Judgment : As this batch of 27 writ petitions involves a common and identical question, they are being disposed of by this common order. 2. The petitioners in all the writ petitions were declared as landless poor cultivating tenants in respect of the respective lands under their cultivation belonging to the respective temples by different orders of the concerned Assistant Commissioner, Endowments in the years 2003 and 2004. The Executive Officers of the respective temples filed appeals against the said orders along with applications for condonation of delay in 2010 under Rule 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Lease of Agricultural Land Rules, 2003 (for short “the Rules”) under Section 82 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions & Endowments Act, A.P. Act 30 of 1987 (for short “the Act”) issued in G.O.Ms. No.379 Revenue (Endowments.I) Department, dated 11-03-2003. 3. The temples contended the lands under their absolute ownership having commercial value to be within the Urban Area of Vijayawada, Guntur, Tenali and Mangalagiri Urban Region under G.O.Ms. No.144 LA & UD Department, dated 03-03-1988 and the lands were claimed to have been declared as urban lands within the master plan of the said urban authority under G.O.Ms. No.695 Municipal Administration, dated 09-11-1977. The lands were also claimed to have been set apart for residential, industrial and conservation purposes, etc., changing their character from agricultural to urban land, fit for construction by virtue of G.O.Ms. No.679, dated 29-12-2006. The temples also contended that there were no registered lease deeds executed between the temples and the writ petitioners, which is in violation of Section 82 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987, due to which the writ petitioners could not have been considered to be cultivating tenants, entitled to be declared as landless poor persons. The orders of the Assistant Commissioner were, hence, contended to be vitiated by errors apparent on the face of the orders, apart from the lands in question being required for the personal use of the temples. The temples contended that there was no delay in preferring the appeals after the inclusion of the lands in question in the urban development zone and to avoid any legal objections, the temples have filed petitions to condone the delay in preferring the appeals. 4. The temples contended that there was no delay in preferring the appeals after the inclusion of the lands in question in the urban development zone and to avoid any legal objections, the temples have filed petitions to condone the delay in preferring the appeals. 4. The tenants in their counters denied any necessity to have registered lease deeds when they were paying maktha regularly to the temples in respect of the lands under their personal cultivation even after the impugned orders. They also contended that the petitions for condonation of delay did not state any sufficient cause and did not explain day to day delay. 5. In the impugned orders allowing the delay condonation petitions, which are verbatim identical in 22 writ petitions, the decision in Donthireddy Sambi Reddy v. Commissioner, Endowments Department, Hyderabad 2008(6) ALD 121 was referred to as applying the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to proceedings under Section 82 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987. It was also opined that the right of a lessee, vis-a-vis the lands held by religious institutions are to be determined and worked out only so long as the land is put to agricultural use. The principles laid down by the Supreme Court in a decision reported in (1987) 2 SCC 107 were extracted apart from referring to (1998) 7 SCC 123 and N. Hemamalini v. N.A. Raghu 2008(2) ALD 171 . The observations in Donthireddy Sambi Reddy v. Commissioner, Endowments Department, Hyderabad (1 supra) that if the period of tenancy falls short of six years or if there is no valid lease, the claim cannot be accepted even if the person fits into the parameters of the landless poor, were also referred to. The temples argued that due to subsequent developments, the land in question changed its character and the right vested in the writ petitioners by virtue of declaration of their status as landless poor is only right to cultivate the lands. The Regional Joint Commissioner, who passed the impugned orders after elaborate reference to the contentions, only stated in the impugned orders that as the scope of the petitions is limited to the extent of condoning the delay, it is better not to express any opinion on the merits of the case. The Regional Joint Commissioner, who passed the impugned orders after elaborate reference to the contentions, only stated in the impugned orders that as the scope of the petitions is limited to the extent of condoning the delay, it is better not to express any opinion on the merits of the case. Still he found force in the contentions of the petitioners to come to the conclusion that there was no wilful delay in preferring the appeals, as admittedly the land in question was declared as urban land, fit for construction by subsequent Government orders, due to which the impugned order treating the lands as agricultural lands and declaring the status of the respondent needs to be examined in the main appeal, in all the 22 matters. Therefore, the Regional Joint Commissioner allowed the applications to condone the delay in the interests of justice, leaving it open to both parties to raise all other issues except limitation in the main appeals. 