Judgment 1. The subject matter of this writ petition is land bearing BBMP Katha No.48/15/1 in Sy.No.48/15 situated at Jakkasandra Village, Bangalore South Taluk, which is morefully described in the schedule to the writ petition and hereinafter referred to as the ‘schedule property’. The petitioner has called in question the validity of the preliminary notification at Annexure-Q dated 15-12-1984 and the final notification at Annexure-R dated 28-11-1986 issued by the competent authority for acquiring the schedule property and the possession notice at Annexure-T dated 21-10-1993. 2. The contention of the petitioner is that his father Kaverappa had purchased the schedule property under a deed of sale at Annexure-A dated 23-10-1951. After purchase of the property, katha has been transferred to the joint name of his father and his cousin Muniyallappa. It is further contended that in the family partition in the year 2001, the schedule property has fallen to his share. The father of the petitioner was not notified in the acquisition proceedings in respect of the schedule property. When respondent Nos.1 and 2 interfered with his possession and enjoyment of the said property, he filed a suit in O.S.No.102 of 2002 on the file of the 9th Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bangalore for injunction restraining respondent Nos.1 and 2 from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the property. Though, the respondents filed their written statement, they have not let in any evidence. The Trial Court dismissed the suit on 1.8.2011. Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal in RFA No.1728 of 2011. During the course of the said proceedings, Bangalore Development Authority (for short, ‘BDA’) has produced the documents relating to the acquisition of the land along with an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC. Taking note of the documents filed along with the application, the appeal was dismissed on 13-12-2012 reserving liberty to the petitioner to challenge the acquisition proceedings. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that BDA has not taken possession of the schedule property from the petitioner. He was not aware of the proceedings initiated by the respondents for acquisition of the land. When he came to know that the lands have been acquired, he filed the writ petition challenging the acquisition proceedings. 4. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that BDA has not taken possession of the schedule property from the petitioner. He was not aware of the proceedings initiated by the respondents for acquisition of the land. When he came to know that the lands have been acquired, he filed the writ petition challenging the acquisition proceedings. 4. On the other hand, learned Advocates appearing for the respondents submit that there is a long delay of more than 25 years in approaching this Court for challenging the acquisition proceedings. It is contended that the name of the petitioner was shown as ‘Anubhavadar’ in the award passed on 31-1-1990. BDA has filed written statement in the suit giving the particulars of acquisition of the lands. Even thereafter, petitioner has not challenged the acquisition proceedings. It is further argued that the land has been acquired and possession has been taken in accordance with law. They pray for dismissal of the writ petition. 5. Materials on record would clearly disclose that State Government has issued the preliminary notification for acquisition of the land as per Annexure-Q dated 15-12-1984. This was followed by a final notification dated 28-11-1986. The name of the father of the petitioner Kaverappa has been included in the notifications under challenge. The petitioner filed a suit O.S.No.102 of 2002 for permanent injunction restraining the Commissioner of BDA from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the suit property. In the said suit, BDA has filed its written statement contending that Sy.No.48/15 of Jakkasandra Village, measuring 20 guntas was acquired for the formation of “HSR Layout” under the final notification dated 25-12-1986 and possession was handed over to the Engineering Section on 21-10-1993. In the said suit, BDA did not lead any evidence. However, the court below on appreciation of the materials on record, has dismissed the suit observing as under: “Though the defendant failed in its attempt to place any materials that survey No.48/15 was acquired, even the materials placed by the plaintiff do not establish that the plaintiff is in lawful possession of the property as on the date of the suit.” 6. In the appeal in RFA No.1728 of 2011 filed by the petitioner herein challenging the above judgment and decree, BDA filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC seeking permission for production of the additional documents. In the appeal in RFA No.1728 of 2011 filed by the petitioner herein challenging the above judgment and decree, BDA filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC seeking permission for production of the additional documents. Along with the said application, BDA has produced the documents relating to the acquisition of the schedule property. The said application was allowed and the appeal was dismissed in the following terms:— “However, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, the acquisition proceedings were specifically referred to in the written statement. The lapse on the part of the respondent in not tendering evidence, is sought to be cured by production of the relevant documents. They are a matter of public record. The appellant feigning ignorance of the acquisition proceedings, cannot be an excuse to either adjourn the matter or to consider the matter on merits. The Trial Court having found against the appellant notwithstanding the non-production of any documents pertaining to the acquisition proceedings, would disable the appellant certainly in the face of the acquisition proceedings being evidenced by the present documents. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the application deserves to be allowed in terms of Order XLI Rule 27(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Since there cannot be any dispute about these documents which are gazetted, the contention that the appellant should be enabled to challenge the same, is not feasible in the present proceedings. It is sufficient however for disposal of this appeal in the face of the circumstance that the suit property was subject matter of acquisition proceedings that have attained finality several decades ago. Therefore, there is no merit in this appeal. The application under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC is allowed. The appeal stands dismissed.” 