Research › Search › Judgment

Punjab High Court · body

2012 DIGILAW 521 (PNJ)

Maghi Ram (deceased) through his Legal Representatives v. Gram Panchayat, Chirwa

2012-03-30

RAJIVE BHALLA, RAKESH KUMAR JAIN

body2012
JUDGMENT RAJIVE BHALLA, J. By this order, we shall decide Civil Writ Petition Nos.5921 of 1985 and 16885 of 1996, as they involve adjudication of similar questions of fact and law. Civil Writ Petition No.5921 of 1985, has been filed by Maghi Ram and others, challenging orders dated 23.11.1983 (Annexure P-5) and 20.08.1985 (Annexure P-6), passed by the Collector, Patiala and the Joint Director, Panchayats, Punjab (exercising the powers of Commissioner), whereas Civil Writ Petition No.16885 of 1996, has been filed by the Gram Panchayat of Village Chirvi, Tehsil and District Patiala, challenging orders dated 12.12.1994 (Annexure P-1) and 31.01.1996 (Annexure P-3), passed by the Collector, Patiala, and the Joint Development Commissioner (IRD), Punjab (exercising the powers of Commissioner), respectively. Both writ petitions pertain to the same land but the Collector and the Commissioner have recorded diametrically opposite findings as to ownership. In the first writ petition, the Gram Panchayat has been held to be owner whereas in the second Writ Petition the legal representatives of Maghi Ram have been held to be owners. The Gram Panchayat, filed a petition under Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation), Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1961 Act'), praying for ejectment of Maghi Ram and Kura Ram (since deceased), now represented by their legal representatives. Maghi Ram and Kura Ram filed a reply averring that as a similar application was dismissed on 21.10.1969, the application is barred by resjudicata. The Collector, dismissed the petition by holding that the order dated 21.10.1969 operates as resjudicata. The Gram Panchayat filed a petition under Section 7 read with Section 11 of the 1961 Act on 11.08.1982, claiming ownership and praying for eviction of Maghi Ram and Kura Ram. The Collector, vide order dated 23.11.1983, allowed the petition by holding that as the Gram Panchayat is owner of the land, in dispute the petitioners are liable for eviction. The petitioners filed an appeal before the Joint Director, Panchayats, Punjab,respondent no.2, which was dismissed on 20.08.1985. Civil Writ Petition No.5921 of 1985, impugning these orders, was admitted on 20.03.1986. During pendency of the writ petition, Maghi Ram, passed away. The petitioners filed an appeal before the Joint Director, Panchayats, Punjab,respondent no.2, which was dismissed on 20.08.1985. Civil Writ Petition No.5921 of 1985, impugning these orders, was admitted on 20.03.1986. During pendency of the writ petition, Maghi Ram, passed away. Gurbachan Singh and Gurbux Singh, his sons, who have been impleaded as his legal representatives, filed a petition under Section 11 of the 1961 Act, before the Collector, claiming ownership of land bearing Khewat/Khatauni No.63/97, Khasra No.45(5-4) 46/2 (3-10), 47(6-5), 48(6-3), total measuring 21 Bighas and 10 Biswas. The Gram Panchayat filed an application praying for dismissal of the petition, on the ground that question of title has already been decided. The Collector dismissed the application and vide order dated 12.12.1994 allowed the petition filed by Gurbachan Singh and Gurbax Singh by holding that as the Gram Panchayat did not file any appeal or writ petition against the interim order, the Gram Panchayat has forfeited its right to get any relief. The Gram Panchayat filed an appeal. The appellate authority did not consider the merits and dismissed the appeal by holding that the Gram Panchayat could not file a joint petition, under Sections 7 and 11 of the 1961 Act, and as the interim order, rejecting the Gram Panchayat's plea for dismissal of the petition on the ground of resjudicata, was correct, the appeal could not be entertained. It would be appropriate, to point out, that the appellate authority did not make reference to the fact that, a writ was pending adjudication before the High Court, with respect to the land in dispute. Counsel for the petitioners in Civil Writ Petition No.5921 of 1985 and private respondents in Civil Writ Petition No.16885 of 1996 contends that dismissal of prior petitions under Section 7 of the 1961 Act, on 21.10.1969 and 27.07.1982 operate as resjudicata in the subsequent petition filed under Section 11 of the 1961 Act. It is further submitted that as the petitioners/ their predecessors were in cultivating possession of “Shamilat Deh” before 26.01.1950, the land is excluded from “Shamilat Deh” by virtue of Section 2(g)(iii). It is further submitted that the expression “Shamilat Deh Hasab Hissas Mundarza Shijra Nasaj”, coupled with the expression “Makbuja Malkan” establishes the possession of proprietors, thereby, excluding the land from “Shamilat Deh”. It is further submitted that the expression “Shamilat Deh Hasab Hissas Mundarza Shijra Nasaj”, coupled with the expression “Makbuja Malkan” establishes the possession of