6. In W.P. No.22294 of 2011, the order in I.A. No.59 of 2010, dated 01-07-2011 is under challenge. The impugned order of the Assistant Commissioner was contended to be void in the absence of registered lease deed in favour of the tenant and the tenant contended that the abnormal delay in preferring the appeal was not explained and sufficient cause was not made out. Referring to the same set of decisions, the Regional Joint Commissioner observed that it is clear that the Tribunal has discretion to condone the delay if there is reasonable cause for such delay and he opined that whether the land can be used for agricultural purpose is to be decided in the main appeal and suffice it for the petitioner that the land in question was declared as urban land after passing of the impugned order. The Regional Joint Commissioner was of the view that it cannot be expected that the petitioner can raise the above issue at the time of declaring the status of the respondent as landless poor person, since the land was declared as urban land much subsequent to the said declaration. The Regional Joint Commissioner was of the view that it cannot be expected that the petitioner can raise the above issue at the time of declaring the status of the respondent as landless poor person, since the land was declared as urban land much subsequent to the said declaration. As the appeal was filed due to subsequent event and as A.P. Act 30 of 1987 did not provide for any other remedy except to prefer an appeal, the Regional Joint Commissioner considered the explanation as reasonable and was convinced that the petitioner was able to show sufficient cause to condone the delay. He also observed that the petitioner categorically stated that the delay was neither wilful nor wanton and there is no negligence on his part in preferring the appeal. He further observed that the delay shall be considered liberally and still the respondent is at liberty to canvass the issue of limitation in the main appeal, if so advised. Consequently, he allowed the petition. 7. In the remaining four writ petitions (W.P. Nos.10171 to 10174 of 2012), the final orders passed in the appeals are under challenge. In identical final orders in the appeals dated 04-02-2012, the Regional Joint Commissioner referred to 2006 (6) ALD 214 holding that a cultivating tenant in Section 82 of the new Act must be understood to denote cultivating tenant under a lawful duly executed lease and observed that no lease deeds were produced to substantiate the grant of lease to the writ petitioners under duly executed registered lease deeds. 2008(6) ALD 121 (1 supra) was also referred to and it was observed that the writ petitioners failed to produce any document evidencing lease of the land for six years prior to commencement of A.P. Act 30 of 1987. The decision was also relied on for the proposition that the rights of a lessee under the enactments are to be determined and worked out only as long as the land is put to agricultural use and the rights and needs of the religious institutions are of paramount consideration and the freedom to the institution to put the property to any other use cannot be denied. The Regional Joint Commissioner felt that the declaration under Section 82 of the Act is not absolutely extinguishing the rights of the temple/institution from putting the lands for any different use and that the declaration may not empower the tenant to purchase the lands depriving the temple its valuable rights. The Regional Joint Commissioner observed the order of the Assistant Commissioner to be not a speaking order and he did not verify whether there is any registered lease deed in favour of the respondents. The Regional Joint Commissioner, therefore, felt that the Assistant Commissioner committed grave error in not giving any valid and tenable reasons for declaring the status of the respondents. The Regional Joint Commissioner also referred to 2004 (2) ALD 148 and Sections 82 and 84 to 86 about the liability of the tenant to be evicted or removed. Therefore, the Regional Joint Commissioner set aside the orders of the Assistant Commissioner and directed the authority to put the land to public auction after recovering the same from the respondents, thus, allowing the appeals. 8. The challenge to condonation of delay by the writ petitioners, who claimed to be the cultivating tenants under the temples in the respective lands, was on the ground that on the approach of the tenants to the Assistant Commissioner as per the rules under G.O.Ms. No.379 Revenue (Endowments.I) Department, dated 11-03-2003, notices were issued to the temples. Only after thorough enquiry, the declaration of status of the respective petitioners as landless poor persons was made. In the petitions filed for condonation of the delay along with the appeals, the Regional Joint Commissioner, in fact, had no power under the Act or the Rules to condone the delay. Rule 4 of the Rules did not provide for any condonation of delay when it made it mandatory to prefer an appeal within 30 days from the date of receipt of the decision or order. The quasi-judicial authority could not have condoned the abnormal delay without any explanation, when what were referred to were only the subsequent events which cannot be taken into account. 9. The quasi-judicial authority could not have condoned the abnormal delay without any explanation, when what were referred to were only the subsequent events which cannot be taken into account. 9. In W.P. No.22294 of 2011, it was further stated that when A.P. Act 30 of 1987 is a complete code by itself and the appellate authority is only a persona designata, any inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 5 of the Limitation Act could not have been invoked. Even under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction and any delay, which a party could have avoided by exercise of due care and caution and attention cannot be a sufficient cause. The indefeasible right accrued to the tenant, could not have been interfered with on equitable grounds, more so when the delay was unexplained and deliberate. 10. In W.P. No.20581 of 2011, etc., it was further pointed out that even after coming to know about the zonal development plan of 2006, there was a delay of more than four years, which was unexplained and deliberate. It was also stated that the decision reported in 2008 (6) ALD 121 (1 supra) did not declare the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to such proceedings. 