JUDGMENT S. Talapatra, J. 1. Heard Ms. N. Guha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as Mr. R.C. Debnath, learned Spl. PP appearing for the State-respondent. This petition filed under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (Cr.P.C. in short) is directed against the judgment and order dated 11.10.2004 as passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Udaipur, South Tripura, in Crl. Appeal No. 24(3) of 2004. 2. By that judgment and order dated 11.10.2004, learned Sessions Judge, Udaipur, South Tripura affirmed the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 02.08.2004 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Udaipur, South Tripura convicting and sentencing the petitioner to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- for commission of offence punishable under Section 279 IPC and in default of making payment of fine to suffer SI for one month and he was further sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- for commission of offence punishable under Section 337 IPC and in default of making payment of fine to suffer SI for another 15 days and he is also sentenced to suffer RI for one year for commission of offence punishable under Section 304(A) IPC and also sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- for the same offence and in default of making payment of fine he was directed to suffer SI for another one month. 3. Ms. Guha, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned judgment of conviction is affected by two incurable defects. (1) The identification of the driver has not been established by any legal evidence and (2) the statement made under Section 313 Cr.P.C. has been treated as a substantive piece of evidence for the purpose of returning the judgment of conviction. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Debnath, learned Spl. PP for the State submits that the statement made admitting a fact by the accused while recording his statement of response to the prosecution's evidence under Section 313, Cr.P.C. is a substantive piece of evidence as the accused had been voluntarily making such statement, not under coercion by any mechanism for extracting such statement. The accused voluntarily admitted that fact. It can be treated as substantive piece of evidence which can be used as a basis for returning the judgment of conviction. 5. Mr. Debnath, learned Spl. The accused voluntarily admitted that fact. It can be treated as substantive piece of evidence which can be used as a basis for returning the judgment of conviction. 5. Mr. Debnath, learned Spl. PP further submits that the identification of the accused person for the first time in the Court is admissible in evidence and that can be used for the purpose of convicting the accused. 6. Ms. Guha, learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of her contentions, relied two Apex Court decisions and submits that the statement of the accused as recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be used as a substantive piece of evidence for returning a finding of conviction. 7. In Rabindra Kumar Pal @ Dara Singh Vs. Republic of India as reported in AIR 2011 SC 1436 wherein the Apex Court held in para-15 that: 15. In Jana Yadav Vs. State of Bihar, (2002) 7 SCC 295 , para 38 : ( AIR 2002 SC 3325 ), the following conclusion is relevant: Failure to hold test identification parade does not make the evidence of identification in Court inadmissible, rather the same is very much admissible in law, but ordinarily identification of an accused by a witness for the first time in Court should not form the basis of conviction, the same being from its very nature inherently of a weak character unless it is corroborated by his previous identification in the test identification parade or any other evidence. The previous identification in the test identification parade is a check valve to the evidence of identification in Court of an accused by a witness and the same is a rule of prudence and not law. It is clear that identification of accused persons by witness in dock for the first time though permissible but cannot be given credence without further corroborative evidence. Though some of the witnesses identified some of the accused in the dock as mentioned above without corroborative evidence the dock identification alone cannot be treated as substantial evidence, though it is permissible. 8. In Santi Ram Deka Vs. State of Assam reported in 2008 (3) GLT 840 : (2009) 5 GLR 550 wherein it is held that: 12. Sub-section 4 of Section 313 of Cr. 8. In Santi Ram Deka Vs. State of Assam reported in 2008 (3) GLT 840 : (2009) 5 GLR 550 wherein it is held that: 12. Sub-section 4 of Section 313 of Cr. PC reads as under: The answer given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such inquiry or trial, and put in evidence for or against him in any other inquiry into, or trial for, any other offence which such answers may tend to show he has committed. So this provision has given an opportunity to the Court to act on the answer given by the accused in answer to the question put to him or her with reference to the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence. Though the answer given by the accused cannot be strictly branded as evidence, the same can be taken into consideration against the accused while considering his guilt. This section cast a duty on the court to place before the accused the facts and circumstances appearing against him in the evidence in order to furnish him an opportunity to explain them and, thus, help him in showing his innocence. 13. We have already stated herein before that the answers are not evidence and there can be no conviction merely on the accused's statements in absence of any other evidence on the basis the accused can be held to have committed the offence. Since the evidence of CW1 and PW1 proves a case against the appellant under the charge 302, IPC, admission so made by the appellant during recording his statement under Section 313 of the Cr. PC also lends support to the prosecution case. Therefore, we cannot have a hesitation in accepting the facts that it was the appellant who caused the death of the deceased. 