JUDGMENT [Hon’ble B.S. Verma, J. (Oral)] (Stay Application No. 9372 of 2012) Heard Ms. Sonam Nagrath, learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. 2. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has sought a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the judgment and decree dated 21.7.2001 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division)/Judge, Small Cause Court Haridwar (for short the J.S.C.C.) in S.C.C. Suit No. 13 of 1999, whereby the suit of the plaintiff-respondent herein was decreed for recovery of rent and damages as well as for eviction of the petitioner from the disputed property. The petitioner has also assailed the judgment and order dated 19-5-2012, passed by the learned Additional District Judge/III F.T.C. Haridwar in S.C.C. Revision No. 28 of 2001, Narendra Kumar Sharma Vs. Vaishya Kumar Sabha, whereby the revision of the petitioner has been dismissed. 3. Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the plaintiff-respondent filed S.C.C. Suit against the petitioner-defendant for recovery of rent and damages and for eviction of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff is a public charitable and religious institution and is registered society under the Societies Registration Act having is head office at Jwalapur Road, Kankhal, district Haridwar; that the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable to the plaintiff institution; that the defendant is the tenant of the plaintiff @ Rs. 7/- per month and the tenancy of the defendant is month to month. The defendant defaulted in payment of rent from 1.5.1989 to 30-11-1998. The plaintiff demanded the rent from the defendant many a times but to no avail. Ultimately the plaintiff sent a registered notice to the defendant on 9.12.1998 and determined the tenancy of the defendant-petitioner and demanded arrears of rent but neither the rent was paid nor the defendant vacated the property in dispute. Hence the suit has been filed claiming the rent for a period of three years from 14-1-1996 to 13-1-1999 amounting to Rs. 252/- and for damages for illegal use and occupation of the property in dispute pendente lite and future @ Rs. 200/- per month. 4. Hence the suit has been filed claiming the rent for a period of three years from 14-1-1996 to 13-1-1999 amounting to Rs. 252/- and for damages for illegal use and occupation of the property in dispute pendente lite and future @ Rs. 200/- per month. 4. The defendant-petitioner resisted the suit by filing his written statement and admitted the plaintiff as landlord, but has denied other allegations made in the plaint on the ground that no cause of action arose to the plaintiff to file the suit and the suit is not maintainable. It was alleged that the plaintiff-institution is a registered society but it is not a public and charitable institution and the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are fully applicable to the property in dispute. It has been pleaded that the plaintiff does not spend the income from the rent on the maintenance of disputed property and other property and also not for any charitable and public purpose. The defendant has admitted his tenancy on monthly rent of Rs. 7/-. It has been pleaded that the defendant wants to pay the rent to the plaintiff but the plaintiff did not accept the same and consequently, the defendant sent the rent through money order on 14.12.1998 but the same was refused to be accepted by the plaintiff-respondent. Therefore, the defendant deposited the rent under Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in the court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) Haridwar on 1-2-1999. It has also been pleaded that no default has been committed in payment of rent by the defendant. It has been denied that the defendant refused to receive the notice dated 14-12-1998 and alleged that no notice was received, therefore, there is no question of refusal of notice by the defendant. 5. The learned J.S.C.C. framed as many as six points for determination in the suit. In Issue No. 1 it has been held that the provisions of U.P. Act NO. 13 of 1972 are not applicable to the property in dispute. On Issue No.2, it has been held that the Pradhyumn Kumar Agrawal is the General Secretary of the plaintiff-institution and he is empowered to file the suit. On Issue No.3 it has been held that the petitioner-defendant committed default in payment of the rent. Issue Nos. 13 of 1972 are not applicable to the property in dispute. On Issue No.2, it has been held that the Pradhyumn Kumar Agrawal is the General Secretary of the plaintiff-institution and he is empowered to file the suit. On Issue No.3 it has been held that the petitioner-defendant committed default in payment of the rent. Issue Nos. 4, 5 and 6 were taken up together and it has been held that the tenancy of the defendant was determined by notice dated 9-12-1998 and that the defendant committed default in payment of rent, therefore, it has been held that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief claimed. Ultimately by the judgment and decree 21.7.2001, the suit of the plaintiff for recovery of rent and damages and for eviction has been decreed as against the defendant-petitioner. 6. Aggrieved, the defendant preferred a Revision which was registered as S.C.C. Revision No. 28 of 2001. The learned revisional Court did not find favour with the petitioner-revisionist and dismissed the revision by judgment and order dated 19-5-20 12, which gave rise to the present writ petition. 7. The main ground of challenge raised in the present writ petition is that the finding of the two courts below is perverse inasmuch as the defendant-petitioner did not commit default in payment of rent. 8. At the outset it may be mentioned that this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot sit like a court of appeal and cannot re-appreciate or reevaluate the evidence so as to arrive at a different conclusion. Only perversity in the impugned order can be seen to find out whether there is a case of mis-reading of evidence by the courts concerned. 