JUDGMENT Mr. Mehinder Singh Sullar, J. (Oral) - The crux of the facts, culminating in the commencement, relevant for the limited purpose of deciding the core controversy, involved in the instant petition and oozing out, from the record, is that, complainant-respondent M/s Grasim Industries Limited (for brevity “the complainant-company”) filed a criminal complaint (Annexure P1) against the petitioner Sanwar Mall Agarwalla, Smt.Sita Devi, partners and their firm M/s Shakambri Textiles (accused) under Sections 406, 420 and 120-B IPC. Taking cognizance of the complaint and after considering the preliminary oral as well as documentary evidence, the Chief Judicial Magistrate summoned them to face the trial for the commission of offence punishable under Section 420 read with Section 120-B IPC, by virtue of impugned summoning order dated 26.8.2002 (Annexure P3), which, in substance, is (para 4) as under:- “4. From the contents of the complaint, statement on oath of the complainant and documents brought on the record, it is apparent that accused no.1 on behalf of accused no.3, issued three cheques dated 31.8.2000, 30.9.2000, 31.10.2000, Ex.P-2, Ex.P-8, Ex.P-14, for a sum of Rs.2,00,000/-, 2,50,000/- and Rs.2,50,000/-, respectively. The cheques were presented to the bank but they were all received back unpaid with the remarks that the drawer’s signatures were in different vernacular. Accused no.1 apparently cheated the complainant and dis-honestly induced it to deliver to him fabrics worth lacs of rupees. Accused no.1 on behalf of accused no.3 committed the offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC. Let them be summoned on filing of PF, copy of complaint etc. for 26.11.2002. Accused no.2 being partner of M/s Shakambri Textile, Durga Market, Kirkend, is also liable to be summoned under Section 420, read with section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. She be also summoned for the date fixed.” 2. Instead of submitting to the jurisdiction of the trial court, the petitioner straightway jumped to file the present petition, to challenge the impugned criminal complaint (Annexure P1) and the summoning order (Annexure P3), invoking the provisions of Section 482 Cr.PC, inter-alia pleading that neither he filled nor signed, but the complainant-company has misused the cheques in question and no offence against him is made out. According to the petitioner that since the complainant-company deleted the name of Smt.Sita Devi from the array of the accused, so, the complaint is also not maintainable against the remaining accused. According to the petitioner that since the complainant-company deleted the name of Smt.Sita Devi from the array of the accused, so, the complaint is also not maintainable against the remaining accused. It was claimed that the accused have already made the payment to the complainant-company against the supply of fabrics/clothes and as the petitioner did not sign the indicated cheques, therefore, no offence whatsoever is made out against them (accused). On the strength of aforesaid grounds, the petitioner sought to quash the impugned criminal complaint (Annexure P1) and the summoning order (Annexure P3) in the manner described hereinbefore. 3. After hearing the learned counsel for parties, going through the record with their valuable assistance and after deep consideration over the entire matter, to my mind, there is no merit in the instant petition in this context. 4. Ex facie, the arguments of learned counsel that the complainant-company has filed a false criminal complaint in order to harass the accused and since the name of Smt.Sita Devi was deleted from the array of the accused, so, the present complaint (Annexure P1) against the petitioner is also not maintainable, are not only devoid of merit but misplaced as well. 5. As is evident from the record/complaint (Annexure P1) that there are direct allegations that the petitioner is a partner of M/s Shakambri Textiles and received the clothes. The accused pleaded that they have made the payment of the clothes, but the complainant-company claimed that they hatched a criminal conspiracy from the very beginning and he (petitioner) knowingly and intentionally signed the cheques in question in such a manner, which were not approved by the bank and were dis-honoured. In this regard, inter-alia, it was further reiterated as under:- “That the accused had given specific assurance to the company that the cheques would be encashed as and when presented in the bank. But the said cheques were dishonoured by the bank of the accused which shows that the accused had malafide intention from the very beginning and hatched up a criminal conspiracy against the company. Their dishonest intention was to cheat the company of the aforesaid amount. The accused knowingly and intentionally signed the cheques which were not approved by the bank. Hence the cheques were returned unpaid on the ground that the signature on the cheques differs and thus the accused had cheated the complainant company. Their dishonest intention was to cheat the company of the aforesaid amount. The accused knowingly and intentionally signed the cheques which were not approved by the bank. Hence the cheques were returned unpaid on the ground that the signature on the cheques differs and thus the accused had cheated the complainant company. All the partners along with the Incharge of the firm are equally liable. The foul play of the accused requires strict action against them so that they may not repeat such action in future.” 