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2012 DIGILAW 532 (KER)

Narayana Reddiar v. State Of Kerala, Rep. By Public Prosecutor, High Court Of Kerala, Ernakulam

2012-06-14

N.K.BALAKRISHNAN

body2012
Judgment: The short question that arises for consideration in all these petitions is whether the prosecution under the provisions of P.F.A. Act, 1954 and P.F.A. Rules, 1955 is sustainable in respect of offences detected on and after 29.7.2010. In all the aforesaid cases food samples were taken by the Food Inspector after 29.7.2010. The sampling, labelling and other procedures were done under the P.F.A. Act and Rules mentioned above and the complaints were filed under the aforesaid Act and Rules. The learned Magistrate took cognizance in all the aforesaid cases for offences under the P.F.A. Act 1954 and the P.F.A. Rules 1955. 2. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that P.F.A. Act, 1954 was repealed by the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (hereinafter referred to as 'F.S.S. Act' for short) and hence no prosecution can be launched against the petitioners under the P.F.A. Act, 1954 and P.F.A. Rules, 1955. The petitioners have relied upon the notification dated 29.7.2010 (Annexure C) issued by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (Department of Health and Family Welfare). The said notification reads: "In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 1 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), the Central Government hereby appoints the 29th day of July, 2010 as the day on which the provisions of Sections 19 to 21 (both inclusive), Sections 23 to 29 (both inclusive), Sections 31 to 35 (both inclusive), Sections 48 to 80 (both inclusive), Section 89, Sections 94 to 98 (both inclusive) and Section 100 of the said Act, shall come into force." 3. On going through section 1 (3) of the Act, it is clear that different dates were appointed for different provisions of the said Act and any reference to any such provision to the commencement of the said Act shall be construed as a reference to the coming into force of that provision. Since Annexure C notification, quoted above, was issued under section 1 (3) of F.S.S. Act and since it is stated that as per the said notification the provisions mentioned therein have come into force on that day; namely on 29.7.2010, it has to be construed that it is only those provisions, mentioned in Annexure C notification, which came into force with effect from 29.7.2010. 4. 4. Smt. Jasmine, the learned Public Prosecutor, would submit that so many other provisions in the Act did not come into force with effect from 29.7.2010. It is not disputed that different provisions have come into force with effect from different dates as mentioned in those notifications. For example, sections 36 to 47 came into force with effect from 31.7.2009. 5. According to the petitioners, since Annexure C notification makes it clear that sections 94 to 98 (both inclusive) came into force with effect from 29.7.2010, no prosecution can be had under P.F.A. Act, 1954 and Rules, 1955 on and after 29.7.2010. As indicated above, sections 97 and 98, which are the relevant provisions, also came into force with effect from 29.7.2010. But the learned Public Prosecutor would submit that there is difference between a notification issued under section 1 (3) of F.S.S. Act and a notification which is issued under section 97 (1) of the F.S.S. Act. 6. Section 97 reads: "Repeal and savings (1) With effect from such date as the Central Government may appoint in this behalf, the enactment and Orders specified in the Second Schedule shall stand repealed; PROVIDED that such repeal shall not affect:- (i) the previous operations of the enactments and Orders under repeal or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (ii) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any of the enactment or Orders under repeal; or (iii) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offences committed against the enactment and Orders under repeal; or (iv) any investigation or remedy in respect of any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment. and any such investigation, legal proceedings or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if this Act had not been passed: (2) If there is any other law for the time being in force in any State, corresponding to this Act, the same shall upon the commencement of this Act, stand repealed and in such case, the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), shall apply as if such provisions of the State law had been repealed. (3) Notwithstanding the repeal of the afore said enactment and Orders, the licences issued under any such enactment or Order, which are in force on the date of commencement of this Act, shall continue to be in force till the date of their expiry for all purposes, as if they had been issued under the provisions of this Act or the rules or regulations made thereunder. (4) Not with standing anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no court shall take cognizance of an offence under the repealed Act or Orders after the expiry of a period of three years from the date of commencement of this Act." (underlined by me to lay emphasis) 7. The notification under section 97 is intended to repeal the enactment and orders specified in the Second Schedule with effect from the date on which the said provision came into force. The proviso makes it further manifest that such repeal shall not affect the previous operations of the enactments under repeal or anything duly done or suffered thereunder or any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any of the enactments under repeal. The Second Schedule takes in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. As indicated above any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against the enactments under repeal (in this case under the P.F.A. Act), shall not be affected by the coming into force of the F.S.S. Act by virtue of the notification issued under section 97 (1). Therefore, the prosecution contends that the P.F.A. Act, 1954 could stand repealed only by virtue of a notification issued under section 97 (1) of the Act and not on the strength of a notification issued under section 1 (3) of the Act. 8. F.S.S. Act