JUDGMENT TARUN KUMAR GUPTA, J. 1. The plaintiff is the appellant against this judgment of confirmation. The plaintiff being owner landlady filed said suit for eviction against defendant tenants after serving statutory notice on the grounds of reasonable requirement of the suit premises situated in the ground floor for plaintiffs and her family members' use and occupation, damages caused by the defendants in the suit premises as well as building and rebuilding of a portion of the suit house for reconstruction of the staircase. Only defendant No.3 contested said suit filing a written statement denying material allegations of the plaint and contending inter alia that plaintiff did not require the suit premises as plaintiff already got possession of entire first floor after eviction of a tenant therefrom on the same ground of reasonable requirement and that the defendant tenant did not cause any damage to suit property and that there is no need of building and rebuilding of a portion of the suit house for reconstruction of the staircase. 2. Both sides adduced evidence in support of their respective claims. After contested hearing learned Trial dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff failed to establish that she reasonably required the suit premises for her and her family members' use and occupation, or that defendant tenant caused any damage to the suit building or that she reasonably requires the suit premises for building and rebuilding of a portion of the suit house for the purpose of reconstruction of the staircase. The appeal preferred by the plaintiff landlady was also dismissed after contested hearing. 3. At the time of admission of this second appeal the following two substantial questions of law were formulated. (II) Whether in view of the positive case of the plaintiff asserting an element of need of 10 rooms then when she was only in occupation of 7 rooms, the Courts below erred in negativing the said claim mainly on reliance of a decision rendered by this Hon'ble Court in a case against another tenant overlooking altogether the positive evidence of the plaintiff regarding enhancement of requirement since thereafter. (IV) Whether the judgment in the other suit rendered by this Hon'ble Court operates as a bar to her claim in the present suit in spite of the fact of imergence of additional causes to wit the plaintiff's illness and subsequent requirement of more rooms of her doctor son. During hearing of this second appeal learned counsel by the parties restricted their arguments only on the ground of alleged requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiff landlady for her and her family members' use and occupation. Mr. S. P. Roychowdhury, learned senior counsel for the appellant plaintiff, submits that learned Courts below without applying correct legal test regarding reasonable requirement of the suit premises by the landlady for her as well as for her family members' use and occupation, rejected the claim for ejectment of the tenant. 4. In this connection he refers to a case law reported in AIR 1979 Supreme Court page 272 (Mst. Bega Begam and others vs. Abdul Ahad Khan) wherein the term reasonable requirement was explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court. In said case it was held that the words "reasonable requirement" undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish, and that the distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire. 5. In this connection he refers to the case laws reported in (2001) 8 SCC 431 (R. C. Tamrakar and another vs. Nidllekha), (2000) 1 SCC page 679 (Ragavendra Kumar vs. Firm Prem Machinery and Co.) and (2008) 8 SCC page 497 (Deep Chandra Juneja vs. Lajwanti Kathuria) to impress upon this Court that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and that neither the tenant nor the Court should make endeavour to show the landlord how he should adjust himself. Mr. Roychowdhury next submits that requirement of a married daughter is required to be considered at the time of examining the claim of the landlord in this regard. In support of his contention he refers to a case law reported in 96 CWN page 57 (Himanshu Bikash Das vs. Ramendra Mohan Dutta). Mr. Roychowdhury next submits that requirement of a married daughter is required to be considered at the time of examining the claim of the landlord in this regard. In support of his contention he refers to a case law reported in 96 CWN page 57 (Himanshu Bikash Das vs. Ramendra Mohan Dutta). He further submits that in this case the plaintiff projected the requirement of his highly qualified doctor son who is presently studying at U.K. and that said requirement was required to be examined in proper perspective. In support of his contention he referred case laws reported in AIR 1988 SC page 852 (Hiralal Kapur vs. Prabhu Choudhury) and (1990) (Supp) Supreme Court cases page 736 (Smt. Sheela Chadha and others vs. Dr. Achharaj Ram Seghal). Mr. Roychowdhury further submits that even in cases of concurrent findings of fact if it is found that said findings were perverse and / or patently erroneous causing miscarriage of justice then the High Court in the second appeal can interfere under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of his contention he has referred case laws reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court page 1484 (Budhwanti and another vs. Gulab Chand Prasad). Mr. Roychowdhury further submits that in the earlier occasion when the appellant landlady filed a suit for eviction against the first floor tenant on the ground of reasonable requirement this Court observed that plaintiff landlady required three more rooms to meet her requirements but on account of refusal on the part of tenant of that suit to accept partial eviction plaintiff landlady got the eviction decree in respect of entire first floor comprising of four rooms. 