11. In W.P. No.18313 of 2011, it was further contended that after amendment of the A.P. Act 30 of 1987 by the Amendment Act 33 of 2007 with effect from 03-01-2008, the Endowments Tribunal alone has jurisdiction and the Regional Joint Commissioner, Endowments could not have passed the impugned orders except till constitution of the Tribunal. The impugned orders are, hence, contended to be void and without jurisdiction and the Executive Officers of the temples were contended to be having no locus standi to challenge the order of the Assistant Commissioner. Change of character of lands on paper will not effect any change on land and without impleading the Assistant Commissioner, the appeals and the delay condonation petitions are vitiated by nonjoinder of necessary party. 12. In the four writ petitions, in which final orders of the appeals are challenged also, it was firstly contended that there is no provision in Rule 4 of the Rules empowering the appellate authority to condone any delay and the appeal ought to have been rejected on the sole ground. 12. In the four writ petitions, in which final orders of the appeals are challenged also, it was firstly contended that there is no provision in Rule 4 of the Rules empowering the appellate authority to condone any delay and the appeal ought to have been rejected on the sole ground. Subsequent changes in the status of the land cannot change the nature of status of the tenant in cases decided long ago. The amendment to Section 82 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 with effect from 03-01-2008 only refers to the lands situated in Municipalities and Municipal Corporations and not to the areas under zonal development plans. The precedents relied on have no application to the facts of the case and therefore, the appellate orders are desired to be set aside. 13. The case of the temples in the various vacate stay petitions filed by them is that the Assistant Commissioner issued circular instructions to file appeals before the Regional Joint Commissioner, as the lands are urbanized and in view of the amendments to Section 82(2) with effect from 03-01-2008. The tenancy of the writ petitioners is admitted and the words “Municipalities and Municipal Corporations” are claimed to be subject to liberal interpretation as meaning ‘urban areas’. When the very character of the agricultural land is changed, it will be a contradiction in terms to contend that a landless poor person with less than Rs.12,000/-annual income is ready to buy in case of sale of temple, land worth crores of rupees. In view of the decision in 2008(6) ALD 121 (1 supra), there was absolutely no illegality or infirmity in the impugned orders. The delay should be reckoned only from the date on which the temples received the proceedings of the Assistant Commissioner in 2010 directing filing of the appeals. 14. Sri A. Satyaprasad, learned senior counsel in the writ petitions filed by Sri Prakash Buddarapu, learned counsel, Sri Gurram Ramachandra Rao, Sri Koneti Raja Reddy, Dr. R. Prabhakar and Sri V.V.N. Narasimhamam, learned counsel advanced extensive arguments on behalf of the petitioners, while Sri T. Surya Satish, learned Government Pleader for Endowments and Sri V.T.M. Prasad, learned standing counsel for Endowments, assisted by Sri D.V. Sasidhar, learned counsel made elaborate submissions on behalf of the respondents. 15. R. Prabhakar and Sri V.V.N. Narasimhamam, learned counsel advanced extensive arguments on behalf of the petitioners, while Sri T. Surya Satish, learned Government Pleader for Endowments and Sri V.T.M. Prasad, learned standing counsel for Endowments, assisted by Sri D.V. Sasidhar, learned counsel made elaborate submissions on behalf of the respondents. 15. The primary point that arises for consideration is whether the condonation of delay in filing the appeals is factually or legally justified or not and if not, whether the impugned orders are sustainable ? 16. It is true that in Donthireddy Sambi Reddy v. Commissioner, Endowments Department, Hyderabad (1 supra), the learned Judge was considering about the appellate authority committing any procedural irregularity in disposing of the applications for condonation of delay in filing the appeals or the appeals themselves and found the absence of any procedural irregularity and the conclusion was on the basis of the facts and circumstances referred to by the learned Judge. The twin questions raised herein as to whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act applies and even if it applies, whether there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay, were not specifically raised for the consideration of His Lordship. The applicability of the observations of His Lordship that the claim to declare a person as a landless poor cannot be accepted, if the period of tenancy falls short of six years or if there is no valid lease even if the person fits into the parameters, that the right of a lessee vis-à-vis the lands held by religious institutions are to be determined and worked out only as long as the land is put to agricultural use, that no lessee can take away the freedom of the institution to put the property held by it to a particular use and that clear contradiction in terms comes into existence where a person is declared as a landless poor on account of his meagre income on the one hand and is conferred with the right to purchase the property worth crores of rupees on the other, to the facts in issue herein, arises for consideration only in the event of the appellate authority having the power to condone the delay and there exists sufficient cause for considering condonation of such delay. 17. 