proprietors, thereby, excluding the land from “Shamilat Deh”. It is argued that the petitioners filed an application before the Collector for summoning the Patwari to prove their possession prior to 26.01.1950 but this application was rejected thereby leading to serious prejudice to the petitioners. It is further submitted that order passed under Section 11 of the 1961 Act holding that the Gram Panchayat is owner of the land in dispute, is non-speaking, has been passed without framing issues or grant of adequate opportunity to lead evidence. The summary procedure adopted by the Collector is contrary to the procedure prescribed by the 1961 Act. The Collector and the Commissioner have committed an error of law in deciding against the petitioners. In support of the orders, passed in their favour and impugned by the Gram Panchayat in Civil Writ Petition No.16885 of 1996, the petitioners contended that findings recorded by the Collector and the Appellate Authority are legal and valid. The Gram Panchayat filed an application before the Collector that the earlier order passed under Section 11 of the 1961 Act operates as resjudicata. The Collector, however, dismissed the application. The Gram Panchayat did not challenge this order by way of a writ or an appeal. The consequent finding recorded by the Collector and the Appellate Authority that as the Gram Panchayat has not challenged this order, it is not entitled to any relief is legally correct. It is further argued that an application under Sections 7 and 11 of the 1961 Act is not maintainable, the impugned orders should be affirmed. Counsel for the Gram Panchayat, on the other hand, submits that the petitioners have not produced any evidence of their cultivating possession, prior to 26.01.1950, as required by Section 2 (g)(iii) of the 1961 Act. The petitioners have not produced any evidence of partition amongst co-sharers much less possession pursuant to such partition and, therefore, findings recorded by the Collector and the Appellate Authority, in favour of the Gram Panchayat, should be affirmed and those against the Gram Panchayat should be set aside. The petitioners have not produced any evidence of partition amongst co-sharers much less possession pursuant to such partition and, therefore, findings recorded by the Collector and the Appellate Authority, in favour of the Gram Panchayat, should be affirmed and those against the Gram Panchayat should be set aside. It is further submitted that as a petition under Section 11 of the 1961 Act had already been decided in favour of the Gram Panchayat, the subsequent petition filed by the respondents was barred by the principles of resjudicata. The Collector and the Appellate Authority ignored the earlier decision under Section 11 of the 1961 Act and the fact that the petition was pending adjudication before the High Cour. It is further argued that the expression “Shamilat Deh Hasab Hissas Mundarza Shijra Nasar”, coupled with the expression “Makbuja Malkan” refers to the share holdings of proprietors as it existed prior to vesting of the land in the Gram Panchayat as “Shamilat Deh” and the possession in common, of proprietors but not to their cultivating possession. We have heard counsel for the parties and perused the impugned orders in the writ petitions. The question, that would decide the fate of these writ petitions, is whether the land in dispute is “Shamilat Deh”? The petitioners in Civil Writ Petition No.5921 of 1985 and private respondents in Civil Writ Petition No.16885 of 1996 contended that land was “Shamilat Deh Hasab Hissas Mundarza Shijra Nasar”, and in possession of “Makbuja Malkan”, thereby proving their possession prior to 26.01.1950 and exclusion of the land from “Shamilat Deh”. It is also contended that as khewatdars, including the petitioners' predecessors, were in possession in accordance with their respective shares, prior to 26.01.1950, the land does not vest in the Gram Panchayat. Another plea raised by the petitioners is that dismissal of earlier application under Section 7 of the 1961 Act operates as resjudicata in proceedings under Section 11 of the 1961 Act. The land, in dispute, was described in the revenue record as “Shamilat Deh Hasab Hissas Mundarza Shijra Nasab” and in possession of “Makbuja Malkan”. The expression “Shamilat Deh Hasab Hissas Mundarza Shijra Nasar”, denotes ownership of proprietors, in accordance with their share holdings, prior to the enactment of the Pepsu Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Pepsu Act'). The expression “Shamilat Deh Hasab Hissas Mundarza Shijra Nasar”, denotes ownership of proprietors, in accordance with their share holdings, prior to the enactment of the Pepsu Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Pepsu Act'). The expression “Makbuja Malkan” denotes possession in common, of the proprietary body, with no particular proprietor in possession of any portion of land, much less, in cultivating possession. Upon enactment of the Pepsu Act, in 1954, land described as “Shamilat Deh” came to vest in a Gram Panchayat, thereby putting an end to the ownership of proprietors, without any exception. The Pepsu Act, was repealed and re-enacted as the 1961 Act. Section 3(1) and 3(2)(i) of the 1961 Act provide that land that was “Shamilat Deh” under the Pepsu Act, shall continue to vest in the Gram Panchayat to the extent and in the manner, provided by Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act. Section 3 of the 1961 Act reads as follows:- “3. Lands to which this Act applies.