9. These decisions have been relied for obvious purpose of demonstrating to this Court that the admission so made at the time of making response under Section 313 Cr. P.C. may lend support to the prosecution but there cannot be any conviction merely on the accused's statement in absence of other evidence on the basis of which the accused can be held to have been committed the offence. 10. Mr. Debnath, learned Spl. PP for the State appears not concurring with the interpretation as culled out from Rabindra Kumar Pal (supra) and Santi Ram Deka (supra). 10. Mr. Debnath, learned Spl. PP for the State appears not concurring with the interpretation as culled out from Rabindra Kumar Pal (supra) and Santi Ram Deka (supra). On the point of first time identification in dock, he has relied Kuldeep Singh Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh reported in AIR 2008 SC 3062 . Learned counsel for the respondent referred another judgment of the Apex Court in George & Ors. Vs. State of Kerala & Ann reported in AIR 1998 SC 1376 where the Apex Court held that: 25. That brings us to the question whether the ground canvassed by the trial Court for rejection of her evidence regarding, identification of the appellants, whom she, admittedly, did not know from before, as the assailants are improper or not. So far as the first ground is concerned, law is well settled that identification of an accused in Court is the substantive evidence of the person identifying and his earlier identification in a T.I. parade corroborates the same. In other words, want of evidence of earlier identification in a T.I. parade does not affect the admissibility of the evidence of identification in Court. It has been further held in para 26 of that judgment as follows: 26. We may now consider what will be the effect of failure to hold the T.I. parade. In Kanta Prasad v. Delhi Administration, 1958 SCR 1218 : AIR 1958 SC 350 ) a two Judge Bench of this Court observed as under (Para 5 of AIR): It would no doubt have been prudent to hold a test identification parade with respect to witnesses who did not know the accused before the occurrence, but failure to hold such a parade would not make inadmissible the evidence of identification in Court. The weight to be attached to such identification would be a matter for the Courts of fact and it is not for this Court to reassess the evidence unless exceptional grounds were established necessitating such a course. 11. In another decision on the question of returning a judgment of conviction on the basis of statement made under Section 313 Cr. P.C., Mr. Debnath, learned Spl. PP for the State referred the decision rendered in Sanatan Naskar & Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 2010 SC 3570 where the Apex Court has held as under: 10. In another decision on the question of returning a judgment of conviction on the basis of statement made under Section 313 Cr. P.C., Mr. Debnath, learned Spl. PP for the State referred the decision rendered in Sanatan Naskar & Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal reported in AIR 2010 SC 3570 where the Apex Court has held as under: 10. The answers by an accused under Section 313 of the Cr. PC are of relevance for finding out the truth and examining the veracity of the case of the prosecution. The scope of Section 313 of the Cr. PC is wide and is not a mere formality. Let us examine the essential features of this section and the principles of law as enunciated by judgments, which are the guiding factors for proper application and consequences which shall flow from the provisions of Section 313 of the Cr. PC. As already noticed, the object of recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the Cr. PC is to put all incriminating evidence to the accused so as to provide him an opportunity to explain such incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence of the prosecution. At the same time, also permit him to put forward his own version or reasons, if he so chooses, in relation to his involvement or otherwise in the crime. The Court has been empowered to examine the accused but only after the prosecution evidence has been concluded. It is a mandatory obligation upon the Court and, besides ensuring the compliance thereof, the Court has to keep in mind that the accused gets a fair chance to explain his conduct. The option lies with the accused to maintain silence coupled with simplicitor denial or, in the alternative, to explain his version and reasons, for his alleged involvement in the commission of crime. This is the statement which the accused makes without fear or right of the other party to cross-examine him. However, if the statements made are false, the Court is entitled to draw adverse inferences and pass consequential orders, as may be called for, in accordance with law. The primary purpose is to establish a direct dialogue between the Court and the accused and to put every important incriminating piece of evidence to the accused and grant him an opportunity to answer and explain. The primary purpose is to establish a direct dialogue between the Court and the accused and to put every important incriminating piece of evidence to the accused and grant him an opportunity to answer and explain. Once such a statement is recorded, the next question that has to be considered by the Court is to what extent and consequences such statement can be used during the enquiry and the trial. Over the period of time, the Courts have explained this concept and now it has attained, more or less, certainty in the field of criminal jurisprudence. The statement of the accused can be used to test the veracity of the exculpatory nature of the admission, if any, made by the accused. It can be taken into consideration in any enquiry or trial but still it is not strictly evidence in the case. The provisions of Section 313(4) of Cr. PC explicitly provides that the answers given by the accused may be taken into consideration in such enquiry or trial and put in evidence for or against the accused in any other enquiry into or trial for, any other offence for which such answers may tend to show he has committed. In other