17. Sri Satyaprasad, learned senior counsel relied on Prakash H. Jain v. Marie Fernandes(2003) 8 Supreme Court Cases 431 = AIR 2003 SC 459, wherein the Apex Court examined the provisions of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act and observed that the competent authority constituted under and for the purposes of the provisions contained in the Act is merely and at best a statutory authority created for a definite purpose and to exercise, no doubt, powers in a quasi-judicial manner but its powers are strictly circumscribed by the very statutory provisions which conferred upon it those powers and the same could be exercised in the manner provided therefor and subject to such conditions and limitations stipulated by the very provision of law under which the competent authority itself has been created. The distinction between ‘court’ and ‘persona designata’ was also adverted to and it was observed that the competent authority is obliged to pass orders in accordance with the time as has been stipulated in the statute itself as a condition precedent for the competent authority to proceed further to enquire into the merits. 18. While dealing with the Central Excise Act, 1944 considered to be a complete code by itself, the Apex Court in Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited (2009) 5 Supreme Court Cases 791 dealt with Sections 5 and 29 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 and firstly held that in the absence of any clause for condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of Limitation Act and then concluded that even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would, none the less, be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent, the nature of both the provisions or the nature of the subject matter and the spirit of special law exclude their operation. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not only from the terms of the Limitation Act but also by the provisions of the special law. In other words, the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, therefore, is to be judged not only from the terms of the Limitation Act but also by the provisions of the special law. Even earlier in Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. v. Custodian (2004) 11 Supreme Court Cases 472, the Supreme Court dealing with the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, observed that prescribed periods for initiating or taking steps in legal proceedings are intended to be abided by, subject to any power, ex facie, conferred on the Court to condone any delay. It was also pointed out that if the power to condone the delay is implicit in every statutory provision providing for a period of limitation in respect of the proceedings before Courts, Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 will be rendered redundant. It was also pointed out that it is not for the Court to determine whether the period of 30 days is too short to take into account the various misfortunes that can be faced by the concerned nor can the section be held to be directory because of such alleged inadequacy of time. 19. Sri Gurram Ramachandra Rao, learned counsel invited attention to Basdeo and others v. Murli Dhar Singh and others AIR 1942 Oudh 447 where a new ruling was held to be no ground for reviewing a previous judgment. He also referred to K.V. Kudva and another v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, Bangalore AIR 1972 Mysore 204, wherein it was held that a litigant, who has acquiesced in the judgment of a Court by not preferring an appeal within the period of limitation, cannot wake up and prefer an appeal after a subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court or the High Court which he considers as being favourable to him. Nor can the advice of his counsel that his case is not a fit one for appeal, which advice may turn out to be a mistaken one in the light of a subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court or the High Court, be regarded as a sufficient cause for condoning the delay. Nor can the advice of his counsel that his case is not a fit one for appeal, which advice may turn out to be a mistaken one in the light of a subsequent ruling of the Supreme Court or the High Court, be regarded as a sufficient cause for condoning the delay. The precedent pre-eminently strengthens the cause of the writ petitioners herein and so also Ram Kumar v. Virender Kumar 1986(1) Arbitration Law Reporter 341, relied on by the learned counsel, in which it was laid down that a new interpretation of law by the High Court or the Supreme Court cannot be considered a sufficient cause for condoning the delay as if it was treated a sufficient cause, then there would never be any finality. It was held that it was nowhere held that new interpretation of law was a sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the filing of the appeal. 20. The Apex Court was considering the question of condonation of delay in filing an appeal before the Collector under the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana Area) Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 in Sakuru v. Tanaji (1985) 3 SCC 590 . K. Venkaiah v. K. Venkateswara Rao AIR 1978 AP 166 by a Division Bench was referred to, wherein this Court held that the Limitation Act applies only to proceedings before a civil or criminal Court and since the Collector before whom an appeal is filed under Section 90 of the Tenancy Act is not a civil or criminal Court, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 have no application to the proceedings before him unless there is express provision in the special enactment, whereunder the Collector is exercising appellate jurisdiction, making any particular section of the Limitation Act specifically applicable to such proceedings. The Division Bench, in fact, did not even consider Section 93 of the said Act, which made the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 apply for the purpose of computation of the period of limitation for filing appeal or application for revision under that Act, to be making the provisions of Section 5 applicable, as only Sections 12 to 24 of the Limitation Act fall within the group of the sections relating to the computation of the period of limitation. The Apex Court unhesitatingly came to the conclusion that the view taken by the Division Bench in K. Venkaiah v. K. Venkateswara Rao (7 supra) is perfectly correct and sound and referred to the precedents from the