Vikram Nath, J.;- By means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioners have prayed for quashing of the judgement and orders dated 23.9.1974, 30.04.1971 and 12.02.1969 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Jaunpur, Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation, Jaunpur and the Consolidation Officer, Gulzarganj, Tehsil Mariyahun, District Jaunpur. respectively whereby all the Consolidation Courts have decided in favour of the respondents and against the petitioners. The dispute relates to land comprising of Khata Nos. 69A, 74A, 12, 13, 14, 70 and 138 situate in village Belgahan, Pargana & Tehsil Mariyanhu, District Jaunpur (hereinafter referred to as the Khatas in dispute). According to the petitioners Khata No. 69A and 74A were ancestral, whereas the remaining Khata Nos. 12, 13, 14, 70 and 138 was the sole acquisition of Gajadhar. Smt. Govindi, widow of Gajadhar executed a gift deed on 2nd September, 1939 in favour of her four daughters Maharaji, Sukhraji, Dilraji and Kabila as also her maternal grand sons Chhangu, Ram Baran, Kedar, Kabila and Krishan Chandra. They continued to be recorded as such. On the other hand respondent no.4 Dukhi claimed that Gajadhar and Panchu constituted a joint Hindu family and the acquisition made by the Gajadhar was not for self alone but was for the benefit of the family and he being the elder his name was recorded after the acquisition. It is further the case of the parties that with regard to the ancestral property comprising of Khata Nos. 69-A and 74-A a compromise had been entered by Smt. Ramraji on behalf of respondent no.4-Dukhi who was minor at that time. Dukhi challenged the compromise decree on the ground that Smt. Ramraji had not obtained due permission from the District Judge being the guardian of a minor and having acted adversely to the interest of the minor by entering into the compromise. Dukhi further challenged gift deed executed by Smt. Govindi in favour of her daughters and maternal grand sons on the ground that she had limited interest having inherited as a widow only to retain the possession and as such could not alienate the same by executing the gift deed. This was registered as Civil Suit No.631 of 1954. Another suit was filed by the petitioners claiming relief for permanent injunction which was registered as Suit No.105 of 1956. Both the suits were consolidated and tried together. This was registered as Civil Suit No.631 of 1954. Another suit was filed by the petitioners claiming relief for permanent injunction which was registered as Suit No.105 of 1956. Both the suits were consolidated and tried together. The Trial Court dismissed the suit filed by Dukhi i.e. Suit No.631 of 1954 and decreed the suit filed by petitioners i.e. Suit No. 105 of 1956. Dukhi filed two appeals bearing Civil Appeal Nos. 624 and 657 of 1960. The Appellate Court allowed both the appeals vide judgement dated 28th March, 1962. The result was that the suit filed by Dukhi suit decreed whereas the suit filed by the petitioners stood dismissed. The petitioners filed two second appeals before the High Court registered as Second Appeal Nos.2660 of 1962 and 2693 of 1962. The High Court vide judgement dated 4th March, 1965 dismissed both the appeals. In the meantime the Consolidation operations intervened wherein objections were filed by the petitioners under section 9-A of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the CH Act). The Consolidation Officer vide order dated 12th February, 1969 partly allowed the objections. Against the same both sides filed appeals under Section 11 of the CH Act. The Assistant Settlement Officer Consolidation vide order dated 30th April, 1971 dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners and allowed the appeal filed by Dukhi. Against the same petitioners filed revisions, which have been dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation vide order dated 23rd September, 1974. All the three Consolidation Courts have specifically recorded that the issues between the parties stood already settled vide judgement of the High Court dated 4th March, 1965 passed in the second appeals referred to above and as such the claim of the petitioners was barred by principles of resjudicata. Aggrieved by the orders of the Consolidation authorities the present petitioner has been filed. I have heard Sri S. L. Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri Aditya Kumar Yadav, learned counsel representing the respondents. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioners is firstly that the Court did not decide the question with regard to the majority of the objector; secondly that the Consolidation Courts have not decided the claim of the petitioners on the basis of adverse possession and lastly the status of the land in dispute was not disclosed nor any finding recorded by the Consolidation Court. In reply learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that all the issues sought to be raised stood decided in the earlier round of litigation before the Civil Court which came up to this Court in second appeal and where also the petitioners had lost. Their claim, if any, was barred by principles of res-judicata. I have considered the submissions advanced and from the material of the record, I find substance in the argument advanced by the respondents. Before the Civil Court specific issues had been raised with regard to the validity of the gift deed of 1939 executed by Smt. Govindi, the validity of the compromise arrived at by Smt. Ramraji as guardian of Dukhi (respondent no.4) and also the nature / status of the land in dispute which was partially claimed as ancestral and partially it was claimed to be self acquisition. The High Court in its judgement dated 4th March, 1965 has recorded specific findings on all the issues and had affirmed the findings recorded by the lower appellate court on the said issues. It is further clear from the judgement that the petitioner and the respondents were parties to the civil litigation. The petitioners having lost before the Civil Court, cannot raise the same claim again by way of fresh litigation before the consolidation court. Thus, I do not find any infirmity in the impugned orders passed by the Consolidation Courts and the finding so recorded by the Consolidation Court on the claim of the petitioners that it was barred by principles of res-judicata as just, sound and proper. The petition lacks merit and it is accordingly dismissed.