C.R. Sarma, J.— This appeal is directed against the judgment and order, dated 18.08.2009, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sonitpur, at Tezpur, in Sessions Case No. 170/2003, arising out of G.R. Case No. 341/2003, whereby and whereunder, the learned Sessions Judge convicted Shri Sukru Munda (hereinafter called the appellant) under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (in short, "IPC") and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default suffer rigorous imprisonment for another period of 6 (six) months for his conviction under Section 302 IPC. 2. Aggrieved by the said conviction and sentence, the convicted person, as appellant, has come up with this appeal. 3. We have heard Ms. Rita Das Mazumdar, learned Amicus Curiae, appearing for the appellant and Mr. K.A. Mazumdar, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State-respondent. 4. The prosecution case, as revealed at the trial, in brief, may be stated as follows: On the night of 09.03.2003, at about 6.00 p.m., the appellant caused the death of his wife, Smti Mina Sainashi (in short, "deceased"), by setting her ablaze, after pouring kerosene oil on her body. The deceased, who made dying declaration, involving her husband, i.e. the appellant, with her death, was shifted to hospital, where she succumbed to her injuries, on the same night. ShriSuresh Sainashi (PW-1), who is the brother of the deceased, lodged the FIR (Ext. 1) with the police, on 18.03.2003. On receipt of the said FIR, police registered a case under Section 302 IPC and launched investigation in to the matter. 5. At the close of the investigation, police submitted charge sheet, under Section 302 IPC, against the appellant and forwarded him to the court for trial. The offence, being exclusively triable by the court of sessions, the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Tezpur committed the case to the court of Sessions. The learned Sessions Judge framed charge, under Section 302 IPC, against the appellant. The charge was read over and explained to the accused person, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. In order to prove their case, prosecution examined, as many as, 11 (eleven) witnesses, including the medical officer (PW 3), who performed the autopsy of the deceased and the investigating officer (PW 9). The charge was read over and explained to the accused person, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 6. In order to prove their case, prosecution examined, as many as, 11 (eleven) witnesses, including the medical officer (PW 3), who performed the autopsy of the deceased and the investigating officer (PW 9). At the close of the examination of prosecution witnesses, the accused person was examined, under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter called, the 'Cr.P.C.'). He denied the allegations, brought against him and declined to adduce defence witness. 7. Considering the evidence on record, the learned Sessions Judge held the appellant guilty of committing the offence of murder of the deceased and accordingly convicted and sentenced him, as indicated hereinabove. 8. Ms. R.D. Mazumdar, learned Amicus Curiae, appearing for the appellant, taking us through the evidence on record, has submitted that, except the dying declaration alleged to be made before PWs 2 and 6, there is no evidence against the appellant to show that he caused the death of the deceased. The learned Amicus Curiae, referring to the delay in lodging the FIR, has submitted that the FIR was lodged after 9 (nine) days from date of occurrence and that the said delay has not been satisfactorily explained. Referring to the evidence of PW 1, i.e. the first informant, the learned Amicus Curiae has submitted that the informant, in his evidence, has stated that the FIR was lodged after 2 (two) days of receiving the dead body from Tezpur Hospital, but in the explanation given, in the FIR, it has been stated that the delay was caused due to delayed receipt of information, regarding the death of the deceased, at the hand of her husband. According to the learned Amicus Curiae, the said explanation is self contradictory and un-acceptable. It is also submitted that though the prosecution claimed that the deceased had made dying declaration before PWs 2 and 6, who are brother and sister of the deceased, failure to mention about such declaration in the FIR (Ext. 1), raises doubt about the prosecution version. It is also submitted that the mother of the deceased Smti Adarmoni Sayanashi (PW 5) and Shri Budhu Karmakar (PW 4), who met the deceased, immediately after the incident, did not whisper any thing about the dying declaration. 1), raises doubt about the prosecution version. It is also submitted that the mother of the deceased Smti Adarmoni Sayanashi (PW 5) and Shri Budhu Karmakar (PW 4), who met the deceased, immediately after the incident, did not whisper any thing about the dying declaration. The learned Amicus Curiae has also pointed out that the mother of the deceased, in her cross-examination, clearly stated that she did not know as to how the deceased met with her death. Therefore, it is submitted by the learned Amicus Curiae that, in view of the silence of mother of the deceased, regarding dying declaration, the evidence given by PWs 2 and 6, about the dying declaration, is not free from doubt. The learned Amicus Curiae has strenuously argued that the prosecution failed to prove the case, beyond all reasonable doubt and as such, the appellant is entitled to be acquitted and set at liberty. 9. Controverting the said arguments, advanced by the learned Amicus Curiae, Mr. K.A. Mazumdar, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, appearing for the State respondent, has submitted that there is sufficient corroboration in the evidence of PWs 2 and 6 to show that the deceased had made dying declaration, involving the appellant and as such the said evidence was sufficient to base the conviction. Supporting the impugned conviction and sentence, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that the learned trial Judge committed no error by convicting the appellant and as such the impugned conviction and sentence warrants no interference. 10. Dr. Tilok Bhattacharjee, Medical Officer (PW-3), who performed the autopsy of the dead body of the deceased on 11.03.2003, found the following injuries: "Average built, female dead body of thirty years of age. Rigor mortis present. The face is swollen. Eye and mouth is closed. Burn injury over face, chest, abdomen, back and both arm and both leg. Hair of scalp is also burn. At certain place the burn injury is deep, and some place it is superficial. Percentage of burn injury is =90%. Burn injury is anti-mortem in nature." The medical officer opined that the death of the deceased was caused due to shock and dehydration as a result of the burn injury aforesaid. Therefore, there is no dispute that the deceased died due to burn injury. 