Apex Court holding that the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963 apply only to the proceedings in Courts and not to appeals and applications before Bodies other than Courts such as quasi-judicial tribunals or executive authorities, notwithstanding the fact that such Bodies or authorities may be vested with certain specified powers conferred on Courts under the Codes of Civil or Criminal Procedure. In fact, the Apex Court also repelled the contention that subsequent amendment of the Tenancy Act by the Andhra Pradesh Tenancy Laws (Amendment) Act 1979, A.P. Act 2 of 1979 expressly made the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act applicable to appeals and revisions under the said Act and that the amendment is clarificatory in nature and held that the provisions of Section 93 as they stood prior to the amendment were free from any ambiguity and called for no clarification and the Legislature did not give any indication of any intention to clarify, but has only amended the section with prospective effect. 21. In Om Prakash v. Ahswani Kumar Bassi AIR 2010 SC 3791 , the Apex Court held that the Rent Controller under the East Pubjab Urban Rent Restriction Act is a creature of statute and can only act in terms of the powers vested in him by the statute and cannot, therefore, entertain an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay since the statute does not vest him with such power. Referring to Prakash H. Jain v. Marie Fernandes (3 supra) and Mukri Goipal v. Cheppilat Puthanpuraji AIR 1995 SC 2272 and other precedents, the Apex Court distinguished between a Court discharging the functions of an appellate authority and a statutory authority discharging such functions as a persona designata. 22. Referring to Prakash H. Jain v. Marie Fernandes (3 supra) and Mukri Goipal v. Cheppilat Puthanpuraji AIR 1995 SC 2272 and other precedents, the Apex Court distinguished between a Court discharging the functions of an appellate authority and a statutory authority discharging such functions as a persona designata. 22. The long title of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions & Endowments Act, 1987, A.P. Act 30 of 1987, specified the Act to be to consolidate and amend the law relating to the administration and governance of Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments in the State of Andhra Pradesh, thus, clearly signifying that the enactment was intended and designed to be a complete code in itself so far the administration and governance of such institutions and endowments are concerned. Even the statement of objects and reasons for the said Act referred to the report of Sri Challa Kondaiah Commission, the examination of the recommendations of the Commission by the Government and their acceptance with certain modifications. It was specifically stated that the Government proposed to repeal the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966 and the Tirumala Tirupathi Devasthanams Act, 1979 and in their place proposed to enact a comprehensive law providing better management of the properties and utilization of funds of the institutions and endowments, etc. It was specifically stated that a provision is also made to terminate the leases held by the persons other than landless poor persons and to enable landless poor persons to purchase the lands held by them on lease. The statement of objects and reasons for A.P. Act 33 of 2007, by which Section 82 was amended, stated that the land in urban areas being more precious, the amendment to Section 82 is intended to protect the interests of endowment institutions located in urban areas by not allowing sale of endowment lands in these areas. One of the salient features of the amending legislation was, therefore, safeguarding valuable endowment lands in urban areas and major Gram Panchayats by excluding them from the possibility of sale to lease holders. The Act being a comprehensive and consolidated legislation, did not undergo any change in its character by any subsequent amendments also. 23. A ‘Court’ for the purpose of the Act has been defined in Section 2(8) which did not include any statutory authority beyond the Courts specified in its meaning. The Act being a comprehensive and consolidated legislation, did not undergo any change in its character by any subsequent amendments also. 23. A ‘Court’ for the purpose of the Act has been defined in Section 2(8) which did not include any statutory authority beyond the Courts specified in its meaning. The powers and functions of Regional Joint Commissioner defined by Section 9 do not clothe any exercise of powers or performance of functions by the Regional Joint Commissioner with any colour of such exercise of powers or performance of functions by a Court. None of the provisions of the enactment providing for any appeals or reviews or revisions specified the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 or Section 5 of the Limitation Act in particular to be applicable and Section 149, which governs the procedure and powers at enquiries under the Act including hearing of appeals, prescribes about the applicability of the procedure under the Code of Civil Procedure to the trial of suits and the further applicability of the Evidence Act and Oaths Act, but not the Limitation Act, 1963. Deeming the officers under Section 149(3) to be persons acting judicially within the meaning of the Judicial Officers’ Protection Act, 1850 can be considered no indication of treating such officers as Courts for any other purpose and the beneficiary provision should be considered available only to the specific extent provided therein to the officer, but cannot be stretched to make the officer a judicial officer/Court for all purposes. 