Judgment : Sri Bellapu Nageswar Rao, the petitioner, has filed this public interest litigation case, in person, seeking a Writ of Mandamus to declare G.O. Ms. No.390 dt.18.6.2012, insofar as not providing reservation to Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Backward Classes candidates and collection of fixed licence fee proposed, based on population, as illegal, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14, 15(2)(a), 16(2), and 19(1)(g) and 19(6) of the Constitution of India, and to direct the respondents to follow the Rule of Reservation as per the Constitution. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, it is stated that the petitioner is questioning the policy of the Government for the excise year 2012-2013 for disposal of retail liquor outlets on the ground that the people belonging to Scheduled Casts and Backward Classes are not provided reservation.In support of his case, he relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Cooverjee B. Bharucha v. Excise Commissioner and the Chief Commissioner, Ajmer AIR 1954 SC 220 . It is stated that the Government of Andhra Pradesh, instead of following the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment, issued the impugned G.O.In this regard, the petitioner statedly made representations to Government complaining that the collection of licence fee is illegal and against the Constitution of India and requesting to make the reservation to all groups of communities (A, B, C, D. groups in BCs; S.Cs, STs and Toddy Tapers Societies) in selection and appointment of liquor retail and outlet dealerships, in vain.It is further stated that the privilege of selling liquor through retail shops by collecting fixed licence fee based on population of various places where the shops are proposed to be established is also illegal, and grant of licences should be made free on application, like the Gas Agencies, Petrol Bunks and Civil Supply dealership based on reservation.The petitioner specifically stated that he is not opposing the lottery system in selecting the wine shop dealers, but he questions the action of the Government in not providing for reservation in the lottery system. Initially we have cautioned the petitioner that under Rule 7-A (b)(vii) of the Writ Proceeding Rules, 1977, that if the Court comes to the conclusion that this public interest litigation is motivated by any extraneous and/or ulterior motives or without bona fides, it shall be open to the Court to impose exemplary costs and/or compensatory damages upon the petitioner.However, he chose to argue the matter.As required under Rule 7-A(b)(i) of the Writ Proceedings Rules, the petitioner in his affidavit stated that he undertakes to pay exemplary costs and/or compensatory damages as directed by this Court in the event of a contrary finding upon adjudication by the Hon’ble Court that the writ petition is filed for extraneous/personal considerations or with an oblique motive. We have heard the petitioner/party-in-person and the learned Advocate General for the State. The Andhra Pradesh Excise Act, 1968 (for short, ‘the Act’), as enacted and amended from time to time, regulates production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquor.Under Section 3 of the Act, the Government may, by notification, appoint an officer as the Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise for the State, and subject to the general or special orders of the Government, he shall be the chief controlling authority in all matters connected with the administration of the Act.Under Section 13 of the Act, no person shall manufacture, collect, sell, transport any intoxicant without the grant of licence.Section 14 of the Act prohibits possession of excisable articles in excess of the quantity specified.Under Section 15 of the Act, no person shall sell or buy any intoxicant except under the authority and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence.Section 17 of the Act provides for grant of exclusive privilege of manufacture and Section 23 of the Act provides for payment for exclusive privilege fee as fixed and imposed for grant of right of the State Government in favour of private individuals. The State Government alone is exclusive owner and possessor and is entitled to deal with intoxicant liquors and its right can be granted to certain private individuals subject to terms and conditions as per the provisions of the Act by way of lease or licence in the manner provided. The State Government alone is exclusive owner and possessor and is entitled to deal with intoxicant liquors and its right can be granted to certain private individuals subject to terms and conditions as per the provisions of the Act by way of lease or licence in the manner provided. Accordingly, in exercise of powers conferred by Section 72 read with Sections 17, 28 and 29 of the Act, and in supercession of Andhra Pradesh (Lease of Right in Selling by shop and conditions of licence) Rules, 2005, in G.O. Ms. No.391, Revenue (Ex.II) Department, dt.18.6.2012 ‘Andhra Pradesh Excise (Grant of licence of selling by shop and conditions of licence) Rules, 2012’ were framed. Before making the Rules under G.O. Ms. NO.391, dt.18.6.2012, the Government approved the excise policy for disposal of retail liquor shops vide orders in G.O. Ms. No.390, Revenue (Ex-II) Department dt.18.6.2012. As per the said policy of the Government, the Government formulated new excise policy in relation to disposal of retail liquor shops for the excise year 2012-2013 to the effect that the privilege of selling liquor through retail shops shall be granted by collecting Fixed Licence Fee based on population (as per census) of the places (Municipality/Town/Village) where the shops are proposed to be established. The method of selection for grant of shop licences shall be drawal of