6. Meaning thereby, from the bare reading of the complaint, which is supported by the preliminary evidence of the complainant-company, all the essential ingredients of criminal conspiracy and cheating are complete and prima facie the commission of offence punishable under section 420 read with Section 120-B IPC is made out against the petitioner. The mere fact that the complainant-company has deleted the name of Smt.Sita Devi (accused No.2) from the array of the accused, ipso facto, is not a cogent ground to quash the complaint (Annexure P1) against the other accused as well. It is not a matter of dispute that there are direct allegations against the petitioner that he (accused No.1) on behalf of accused No.3 issued the three cheques in question and signed the same in a different fashion, which were disapproved and dishonoured by the bank. In other words, the petitioner is the main accused in the present case. Thus, the contrary submissions of his counsel “stricto sensu” deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances. 7. As indicated earlier, taking cognizance of the complaint and after considering the preliminary evidence, the trial Magistrate has rightly summoned the petitioner-accused to face trial for committing the offence punishable under section 420 read with Section 120-B IPC, vide impugned summoning order (Annexure P3). The summoning order is in consonance with the ratio of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case U.P. Pollution Control Board v. M/s Mohan Meakins Ltd. and others 2000(3) SCC 745, wherein, it was ruled as under (para 6):- “6. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court it has been pointed out that the legislature has stressed the need to record reasons in certain situations such as dismissal of a complaint without issuing process. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court it has been pointed out that the legislature has stressed the need to record reasons in certain situations such as dismissal of a complaint without issuing process. There is no such legal requirement imposed on a magistrate for passing detailed order while issuing summons vide Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of West Bengal, 2000(1) RCR(Crl.) 407 : 2000(1) SCC 722. The following passage will be apposite in this context: “If there is no legal requirement that the trial Court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial Courts be further burdened with such an extra work ? The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the Court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all (sic) causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different stages, the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial Courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages of the trial.” (Emphasis supplied) 8. Therefore, no illegality or procedural irregularity can possibly be assigned to the impugned summoning order in the obtaining circumstances of the case, as (contrary) urged on behalf of petitioner-accused. 9. What cannot possibly be disputed here is that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has authoritatively held, in a celebrated judgment in case State of Haryana and others v. Ch.Bhajan Lal and others, AIR 1992 Supreme Court 604, which was again reiterated in case Som Mittal v. Government of Karnataka 2008(2) R.C.R.(Criminal) 92, that the criminal prosecution can only be quashed in rarest of rare case at the initial stage as per the following conditions:- (i) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (ii) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under S.156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of S.155(2) of the Code. (iii)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (iv) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under S.155(2) of the Code. (v) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (vi) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (viii)Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 10. Not only that, again the Hon’ble Apex Court in case Jeffery J.Diermeier & Anr. v. State of West Bengal & Anr. 2010(3) R.C.R.(Criminal) 183, having interpreted the scope of section 482 Cr.PC, has ruled (para 16) as under:- “16. Before addressing the contentions advanced on behalf of the parties, it will be useful to notice the scope and ambit of inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code. The Section itself envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of process of Court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. The Section itself envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code; (ii) to prevent abuse of process of Court; and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. Nevertheless, it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the Court. Undoubtedly, the power possessed by the High Court under the said provision is very wide but is not unlimited. It has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and cautiously, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for which alone the court exists. It needs little emphasis that the inherent jurisdiction does not confer an arbitrary power on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. The power exists to prevent abuse of authority and not to produce injustice.” 