11. The prosecution version is that the appellant set her ablaze by pouring kerosene oil. Burn injury is anti-mortem in nature." The medical officer opined that the death of the deceased was caused due to shock and dehydration as a result of the burn injury aforesaid. Therefore, there is no dispute that the deceased died due to burn injury. 11. The prosecution version is that the appellant set her ablaze by pouring kerosene oil. Admittedly, the first information report has been lodged after much delay. Unless delay is properly explained, it is not safe to accept the prosecution story. 12. Having heard both the parties and carefully perusing the evidence on record, we find that the occurrence took place on 9.3.2003, in the evening and the FIR was lodged on 18.03.2009. The brother of the deceased, who lodged the FIR as informant, deposed as PW 1. The FIR is silent about the dying declaration. Failure to mention about the dying declaration in the FIR, which is a vital discloser involving the appellant, raises doubt as to whether the deceased had made such declaration. PW 1, i.e. the informant was not present either in the place of occurrence or at the time of death of the deceased. After receipt of the information about the death of his sister, he rushed to Tezpur Hospital, where the deceased had succumbed to her injuries. In the FIR, it has been stated that the dead body of the deceased was taken from the Hospital and thereafter cremated in the place of residence. The informant in his evidence, given as PW 1, stated that 2 (two) days after his arrival from the Tezpur Hospital, he lodged the FIR, but in his cross examination, admitting the fact that he had lodged the FIR on 18.03.2003, this witness stated that he came to know about the occurrence after returning home on 19.03.2003. Therefore, if he came to know about the incident on 19.03.2003, it is difficult to understand how he could mention in the FIR, lodged on 18.03.2003, that the deceased was killed by her husband by setting her ablaze after pouring kerosene oil. That apart, coming to know about the incident, he rushed to the Tezpur Civil Hospital, where the deceased was taken for treatment. This indicates that he met the deceased in the said Civil Hospital, where the deceased died on the night of the incident. Therefore, this witness came to know about the incident on the same night. That apart, coming to know about the incident, he rushed to the Tezpur Civil Hospital, where the deceased was taken for treatment. This indicates that he met the deceased in the said Civil Hospital, where the deceased died on the night of the incident. Therefore, this witness came to know about the incident on the same night. It is difficult to believe that he did not know about the incident till 19.03.2003, on which date the FIR was lodged. Hence, the explanation put forward for the delay is not satisfactory. 13. Admittedly, PW 1 lodged the FIR after meeting the members of his family including his brother and sister, i.e. PWs 2 and 6. Both PWs 2 and 6 stated that the deceased had made a dying declaration. If the deceased had made any dying declaration before PWs 2 and 6, involving the appellant, there was no reason for P W 2 and 6 to withhold such vital information from P W1, who lodged the FIR. Therefore, the silence of PW 1, i.e. the informant about such dying declaration, raises doubt about the veracity of the evidence, given by PWs 2 and 6, with regard to the dying declaration. That apart, PW 2 Shri Sadin Proja, who stated about the dying declaration, in his cross-examination, stated that Shri Budhua Karmakar (PW 4) and his wife Smti Moti Karmakar (not examined) were present, but PW 4, Shri Budhua Karmakar did not whisper anything about the dying declaration. If the deceased had made any dying declaration before PWs 2 and 6, there was no reason for PW 4 not know about such vital disclosure. Hence, PW 4's evidence does not support the PW 2's evidence that the dying declaration was made in his presence as well as in presence of PW 6. According to PWs 2 and 6, the deceased had told them that her husband, i.e. the appellant set her ablaze by pouring kerosene oil on her body, but PW 6, who is also sister of the deceased did not state about use of kerosene oil. Neither the container of kerosene oil, alleged to be used by the appellant has not been seized, nor any forensic evidence regarding use of kerosene oil could be adduced to substantiate the allegation regarding use of kerosene oil. Neither the container of kerosene oil, alleged to be used by the appellant has not been seized, nor any forensic evidence regarding use of kerosene oil could be adduced to substantiate the allegation regarding use of kerosene oil. P W 7 also, who is the brother of the deceased did not state anything about the setting ablaze. That apart, the silence of PWs 1 and 4 about the dying declaration raises doubt about the evidence of PWs 2 and 6. Hence, we do not find it safe to solely rely on the said dying declaration without corroboration on material point. 14. In view of the above discrepancies, we do not find it safe to rely on the evidence of PWs 2 and 6 to believe that the deceased had made dying declaration, involving the appellant. If the evidence regarding dying declaration, claimed to be made by the deceased, is not accepted, then, there remains no other evidence to substantiate the prosecution version, that the appellant had caused the death of the deceased. 15. In view of what has been discussed above, we are inclined to hold that the prosecution failed to establish, beyond all reasonable doubt that the appellant caused the death of the deceased. Therefore, in our considered opinion, the appellant is entitled to be acquitted on the benefit of doubt, we find sufficient merit in this appeal, requiring interference with the impugned conviction and sentence. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The impugned conviction and sentence are set aside and the appellant is acquitted and set at liberty forthwith, if not required in any other case. 16. Return the LCR. 17. We record our appreciation for the I services, rendered by Ms. Rita Das Mazudmar, as Amicus Curiae and direct that an amount of Rs. 5,000/- be paid to her as remuneration by the State Legal Services Authority. _____________