24. Section 82(1) of the Act provided exemption to leases held by landless poor persons from the general cancellation of all leases of agricultural lands subsisting on the date of commencement of the Act and the Rules under G.O.Ms. No.379 Revenue (Endowments.I) Department, dated 11-03-2003 were made in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 82 read with the general rule making power under Section 153 (1). While Rule 3 thereof provides for determination of landless poor person, Rule 4 provides for an appeal to the Regional Joint Commissioner having jurisdiction within 30 days from the date of receipt of the decision or order made or passed under Rule 3 by any person aggrieved by such decision or order and the decision or order of the Regional Joint Commissioner is made final. The period of 30 days from the date of the receipt of the decision or order by the aggrieved person, within which the appeal has to be, thus, filed under the statutory rules, is not expressly or impliedly impressed with any elasticity either by the statutory rules or by the statute under which the rules were made. The above background may clearly exclude the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to such appeals. 25. Section 5 of the Limitation Act providing for extension of prescribed period in certain cases like any appeal or any application, enabled admission of such an appeal or application only if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the “Court” that he had a sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. The word “Court” itself, not defined by the Limitation Act, 1963, but defined by A.P. Act 30 of 1987 for its purposes, does not include the Regional Joint Commissioner of Endowments in any view. 26. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 provided that the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law, where any such special or local law prescribed for any suit, appeal or application a different period of limitation than prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963. A.P. Act 30 of 1987 being a complete code in itself may, thus, make any applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the appeals provided by the statutory rules above referred to, not arise with reference to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, apart from Section 5 specifically referring to satisfaction of the Court in this regard. The principles laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in K. Venkaiah v. K. Venkateswara Rao (7 supra) upheld by the Apex Court in Sakuru v. Tanaji (6 supra) and the ratio decidendi of the other precedents above referred to, make Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 inapplicable to appeals under Rule 4 of the Rules in the absence of any express or even an implied provision under A.P. Act 30 of 1987 to consider such application even remotely possible. The limitation on exercise of such power by a statutory authority, who is a persona designata, is circumscribed by the very statutory provisions, which conferred quasi-judicial powers and any other equitable considerations cannot provide shelter to exercise of any such power against the unambiguous letter of the statute and if so, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could not have been taken aid by the Regional Joint Commissioner to entertain applications for condonation of delay in filing the appeals under Rule 4 of the Rules and condone the delay by allowing any such applications on any ground. 27. Even otherwise, whether there was any basis for the statutory authority to arrive at any satisfaction about the appellants having sufficient cause for not preferring the appeals within the prescribed period, also appears to be a question to be answered against the appellants. In all the appeals, the petitions for condonation of delay and the appeals were filed on the instructions of the Assistant Commissioner, Endowments directing the Executive Officers/Managers/Executive Authorities of the temples/Institutions having lands situated at urban area or under Vijayawada, Guntur, Tenala, Mangalagiri Urban Development Authority and who got the landless poor declaration orders previously from the very office of the Assistant Commissioner, who gave instructions to file revision petitions before the Regional Joint Commissioner, Endowments, Multizone-II, Tirupati for cancellation of the landless poor declarations immediately, since the tenants for the urban lands cannot be declared as landless poor tenants. While it is strange that the very person who declared the tenants as landless poor for the purposes of Section 82(1) himself instructed the temples/institutions to file revision petitions (?) before the Regional Joint Commissioner questioning his own orders (even if it were an individual who is successor in office to the individual who gave such declarations), the affidavits of the executive officers of the temples in support of their applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay only referred to the factual background of the lands being of commercial value and in urban area, the tenants having no registered lease deeds in their favour, the change in the master plan and the absence of any other remedy against the impugned orders except an appeal under Rule 4, but did not allege any cause, leave alone sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeals beyond the prescribed period. The inclusion of the land in question in the urban development zone alone was claimed to be justifying preferring the appeals at that distance of time, which was attempted to be construed as indicating practically the absence of any delay. The petitions were filed in 2010. The orders of the Assistant Commissioner declaring the tenants as landless poor for purposes of Section 82 were in 2003/2004. G.O.Ms. No.695 and G.O.Ms. No.679 referred to about the lands coming under the Andhra Pradesh Urban Areas Development Act, 1975 were in 1977 and 2006. The amendment of Section 82 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 excluding lands situated in municipalities and municipal corporations in sub-section (2), etc., by A.P. Act 33 of 2007 came into effect from 03-01-2008. The instructions of the Assistant Commissioner to file the appeals were in May, 2010 and the appeals along with petitions for condonation of delay were