LOTs. Insofar as the Scheduled Areas are concerned, the shops will be allotted to local Scheduled Tribe candidate by drawal of LOTs, and if local Scheduled Tribe candidate is not available, to other Schedule Tribe candidate. The number of shops are also fixed at the present level as 6596. The licence fee varies depend upon the population of the place, i.e., Municipality/Town/Village. The policy also stipulates that in addition to the licence fee, the licensee will be required to pay the privilege fee @ 8% plus applicable Value Added Tax on the invoice value of liquor purchased during the licence year in excess of six times the annual licence fee. The petitioner specifically contends that the condition of prescribing payment of the privilege fee @ 8% plus applicable Value Added Tax on the invoice value of liquor purchased during the licence year in excess of six times the annual licence fee is an additional liability on the retail outlet dealer and it would be burdensome to the dealers. The petitioner specifically contends that the condition of prescribing payment of the privilege fee @ 8% plus applicable Value Added Tax on the invoice value of liquor purchased during the licence year in excess of six times the annual licence fee is an additional liability on the retail outlet dealer and it would be burdensome to the dealers. After hearing the said contention, we have a feeling that the petitioner has not approached this Court in public interest, but is advancing and espousing cause of the dealers in liquor. There is no reason why he should contend on the liability of the dealers for payment of the privilege fee @ 8% plus applicable Value Added Tax on the invoice value of liquor purchased during the licence year in excess of six times the annual licence fee. The petitioner has not questioned the Andhra Pradesh Excise (Grant of licence of selling by shop and conditions of licence) Rules, 2012 issued in G.O. Ms. No.391, dt.18.6.2012. He is also not questioning the disposal of retail liquor shops by drawing of LOTs. But, he only questions the policy of the Government in not providing reservation to Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes by placing reliance under Articles 14, 15(2) (a), 16(2) and 19(1)(g) and 19(6) of the Constitution of India. Article 14 of the Constitution stipulates that it shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India. Article 15 (2) prohibits discrimination of the citizens on the ground of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth with regard to access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of public interest; the use of wells, tanks bathing ghats, roads and places of public resorts maintained wholly or party out of the State funds or dedicated to the use of the general public. Articles 16(4) of the Constitution of India provides for making provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens and Article 16(4A) provides for making reservation in matters of promotion to any class or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Articles 16(4) of the Constitution of India provides for making provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens and Article 16(4A) provides for making reservation in matters of promotion to any class or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Article 19(1) deals with freedom of speech and expression, to assemble peacefully and without arms; to form associations or unions, to move freely throughout the territory of India, to reside and settle in any part of the territory of India. Article 19(1)(g) specifically provides to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Article 19(6) of the Constitution stipulates that nothing in sub-clause (g) of clause (1) of Article 19 shall affect the operation of any existing law insofar as it imposes, or prevent the State from making any law imposing, in the interests of the general public, reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights conferred by the said sub-clause, and, in particular, nothing in the said sub-clause shall affect the operation of any existing law insofar as it relates to, or prevent the State from making any law. The A.P. Excise Act is an exception to carry on the business in intoxicant liquor. No citizen has a fundamental right to carry on trade in liquor except in accordance with the Act and the Rules made thereunder. The citizens have a limited right to carry on the business in accordance with the lease or licence granted in his favour by the State Government. As the State is exclusive owner of entire liquor business and the right of privilege can be borrowed in part by a sum payable by the licensee towards the excise duty/privilege and licence fee as prescribed by the Government. The object of directive principles is to embody the concept of welfare State and State has to secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people. In that direction, as it is not possible practically to prohibit intoxicant liquor dealings, State has to regulate the same. In fact, Government of Andhra Pradesh imposed total prohibition of liquor in the State of Andhra Pradesh by enacting A.P. Prohibition Act, 1995, for some period. In that direction, as it is not possible practically to prohibit intoxicant liquor dealings, State has to regulate the same. In fact, Government of Andhra Pradesh imposed total prohibition of liquor in the State of Andhra Pradesh by enacting A.P. Prohibition Act, 1995, for some period. The Apex Court in various judgments has held that in view of nature of liquor trade, licensees have no fundamental right to deal with intoxicant liquor, but they have a limited right to carry on business in accordance with the lease or licence granted in their favour. The Government is under constitutional obligation to provide reservation in favour