Judgment Heard learned Counsel for respective parties. Rule. Interim relief in terms of prayer clause (C). 2. The petitioner -Bajirao Jivanrao Patil is purchaser of the land from Rupchand Chindhu Patil. On 26.03.1970, pre-decessor-in-title of Rupchand had purchased agricultural property from deceased Gulab Supdu Tadvi, who was a tribal. The Assistant Collector, Jalgaon initiated suo motu proceedings for restoration of land to Adivasi. The proceedings were dropped in view of the order passed by the Assistant Collector on 28.02.1976 for the reason that the impugned transaction is in favour of a third person and, therefore, does not fall within the meaning of 'transfer to non tribal' as defined in Section 2(1)(i) of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 3. The Additional Commissioner, Nasik Division, Nasik, initiated suo motu proceedings for review of the order passed by the Assistant Collector on 28.02.1976 and issued notice in that behalf to the petitioner on 15.06.1993. The petitioner appeared before the Additional Commissioner and put forth his submissions. The Additional Commissioner, by his order dated 11.05.1994, directed restoration of land to the Adivisi after securing an affidavit in prescribed form, as provided under Section 3(3) of the Act. 4. The petitioner herein challenged the order passed by the Additional Commissioner by presenting a writ petition bearing No.1623 of 1994 to this Court. The writ petition came up for final disposal before the learned Single Judge of this Court who was pleased to allow the same by judgment dated 17.06.2010 and remitted the matter back to the Additional Commissioner for reconsideration. While disposing of the writ petition, the learned Single Judge has observed in paragraph 8 of the judgment, thus: "8. Perusal of Section 7 of the said Act shows that for invoking the suo moto powers, there has to be a specific direction from the State Government, if such an exercise is beyond the period of 3 years. This is also the law laid down by this Court in Sridhar's case cited supra, relied upon by petitioner. Undisputedly, the initiation of the proceedings by the learned Additional Commissioner in the instant case is beyond the period of 3 years. Although the impugned order recites that the proceedings are initiated by the directions issued by the State Government, there is no specific reference to any such order or direction issued by the State Government. Undisputedly, the initiation of the proceedings by the learned Additional Commissioner in the instant case is beyond the period of 3 years. Although the impugned order recites that the proceedings are initiated by the directions issued by the State Government, there is no specific reference to any such order or direction issued by the State Government. This petition was filed in 1994. The record is not produced from the office of the Additional Commissioner, to find out whether there actually existed any such direction. Hence, the matter will have to be remitted back to the Additional Commissioner for making a reference to any such specific direction, if at all issued by the State Government. Since the jurisdiction of the Commissioner under section 7 depends upon the direction issued by the State Government, it was necessary for the learned Additional Commissioner to refer to such directions in his order. The matter is, therefore, required to be remitted back on this count." 5. On remand of the matter to the Additional Commissioner, the Revisional Authority was required to find out as to whether there was any directions issued by the State Government as contemplated by Section 7 of the Act. The proceedings were initiated by the Additional Commissioner initially by issuing notice on 15.06.1993 thereby expressing his intention to review the order passed by the Assistant Collector on 28.02.1976. The Additional Commissioner has taken up suo motu review of the order passed by the Assistant Collector after about 16 years from the date of issuance of the order. The Additional Commissioner, however, failed to consider the matter in the light of the directives issued by this Court and proceeded to allow the Revision Application by his order dated 15.12.2011. The order passed by the Additional Commissioner, after remittance of the matter back to him by this Court, is subjected to challenge in this writ petition. 6. Shri Choudhari, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, contends that there is absolutely no record in respect of any direction issued by the State Government to the Additional Commissioner in respect of taking review of the matter decided by the Assistant Collector, Jalgaon. In the absence of there being any directive from the State Government for taking review of the order, the limitation prescribed under Section 7 of the Act for reopening the proceedings by the Commissioner is three years. In the absence of there being any directive from the State Government for taking review of the order, the limitation prescribed under Section 7 of the Act for reopening the proceedings by the Commissioner is three years. Reliance is placed on the judgment in the matter of Sridhar Damodar Kamalaskar (Wani) and others Vs. Sonu Gunaji Dhumase and others, reported in 2003 (2) Bom.C.R. 50 . The challenge before the learned Single Judge was in respect of the order passed by the Additional Commissioner, Nasik Division, Nasik on 27.10.1988, by which the Additional Commissioner had exercised revisional powers conferred under Section 7 of the Act and reversed the order of the Tahsildar. The Tahsildar had dropped the proceedings for restoration of the land in favour of tribal transferor. The transaction in question is said to be dated 16.07.1973. The proceedings initiated in respect of restoration of land to the Adivasi came to be dropped by the Tahsildar by an order dated 10.02.1982. The Additional Commissioner thereafter directed issuance of notice on 18.11.1987 in exercise of revisional powers. The objection raised before the learned Single Judge was in respect of exercise of revisional powers by the Additional Commissioner after lapse of five years. While considering the objection, the learned Single Judge, in paragraph 6 of the judgment, has observed thus: "6 Mr. Naik, learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that, and