9. In the case “Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash” [(2004) 3 S.C.C. page 682], the Apex Court has observed inter alia in paragraph 4 of the judgment that “An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal.” 10. The Apex Court in the case of Shamshad Ahmad and others Vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) through L.RS. and others [(2008) 9 Supreme Court Cases, 1] while dealing with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has observed as under: “38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law.” 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of her contention has contended that after the money order sent by the defendant was refused by the respondent-plaintiff, the rent of the property in dispute was deposited by the defendant regularly in the Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division) Haridwar under Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, therefore, finding of the two courts below that the defendant committed default in payment of rent is perverse and not sustainable in the eye of law. 12. 12. On the other hand, in reply, the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent has submitted that the rent allegedly deposited by the defendant under Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 is of no help to the case at hand, since the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not attracted to the plaintiff-institution. 13. I have pondered over the matter. 14. Whether the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are applicable or not, the learned J.S.C.C. framed Point No.1 for consideration on the issue. After an elaborate discussion of evidence, the learned J.S.C.C. has recorded a finding that the plaintiff-institution is registered society and is engaged in execution of public and charitable purposes and that the property in dispute is exempted from the purview of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. On this point, the learned revisional Court has also considered the evidence of the parties and has recorded its independent finding at page nos. 3 to 6 and on appraisal of the documentary and oral evidence has held that the provisions of U.P.Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable to the property in dispute. It has also been held by the revisional court that the defendant has not denied that the property in dispute was earlier transferred by its previous owner to the plaintiff-institution by a wakf deed for public and charitable purposes. Therefore, in any view of the matter it cannot be said that the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are applicable to the property in dispute. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not acceptable. 15. Since the provisions of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not applicable in the case at hand, therefore, even if it be taken for granted that any amount was deposited by the defendant under Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, that would not help the petitioner, for the simple reason that after the termination of tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, the tenant may be presumed to be an unauthorized occupant. 16. 16. Even otherwise, it is also pertinent to mention here that in the case at hand, since the suit was filed on the basis of notice of demand of arrears of rent and determination of tenancy, it was obligatory on the defendant to have complied with the provisions of Order XV, Rule 5 (1) of the C.P.C. It is not the case of the defendant that the defendant had ever tendered in the Court on or before the first hearing of the suit the entire amount admitted by him to be due together with interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum and that the defendant had continued to make deposit of the monthly admitted rent due within a week from the date of its accrual, as per provisions of sub-rule (1) of Rule 5 of Order XV, C.P.C. before the J.S.C.C. No such averment has been made by the petitioner in the writ petition as to the compliance of this provision of law before the J.S.C.C. Be that as it may, for want of compliance of the said provision of law, no protection against eviction is available to the defendant-petitioner. However, in the case at hand, it appears that the suit has been decided by the J.S.C.C. on merits. It has been held by the learned J.S.C.C. on Point No.3 that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent w.e.f. 1.5.1989. This finding has also been upheld by the revisional Court. It has also been held on Point No. 4 by the J.S.C.C. that the tenancy of the defendant was terminated by the plaintiff by the notice dated 9-12-1998. The finding on the point of default is a finding of fact, arrived at by the two courts below on appraisal of evidence. 17. Having heard the submission of the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the entire material placed before this Court, I do not find any perversity or manifest error of law in the impugned judgment and decree orders. There is no merit in this writ petition, which is liable to be dismissed outright at the admission stage. 18. The writ petition is dismissed in limine. There is no merit in this writ petition, which is liable to be dismissed outright at the admission stage. 18. The writ petition is dismissed in limine. However, to do complete justice, the petitioner-defendant is granted one year’s time to vacate the property in dispute from today provided the petitioner furnishes a written undertaking before the J.S.C.C. within a period of three months to the effect that he shall vacate the property in dispute before the expiry of the said period of one year and shall deliver its vacant and peaceful possession to the respondent-plaintiff. It is further provided that the petitioner shall deposit the entire decretal amount before the J.S.C.C. within a period of three months and shall also pay/deposit damages as directed by the learned J.S.C.C. @ Rs. 100/- per month regularly by the seventh day of each succeeding month for the previous month. In case of default, the plaintiff-respondent would be at liberty to get the property in dispute vacated in accordance with law. The petitioner-defendant would be at liberty to withdraw the amount, if any, deposited by him under Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in respect of the property in dispute.