much later. Even assuming that the amendment by A.P. Act 33 of 2007, which came into force with effect from 03-01-2008, either activated or provided justification for the appellants to file the appeals along with petitions for condonation of delay, why the Assistant Commissioner or the appellants did not act from 03-01-2008 till May, 2010/July, 2010 was never stated. Apart from the question whether the subject lands herein, which are not claimed to be situated within the territorial limits of any municipality or municipal corporation, can be considered exempt by Section 82(2) as amended with effect from 03-01-2008, even the counter-affidavits filed along with vacate stay petitions did not attempt even to remotely state the causes for not preferring the appeals against the orders of the Assistant Commissioner declaring the writ petitioners herein as landless poor, within the prescribed period or thereafter till July, 2010, though even the last of the events, which is claimed as providing the justification for filing the appeals due to the amendment of Section 82(2) with effect from 03-01-2008, was more than two and half years earlier to filing of the appeals and the delay condonation petitions. Even if the statute provided no other remedy as claimed, that cannot justify any condonation of delay in the absence of satisfaction of the Court about the requirements of Section 5. 28. Dr. R. Prabhakar, learned counsel rightly referred to the decision of the Apex Court in Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) by Lrs. v. Exe.Eng. Even if the statute provided no other remedy as claimed, that cannot justify any condonation of delay in the absence of satisfaction of the Court about the requirements of Section 5. 28. Dr. R. Prabhakar, learned counsel rightly referred to the decision of the Apex Court in Pundlik Jalam Patil (D) by Lrs. v. Exe.Eng. Jalagaon Medium Project and another 2008 (6) ALT 38 (SC), wherein the Apex Court held that where there is no sufficient cause for condoning the delay but the delay was condoned, it is a case of discretion not being exercised judicially and the order becomes vulnerable and susceptible for its correction by the superior Court. The Apex Court made it clear that the Court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity and the Court helps those who are vigilant and do not slumber over their rights. An earlier decision in Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and another v. State of Gujarat (1981) 1 SCC 495 was referred to, wherein it was also laid down that no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute sufficient cause and it was stated that even if the sufficient cause has been shown, a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. Pointing out that the proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5, the Supreme Court held that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration at this stage. It was made clear that settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue and it is stated that the same serves no public interest. Thus, while holding that the law of limitation is founded on public policy, the Apex Court made it clear that the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. If so, there can be said to be no reasonable basis for considering the request of the appellants for condonation of delay. 29. Thus, while holding that the law of limitation is founded on public policy, the Apex Court made it clear that the law of limitation is same for citizen and for governmental authorities. If so, there can be said to be no reasonable basis for considering the request of the appellants for condonation of delay. 29. The Apex Court pointed out in Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari and others AIR 1969 SC 575 that the words ‘sufficient cause’ receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant. Similarly in State of West Bengal v. The Administrator, Howrah Municipality and others (1972) 1 SCC 366 , the well settled legal position under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was reiterated pointing out that it was the duty of the Court to have scrutinized the reasons given by the State and considered the same on merits and expressed an opinion, one way or the other. Emphasizing that Courts have to use their judicial discretion in the matter soundly in the interest of justice, absence of negligence or inaction or want of bona fides were again reiterated as propelling liberal construction. 30. In State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others (1996) 3 SCC 132 , the Apex Court not only noted the law of limitation to be the same for a private citizen as for governmental authorities, but also took note of the very nature of governmental functioning which makes procedural delay implicit and incidental to the decision making process. While certain amount of latitude is not impermissible, the expression ‘sufficient cause’ was directed to be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. However, it is to be noted that it is evident that even in such a case some cause should exist and in no event non-existence of any cause will help the defaulter. 31. Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and others (2008) 3 SCC 70 is a case where any strait-jacket formula for accepting or rejecting an explanation furnished for delay is not adopted, but the causes shown for condonation have to be of acceptable value. 32. 31. Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and others (2008) 3 SCC 70 is a case where any strait-jacket formula for accepting or rejecting an explanation furnished for delay is not adopted, but the causes shown for condonation have to be of acceptable value. 