was made enforceable with effect from 28.5.2008. Therefore, the prosecution contends that the P.F.A. Act, 1954 could stand repealed only by virtue of a notification issued under section 97 (1) of the Act and not on the strength of a notification issued under section 1 (3) of the Act. 8. F.S.S. Act was made enforceable with effect from 28.5.2008. But the learned Public Prosecutor would submit that as per the provisions of this Act, Rules have to be framed and standards have to be prescribed and so many actions have to be taken under the Act and that was the reason why section 1 (3) made it clear that different dates be appointed for different provisions of the Act and that on the strength of such notifications only those provisions mentioned therein will come into force with effect from the dates specified therein and as such even if the F.S.S. Act came into force on a date prior to the dates of detection of the offences mentioned in these complaints, that will not affect the power of the Food Inspectors to detect offences till the P.F.A. Act stood repealed on the strength of the notification issued under section 97 (1) of the Act. It is further argued that it could never be construed that there should be a period of interregnum so as to enable persons who violate the law to go unpunished or such violations to go unnoticed. In short the actions taken by the Food Inspectors as per the provisions of the P.F.A. Act, 1954, should be allowed to continue till the P.F.A. Act stood repealed on 5.8.2011. 9. The object of the F.S.S. Act is to consolidate the laws relating to food and to establish the Food Safety and Standards Authority of India for laying down science based standards for articles of food and to regulate their manufacture, storage, distribution, sale and import, to ensure availability of safe and wholesome food for human consumption and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.That would support the argument advanced on behalf of the prosecution that the legislature never intended to create a vacuum where no provision was in force at the relevant time so as to prosecute a person for committing violation of the provisions of the P.F.A. Act. 10. The normal effect of repealing a Statute is to obliterate it from the statute book completely as if it had never been passed. 10. The normal effect of repealing a Statute is to obliterate it from the statute book completely as if it had never been passed. Section 97 of the F.S.S. Act contains provisions which are in tune with section 6 of the General Clauses Act which is made clear in section 97(1) of the Act. When an old Act is repealed by a new Act there would be a period of changing over. Therefore, invariably there would be a saving clause in the new Statute just like section 97 of the F.S.S. Act in order to ensure a smooth changing over. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that the legislature could not have contemplated a situation to break the continuity of the enforcement of procedural steps and it was for that purpose a further provision was made in section 98 of the Act also. Therefore, according to the prosecution, the saving clause contained in section 97 which is further fortified by section 98 would keep the old Act in force till the rules are framed, the standards are prescribed and other steps are taken under the F.S.S. Act. Since sections 97 and 98 are clear, it is not necessary to delve deep into the question of implied repeal. In other words, the question of implied repeal does not arise in this case since the notification under section 97(1) of the Act was published and it came into force only with effect from 5.8.2011. A construction which results in hardship, serious inconvenience, absurdity or anomaly or which leads to uncertainty and friction in the system has to be rejected and preference should be given to that construction which avoids such results. In fact, here, there is no conflict in the two statutes or as to the date when the old Act stood repealed since the notification as per which the old Act stood repealed was issued under section 97(1) only as per the notification dated 4.8.2001. A survey of the various provisions of F.S.S. Act would leave no doubt that several steps or actions were/are to be taken for the implementation of the Act and for that purpose, notifications had to be issued stage by stage, for, otherwise Section 1(3) of the Act would not have been so worded indicating in that provision itself that different dates be appointed for the coming into force of the different provisions of the Act. 11. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that since Annexure C notification makes it clear that sections 94 to 98 shall also come into force with effect from 29.7.2010, there is an implied total repeal of the P.F.A. Act, 1954. This argument has been countered by Smt. Jasmine pointing out that what has been notified under Annexure C notification issued under section 1 (3) of the Act is only the commencement of the provisions including sections 97 and 98. That does not mean that P.F.A. Act stood repealed without a notification being issued under section 97 (1) of the Act. That submission, according to the learned Public Prosecutor, gets further fortified in view of the fact that notification under section 97 (1) was actually issued by the Government on 4.8.2011. That notification reads: “ In exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 97 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (34 of 2006), the Central Government hereby repeals the enactments and orders in the Second Schedule of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 and the Milk and Milk Products Regulations, 1992, with effect from 5th August, 2011" (underlined by me to lay emphasis) 12. It is also manifest that a notification under section 97(1) can be issued only when section 97 has been brought into force. So it can be found that Annexure C notification was issued to bring into force section 97 of the Act. It was after section 97 was brought into force as per Annexure C notification, the notification dated 4.8.2011 could be issued by the Government. In short, Annexure C notification is not a notification issued or which can be issued under section 97 (1) of the Act. That is only a notification as per which section 97 was brought into force. 