--(1) This act shall apply and before the commencement of this Act the Shamilat Law shall be deemed always to have applied to all lands which are shamilat deh as defined in clause (g) of Section 2. Section 3 of the 1961 Act reads as follows:- “3. Lands to which this Act applies.--(1) This act shall apply and before the commencement of this Act the Shamilat Law shall be deemed always to have applied to all lands which are shamilat deh as defined in clause (g) of Section 2. [(2)] Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) of section 4,-- (i) where any land has vested in a Panchayat under the Shamilat law, but such land has been excluded from shamilat deh under clause (g) of section 2 other than the land so excluded under sub-clause (ii-a) of that clause, all rights, title and interest of the panchayat in such land as from the commencement of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Amendment Act, 1995, shall cease and all such rights, title and interest shall vest in the person or persons in whom they were vested, immediately before the commencement of the shamilat law; (ii) where any land has vested in a Panchayat under this Act, but such land has been excluded from shamilat deh under sub-clause (ii-a) of clause (g) of section 2, all rights, title and interest of the Panchayat in such land, as from the commencement of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Amendment Act, 1995, shall, ceased, and all such rights, title and interest shall on or before the 9th day of July, 1985, revest in the person or persons to whom the land so excluded has been allotted or otherwise transferred by sale or by any other manner whatsoever, subject to the condition that- (a) any sum of money realised by the Rehabilitation Department of the Government of Punjab as a result of allotment or transfer of such land shall along with interest at the rate of three per cent payable from the date of such allotment or transfer; or (b) where no money was realisable by the Rehabilitation Department of the Government of Punjab as a result of allotment or transfer of such land, the amount of compensation in respect of such land as determined by the Collector of the District in which such a land is situated alongwith interest at the rate of three per cent payable from the date of allotment or transfer, as the case may be; shall be paid by the Rehabilitation Department of the Government of Punjab to the Department of Rural Development and Panchayats for onward disbursement to the Panchayat to which such shamilat deh belonged. (3) As soon as may be, on the commencement of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Amendment Act, 1995, the Department of Rural Development and Panchayats shall make a reference to the Collector of the District to determine the amount of compensation under sub-clause (b) of clause(ii) of sub-section(2) and the Collector of the District shall, keeping in view the market value of the shamilat deh at the time it was allotted or transferred determine the amount of compensation.]” The vires of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1954, which is para-materia to the Pepsu Act was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in Hukum Singh Shibba and others v. The State of Punjab and others, AIR 1955 Punjab, 220. The validity of the 1961 Act was upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in Kangra Valley Slate Co., Ltd v. Kidar Nath and others, AIR 1964, Punjab, 503 and thereafter by a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 (SC), 632, setting on rest any controversy that with the enactment of the Pepsu Act and the 1961 Act, right, title or interest of proprietors in “Shamilat Deh” stood extinguished in its entirety but stand restored only to the extent such land is execluded from “Shamilat Deh” in accordance with the 1961 Act. Admittedly, the land in dispute was “Shamilat Deh” on the enactment of the Pepsu Act. The land, therefore, vested in the Gram Panchayat in 1954 and can only be excluded from “Shamilat Deh”, if it is proved that it falls within any of the sub-sections of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act, enacted to exclude land from “Shamilat Deh”. The petitioners claim exclusion from “Shamilat Deh” under Section 2(g) (iii) of the 1961 Act and are, therefore, required to prove:- (a) that they were in his possession as proprietors; (b) the land was partitioned; and (b) brought under cultivation by individual land owners before 26.01.1950. A perusal of the paper book reveals that the petitioners have not produced any evidence to establish partition amongst proprietors or that the