32. The test of ‘sufficient cause’ was stated in R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhvaneswari (2009) 2 SCC 689 to be purely an individualistic test and not an objective test. Hence, no two cases can be treated alike. It was pointed out that the concept of ‘sufficient cause’ was left delightfully undefined and each case spells out a unique experience to be dealt with by the Court as such. 33. The Apex Court further held in Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh and others (2010) 8 SCC 685 after an exhaustive review of the precedents, that even if the term ‘sufficient cause’ has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The explanation has to be reasonable or plausible so as to persuade the Court to believe that the explanation rendered is not only true, but is worthy of exercising judicial discretion in favour of the applicant. The normal behaviour of a common prudent person was referred to and it was cautioned that liberal construction cannot be equated with doing injustice to the other party. The word ‘sufficient cause’ was stated to mean adequate enough and the party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The decisive factor is the sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation. 34. The later view of the Supreme Court was clarified in Lanka Venkateswarlu (D) by L.Rs. v. State of A.P. & Ors. AIR 2011 SC 1199 , wherein it was asserted that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’, ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. It was also stated that all discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law and the discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. 35. It was also stated that all discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law and the discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. 35. The latest declaration of law on the subject is by Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157 , wherein the Supreme Court stated that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. It was laid down that no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest. In fact, in the case before Their Lordships, the cause shown for the delay of more than 7 years was treated as wholly unsatisfactory and as poor apology for the exercise of discretion by the Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 36. Thus, the principles are well settled and the application of the principles to the facts of the case does not disclose any reason being assigned for the delay that occurred in filing the appeals at least since the amendment to Section 82 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 coming into force with effect from 03-01-2008 and the filing of the appeals in or after July, 2010, even assuming that the subsequent statutory amendment can provide justification for reopening of closed and stale matters. The circumstances relating to the absence of registered lease deeds and urbanization of the lands were in existence even since earlier, but were not acted upon and the inaction since inception up to filing of the appeals cannot be considered to be providing any reasonable basis for condonation of delay even assuming the question to be answerable with the broadest of liberality to be adopted. As such, even on facts, the judicial discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 on satisfaction about the existence of sufficient cause for the delay cannot be considered to have been exercised in accordance with sound judicial principles and the rights of the writ petitioners herein were obviously very lightly interfered with, even without the existence of any cause, leave alone sufficient cause justifying any condonation of delay. 37. Many other questions were raised by either parties about the relevancy of the subsequent change in the contents of the statute or the nature of the land providing any reasonable basis for reopening a closed chapter by way of an appeal against an order which had become final by efflux of time and about the jurisdiction or otherwise of the Regional Joint Commissioner to entertain the appeals or petitions for condonation of delay after the Endowments Tribunal has been made part of A.P. Act 30 of 1987. However, Dr. Prabhakar himself in his usual fairness referred to the decision of this Court in W.P. No.9681 of 2008 W.P. No.9681 of 2008 of High Court of A.P., dated 11-11-2008, wherein it was held that till the adjudicatory machinery contemplated under an enactment is brought into existence, the arrangement that has been functional prior to it would continue and consequently, as the Endowments Tribunal was not constituted by the time the impugned orders are passed, the matter may not require any further probe. Even in the writ petitions where the final orders in the appeals are challenged, there is no need to go into the orders in appeals further in view of the legal basis for entertaining such appeals being found to be non-existent. 38. Even in the writ petitions where the final orders in the appeals are challenged, there is no need to go into the orders in appeals further in view of the legal basis for entertaining such appeals being found to be non-existent. 38. Similarly, the learned Government Pleader for Endowments and the learned standing counsel for Endowments referred to the statutory or other alternatives still open to the authorities in this regard in their perception, about which no expression of opinion is being made, lest the same should prejudice the rights and interests of the parties in any such future events. The present consideration is, thus, purely confined, as already stated, to the twin questions of the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and if it applies, the existence of a sufficient cause for condonation of delay, both of which have to be answered in favour of the writ petitioners for the reasons stated above. 39. Therefore, the impugned orders in all the writ petitions entertaining the applications under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay in filing appeals, without any jurisdiction and accepting the requests for condonation of such delay even without the existence or proof of any sufficient cause, are declared illegal and the impugned orders including those orders passed in the appeals are, hence, quashed. The writ petitions are allowed accordingly. No costs.