7. Thus, it is clear that the land in question has been acquired by the respondents. As noticed above, there is a long delay of 26 years in approaching this Court for challenging the acquisition proceedings. The contention of the petitioner is that he was not aware of the proceedings initiated for acquisition of land. The name of the father of the petitioner is found in the preliminary notification, final notification and the possession notice at Annexures-Q, R and T respectively. The contention of the petitioner is that he was not aware of the proceedings initiated for acquisition of land. The name of the father of the petitioner is found in the preliminary notification, final notification and the possession notice at Annexures-Q, R and T respectively. In fact, in the award, there is a reference that none of the interested parties have filed required documents in support of their title. Be that as it may. Atleast when the BDA has filed written statement in the suit O.S.No.102 of 2002, petitioner must have come to know that acquisition proceedings have been concluded. Petitioner has not challenged the acquisition even thereafter. The suit filed by the plaintiff was dismissed and even the appeal filed by him was also dismissed. The petitioner has not assigned any cogent reasons for the long delay in filing the writ petition. 8. Perusal of the notifications referred to above, would disclose that for the purpose of formation of “HSR Layout”, the State Government has notified for acquisition of land measuring 400 acres 12 guntas of land in 7 villages, namely, Haralakunte, Rupena Agrahara, Jakkasandra, Yalikunte, Venkoji Rao Khane, Bommanahalli and Agara. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has been residing in the schedule property. It is common knowledge that when notifications are issued for acquisition of large extent of lands, it will be talk of the town in a short-while. It is very difficult to believe that a person, who is a resident of the same locality, did not know the impugned notifications. 9. In Hari Singh & Others v. State of U.P. and others ( AIR 1984 SC 1020 : (1984) 2 SCC 624 ), the Apex Court has held that the petition filed after a delay of nearly two and half years, questioning the Notification issued for acquisition of the lands is fatal. In the said decision, it has been held as follows:— “4. At the out set we are of the view that the writ petition filed in July, 1982 questioning the notification issued in January, 1980 after a delay of nearly two and a half years is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only. In the said decision, it has been held as follows:— “4. At the out set we are of the view that the writ petition filed in July, 1982 questioning the notification issued in January, 1980 after a delay of nearly two and a half years is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only. It is no doubt true that the appellants have pleaded that they did not know anything about the notifications which had been published in the Gazette till they came to know of the notices issued under Section 9(3) of the Act but they have not pleaded that there was no publication in the locality of the public notice of the substance of the notification as required by Section 4 (1) of the Act”. 10. In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v Industrial Development Investment Company ( AIR 1997 SC 482 : (1996) 11 SCC 501 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should not quash the notification particularly when there is an inordinate delay in filing the writ petition. The relevant portion is as follows:— “It is well settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award, which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned single judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches”. 11. In State of Rajasthan and others v D.R. Laxmi and others ( (1996) 6 SCC 445 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that though the High Court has discretionary powers to quash the notification, it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. 11. In State of Rajasthan and others v D.R. Laxmi and others ( (1996) 6 SCC 445 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that though the High Court has discretionary powers to quash the notification, it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. It is further held that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, Court should not quash the acquisition proceedings. The relevant portion is as under: “Recently another Bench of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development & Investment Company Private Limited, Re-examined the entire case law and had held that once the land was vested in the State the Court was not justified in interfering with the notification published under appropriate provisions of the Act. Delay in challenging the notification was fatal and writ petition entails with dismissal on grounds of latches. It is thus, well settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken into acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loathe to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award, which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference.” 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his contention has relied on the decision of the Apex Court in State of Punjab v Amarjit Singh (2012 AIR SCW 1177), in order to contend that law of limitation is not applicable for filing the writ petitions. In the said case, the Apex Court has held that Section 65 of the Limitation Act is not applicable where legality of the acquisition proceedings is challenged. In the present case, writ petition has to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches and not on the ground that it is barred by time. In the said case, the Apex Court has held that Section 65 of the Limitation Act is not applicable where legality of the acquisition proceedings is challenged. In the present case, writ petition has to be dismissed on the ground of delay and latches and not on the ground that it is barred by time. In Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v State of Haryana & Others (2012 AIR SCW 240 : (2012) 1 SCC 792 ), the Apex Court has held that the paper possession is not the actual possession. But in the present case, the challenge is to the validity of the notifications for acquisition of the land. Both these decisions do not advance the case of the petitioner. 13. There is no merit in this writ petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs.