JUDGMENT Mr. Rameshwar Singh Malik, J.: - The petitioners have approached this Court by way of instant petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (‘Cr.P.C.’ for short) invoking the inherent jurisdiction for quashing of complaint No.42/1 dated 02.05.2008 (Annexure PI) titled as “Mota Singh Sekhon versus Gurbarinder Singh Aulakh” and others under Sections 406, 498-A, 506 IPC and also the summoning order dated 03.03.2009, passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Jalandhar, (Annexure P2). 2. Succinctly put, the facts necessary for resolving the issue involved in the present case, are that the marriage between Gagandeep Kaur (daugh­ter of the respondent) and Gurbarinder Singh Aulakh (son of the petitioners No.1 and 2) was solemnised on 13.02.2005 it is pertinent to note here that the present petition was not pressed qua Gurbarinder Singh Aulakh, as withdrawn. 3. It is the further case of the petitioner that Gur­barinder Singh Aulakh went to New Zealand on 01.03.2005. Thereafter, his wife Gagandeep Kaur left for New Zealand on 02.04.2005. It is also submitted that Gagandeep Kaur stayed with the petitioner Nos.1 and 2 only for few days and they were not, in any manner, liable for the mat­rimonial dispute between husband and wife i.e. Gurbarinder Singh Aulakh and Gagandeep Kaur. Differences between the husband and wife arose when they stayed at New Zealand and ulti­mately they got separated on 02.07.2005, as al­leged by the petitioners. Gurbarinder Singh Au­lakh filed divorce petition for dissolution of the marriage in the Family Court, District North Shore, Auckland (New Zealand) and vide order dated 24.09.2007, passed by that Court, the di­vorce was granted and the marriage was dissolved. The decree of divorce was not challenged by Gagandeep Kaur and it became final, copy whereof is appended with the petition as An­nexure P3. 4. The respondent filed the complaint (Annexure PI) against the petitioners under Sections 406,498-A, 506 IPC leveling & allegations that all the three accused have committed the alleged offences. Details have been stated in the complaint. The learned trial Court, after examining the pre­-summoning evidence, issued the summoning order dated 03.03.2009 (Annexure P2), vide which all the three accused have been summoned to face trial for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 406, 498-A, 506 IPC. 5. Details have been stated in the complaint. The learned trial Court, after examining the pre­-summoning evidence, issued the summoning order dated 03.03.2009 (Annexure P2), vide which all the three accused have been summoned to face trial for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 406, 498-A, 506 IPC. 5. Feeling aggrieved against the impugned summoning order, the petitioners have filed the pre­sent petition for quashing of the complaint, summoning order and also the further proceedings arising therefrom. 6. Mr. Baldev Singh, learned senior counsel for the petitioners, vehemently contended that since the marriage took place on 13.02.2005 and Gurbarinder Singh Aulakh left for New Zealand on 01.03.2005 whereas his wife Gagandeep Kaur went to New Zealand on 2.4.2005, there was hardly any time spent by Gagandeep Kaur with petitioner Nos.1 and 2. He further submits that once Gagandeep Kaur stayed with the petitioners only for few days, they cannot be held liable for d any of the offences alleged against them in the impugned complaint. Learned senior counsel also submitted that the court at Jalandhar had no jurisdiction to try the impugned complaint because the petitioners have been living at Chandigarh, and also because no cause of action arose at Jalandhar. Only the Chandigarh court, as submit­ted by the learned senior counsel, had the jurisdiction to try the impugned complaint. 7. Learned senior counsel next contended that the learned Magistrate has miserably failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of Sec­tion 202 Cr.P.C. before passing the impugned summoning order for the reason that no inquiry was held by the learned Magistrate as contem­plated under Section 202 Cr.P.C. He also sub­mits that the allegation of demand of Rs.5 lacs stands falsified, because no such allegation was levelled by Gagandeep Kaur in her complaint (Annexures P5 and P6). Learned senior counsel, while relying upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court in S.K. Bhowmik v. S.K. Arora and another, 2007(4) Criminal Court Cases 839 (P&H), Prem Kaur @ Premo v. Balwinder Kaur, [2009(1) Law Herald (P&H) 278] : 2009(2) Criminal Court Cases 490 (P&H) : Harmanpreet Singh Ahluwalia and others v. State of Punjab and others, [2009(2) Law Herald (P&H) 1643 (SC)] : 2009(3) Criminal Court Cases 794 (S.C.): K.T. Joseph v. State of Kerala and another, : 2010(2) SCC (Crimi­nal) 384, Bahadur Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another, [2010(2) Law Herald (P&H) (DB) 1535] : 2010(3) RCR(Criminal) 252 and Smt. Neeta Sinha v. P.S. Raj. Steels Pri­vate Ltd., [2010(3) Law Herald (P&H) 2415] : 2010(3) Civil Court Cases 315 (P&H) concluded by submitting that the impugned complaint as well as the summoning order were nothing but sheer misuse of process of Court and were liable to be quashed. 