11. Therefore, the Bench mark set out in the aforesaid judgments and essential ingredients for quashing the criminal prosecution at the initial stage are totally lacking in this case. Moreover, a conjoint and meaningful reading of Sections 200 to 204 Cr.PC would reveal that at the stage of summoning, all that Magistrate has to see is whether or not there is “sufficient ground for proceeding” against the accused. The Magistrate is not to weigh the evidence so meticulously as he is required to do during the course of trial of main case. The standard to be adopted by the Magistrate in scrutinizing the evidence is not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing charges. This matter is no more res integra and is now well settled. 12. An identical question came to be decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case Shivjee Singh v. Nagendra Tiwary & Ors. 2010(7) SCC 578, wherein the view taken in case Mohinder Singh v. Gulwant Singh 1992(2) RCR (Criminal) 134 was reiterated and observed (paras 11 & 12) as under:- “11. 12. An identical question came to be decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case Shivjee Singh v. Nagendra Tiwary & Ors. 2010(7) SCC 578, wherein the view taken in case Mohinder Singh v. Gulwant Singh 1992(2) RCR (Criminal) 134 was reiterated and observed (paras 11 & 12) as under:- “11. The scope of enquiry under Section 202 is extremely restricted only to finding out the truth or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint in order to determine whether process should issue or not under Section 204 of the Code or whether the complaint should be dismissed by resorting to Section 203 of the Code on the footing that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding on the basis of the statements of the complainant and of his witnesses, if any. But the enquiry at that stage does not partake the character of a full dress trial which can only take place after process is issued under Section 204 of the Code calling upon the proposed accused to answer the accusation made against him for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of the said accused person. Further, the question whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of the enquiry contemplated under Section 202 of the Code. To say in other words, during the course of the enquiry under Section 202 of the Code, the enquiry officer has to satisfy himself simply on the evidence adduced by the prosecution whether prima facie case has been made out so as to put the proposed accused on a regular trial and that no detailed enquiry is called for during the course of such enquiry.” (emphasis supplied) 12. The use of the word ‘shall’ in proviso to Section 202(2) is prima facie indicative of mandatory character of the provision contained therein, but a close and critical analysis thereof along with other provisions contained in Chapter XV and Sections 226 and 227 and Section 465 would clearly show that non examination on oath of any or some of the witnesses cited by the complainant is, by itself, not sufficient to denude the concerned Magistrate of the jurisdiction to pass an order for taking cognizance and issue of process provided he is satisfied that prima facie case is made out for doing so. Here it is significant to note that the word ‘all’ appearing in proviso to Section 202(2) is qualified by the word ‘his’. This implies that the complainant is not bound to examine all the witnesses named in the complaint or whose names are disclosed in response to the order passed by the Magistrate. In other words, only those witnesses are required to be examined whom the complainant considers material to make out a prima facie case for issue of process. The choice being of the complainant, he may choose not to examine other witnesses. Consequence of such non-examination is to be considered at the trial and not at the stage of issuing process when the Magistrate is not required to enter into detailed discussions on the merits or demerits of the case, that is to say whether or not the allegations contained in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in conviction of the accused. He is only to see whether there exists sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.” 13. The next contentions of learned counsel that petitioner has been falsely implicated by the complainant-company, the version contained in the complaint is concocted and all other submissions, relatable to appreciation of evidence (as now sought to be urged on his behalf), would be the moot points to be decided during the course of trial by the trial Court. If all such points, which require determination by the trial Court, are to be decided by this Court in the garb of petition under section 482 Cr.PC, then the sanctity of the trial would pale into insignificance and amount to nullify the statutory procedure of trial as contemplated under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is not legally permissible. 14. No other legal point, worth consideration, has either been urged or pressed by the learned counsel for the parties. 15. In the light of aforesaid reasons and without commenting further anything on merits, lest it may prejudice the case of either side during the course of trial of the main complaint case, as there is no merit, therefore, the instant petition is hereby dismissed as such. 16. Needless to mention that nothing observed, here-in-above, would reflect, in any manner, on merits during the trial of the main complaint case, as the same has been so recorded for a limited purpose of deciding the present petition in this relevant direction. ---------0.B.S.0------------