words, the use is permissible as per the provisions of the Code but has its own limitations. The Courts may rely on a portion of the statement of the accused and find him guilty in consideration of the other evidence against him led by the prosecution, however, such statements made under this Section should not be considered in isolation but in conjunction with evidence adduced by the prosecution. Another important caution that Courts have declared in the pronouncements is that conviction of the accused cannot be based merely on the statement made under Section 313 of the Cr. PC as it cannot be regarded as a substantive piece of evidence. In the case of Vijendrajit v. State of Bombay ( AIR 1953 SC 247 ), the Court held further: (3).... As the appellant admitted that he was in charge of the godown, further evidence was not led on the point. The Magistrate was in this situation fully justified in referring to the statement of the accused under Section 342 as supporting the prosecution case concerning the possession of the godown. As the appellant admitted that he was in charge of the godown, further evidence was not led on the point. The Magistrate was in this situation fully justified in referring to the statement of the accused under Section 342 as supporting the prosecution case concerning the possession of the godown. The contention that the Magistrate made use of the inculpatory part of the accused's statement and excluded the exculpatory part does not seem to be correct. The statement under Section 342 did not consist of two portions, part inculpatory and part exculpatory. It concerned itself with two facts. The accused admitted that he was hi charge of the godown, he denied that the rectified spirit was found in that godown. He alleged that the rectified spirit was found outside it. This part of his statement was proved untrue by the prosecution evidence and had no intimate connection with the statement concerning the possession of the godown. 12. In addition to these decisions, some other decisions of the Apex Court may be noticed for arriving at a finding on the contentious issue as has been raised. The Apex Court in Sukhbir Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab reported in (2011) 11 SCC 436 and in Malkhan Singh & Ors. Vs. State of M.P. reported in (2003) 5 SCC 746 on adequately dilating the issue held that: there is absolutely no evidence other than the identification in Court made by Naranjan Singh long after the incident. It is true that there is no inflexible rule that an identification made for the first time in Court has to be always ruled out of consideration; but the broad principle is that (sic if) in the background there is no other evidence against an accused an identification in court made long after the event is clearly not acceptable. The judgment cited by Mr. Kuldip Singh of Malkhansingh's case is on the facts of that particular case, as a prosecutrix, who was the victim of a gang rape, had identified some of the accused for the first time in Court on which the Court opined that the identification was acceptable as a good piece of evidence. 13. Thereafter, in Sukhbir Singh (supra), Malkhansingh's proposition was reiterated that first time identification in the dock cannot be acceptable in absence of other corroborative evidence so far the identification of the accused is concerned. 13. Thereafter, in Sukhbir Singh (supra), Malkhansingh's proposition was reiterated that first time identification in the dock cannot be acceptable in absence of other corroborative evidence so far the identification of the accused is concerned. The same proposition was affirmed by the Apex Court in Ramesh Vs. State of Karnataka as reported in (2009) 15 SCC 35 and in Dana Yadav @ Dahu & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar as reported in (2002) 7 SCC 295 . 14. The decisions as has been relied by Mr. Debnath, learned Spl. PP for the State on the point of first time identification in dock in the context of this case does not appeal much. In the decision in Dana Yadav (supra), the Apex Court held that such evidence is admissible in evidence; and such evidence sometimes becomes the corroborative evidence of identification to the touch identification as held. But whether that piece of evidence can be the basis of the conviction, on that point George (supra) is also silent. 15. The decision as referred by Mr. Debnath, learned Spl. PP for the State does not provide any springboard on the point of returning the finding of conviction solely on the basis of the statement made under Section 313 Cr. P.C. Such statement on admitting a particular fact whether can be made the basis of conviction, has not been answered propounding a guiding principle, rather it provides that such statement is not substantive piece of evidence, meaning thereby, such statement though in evidence for the purpose of finding out the further materials for purpose of corroboration but that cannot be made the basis of the conviction, 16. On appreciation of the evidence as led by the prosecution, it appears that for rash and negligent driving of the vehicle which was involved in the accident, the accident occurred. But there is no evidence in the records to connect the petitioner with the offence as referred. In absence of identification of the driver by legal evidence, no conviction can be sustained. 17. But there is no evidence in the records to connect the petitioner with the offence as referred. In absence of identification of the driver by legal evidence, no conviction can be sustained. 17. In view of this, the impugned judgment and order dated 11.10.2004 as passed by the learned Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur in Criminal Appeal No. 24(3) of 2004 is set aside and as consequence thereof the judgment and order as passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Udaipur on 02.08.2004 in G R. No. 102 of 2006 is also set aside and quashed. The petitioner is acquitted from the charge under Section 279, 337, 304 of the IPC on benefit of doubt and he is set at liberty. Accordingly, the instant criminal revision petition is allowed. Return the LCR forthwith. Petition allowed