8. Per contra, Mr. Vipin Mahajan, learned coun­sel for the respondent submits that learned trial court at Jalandhar had the jurisdiction to try the impugned complaint for the reason that the mar­riage was admittedly solemnised at Jalandhar and the entrustment also took place at Jalandhar. He relies upon Section 181 (4) Cr.P.C. in this re­gard. He further submits that since the cause of action arose only at Jalandhar, the fact that the petitioner had been residing at Chandigarh, would be of no significance. He further submits that Gagandeep Kaur stayed with the petitioners w.e.f. 13.02.2005 to 02.04.2005. During this pe­riod learned counsel for the respondent submits, the Panchayat was convened twice, who went to the house of the petitioners on 27.02.2005 to re­solve the issues requesting them not to misbe­have and torture the girl but all in vain. Members of the Panchayat were examined in the Court at pre- summoning stage. It is further alleged that the Panchayat went to the house of the petition­ers again on 01.03.2008 for settling the dispute but the petitioners misbehaved with the members of Pane hay at also. Members of the Panchayat ap­peared as witnesses during the course of prelimi­nary evidence and pre-charge evidence. Learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that the decree of divorce was secured by Gurbarin­der Singh Aulakh against Gagandeep Kaur by concealing and withholding address of Gagan­deep Kaur, which is clear from Annexure P3. Members of the Panchayat ap­peared as witnesses during the course of prelimi­nary evidence and pre-charge evidence. Learned counsel for the respondent also submitted that the decree of divorce was secured by Gurbarin­der Singh Aulakh against Gagandeep Kaur by concealing and withholding address of Gagan­deep Kaur, which is clear from Annexure P3. He also submitted that a bare reading of Annexure P3 would leave no scope for any doubt that court in New Zealand was misled while granting the decree of divorce, behind the back of Gagandeep Kaur which speaks volumes about the serious misconduct of the accused. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgments rendered by this Court in Sukhdev Singh and others v. Pawanjeet Kaur in Criminal Miscellaneous No. M-34031 of 2011, decided on 16.11.2011, Amandeep Singh v. Balwinder Singh in Criminal Miscellaneous No.M-39101 of 2011 decided on 23.12.2011, Kapila Trading Co. & Anr. v. M/s. Mittal Trading Co. in Criminal Miscellaneous No. M-3258 of 2012, decided on 10.02.2012 and he concluded by submitting that the petition was wholly without any substance and same was liable to be dismissed. 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the par­ties and with their able assistance, have gone through the record of the case. After giving thoughtful consideration to the ri­val contentions raised on behalf of learned counsel for both the parties and also in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, this Court is of the consid­ered opinion that the instant petition is wholly misconceived being without any merits and liable to be dismissed for more than one reasons. 11. The contentions raised by the learned senior counsel have been found without any force. There is no denying the fact that the marriage was solemnised at Jalandhar and entrustment also took place at Jalandhar. Thus, the cause of action arose only at Jalandhar. 11. The contentions raised by the learned senior counsel have been found without any force. There is no denying the fact that the marriage was solemnised at Jalandhar and entrustment also took place at Jalandhar. Thus, the cause of action arose only at Jalandhar. Section 181(4) Cr.P.C., relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, reads as under: “Any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be returned or accounted for, by the accused person.” In view of the above, this Court has no hesitation to hold that the learned trial court at Jalandhar has got the jurisdiction. 