of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Backward Classes etc., as is being provided in the case of employment, admission to educational institutions and for elected bodies. The petitioner seeks similar implementation of rule of reservation with regard to disposal of retail liquor shops. We are unable to accept the said contention. As no individual has fundamental right to carry on trade in liquor, the question of implementation of rule of reservation does not arise. As a matter of fact, no one is excluded from participating in the method of disposal of retail liquor shops. SCs, STs, BCs all are entitled to participate in the disposal of retail liquor shops. The petitioner is not questioning the allotment of shops in Scheduled Areas to ST candidates. At this stage, it is appropriate to notice certain well-settled propositions relating to right to trade in intoxicant liquors. In Ugar Sugar Works Ltd., v. Delhi Administration (2001) 3 SCC 635 , the Supreme Court reviewed the entire case law and held that any argument impugning policy decision of the State Government based upon Article 19(1)(g) is totally out of place and merits outright rejection. Paragraphs and 13 and 14 of the judgment are apt to be extracted hereunder: “13.That there is no fundamental right to trade in intoxicants, like liquor, has been conclusively held by this Court in State of A.P. & ors. vs. McDowell & Co. & ors. (1996) 3 SCC 709 ,where taking note of some of the earlier Constitution Bench decisions of this Court, the argument that a citizen of this country has a fundamental right to trade in intoxicant liquor was once again emphatically repelled. That issue is, thus, no longer res integra. The following observations of the Bench in McDowell's case (supra) are educative (SCC pp. That issue is, thus, no longer res integra. The following observations of the Bench in McDowell's case (supra) are educative (SCC pp. 735-36, para 39): ’39. The contention that a citizen of this country has a fundamental right to trade in intoxicating liquors refuses to die in spite of the recent Constitution Bench decision in Khoday DistilleriesKhoday Distilleries Ltd. V. State of Karnataka : (1995) 1 SCC 574 .It is raised before us again. In Khoday Distilleries this Court reviewed the entire case-law on the subject and concluded that a citizen has no fundamental right to trade or business in intoxicating liquors and that trade or business in such liquor can be completely prohibited. It held that because of its vicious and pernicious nature, dealing in intoxicating liquors is considered to be res extra commercium (outside commerce). Article 47 of the Constitution, it pointed out, requires the State to endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption except for medicinal purposes of intoxicating drinks and all drugs which are injurious to health. For the same reason, the Bench held, the State can treat a monopoly either in itself or in an agency created by it for the manufacture, possession, sale and distribution of liquor as a beverage. The holding is emphatic and unambiguous. Yet an argument is sought to be built upon certain words occurring in clauses (e) and (f) of the summary contained in para 60 of the decision. In these clauses, it was observed that creation of a monopoly in the State to deal in intoxicating liquors and the power to impose restrictions, limitations and even prohibition thereon can be imposed both under clause (6) of Article 19 or even otherwise. Seizing upon these observations, Shri Ganguly argued that this decision implicitly recognises that business in liquor is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g). If it were not so, asked the learned counsel, reference to Article 19(6) has no meaning. We do not think that any such argument can be built upon the said observations. In clause (e), the Bench held, a monopoly in the State or its agency can be created ‘under Article 19(6) or even otherwise’. Similarly, in clause (f), while speaking of imposition of restrictions and limitations on this business, it held that they can be imposed ‘both under Article 19(6) or otherwise’. In clause (e), the Bench held, a monopoly in the State or its agency can be created ‘under Article 19(6) or even otherwise’. Similarly, in clause (f), while speaking of imposition of restrictions and limitations on this business, it held that they can be imposed ‘both under Article 19(6) or otherwise’. The said words cannot be read as militating against the express propositions enunciated in clauses (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of the said summary. The said decision, as a matter of fact, emphatically reiterates the holding in Har ShankerHar Shankar v. Dy. Excise and Taxation Commissioner : (1975) 1 SCC 737 , that a citizen has no fundamental right to trade in intoxicating liquors. In this view of the matter, any argument based upon Article 19(1)(g) is out of place.’ 14. In Har Shankar & ors. vs. The Dy. Excise and Taxation Commr. & ors. (supra),Chandrachud, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) in para 53 of the judgment opined: ‘53. In our opinion, the true position governing dealings in intoxicants is as stated and reflected in the Constitution Bench decisions of this Court in Balsara's caseState of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara : AIR 1951 SC 318 : 52 Crl. LJ 1361, Cooverjee's case (supra), Kidwai's caseState of Assam v. A.N. Kidwai, Commr. Of Hills Division : 1957 SCR 295 : AIR 1957 SC 414 , Nagendra Nath's caseNagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. Of Hills Division : AIR 1958 SC 398 , Amar Chakraborty's caseAmar Chandra Chakraborty v. Collector of Excise : (1972) 2 SCC 442 and the R.M.D.C. caseState of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala : AIR 1957 SC 699 , as interpreted in Harinarayan