JUDGMENT : By means of this writ petition, the petitioners have sought a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 11-1-1994 and 13-5-1993 passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and the Settlement Officer Consolidation respectively. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the present writ petition, according to the petitioners, are that a Patta was allotted to Bhullan, father of the petitioners, by the Collector under the Government Grants Act. Copy of the Patta and Khatauni have been annexed by the petitioners as Annexure-1 to the writ petition. The land in dispute pertains to plot No. 360/3, area 0.94 Bigha, plot no. 366/2, 1 Bigha and plot no. 361/3 area 0.57 Bigha, situated at village Daduwala, Tehsil Kashipur, district Nainital. The petitioners filed objection before the Consolidation Officer claiming that the names of the petitioners be recorded in place of their father Bhullan, since he had died. The respondent no.3 filed objection on the ground that the land in question has been purchased and an unregistered agreement to sale was executed by Sri Bhullan in favour of the mother of respondent no.3, Smt. Vero wife of Gurunam Singh. The respondent no.3 Sewa Singh claimed his adverse possession on the basis of unregistered agreement for sale through his mother since she had paid Rs. 8,000/- for purchase of the land in question. The Consolidation Officer on the basis of the objection filed by the parties, framed following Issues:- 1. Who legally inherits land of Khata No. 154? 2.Whether Sewa Singh has perfected his right on the basis of adverse possession? If so, its effect? After perusing the evidence adduced by the parties, the objection of respondent no. 3 was rejected by the Consolidation Officer on the ground that on the basis of receipt of irrigation, which has been filed by Sewa Singh, pertains of his own Bhumidhari land and on the basis of receipt, the possession cannot be presumed adverse against the petitioners, who are legal heirs of late Bhullan. Learned Consolidation Officer also held that Sewa Singh failed to prove his adverse possession continuously for the last preceding 12 years. Ultimately, by order dated 17-1-1993, the Consolidation Officer directed that the name of deceased Bhullan be replaced by his legal heirs over Khata No. 154 and the claim of the respondent no.3 Sewa Singh was rejected. Learned Consolidation Officer also held that Sewa Singh failed to prove his adverse possession continuously for the last preceding 12 years. Ultimately, by order dated 17-1-1993, the Consolidation Officer directed that the name of deceased Bhullan be replaced by his legal heirs over Khata No. 154 and the claim of the respondent no.3 Sewa Singh was rejected. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent no.3-Sewa Singh preferred an appeal (Appeal No. 225 under Section 11(1) of Consolidation of Holdings Act before the Settlement Officer Consolidation (for short SOC). The S.O.C. has set aside the order of the Consolidation Officer on the ground that the appellant had filed the receipt from 1385 Fasli to 1388 Fasli and has also produced one Vinod Kumar Saxena, an employee of Irrigation Department. Learned SOC has given a find that Bhullan had given possession to the mother of respondent no.3-Sewa Singh after receiving Rs. 8000/- from her. Aggrieved further by the order passed by the S.O.C., the petitioner preferred a revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. In the revision, the learned Deputy Director of Consolidation affirmed the finding of the S.O.C. on the same ground on which the appeal was allowed and presumed the possession on the basis of irrigation receipt, which gave rise to the present writ petition. This fact is not disputed that the possession of respondent no.l3-Sewa Singh had never been recorded in the Khasra entry. I have heard learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the learned Consolidation Officer has specifically given a finding that the irrigation receipt, which has been filed by Sewa Singh is of a land belonging to him of Bhumidhari right. Learned SOC has set aside this finding without observing what Sri Vinod Kumar Saxena has said on the basis of irrigation report in respect of 4 years, i.e. 1385 Fasli to 1388 Fasli, but has presumed the adverse possession from the last preceding 12 years. By a perusal of the Khasra 1386 Fasli, certified copy of which has been filed by the petitioner, it is admitted that Bhullan, father of the petitioner, is recorded in the revenue record. By a perusal of the Khasra 1386 Fasli, certified copy of which has been filed by the petitioner, it is admitted that Bhullan, father of the petitioner, is recorded in the revenue record. From a perusal of photocopy of the agreement it reveals that no plot number has been mentioned in the so called agreement and only it has been mentioned that the agricultural land of village Daduwala was agreed to