land was brought under cultivation by individual land owners before 26.01.1950. The petitioners, in fact rely upon the expression “Makbuja Malkan” in support of their plea of possession before 26.01.1950. A perusal of the paper book reveals that the petitioners have not produced any evidence to establish partition amongst proprietors or that the land was brought under cultivation by individual land owners before 26.01.1950. The petitioners, in fact rely upon the expression “Makbuja Malkan” in support of their plea of possession before 26.01.1950. As held hereinbefore, the expression “Makbuja Malkan” refers to possession of the proprietary body in common as opposed to cultivating possession of proprietors, much less after partition. A reference may be made to a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported as Rama Sarup and others v. State of Haryana and others, 2006 (4) RCR (Civil) 350, wherein while considering the meaning of a similar expression and the import of the words “cultivating possession”, it was held as follows:- “21. In the case in hand the term revenue records “Shamilat Deh Hasab Rasad Raqba Khewat”. With the use of the expression “Raqba Khewat” it is evident that the share of the proprietors in the Shamilat Deh land is to the extent of the share of their holdings in the khewat. Besides, it is not the case of the petitioners that the land has been partitioned amongst the holders of the land according to their share in the holding in the khewat. Section 2(g) as has been noticed is in two parts. The first part of Section 2(g) relates to land which is included in Shamilat Deh and the second part is that which is excluded from Shamilat Deh. In terms of clause (iii) in the second part which relates to exclusion of land from Shamilat Deh, it has been provided that the land which has been partitioned and brought under cultivation by individual land owners before 26.1.1950 would not be included in Shamilat Deh. It is not even the case of the petitioners that the land in question has ever been partitioned, which may bring their case in the said exclusion clause. It is also not the case of the petitioners that they are in individual cultivating possession of the Shamilat land of co-sharers not being in excess of their respective share in Shamilat Deh on or before 26.1.1950 so as to come within the exclusion provided by clause (viii) of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act. It is also not the case of the petitioners that they are in individual cultivating possession of the Shamilat land of co-sharers not being in excess of their respective share in Shamilat Deh on or before 26.1.1950 so as to come within the exclusion provided by clause (viii) of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act. The expressions “individual cultivating possession”: and “respective shares” were considered in the case of Ram Bahu and others v. Gram Panchayat (Gram Sabha) of Village Indri, 1971 PLJ 487, wherein it was observed as follows:-“The use of the words and expressions “individual”, “cultivating possession” and “respective shares” would suggest that a co-sharer or a small body of co-sharers should be in separate cultivating possession of lands on individual basis before they can claim the benefit of the exception. There is further condition attached that the separate cultivating possession of an individual co-sharer or small body of co-sharers should not exceed his or their due share in the Shamilat land. There is no question of the entire proprietary body having its “respective share” in the shamilat. The proprietary body would be owing the entire Shamilat on a joint basis and cannot be said to have only a share in the Shamilat. There is no separate cultivating possession of the proprietary body on individual basis in the capacity of an individual co-sharers or a small body of co-sharers which could claim to be distinct and separate from the proprietary body so that he or they could have their respective shares in the Shamilat. The plaintiff-appellants are not shown to have been in cultivating possession of any separate parcels of the Shamilat land as co-sharers at the crucial time and there is nothing to stop the Shamilat land from vesting in the defendant-panchayat on the coming into force of the Act.” The judgment in Ram Babu's case (supra) was affirmed by a Division Bench of this Court in Tel Ram v. Gram Sabha Manakpur, 1976 PLJ 628, wherein it was also observed that the land if it falls under any of the clauses of Section 2(g), it is sufficient to bring the land within the definition of the word Shamilat Deh and the requirement of clause (1) is applicable to the said land and no further reference to any other clause is necessary to treat the land as Shamilat Deh. Therefore, the land having been described as Shamilat Deh, it would come within the ambit of clause (1) of Section 2(g) of the 1961 Act and vests in the Gram Panchayat by virtue of Section 4(1) thereof.” It is, therefore, apparent that the expression “Shamilat Deh Hasab Hissas Mundarza Shijra Nasar”, coupled with the