Jaiswal's caseState of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal : (1972) 2 SCC 36 and Nashirwar's caseNashirwar v. State of M.P. : (1975) 1 SCC 29 (supra). There is no fundamental right to do trade or business in intoxicants. The State, under its regulatory powers, has the right to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants --its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. In all their manifestations, these rights are vested in the State and indeed without such vesting there can be no effective regulation of various forms of activities in relation to intoxicants. The State, under its regulatory powers, has the right to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants --its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. In all their manifestations, these rights are vested in the State and indeed without such vesting there can be no effective regulation of various forms of activities in relation to intoxicants. In "American Jurisprudence", Volume 30 it is stated that while engaging in liquor traffic is not inherently unlawful, nevertheless it is a privilege and not a right, subject to governmental control (page 538). This power of control is an incident of the society's right to self-protection and it rests upon the right of the State to care for the health, morals and welfare of the people. Liquor traffic is a source of pauperism and crime (pp.539, 540, 541).’ Reliance placed by the petitioner on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Cooverjee B. Bharucha case (supra) will not be of any help to him. In fact, paragraph 8 of the said judgment is against the contentions raised by him, and the same reads as under: “The contention that the effect of some of these provisions is to enable Government to confer monopoly rights on one or more persons to the exclusion of others and that creation of such monopoly rights could not be sustained under article 19 (6) is again without force. Reliance was placed on the decision in Rashid Ahmad v. Municipal Board of Kairana AIR 1950 SC 163 (B). That decision is no authority for the proposition contended for. Elimination and exclusion from business is inherent in the nature of liquor business and it will hardly be proper to apply to such a business principles applicable to trades which all could carry. The provisions of the regulation cannot be attacked merely on the ground that they create a monopoly. Properly speaking, there can be a monopoly only when a trade which could be carried on by all persons is entrusted by law to one or more persons to the exclusion of the general public. Such, however, is not the case with the business of liquor. Reference in this connection may be made to the observations of Lord Porter in ‘Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales’1950 AC 235 (C). Such, however, is not the case with the business of liquor. Reference in this connection may be made to the observations of Lord Porter in ‘Commonwealth of Australia v. Bank of New South Wales’1950 AC 235 (C). This is what his Lordship said: "Yet about this as about every other proposition in this field a reservation must be made. For their Lordships do not intend to lay it down that in no circumstances would exclusion of competition so as to create a monopoly either in a State or Commonwealth agency or in some other body be justified. Every case must be judged on its own facts and in its own setting of time.” Further it seems to us that this argument suffers from a fallacy. Under the rules every member of the public who wishes to carry on trade in liquor is invited to make bids. This is the only method by which carrying on of liquor trade can be regulated. When the contract is thrown open to public auction, it cannot be said that there is exclusion of competition and thereby a monopoly is created. For all these reasons we are of opinion that the contention that the provisions of the regulation are unconstitutional as they abridge the rights of the petitioner to carry on liquor trade freely cannot be sustained.” The petitioner has also placed reliance upon The State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal AIR 1972 SC 1816 . That was a case dealing with the power of the Government to accept or reject highest bid in conformity with the powers conferred on the Government under Sections 22 and 29 of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act. We fail to see any relevance of the decision to the present case. Similarly, the petitioner relied upon Aaljit Singh Ahluwalia v. Chandigarh Housing Board AIR 1990 Punjab & Haryana 144 which considered the policy of allotment of tenements by draw of lots by the Chandigarh Housing Board. That decision also has no releancy when the petitioner has not questioned the method adopted under the present policy of disposal of retail liquor shops by drawing lots. We are, therefore, neither satisfied with the contentions of the petitioner on merits nor satisfied with the bona fides of the petitioner in espousing the cause in public interest. That decision also has no releancy when the petitioner has not questioned the method adopted under the present policy of disposal of retail liquor shops by drawing lots. We are, therefore, neither satisfied with the contentions of the petitioner on merits nor satisfied with the bona fides of the petitioner in espousing the cause in public interest. We have, as noted above, cautioned the petitioner – party-in-person at the beginning, but he has persisted with the contentions consuming valuable time of the Court. We are, therefore, constrained to dismiss this public interest litigation with exemplary costs quantified at Rs.50,000/-(Rupees fifty thousand only) payable by the petitioner to the Andhra Pradesh State Legal Services Authority within two weeks. For compliance, post after two weeks.