Judgment:- Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J. 1. This appeal is by the employer. Under challenge is an order of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner. 2. The workman, Murugan, sustained injury to his left index finger while operating a vibrating machine. The Chief Medical Officer of the employer assessed the disability at 3%. The Medical Board of the Idukki District issued Exhibit A1 certificate, assessing the permanent physical disability due to the injury at 10%. The workman gave evidence as A.W.1. His testimony was corroborated by A.W.2. There is no contra evidence by the management. The monthly earnings of the workman was proved. The Commissioner took it as Rs.1,700/- per month. 3. The first aspect of the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Commissioner acted contrary to law in adopting 10% as the loss of earning capacity. It is pithily pointed out that the determination of 10% as the permanent physical disability by the Medical Board cannot, by itself, suffice to say that the workman suffered 10% loss of earning capacity. The learned counsel also argued that the doctor of the Medical Board, who issued Exhibit A1 Certificate, had not tendered oral evidence. 4. It is not necessary to examine the doctor to corroborate the Medical Board's certificate, more particularly when there is no challenge to its contents by any contra evidence by the employer. We see that the loss of earning capacity has not been mentioned in the Medical Certificate. The Chief Medical Officer of the employer had also assessed only the percentage of physical disability. The variation between CMO's certificate and the Medical Board's certificate is 3% to 10%. Loss of the left index finger or injury to it, was taken, along with Exhibit A1 certificate, to hold that the workman suffered 10% loss of earning capacity. On the totality of the facts and circumstances, we do not find any perversity in the appreciation of evidence by the Commissioner. So much so, we do not find any substantial question of law arising for decision in favour of the employer regarding that aspect. 5. The Commissioner ordered that interest would run from the date of accident, that is, 10.05.2000. Relying on the decision of the apex Court in National Insurance Co. So much so, we do not find any substantial question of law arising for decision in favour of the employer regarding that aspect. 5. The Commissioner ordered that interest would run from the date of accident, that is, 10.05.2000. Relying on the decision of the apex Court in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mubasir Ahmed [2007 (3) KLT 26 (SC)], the learned counsel for the appellant argued that the starting point of the liability to pay interest is only from the date of the order of the Commissioner. We may note that this issue had obtained focused attention of the Division Bench of this Court. Analysing the various precedents, including the one referred to above, and the different aspects of the matter, it was held in M.F.A.No.59 of 2011 that the precedent law as available from the law laid down by the Apex Court categorically shows that the liability to pay interest runs from the date of accident. 6. On a complete evaluation of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since re-christened as "Employees Compensation Act, 1923", we see that the liability to pay compensation is statutory. Section 3 onwards in Chapter II of that Act would show that the liability that arises is fixed statutorily. It runs from the sufferance of the incident that generates the right in the employee or workman to compensation. Hence, the employer has a statutory liability to deposit amounts which he admits as compensation. Similarly, even if there is any settlement of claims to the extent permitted under that Act, such agreements can work only with the seal of approval of the Commissioner. The liability to pay interest would start to run from the non-performance and non-discharge of the obligation to pay the compensation. That liability being a statutory one under Section 3, it would run from the date of the incident. May be, in exceptionally exceptional cases where there is grave and enormous delay in making a demand for compensation, the Courts may take a different view; of course, without ignoring the fact that the legislation is meant to provide support to a socially and economically challenged and marginalized sector of the society. With this, we follow the judgment in M.F.A.No.59 of 2011 and hold that the Commissioner was justified in granting interest from the date of the incident. 7. With this, we follow the judgment in M.F.A.No.59 of 2011 and hold that the Commissioner was justified in granting interest from the date of the incident. 7. In the above circumstances, we do not find any substantial questions of law arising for decision in favour of the appellant. The appeal fails. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. No costs.