted by the defence that there was enmity between the 2 families. Keeping that all in view, insofar as accused nos. 2 & 4 are concerned, in our opinion all the above circumstances of the case clearly depict completion of chain of evidence pointing out to the guilt of these accused, and therefore, we see no reason why statements of PW2 and PW3, cannot be relied upon to form an order of conviction against them. 36. We are satisfied that accused nos. 2 & 4 did commit an offence of murder. We may also observe that the Court below while convicting accused no.1 has not recorded any reason whatsoever for separating the case of accused nos. 2 & 4 from the case of accused no.1. 36. We are satisfied that accused nos. 2 & 4 did commit an offence of murder. We may also observe that the Court below while convicting accused no.1 has not recorded any reason whatsoever for separating the case of accused nos. 2 & 4 from the case of accused no.1. We do not find from the Judgment, the reasons why the evidence of eyewitnesses was accepted to convict accused no.1 only when their evidence equally implicates accused nos. 2 & 4 also. Though we would not like to make any further comments on the Judgment of the trial Court, we cannot resist ourselves from observing that the findings/reasons recorded in the impugned judgment insofar as accused nos.2 and 4 are concerned, are perverse, which could not have been possibly arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and judiciously. 37. Insofar as accused nos.3, 6 & 8, who allegedly were armed with clubs, are concerned, we find force in the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the defence that except the ocular evidence of interested/inimical witnesses, there is no other evidence on record supporting the allegations against these accused. The evidence of P.W.8 Dr. Krishnamurthy in our opinion does not support the prosecution case against these accused. The deceased did not sustain a single injury which could be attributed to these accused who allegedly used clubs while assaulting the deceased. Insofar as recovery is concerned, a club was recovered at the instance of accused no.3. That alone in our opinion would not help the prosecution to prove the charge against accused no.3. As observed by the Supreme Court the evidence of eye-witnesses unless corroborated by expert's evidence and the circumstances of the case, the evidence of interested witnesses cannot be relied upon to form an order of conviction. As observed earlier, we are not unmindful of the fact that we are dealing with an appea1 against an order of acquittal in a murder case, allegedly caused in June, 1998. The evidence on record insofar accused nos.3, 6 & 8 is concerned, cannot be stated to be of such a nature that there is assurance of the guilt of the accused. The evidence on record insofar accused nos.3, 6 & 8 is concerned, cannot be stated to be of such a nature that there is assurance of the guilt of the accused. We cannot overlook the fact that in all such cases, as is the present case, a tendency of the witnesses is to involve/implicate more and more number of persons in the family and/or to exaggerate, may be to settle score with them. But that by itself cannot be a ground for discarding their evidence. The duty of the Court is to sift the grain from chaff. In other words, court should accept what appears to be true and reject the rest. So also, when the statements of the interested/inimical eye witnesses find corroboration from the evidence such as expert's evidence and the circumstances of the case which clearly depict completion of the chain of evidence pointing out to the guilt of the accused. When we apply this test insofar accused nos. 3, 6 & 8 are concerned, we are inclined to give benefit of doubt to these accused. 38. That takes us to consider the case of accused nos. 5, 7 & 9. These accused, according to the eyewitnesses, were standing outside and they were instigating the accused inside the farm house. PW2 has attributed utterances to these accused whereby they were instigating the accused inside. They were saying "not to leave him and kill and they would see whatever happens". Whereas PW3 states that these accused were instigating the accused inside the farm house saying that "he has grabbed our land, goes from court to court, if we leave him today, he would not leave the lands in future". There is a clear variance in the utterances attributed by these two witnesses to these accused. There is also a variance in what PW2 and PW3 state about the overt act. According to PW2 these accused pushed him when he and PW3 tried to enter the farm house, whereas PW3 does not say so. Moreover there is no evidence on record to show that due to their instigation more blows were given by the accused inside the farm house. This is not even the case of the prosecution. According to PW2 these accused pushed him when he and PW3 tried to enter the farm house, whereas PW3 does not say so. Moreover there is no evidence on record to show that due to their instigation more blows were given by the accused inside the farm house. This is not even the case of the prosecution. The Supreme Court in STATE OF ORISSA vs. ARJUN DAS 1999 AIR SCW 3200 while considering similar situation observed that in the absence of evidence to show that due to instigation more blows were given by accused persons, no inference can be drawn that the accused who instigated had common intention of causing death of the deceased or that he actually participated in the criminal act. As observed in the case of accused nos.3, 6, & 8 we find that apart from the ocular evidence of the interested/inimical witnesses, there is no other evidence on record to corroborate their version either in the form of recovery of any incrimination articles or experts evidence. Therefore, we are inclined to give benefit of doubt to these accused also. In the circumstances we pass the following order: The appeal is partly allowed. The judgment of the trial Court insofar as accused nos. 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 & 9 is concerned, it is confirmed. The judgment, acquitting accused nos. 2 and 4 i.e., respondents nos.1 and 3, is set aside and they are convicted for the offence punishable under section 302 IPC read with section 34 IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and also to pay fine of Rs. 5,000/- each, in default of payment of fine to undergo S.I. for a period of one month. Accused nos.2 and 4 (Respondent nos. 1 and 3) are also convicted for the offence punishable under section 448 of IPC. However, no separate sentence under this provision is awarded. It is needless to mention that if the accused have undergone any imprisonment so far, they will be entitled for set off under section 428 Cr.P.C. At the request of learned counsel for accused nos.2 and 4 (respondent nos.1 and 3), accused nos. 1 & 2 are granted ten weeks time to surrender.

State By K. R. Pet Town Marigowda @ Ramakrishnegowda v. .