be sold by Bhullan and a sum of Rs. 8000/- had been received from Smt. Veero. This fact is not disputed that the land was given on lease to said Bhullan by the Collector under Government Grants Act. By a perusal of lease conditions, it is obvious that lease cannot be transferred to a third person and in the land owned by the State, Bhullan was a lessee. No person can be given rights on the land in dispute on the basis of adverse possession of 12 years, although in the case at hand, no adverse possession has been proved by the respondent no.3. The specific case of the respondent no. 3 is that he is in possession through the unregistered agreement, which was executed in favour of his mother, Smt. Veero, and she had paid a sum of Rs. 8,000/- for the same and that possession was handed over to her and that the respondent no. 3 is in possession after the death of his mother. Although this agreement has not been proved before the Consolidation Officer by attesting witness therefore, the same was ignored. It indicates that no possession has been transferred. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that if the possession was given under the agreement, that can only taken as consentive possession. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the case of Achal Reddi Vs. Ramakrishna Reddiar and others [AIR, 1990, Supreme Court, 553]. The Apex Court in paragraph no.8 thereof has inter alia held that “the purchaser who got into possession under an executory contract of sale in a permissible character cannot be heard to contend that his possession was adverse. Ramakrishna Reddiar and others [AIR, 1990, Supreme Court, 553]. The Apex Court in paragraph no.8 thereof has inter alia held that “the purchaser who got into possession under an executory contract of sale in a permissible character cannot be heard to contend that his possession was adverse. In the conception of adverse possession there is an essential and basic difference between a case in which the other party is put in possession of property by an outright transfer, both parties stipulating for a total divestiture of all the rights of the transferor in the property, and in case in which there is a mere executory agreement of transfer both parties contemplating a deed of transfer to be executed at a later point of time. In the latter case the principle of estoppel applies estoppling the transferee from contending that his possession, while the contract remained executory in stage, was in his own right and adversely against the transferor. Adverse possession implies that it commenced in wrong and is maintained against right.” Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the case of S.M.Karim Vs. Mst. Bibi Sakina [AIR 1964, Supreme Court, 1254], wherein the Apex Court in paragraph no. (5) has inter alia held that “Adverse possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and extent and a plea is required at the least to show when possession becomes adverse so that the starting point of limitation against the party affected can be found.” In the case at hand, learned S.O.C. as well as learned Deputy Director of Consolidation on the basis of so-called agreement to sell treated the possession of the respondent no.3 adverse and gave a perverse finding on the basis of irrigation receipt that the respondent no. 3 had acquired and perfected his rights. Moreover, both the courts below did not consider this aspect of the matter that Bhullan was not having any right to transfer the land in question and that in the so-called agreement no plot number has been mentioned and no such evidence has been led whether this agreement pertains to the plot numbers in question, which are subject matter of the present writ petition. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel for both the parties and on perusal of the entire material placed before this Court, this Court is of the opinion that the learned S.O.C. as well as learned Deputy Director of Consolidation lost sight of the fact that the land in question was allotted to the father of the petitioner, namely Bhullan, under the Government Grants Act and that the lease land cannot lawfully transferred to a third person by way of alleged so-called agreement. Both the courts below also lost sight of the fact that in the so-called agreement, there is no mention of disputed plot number. The finding of adverse possession is against the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Achal Reddi (supra). For the reasons and discussion above, the writ petition deserves to be allowed outright. The impugned orders passed by the learned S.O.C. as well as learned Deputy Director of Consolidation are liable to be set aside. The judgment and order passed by the Consolidation Officer deserves to be upheld. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned orders are set aside. The judgment and order dated 17-1-1993 passed by the Consolidation Officer, Kashipur is upheld.