in my view rightly, the Commissioner is not entitled to call for the records after a period of three years have expired from the date of the order except where directions are issued by the State Government. Admittedly, in this case no directions are issued by the State Government." In paragraphs no.10 & 11, it is observed thus: "10 In the present case the Commissioner did not at any stage call for the records within the period of three years. The Collector seems to have sent the record for reasons which are not clear at all. The Commissioner has observed in his order that the Collector, Nasik submitted case papers to the Commissioner's office for revision on 15th July, 1982. It appears very strange indeed that the Collector sent papers to the Commissioner for revision. In any case, this cannot be considered to be calling for the records within the meaning of section 7 for the purpose of revision. It appears very strange indeed that the Collector sent papers to the Commissioner for revision. In any case, this cannot be considered to be calling for the records within the meaning of section 7 for the purpose of revision. The Commissioner admittedly did not take any cognizance till 18th November, 1987 i.e. for a period of five years after the Collector is said to have sent the records." "11. In the circumstances, I find that the exercise of the revisional power by the Commissioner in the facts of the present case was not permissible and the order in revision is, therefore, liable to be set aside. The petition, therefore, succeeds. Rule is made absolute in terms of prayer Clause (a). In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs." 7. It is, thus, contended that the Commissioner is not competent to exercise revisional powers, as contemplated by Section 7 of the Act beyond three years from the date of issuance of the order. Section 7 of the Act reads thus: "7. Where no appeal has been filed within the period provided by sub-section (2) of section 6, the Commissioner may suo motu or on the direction of the State Government at any time- (a) call for the record of any inquiry or proceeding of any Collector for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the legality or propriety of any order passed by, and as to the regularity of the proceedings of, such Collector, as the case may be, and; (b) pass such order thereon as he thinks fit; Provided that no such record shall be called for after the expiry of three years from the date of such order except in cases where directions are issued by the State Government; and no order of the Collector shall be modified, annulled or reversed unless opportunity has been given to the interested parties to appear and be heard." 8. Shri Deshpande, learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No.1, has placed reliance on the judgment in the matter of Udhav Uttam Patil Vs. Daga Holkya Bhil (since deceased) through L.R. & others, reported in 2001 (2) Bom. Shri Deshpande, learned Counsel appearing for Respondent No.1, has placed reliance on the judgment in the matter of Udhav Uttam Patil Vs. Daga Holkya Bhil (since deceased) through L.R. & others, reported in 2001 (2) Bom. C.R. 597; and contended that the Commissioner can exercise powers conferred under Section 7 of the Act suo motu any time within a period of 30 years from the commencement of the Act or a period of 3 years from the conclusion of inquiry by the Collector under Section 3 or 4 of the Act. It is also contended that this interpretation of "reasonable period" shall have to be read in alternative to each other and if any of them is satisfied in a given case it ought to be held that the revisional power is exercised within reasonable period. As noted in paragraph 9 of the judgment, the question for consideration before the learned Single Judge was, 'as to what should be the meaning of the term "at any time" as incorporated in Section 7 of the Act for exercise of revisional powers by the Commissioner'. While dealing with the issue, the learned Single Judge, in paragraph 14 of the judgment, has observed thus: "14 In this regard the affidavit filed by the Government emphasises that so long as the action of revision is proposed within a period of 30 years from the date the Act has been brought into force i.e. From 1st November, 1975, it should be treated to be a reasonable period to commence such an inquiry. Though these submissions do not appear to be unreasonable or unjust, it would be also necessary to set out an outer period of limitation with reference to the date from which the Collector has concluded his inquiry either under section 3 or section 4 of the Act and a period of about 3 years to exercise the powers of revision under section 7 from the date of such orders would not be unreasonable. To read the provisions more harmoniously and for the welfare of the tribals, justice demands that such provisions must be read with flexibility and the rule of rigidity should have no place. To read the provisions more harmoniously and for the welfare of the tribals, justice demands that such provisions must be read with flexibility and the rule of rigidity should have no place. Ends of justice would be met if we set out a period of 30 years from the commencement of the Act (i.e. From 1st November, 1975) or a period of three years from the conclusion of inquiry by the Collector under section 3 or section 4 of the Act so as to exercise the powers of revision under section 7 either suo motu or at the instance of the State Government. These interpretations of reasonable period must be read in alternative to each other and if any of them is satisfied in a given case it ought to be held that the revision power has been exercised within a reasonable period and it cannot suffer by inordinate delay." "In this regard we may safely rely upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (Hindustan Times Limited V. Union of India and others) 1998 (2) S.C.C. 242 , wherein it was held that for exercising powers under section 14B of the Employees Provident Funds Act even after a period of 15 years it cannot be presumed that the authorities had dropped the proceedings and such delay would not vitiate the proceedings initiated by the competent authority. In the instant case, though the revision powers are sought to be exercised after about twenty years from the date of closing the proceedings by the Collector, however, the powers are being exercising within a period of less than thirty years from 1st November, 1975 and hence it ought to be held that the powers are being exercised within a reasonable period. In any case on merits, the petitioners have a forum before the Commissioner to reply and contest the factual aspect regarding the validity of transfer or otherwise or the applicability of the Act etc. and it is not necessary to examine the challenge on merit in these petitions." 