6. According to him, that observation of this Court cannot be relevant at the subsequent stage at the time of disposing of this suit of eviction against ground floor tenant in view of subsequent events. According to him, learned Courts below unnecessarily gave undue stress on the judgment of this Court in connection with earlier eviction suit relating to first floor tenant at the time of considering personal requirement of the plaintiff and their family members relating to the suit premises. According to him, learned Courts below unnecessarily gave undue stress on the judgment of this Court in connection with earlier eviction suit relating to first floor tenant at the time of considering personal requirement of the plaintiff and their family members relating to the suit premises. In this connection he refers case laws reported in AIR 1988 Supreme Court page 1345 (Surajmal vs. Radheshyam) wherein it was held that the bona fide need must be considered with reference to the time when a suit for eviction is filed and it cannot be assumed that once the question of necessity is decided against the landlord it has to be assumed that he will not have a bona fide and genuine necessity ever in future. He has also referred another case law reported in AIR 1994 Supreme Court page 2129 (K. S. Sundararaju Chettiar vs. M. R. Ramchandra Naidu) wherein it was held that even if earlier suit on the ground of requirement for reconstruction was not justified but it cannot be a ground for rejecting subsequent suit if well founded. Mr. Jagabandhu Mondal, learned counsel for the respondent tenants, on the other hand, submits that in the earlier suit being Title Suit No.227 of 1987 the plaintiff landlady while in occupation of the second floor comprising of three rooms and bath and privy projected almost same requirements namely two rooms for chamber of her doctor son who was studying at England and was supposed to return soon and to open a chamber in her house, one bed room for said doctor son, two rooms for the married daughters, one drawing room, one dining room, one kitchen and one Thakur Ghar. Though learned Trial Court passed a decree of ejectment in respect of entire first floor but learned Lower Appellate Court set aside said decree. 7. In the second appeal this Court observed as follows:- "I have perused the evidence and upon a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case I am of the opinion that the plaintiff require at least three more rooms for their own use and occupation. Plaintiffs' family consists of the plaintiffs, their son who is a doctor and a permanent maid-servant. Two daughters of the plaintiffs are married and they are living with their respective husbands and children at their matrimonial homes. Plaintiff's son is a doctor who wants to start private practice. Plaintiffs' family consists of the plaintiffs, their son who is a doctor and a permanent maid-servant. Two daughters of the plaintiffs are married and they are living with their respective husbands and children at their matrimonial homes. Plaintiff's son is a doctor who wants to start private practice. Apart from a bed room he requires at least one room for his chamber. Another room for the patients may not be necessary at the beginning of the practice. At any rate, the covered passage may serve that purpose. Plaintiff Nos. 1 and 2 require one bed room. They also require one dining-cum-drawing room, one kitchen and one guest room which may also be used by the married daughters on their occasional visits to the plaintiffs' house. The plaintiffs have no installed deity and a separate Thakurghar is not required. The bed room of the plaintiffs or the covered corridor may be used as Thakurghar also. So the plaintiffs reasonably require at least six rooms including a kitchen. At present they are possessed of three rooms only one of which is used as a kitchen. Apart from bath-cum-privy there is one covered corridor and one terrace. The Commissioner's report shows that the covered corridor 3' 9" X 24' 3" is used as a passage for ingress and outgress and the terrace is open to sky. So the corridor and terrace cannot be used for any of the purposes aforesaid. The present accommodation of the plaintiffs is palpably quite insufficient and they reasonably require at least three more rooms. The defendants' tenancy comprises four rooms. Mr. Banerjee has submitted with instructions that his client is not willing to partial eviction. The plaintiffs are, therefore, entitled to a decree for eviction in respect of the entire suit premises." 8. According to Mr. Jagabandhu Mondal, learned counsel for the respondent defendant the requirement of the plaintiff remained almost same though by this time her ailing husband has expired but the plaintiff has exaggerated her claim alleging reasonable requirement of the suit premises by projecting a requirement for 12 rooms while she is in occupation of seven rooms. According to him, said projection was inflated one and that learned Courts below were justified to observe that present occupation of seven rooms was sufficient to meet the requirement of the plaintiff. Admittedly, after filing of the present suit plaintiff's husband has expired. According to him, said projection was inflated one and that learned Courts below were justified to observe that present occupation of seven rooms was sufficient to meet the requirement of the plaintiff. Admittedly, after filing of the present suit plaintiff's husband has expired. Presently, plaintiff alone resides in the suit house occupying seven rooms out of which three in the second floor and four in the first floor. According to plaintiff, as she is old and ailing she requires the presence of her daughters in her house for looking after her and on that score she requires two rooms. She also requires one room as bed room, one room as drawing room, one room as dining room and one room as kitchen, one room as store room, one room as Thakurghar, one as bed room for her doctor son, one room for his chamber, one room for examination of the patients and one room for waiting room of the patients, i.e., in total twelve rooms. 