expression “Makbuja Malkan” merely refers to ownership as it existed prior to the vesting of “Shamilat Deh” in a Gram Panchayat under the Pepsu Act and the 1961 Act and records the possession of the proprietors in common, without any particular proprietor being in a specific possession of the land much less in cultivating possession so as to exclude it from “Shamilat Deh” under Section 2(g)(iii) of the 1961 Act. The petitioners have not placed any revenue record before us, to show that they ever “cultivated” the land before 1950. We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that the Collector and the Appellate Authority did not commit any error in holding that the land was “Shamilat Deh” and, therefore, vested in the Gram Panchayat. As regards the plea that earlier orders passed under Section 7 of the 1961 Act, operate as resjudicata in a subsequent petition filed under Section 11 of the 1961 Act, suffice to state that the controversy is no longer res-integra as a Division Bench of this Court in Tara Chand and Fateh Singh v. Gram Panchayat and Gram Sabha of Village Atail and others, 1979 PLJ, 1, followed by another Division Bench judgment in Civil Writ Petition No.653 of 2011 (Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab and others) , decided on 03.02.2012, have held that dismissal of a petition under Section 7 of the1961 Act does not operate as resjudicata in a subsequent petition filed under Section 11 of the 1961 Act. We would reiterate that proceedings under Section 7 of the 1961 Act are summary in nature , whereas proceedings under Section 11 of the 1961 Act are in the nature of a suit which requires the Collector to decide the question of title. An arguments that the petitioners' application for grant of an opportunity to produce the Patwari, to produce the revenue excerpt, was rejected by the Collector, does not merit acceptance. An arguments that the petitioners' application for grant of an opportunity to produce the Patwari, to produce the revenue excerpt, was rejected by the Collector, does not merit acceptance. The petitioners have produced revenue record in the shape of relevant jamabandies and the Patwari had no role to play in advancing the petitioners' case as a presumption of truth attached to jamabandis, which are per-se admissible in evidence. We would now deal with orders passed in Civil Writ Petition No.16885 of 1996. As is apparent from the narrative of facts, despite the fact that the question of title stood decided under Section 11 of the 1961 Act, and the matter was pending before this Court, the legal representatives of Maghi Ram, filed a fresh petition under Section 11 of the 1961 Act, praying for a declaration of ownership of the land, in dispute. The Gram Panchayat, filed an application before the Collector that the petition should be dismissed on the ground of resjudicata. The Collector rejected this application and went on to hold that the land does not belong to the Gram Panchayat. The Appellate Authority also disregarded earlier orders passed under Section 11 of the 1961 Act, affirmed the order passed by the Collector and held that as a joint petition under Sections 7 and 11 of the 1961 Act was not maintainable, the earlier petition did not operate as resjudicata. The orders in our considered opinion are illegal and perverse. The Collector and the appellate authority had any jurisdiction to entertain, much less adjudicate and allow the second application, filed under Section 11. An earlier application under Section 11 of the 1961 Act having already been decided, the second application on the same cause of action and between the same parties, was barred by resjudicata. Even otherwise, as the matter was already pending before this Court, the Collector and the Appellate Authority should have kept the matter in abeyance. Adjudication on a question of title, pursuant to a petition filed under Section 11 of the 1961 Act operates as resjudicata in a subsequent petition pertaining to the same land and between the same parties. The land in dispute in both sets of petition is the same as are the parties. Adjudication on a question of title, pursuant to a petition filed under Section 11 of the 1961 Act operates as resjudicata in a subsequent petition pertaining to the same land and between the same parties. The land in dispute in both sets of petition is the same as are the parties. The Collector and the Appellate Authority, therefore, had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition and pass orders, holding that the petitioners are owners as earlier orders passed by the Collector and the Appellate Authority (impugned in Civil Writ Petition No.5921 of 1985) would necessarily operate as resjudicata. In view of what has been stated hereinabove, orders dated 23.11.1983 (Annexure P-5) and 20.08.1985 (Annexure P-6) are affirmed and Civil Writ Petition No.5921 of 1985 is dismissed, and accordingly orders dated 12.12.1994 (Annexure P-1) and 31.01.1996 (Annexure P-3) are set aside whereas the Civil Writ Petition No.16885 of 1996, is allowed, but with no order as to costs.