13. The aforesaid notification makes it clear that it is as per this notification dated 4.8.2011 the enactments and orders mentioned in the Second Schedule of the F.S.S. Act, 2006, stood repealed. In other words, till 5.8.2011, as mentioned in the notification, the enactments and orders under P.F.A. Act, 1954 remained in force. Since Annexure C is not a notification issued under section 97 (1) of the Act, the contention that P.F.A. Act 1954 stood repealed with effect from 29.7.2010 is seen to be rather unsound and untenable. In other words, till 5.8.2011, as mentioned in the notification, the enactments and orders under P.F.A. Act, 1954 remained in force. Since Annexure C is not a notification issued under section 97 (1) of the Act, the contention that P.F.A. Act 1954 stood repealed with effect from 29.7.2010 is seen to be rather unsound and untenable. The argument advanced by the learned Public Prosecutor, that the standards and safety requirements prescribed and actions to be taken under other provisions of the Act, Rules, Regulations and Orders enlisted in the Second Schedule shall continue to operate and shall have force till rules are framed and standards are prescribed under the F.S.S. Act, is worthy of acceptance. 14. In support of that argument the learned Public Prosecutor also relies upon the transitory provisions contained in Section 98 of the Act which reads: "Notwithstanding the repeal of the enactment and Orders specified in the Second Schedule the standards, safety requirements and other provisions of the Act and the rules and regulations made thereunder and Orders listed in that Schedule shall continue to be in force and operate till new standards are specified under this Act or rules and regulations made thereunder: PROVIDED that anything done or any action taken under the enactment and Orders under repeal shall be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act and shall continue in force accordingly unless and until superseded by anything done or by any action taken under this Act." (underlined by me to lay emphasis) 15. In Criminal M.C. 3570/2011 the date of offence is shown as 29.11.2010. It was on 26.11.2010 the offence was stated to have been detected in the case mentioned in Criminal M.C. 4201/2011. The offence mentioned in the complaint referred to in Criminal M.C. 4226/2011 was stated to have been detected on 12.1.2011. It was on 17.2.2011 the offence mentioned in Criminal M.C. 2447/2011 was stated to have been committed. 16. The upshot of the foregoing discussion is that since the notification under section 97 (1), as per which P.F.A. Act, 1954 stood repealed, came into force only with effect from 5.8.2011, the contention that the offence detected and complaint filed under the provisions of P.F.A. Act, 1954, on and after 29.7.2010 is unsustainable, is found to be bereft of any merit. It is further made clear that by virtue of Annexure C notification issued under section 1(3) of the F.S.S. Act, P.F.A. Act, 1954 and Rules, 1955, made there under were not repealed and that actions taken till 5.8.2011 under the P.F.A. Act, 1954 is not affected by the provisions of the F.S.S. Act. 17. In the light of the findings entered above, the request made by the petitioners in Cr. M.C. No:4226/2011 is only to be rejected. 18. In Cr. M.C. No:4201/2011 the petitioners have raised so many contentions pointing out violation of certain rules, which according to them would be sufficient to throw over board the entire prosecution launched against them. Whether the violations, if any, complained of would vitiate the conviction, is a matter to be gone into at the trial, the learned Public Prosecutor submits. The learned Prosecutor would further submit that some of the Rules alleged to have been violated are only directory and not mandatory and in any event that is a matter for appreciation of evidence after trial. The petitioners can raise all those contentions before the trial Court at the time of trial. Therefore, without prejudice to the contentions so raised by the petitioners, Cr. M.C. No: 4201/2011 is also to be dismissed. 19. In Cr. M.C. No:3570/2011 the petitioners have raised so many contentions other than the maintainability of the complaint under the provisions of the P.F.A. Act and Rules. It is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners in this case that the petitioners are only Directors of the Company and as such they cannot be held liable. Whether the petitioners were in charge of or responsible to the company for the conduct of its business, is a matter to be gone into at the time of trial. If any person has been nominated under sub-section (2) of Section 17 of P.F.A. Act to be in charge of, and responsible to the company, for the conduct of the business of the company, that nominee may be responsible. However, those are matters to be considered by the learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate can also allow the accused/Directors of the Company to be represented through their counsel if application is filed and Magistrate is convinced of the reasons stated by them. The petitioners can raise all those contentions before the trial Court at the time of trial. However, those are matters to be considered by the learned Magistrate. The learned Magistrate can also allow the accused/Directors of the Company to be represented through their counsel if application is filed and Magistrate is convinced of the reasons stated by them. The petitioners can raise all those contentions before the trial Court at the time of trial. Hence, this Criminal M.C. is only to be dismissed without prejudice to the right of the petitioners to urge those contentions before the trial Court. 20. As the prosecution is launched under the provisions of P.F.A. Act, 1954 and P.F.A. Rules, 1955, the alleged violation of the provisions of F.S.S. Act can have no role to play in the trial of the case involved in Cr.M.C.2447/2011. The violations, if any, of any of the provisions of P.F.A. Act, 1954 and Rules, 1955, can be projected by the petitioners before the trial Court at the time of trial. Therefore, Cr. M.C. No: 2447/2011 is also to be dismissed. In the result all the aforesaid Criminal M.Cs are dismissed, subject to the observations made above.