9. It came out from evidence on record that though plaintiff got one room for the chamber of his doctor's son as well as one additional room on the strength of judgment of this Court dated 7th January, 1993 relating to earlier ejectment suit, but up till now said doctor son has not returned to India either to reside with plaintiff or to start his practice in the suit house. It is also an admitted fact that both the daughters of the plaintiff are married and well placed and are residing in their respective matrimonial homes and there is no evidence that any of them is even planning to reside in the suit house permanently for looking after their mother namely the plaintiff. In this connection it is also pertinent to note that even though plaintiff's doctor son as P.W.1 deposed in 1995 that he would return to her mother's place for starting his practice but I have already stated that up till now he did not return to stay in the suit house for starting his practice as a private doctor in spite of getting accommodation of three rooms, one as bed room and the rest two as chamber and waiting room of patients, as far back as in 1993 through the ejectment decree against 1st floor tenant. Under these circumstances it is highly doubtful whether said claim of doctor son of the plaintiff or the claim of the plaintiff that her doctor son will return to stay in the suit house and will open his chamber in the suit house is genuine. Be that as it may admittedly plaintiff is in occupation of the entire first floor and second floor having seven rooms therein. Out of said seven rooms one room as plaintiff's bed room, one room as plaintiff's drawing-cum-dining, one room as kitchen-cum-store, one room as proposed bed room of her doctor son in case he returns to India, two rooms for his proposed chamber out of which one to be used as chamber-cum-examination of patients and another as sitting-cum-waiting room of the patients, and one room for staying of visiting daughters as well as for guest can be used. 10. In the earlier judgment also no separate room was allotted as puja room as plaintiff had no installed deity and the same situation is continuing. It is also pertinent to note that so long plaintiff's doctor son is not returning to Kolkata to reside in the suit house plaintiff is at liberty to use those three rooms earmarked for his use as bed room as well as for chamber for any other purpose. In this connection it will not be irrelevant to note that the plaintiff being aged and ailing widow may require presence of at least one of her daughters for looking her after. So long plaintiff's son is not coming to Kolkata permanently those three rooms can conveniently be used by the plaintiff in any way she likes. Again when her son will permanently come to reside in the suit building then the necessity of staying of her daughters for looking after their mother will not be required as there will be the doctor son to look after his mother. So from whatever angle it can be viewed it appears that the present occupation of seven rooms by the plaintiff landlady is sufficient to meet her requirements as discussed above. The evidence on record is too scanty to hold that the plaintiff is ill and infirm or that for that reason she is not in a position to climb the stairs to come even to the 1st floor or that on that score also she requires the suit ground floor rooms. 11. The evidence on record is too scanty to hold that the plaintiff is ill and infirm or that for that reason she is not in a position to climb the stairs to come even to the 1st floor or that on that score also she requires the suit ground floor rooms. 11. In this connection it is pertinent to note that the question as to whether the landlord reasonably required the suit premises for his as well as his family members' use and occupation is admittedly a question of fact involving no question of law, not to speak of substantial question of law. However, it is true that if the findings of fact of learned Courts below, even if concurrent, are found to be perverse being based on no evidence or based on extraneous matters then the High Court has the jurisdiction to interfere with said findings of fact under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure treating the same as a substantial question of law. 12. In the case in hand, learned Courts below negatived the claim of the ejectment of the tenant on the ground of alleged reasonable requirement of the same by the landlady on the basis of evidence on record and the same cannot be said to be perverse by any stretch of imagination. As such, no interference is called for under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. As a result, the appeal is dismissed on contest. However, I pass no order as to costs. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgment be supplied to learned counsels of the parties, if applied for.