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2012 DIGILAW 524 (PAT)

Nasran Raza v. Chairman, Bihar School Examination Board, Patna

2012-03-27

S.N.HUSSAIN

body2012
JUDGMENT This writ petition was filed by Raja Askari the original petitioner for directing the respondents to reinstate him in service forthwith with all consequential benefits including wages, salary and pension etc. The said original petitioner died on 04.12.2010 whereafter his heirs have been substituted in his place. 2. The claim of the petitioners is that while the original petitioner was in service as Assistant in Bihar School Examination Board, Patna, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Board’ for the sake of brevity) a criminal case bearing Patna Kotwali P.S. Case No.15(7) of 1976 was instituted against him for offences punishable under sections 467, 471, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The said case was tried as T.R. No.121 of 1989 by the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Patna and the original petitioner was finally convicted for two years rigorous imprisonment for the said offences vide judgment dated 07.02.1989. It is not in dispute that only on the said ground of conviction the original petitioner was removed from service vide order dated 04.08.1992 passed by the Secretary, Bihar School Examination Board, Patna. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners also claimed that against the said order of conviction, the original petitioner filed Cr.Appeal No.44 of 1989 and after hearing the parties and perusing the materials on record, Additional Sessions Judge-1, Patna allowed the appeal vide judgment dated 29.07.2005 and set aside the judgment of the trial court and acquitted the original petitioner. Thus the original petitioner filed application dated 05.12.2005 and sent lawyer’s notice dated 22.12.2005 before the authorities of the Board for his reinstatement, but no heed was paid to those applications and notice and hence the original petitioner was constrained to file the instant writ petition. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners further averred that the date of superannuation of the original petitioner was 30.09.2007 and the said date passed without his reinstatement although he was fully entitled to it and finally the sole original petitioner died on 04.12.2010, whereafter the application of substitution of his heirs bearing I.A. No.1220 of 2012 was allowed by this court vide order dated 06.03.2012 and his heirs, namely three sons and a daughter were substituted in his place as petitioners. 5. 5. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that they were entitled to all the back wages of the original petitioner from the date of his termination i.e. 04.08.1992 till the date of his superannuation i.e. 30.09.2007 and also for the amounts of pension etc. thereafter till his death on 04.12.2010 to which the original petitioner was legally entitled. In this connection learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in case of Babu Lal vs. State of Haryana and others, reported in (1991) 2 Supreme Court Cases 335 and also a decision of a Bench of this court in case of Mani Ram Yadav and anr. vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 2000 (1) P.L.J.R. 239 . 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents-Board and its authorities produced a copy of order dated 14.05.2009 by which the Apex Court had decided Civil Appeal No.3564 of 2009 filed by a co-accused of the petitioner in exactly similar circumstances holding that the petitioner of that case was not entitled to back wages and was entitled to pension only. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that against the order passed in the criminal appeal the Board had filed Cr.Revision No.569 of 2007 before this court, which was dismissed by a Bench of this court vide order dated 18.07.2008. Learned counsel for the respondents also claimed that the basis of non-payment of wages as considered in the aforesaid judgment was the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ as the petitioner of that case as well as the original petitioner of this case had not worked for a single day after termination of their respective services. 8. From the arguments made by learned counsel for the parties and the materials on record it is quite apparent that the facts are not disputed that the original petitioner was in service as Assistant in the Bihar School Examination Board, Patna and was convicted in a criminal case for two years rigorous imprisonment by order dated 07.02.1989 and on that ground only the original petitioner was removed from his service on 04.08.1992 by the Board. It is also not in dispute that the original petitioner succeeded in criminal appeal filed against his conviction and the appellate court vide judgment dated 29.07.2005 allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the trial court and acquitted the original petitioner. But in spite of the said fact and repeated petition and notice sent by the original petitioner the Board did not reinstate him and the date of his retirement i.e. 30.09.2007 also passed and finally he died on 04.12.2010 during the pendency of this writ petition. 9. The aforesaid admitted facts and circumstances reveal that the only ground for termination of service of the original petitioner on 04.08.1992 was his conviction in a criminal case bearing Patna Kotwali P.S. Case No.15(7) of 1976 (T.R. No.121 of 1989) vide judgment dated 07.02.1989 passed by the magistrate and when the said conviction and the judgment passed by the magistrate was set aside by the appellate court in Cr. Appeal No.44 of 1989 and the petitioner was cleanly acquitted vide judgment dated 29.07.2005, the very basis on which the order of dismissal was founded was found to be illegal and was taken away and was set aside. In these circumstances this court fails to see how the authorities could refuse to reinstate the original petitioner on the post on which he was working prior to his termination, specially when it was incumbent upon the authority concerned not only to take into consideration the order of acquittal of the original petitioner but also to follow it. 10. It can also not be disputed that after the judgment dated 29.07.2005 passed in criminal appeal the original petitioner approached the authority concerned, but the respondent authorities did not pay any heed to petitioner’s request and the original petitioner was constrained to move this court vide the instant writ petition filed on 21.04.2006 and during the pendency of this writ petition the date of his superannuation i.e. 30.09.2007 also passed and finally he died on 04.12.2010. Thus the termination of the original petitioner or his non-reinstatement after his acquittal was not due to his fault rather it was the respondent authorities, who failed in their duty to reinstate the original petitioner immediately after he was acquitted. Reference in this regard may be made to a decision of the Apex Court in case of Babu Lal Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. Reference in this regard may be made to a decision of the Apex Court in case of Babu Lal Vs. State of Haryana & Ors. reported in 1991(2) SCC 335 . 11. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon an order dated 14.05.2009 passed by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No.3564 of 2009 (Basanti Prasad Vs. The Chairman, Bihar School Examination Board and Others) in which it was held that the employee was not entitled to back wages and would be entitled only to pension. The said order was passed by the Apex Court in a completely different background as the petitioner of that case had died during the pendency of the criminal appeal, whereafter his widow was substituted in the criminal appeal itself and finally the criminal appeal was allowed and that petitioner was acquitted. Thus when the petitioner of that case died, there was no judgment of acquittal in his favour and subsequently when the judgment of acquittal was passed he was not alive to file any application for his reinstatement on the post on which he was working prior to his termination. On the other hand, the instant case is based on completely different facts as it was the employee himself who had filed the criminal appeal which was allowed in his life time and he was acquitted, whereafter he filed applications before the authorities for his reinstatement, but for reasons best known to them the authorities concerned did not pass any order for several years and in the meantime the said employee himself was constrained to file this writ petition in the year 2006, whereafter the date of his superannuation passed on 30.09.2007 and he died on 04.12.2010. Hence, the principle laid down in case of Basanti Prasad (supra) is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case. 12. In the aforesaid facts and circumstances, it is held that the original petitioner Raja Askari was entitled to be reinstated immediately after the date of his acquittal on 29.07.2005 and was entitled to all the salaries, emoluments and benefits since the date of his termination i.e. 04.08.1992 till the date of his superannuation i.e. 30.09.2007, whereafter he was also entitled to his full pension etc. from the date of his retirement i.e. 30.09.2007 till the date of his death i.e. 04.12.2010. 13. from the date of his retirement i.e. 30.09.2007 till the date of his death i.e. 04.12.2010. 13. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed with a direction to the respondents authorities to calculate the said amounts of salaries, emoluments, increments, benefits, pensions, etc. of the original petitioner as mentioned above and pay it to his heirs, namely the substituted petitioners mentioned above within three months from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order.