12. Coming to the next argument raised by learned senior counsel for the petitioners that provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C. have not been complied with before passing the impugned summoning order, it is necessary to refer to the summoning order at this stage. A bare reading of the summoning order dated 03.03.2009 (An­nexure P2) would show that Section 202 Cr.P.C. has been duly complied with by the learned trial Court while examining Kirpal Singh as CW2, Harparkash Singh as CW3 and Gagandeep Kaur as CW4, besides, the complainant himself, who was examined as CW1. The learned trial Court has passed a detailed and speaking summoning order; which shows due application of judicious mind on the part of learned trial Court. Thus, it is held that the learned trial Court has complied with the provisions of Section 202 Cr.P.C. while passing the impugned summoning order. 13. The last argument raised by learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the demand of Rs.5 lacs stood falsified and without any sub­stance by Annexure P5 and P6. A bare combined reading of Annexures P3 to P6 would show that the decree of divorce was secured by Gurbarin­der Singh Aulakh against Gagandeep Kaur be­hind her back while not giving her address, as if it was not known to him. Thus, this argument of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is re­pelled. So far as the judgments cited by the learned senior counsel are concerned, there is, in fact, no dispute about the law laid down therein. Thus, this argument of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner is re­pelled. So far as the judgments cited by the learned senior counsel are concerned, there is, in fact, no dispute about the law laid down therein. However, it is also the settled proposition of law that peculiar facts of each case are to be seen first before applying any codified or Judge made law thereto. The judgments cited by the learned sen­ior counsel for the petitioners are of no help to him, being distinguishable on facts. 14. On the other hand, I find force in the conten­tions raised on behalf of the respondent. The judgment cited by learned counsel for the re­spondent in Sukhdev Singh’s case (supra) is very close to the facts of the present case. After discussing the issue of jurisdiction, while referring to Section 181 Cr.P.C. and also the scope of Section 202 Cr.P.C., the Court has rightly repelled both these arguments. The relevant observations made by this Court in Sukhdev Singh’s case (Supra) read as under: “This Court in the case of S.K. Bhaumik (supra) and Smt. Neeta Sinha (supra) has quashed the summoning order on the ground that at Magistrate has not held any inquiry as contemplated under Section 202 of the Code. There is no dispute on the ratio that if Magistrate fails to hold inquiry himself or direct cit investigation if accused are not residing within his territorial jurisdiction then summoning order is liable to be set aside with remand to the Magistrate to take decision afresh in accordance with law. Let me examine what would constitute inquiry as contemplated under Section 202 of the Code. Inquiry and investigation are defined u/s 2(g) and 2(h) of the Code which are be­ing reproduced hereinunder: (g) “inquiry” means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magis­trate or Court; (h) “investigation” includes all the proceedings under this Code for the collection of evi­dence conducted by a police officer or by any person (other than a Magistrate) who is authorized by a Magistrate in this behalf; From the plain reading of Section 2(g) and 2(h), it is thus clear that inquiry and investigation are two different things. As per Section 2(g) inquiry would be other than the trial. As per Section 2(g) inquiry would be other than the trial. Now question comes as to whether recording of statements of the complainant and his wit­nesses; perusal of complaint, hearing of complainant or his counsel and appreciation thereof minutely to form the opinion whether or not there is sufficient ground to summon or not to summon the accused would constitute inquiry? Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon Interna­tional Ltd. & Ors., reported in 2008(1) Criminal Court Cases 968 (S.C) in para 13 has observed as under: 13. Chapter XV (Sections 200-203) relates to “Complaints to Magistrates” and covers cases before actual commencement of proceedings in a Court or before a Magistrate. Section 200 of the Code requires a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence to examine the complainant and his witnesses on oath. Section 202, however, enacts that a Magistrate is not bound to issue process against the accused as & matter of course, it enables him before the issue of process either to in­quire into the case himself or direct an investiga­tion to be made by a Police Officer or by such other person as he thinks fit for the purpose of de­ciding whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding further. The underlying object of the inquiry under Section 202 is to ascertain whether there is prima facie case against the accused. It thus allows a Magistrate to form an opinion whether the process should or should not be is­sued. The scope of inquiry under Section 202 is, no doubt, extremely limited. At that stage, what a Magistrate is called upon to see whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the matter and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused. In the opinion of this Court and in view of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.K. Sinha (supra), if Magistrate has examined the complaint and evi­dence carefully before forming opinion that there is sufficient material and ground to sum­mon the accused then requirement of inquiry it self stands satisfied.” 15. As noted above in the present case, the learned Magistrate has not only passed a detailed and speaking order but has also recorded his sat­isfaction that there was sufficient ground to pro­ceed against all the accused for the commission of the offences alleged against them. 16. As noted above in the present case, the learned Magistrate has not only passed a detailed and speaking order but has also recorded his sat­isfaction that there was sufficient ground to pro­ceed against all the accused for the commission of the offences alleged against them. 16. The learned trial court has also referred to the statement of Gagandeep Kaur as CW4, who deposed regarding payment of cash amount by the accused, maltreatment, harassment, physical and mental torture suffered by her at the hands of accused. In this view of the matter, it is held that the learned trial court has considered and appreciated each and every aspect of the matter before passing the impugned summoning order. 17. Regarding the issue of jurisdiction, this Court, in Sukhdev Singh’s case (supra) observed as under: “From the perusal of sub-section (4) of Section 181 of the Code, it is thus clear that if any offence of criminal misappropriation or of criminal breach of trust may be inquired into or tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed or any part of the property which is the subject of the offence was received or retained, or was required to be returned or accounted for, by the accused person.” 18. Two other judgments relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent in the cases of Kapila Trading Co. (supra) and also in Amandeep Singh’s case (supra), this Court had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 202 Cr.P.C. and decided both these cases in favour of the complainant-accused. The relevant observations in Amandeep Singh’s case (supra) read as under :­ “On being asked what does the enquiry means as contemplated under Section 202 Cr.P.C., learned counsel for the petitioner states that enquiry means something more than recording the statement of the complainant under Section 202 Cr.P.C. This Court in the case of Sukhdev Singh and others v. Pawanjit Kaur (Criminal Misc. M.No.34031 of 2011) decided on 16.11.2011, while placing reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Limited and others reported as 2008(1) Criminal Court Cases 968 (S.C.) has held that if Magistrate has examined the complainant’s evidence carefully before forming an opinion that there is sufficient material and ground to summon the accused then requirement of inquiry stands satisfied.” No other argument has been raised. 19. 19. In view of the above discussion, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, the inevitable con­clusion is that the present petition is without any substance and devoid of any merit. It is also the settled proposition of law that the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., being the inherent and dis­cretionary powers, are to be used sparingly and only to achieve the objects specified under Sec­tion 482 Cr.P.C. itself. 20. In the present case, neither any glaring ille­gality or perversity has been found in the im­pugned summoning order nor any has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioners warranting the exercise of inherent juris­diction by this Court. No case has been made out for exercising the inherent jurisdiction and the present petition must fail, being without any merit. 21. Accordingly, the instant petition is ordered to be dismissed, however, with no order as to costs. ---------0.B.S.0------------