9. In any case on merits, the petitioners have a forum before the Commissioner to reply and contest the factual aspect regarding the validity of transfer or otherwise or the applicability of the Act etc. and it is not necessary to examine the challenge on merit in these petitions." 9. The learned Single Judge, in Udhav's case (supra), has held that powers exercisable by the Commissioner under Section 7 of the Act can be exercised within a period of 30 years from the commencement of the Act i.e. from 01.11.1975 or a period of three years from the conclusion of inquiry by the Collector under section 3 or section 4 of the Act. It is further observed by the learned Single Judge that the interpretation of "reasonable period" must be read in alternative to each other and if any of them is satisfied in a given case it ought to be held that the revision power has been exercised within a reasonable period. 10. On consideration of Section 7 of the Act, it is clear that the Commissioner may either exercise powers suo motu or on the directions of the State Government. The learned Single Judge, in Shridhar's matter, was dealing with interpretation of the term "at any time" incorporated in Section 7. The term "at any time" mentioned in Section 7 of the Act is referrable to exercise of powers by the Commissioner on the directions of the State Government. The proviso to Section 7 carves out an exception in respect of suo motu exercise of powers by the Commissioner and prescribes that such powers are exercisable by the Commissioner within 3 years from the date of such order. The term 'such order' appearing in proviso has a reference to the order passed by the Collector under Sections 3 & 4 of the Act. Whereas, limitation of three years prescribed in proviso to Section 7 does not apply to the cases wherein matters are taken up for revision by the Commissioner in pursuance to the directions of the State Government. Thus, there is a clear distinction so far as period of limitation for exercise of powers by the Commissioner is concerned, as provided under Section 7 of the Act. 11. Thus, there is a clear distinction so far as period of limitation for exercise of powers by the Commissioner is concerned, as provided under Section 7 of the Act. 11. The learned Single Judge of this Court, while dealing with Udhav's case (supra), has observed in para 14 of the judgment that the period of 30 years or a period of 3 years from the conclusion of inquiry by the Collector under section 3 or section 4 of the Act is applicable in respect of exercise of revisional powers by the Commissioner either suo motu or at the instance of the State Government. It is also further observed that interpretation of period must be read in alternative to each other and if any of the requirement is satisfied in a given case, it ought to be held that the revisional powers have been exercised within reasonable period. Even if interpretation put forth by the learned Single Judge is to be accepted, the period of limitation in respect of exercise of revisional power by the Commissioner suo motu would be 30 years from the date of commencement of the Act. The interpretation put forth by the learned Single Judge in respect of exercise of revisional powers by the Commissioner, as contemplated by Section 7 of the Act, either suo motu or on the directions of the State Government, in both the cases, is 30 years or 3 years and if either of the condition is satisfied, the exercise of powers must be held to be within reasonable period. The interpretation does not appear to be logical apart from not being in conformity with Section 7 proviso. There is clear distinction in respect of exercise of powers by the Commissioner either suo motu or on the directions of the State Government. The proviso to Section 7 carves out an exception and provides for a period of 3 years in respect of exercise of suo motu powers by the Commissioner. Whereas, outer limit of 3 years prescribed under the proviso to Section 7 is not applicable wherein the Commissioner acts as per the directions of the State Government. The view adopted by the learned Single Judge in Udhav's case (supra) also appears to be contrary to the view adopted by the learned Single Judge in Sridhar's case (supra). 12. Whereas, outer limit of 3 years prescribed under the proviso to Section 7 is not applicable wherein the Commissioner acts as per the directions of the State Government. The view adopted by the learned Single Judge in Udhav's case (supra) also appears to be contrary to the view adopted by the learned Single Judge in Sridhar's case (supra). 12. For the reasons set out above, I am of the view that the issue needs to be considered by a larger Bench. In my opinion, the questions that need to be determined are, as to: (1) Whether the term 'at any time', as incorporated in Section 7 of the Act in respect of exercise of revisional powers by the Commissioner suo motu or at the instance of State Government, shall be construed as prescribing limitation for 30 years from the commencement of the Act (i.e. 1st November 1975) or a period of three years from conclusion of inquiry by the Collector under Sections 3 & 4 of the Act and that if any of the requirement is satisfied, (whether) it must be held that revisional power has been exercised within reasonable period. (2) Whether the interpretation put forth by the learned Single Judge in Udhav's case (supra) in respect of suo motu exercise of powers by the Commissioner, is in consonance with the provisions of Section 7 of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974? 13. The Registry is directed to place the matter before the Honourable the Chief Justice as provided by Rule 7, Chapter I of Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, for consideration.