Judgment The applicant -a co-operative society is the original complainant. It had filed a complaint against the respondent no.2 alleging the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jalna, who tried the respondent no.2, however, came to the conclusion that the complainant had failed to prove its case and passed an order of acquittal. The applicant, being aggrieved by the said order of acquittal, is seeking special leave of this Court to file an appeal from the said order of acquittal. 2. Notice of the application for leave was given to the respondents and the respondent no.2 original accused-entered his appearance through Mr. M.M. Patil. 3. Since the record and proceedings had also been called for and since extensive arguments were heard, the leave is treated as granted and appeal is considered for its admission. 4. The case of the applicant (hereinafter referred to as "the complainant" or "the complainant society"), as spelt out in the complaint, was that respondent no.2 (hereinafter referred to as "the accused") was a member of the complainant society and had applied for loan. That a loan of Rs. 56,000/-was sanctioned by the complainant society to the accused and was disbursed to him on 18.10.2002. That, the accused however, did not repay the loan amount in monthly instalments, as had been agreed upon. The accused thus remained in arrears of Rupees more than Rs. 1,16,048/-. This was the position in the month of December, 2006. That, when a demand was made by the complainant society, the accused issued a cheque in the sum of Rs. 1,16,048/-in favour of the complainant society. The said cheque was dishonoured for want of funds in the account of the accused. That, inspite of the demand notice, the accused did not pay the amount and that, the accused had thus committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 5. On behalf of the complainant society, one Ravindra Ghotankar was examined as a witness during the trial. Additionally, some documents were tendered in evidence, marked and exhibited. That, inspite of the demand notice, the accused did not pay the amount and that, the accused had thus committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 5. On behalf of the complainant society, one Ravindra Ghotankar was examined as a witness during the trial. Additionally, some documents were tendered in evidence, marked and exhibited. The defence of the accused, as appearing from the cross examination of the complainant's witness and from the answers given by him during his examination under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was that at the time of giving loan to him, the complainant society had taken a blank signed cheque from him and that, the same had been misused by the complainant society. The accused also submitted that he was not made aware of the dishonour of the cheque by the complainant society. 6. I have carefully gone through the impugned judgment. 7. The reasoning, as to why the learned Magistrate doubted the truth of the complainant's case, is found in paras 6 and 7 of the impugned judgment. 8. The learned Magistrate observed that the name of the payee on the cheque was written by putting a rubber stamp of the name of the complainant society. He considered this aspect as significant and was of the opinion that it was not possible for the accused to have a rubber stamp of the complainant society. He was, therefore, of the opinion that since it was not the case of the complainant society that the accused had come to the office of the complainant society on the date of issue of cheque i.e. on 27.12.2006, it was quite probable that the cheque had not been issued on 27.12.2006, but had been previously issued. He also took into consideration the fact that the name of the accused was written by pencil at the bottom of the cheque. On these aspects, the Magistrate concluded that the defence of the accused that he had previously given some blank cheques to the complainant society and that, one of such cheques was misused by the complainant society, was probable. The reasoning of the learned Magistrate cannot be said to be suffering from any error. 9. In fact, even in the course of the present proceedings, Mr. The reasoning of the learned Magistrate cannot be said to be suffering from any error. 9. In fact, even in the course of the present proceedings, Mr. S.B. Deshpande, the learned advocate for the complainant society was unable to satisfy this Court, as to what is the fault in the reasoning of the Magistrate. The emphasis of Mr. Deshpande is only on the presumption created under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act; and he submitted, by relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Rangappa Vs. Mohan (2010 Cri.L.J. 2871) that the burden, which the accused would be required to discharge, to rebut the presumption, would be considerably high and that, in the instant case, the accused had failed to discharge such burden. He submits that the accused had taken an inconsistent stand viz.:initially he claimed that he has not taken any loan from the complainant society and later on, he claimed that he had given blank cheques to the complainant society at the time of taking loan. 10. I am unable to accept the contentions raised by the learned Advocate for the complainant society. It is clear that the complainant society came up before the Court with a specific case that the loan was taken by the accused on 18.10.2002 and it was in the sum of Rs. 56,000/-. The case was also that the accused did not pay the instalments of the loan, but suddenly, on 27.12.2006, he paid a cheque in the sum of Rs. 1,16,048/-. How and in what manner, the figure was arrived at, has not been stated in the complaint. In the background of the fact that the name of the payee was not written, but was appearing on the basis of the impression of a rubber stamp, there existed a real doubt as to when exactly and under what circumstances, the cheque has been issued to the complainant society by the accused. This doubt was further strengthened because of the fact that the accused had already filed an Insolvency Petition on 25.03.2006. The learned Magistrate was quite right in doubting as to why the accused would, under these circumstances, issue a cheque to the complainant society on 27.12.2006. I am in agreement with the view taken by the Magistrate. The accused was unable to pay or at any rate, did not pay the monthly instalments properly. The learned Magistrate was quite right in doubting as to why the accused would, under these circumstances, issue a cheque to the complainant society on 27.12.2006. I am in agreement with the view taken by the Magistrate. The accused was unable to pay or at any rate, did not pay the monthly instalments properly. A person who fails to pay such instalments of smaller sums would not suddenly pay the whole amount, in normal circumstances. For making a person to pay the whole of the amount, though earlier he was not paying even the instalments, some extraordinary situation would be required to be created, but there is no evidence of any such situation. Apart from this, when the accused had already filed the Insolvency Petition, there was no need for him to create greater difficulty for himself by issuing a cheque of Rs. 1,16,048/-. Also, how the accused arrived at this figure cannot be comprehended. 11. There is substance in the contention advanced by the learned advocate for the accused that on the facts there is bound to be some liability on the part of the accused. However, in my opinion, this aspect would not be sufficient to come to the conclusion that the case of the complainant society, as presented by them before the Court, was true and reliable. 12. Inspite of the presumption enacted by Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, there is no change in the basic principles of criminal jurisprudence viz.:-that the accused is entitled for the benefit of every reasonable doubt, that may arise out of the matters placed before the Court. 13. In the instant case, the doubt felt by the Magistrate was reasonable and proper. 14. In any case, it is settled legal position, that where the view taken by the trial Court would be a possible view of the matter, the appellate Court will not interfere with the order of acquittal, even if some other view of the matter would have also been possible. It cannot be even suggested that the view of the matter, as taken by the trial Court, is not a possible view of the matter. 15. Consequently, there is no merit in this appeal. 16. The appeal is summarily dismissed.