Judgment :- 1. Petitioner – employer has called in question order dated 29.11.2011 Annexure-A passed by the Assistant Labour Commissioner and Conciliation Officer, Division-2 declaring five workmen listed therein as “Protected workmen” under section 33(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in W.P.No.1144/2012. 2. Petitioner – Union in W.P.No.12888/2006 is espousing the cause of 386 workmen has sought for quashing of the order dated 21.07.2005 passed in Reference No.83/1997 Annexure-H whereunder the reference made by the Trade Union came to be answered against workmen by rejecting the reference. 3. The Registry in W.P.1144/2012 has raised an objection as under: “DCF of Rs.400/-to be paid, since the petitioner is challenging Annexure-A wherein five workmen are declared as “Protected workmen”. On account of prayer made by learned counsel for petitioner to post the matter before court, it has been listed before this court for considering the office objection. In Writ Petition No.12888/2006, this court noticed on 1.2.2012 that petitioner-Trade Union is espousing the cause of 386 workmen and if the prayer made in the Writ Petition is granted it would result in monetary benefit accruing to each of the workmen and as such, they are required to pay court fee individually under Rule 7 of the Writ Proceedings Rules 1977. 4. Since the registry was repetitively raising the objection regarding payment of court fee in similar circumstances, learned members of the bar have prayed before this court to issue directions to registry not to raise said objection in view of similar objections having been over ruled by this court and as such said issue can be laid to rest. Hence, this court allowed the learned members of the bar to make their submissions on the issue. 5. I have heard the arguments advanced by Sriyuths K.Subba Rao, S.N. Murthy, K.Kasturi, M.C.Narasimhan, learned senior advocates assisted by other learned advocates of the bar. It is the contention of the senior advocates when the relief sought for is not individual and represents a common or joint interest payment of court fee independently does not arise when such orders are challenged in a writ petition. It is contended that under Rule 7(2) of the Writ Proceeding Rules when there is a petition filed based on a common or joint interest and not seeking any individual relief question of payment of separate court fee would not arise. It is contended that under Rule 7(2) of the Writ Proceeding Rules when there is a petition filed based on a common or joint interest and not seeking any individual relief question of payment of separate court fee would not arise. He would submit that said rule deals only with a situation where only number of persons approached the court with a common or joint interest and not having separate and distinct interest and as such question of payment of court fee individually does not arise. It is the further submission only when number of petitioners approach the court, the said rule would be applicable and payment of court fee is not dependant on the number of respondents since the rule deals with only number of persons approaching the court. It is also contended that Rule 7 does not refer to individual disputes. 6. It is further contended that under industrial law the trade union represents the number of workmen and the Trade Union Act gives power to the Union for collective bargaining and contends that financial constraints come in the way of filing of individual petitions if they are made to pay court fees. It is also contended that under the Minimum Wages Act, a single application in respect of number of employees can be presented under section 20 and orders passed on such application if challenged there would not be necessity to pay separate or distinct court fee. It is also contended that under section 13 of the Trade Union Act, 1926 a union can sue or be sued as a juristic person and as such no separate or distinct interest would be involved so as to direct the trade union to pay the court fee in respect of its members and as such the learned advocates would pray for overruling the office objections. 7. They would rely upon the following judgments: (i) 1981 (1) KLJ 505 (ii) ILR 1993 KAR 1312 (iii) Order passed in W.P.7085/96 dated 28.03.1996 (iv) Order passed in W.P.17544/2006 dated 18.12.2006 (v) Order passed in W.P.10873/2008 dated 11.09.2008 8. Per contra, Sri.Jagadeesh Mundaragi, learned Additional Government appearing for State would support the query raised by the registry directing payment of court fee. He would rely upon the following judgments: (i) 1996 (5) KLJ 161 (DB) (ii) 1968 Lab I.C. 945 9. Per contra, Sri.Jagadeesh Mundaragi, learned Additional Government appearing for State would support the query raised by the registry directing payment of court fee. He would rely upon the following judgments: (i) 1996 (5) KLJ 161 (DB) (ii) 1968 Lab I.C. 945 9. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties I am of the considered view that the following point arises for my consideration: (i) Whether the office objection is to be sustained or over-ruled? (ii) What order?” 10. In order to examine the rival contention it would be necessary, to extract the provision of The Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 and Rules 1960 and Writ Proceedings Rules which have bearing on the issue in question: “6. Multifarious suits: (1) In any suit in which separate and distinct reliefs based on the same cause of action are sought, the plaint shall be chargeable with a fee on the aggregate value of the reliefs: Provided that, if a relief is sought only as ancillary to the main relief, the plaint shall be chargeable only on the value of the main relief. (2) Where more reliefs than one based on the same cause of action are sought in the alternative in any suit, the plaint shall be chargeable with the highest of the fees leviable on the reliefs. (3) Where a suit embraces two or more distinct and different causes of action and separate reliefs are sought based on them, either alternatively or cumulatively, the plaint shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees with which plaints would be chargeable under this Act if separate suits were instituted in respect of the several causes of action: provided that, where the causes of action in respect of reliefs claimed alternatively against the same person arise out of the same transaction, the plaint shall be chargeable only with the highest of the fees chargeable on them. Nothing in this sub-section shall be deemed to affect any power conferred upon a court under Rule 6 of Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act V of 1908). (4) The provisions of this section shall apply mutatis mutandis to memoranda of appeals, applications, petitions and written statements. Explanation: For the purpose of this section, a suit for possession of immovable property and for mesne profits shall be deemed to be based on the same cause of action. (4) The provisions of this section shall apply mutatis mutandis to memoranda of appeals, applications, petitions and written statements. Explanation: For the purpose of this section, a suit for possession of immovable property and for mesne profits shall be deemed to be based on the same cause of action. 7. Determination of market value: (1). Save as otherwise provided, where the fee payable under this Act depends on the market value of any property, such value shall be determined as on the date of presentation of the plaint. (2) The market value of land in suits falling under section 24 (a), 24 (b), 26 (a), 27, 28, 29, 31, 35(1), 35(2), 35(3), 36, 38, 39 or 45 shall be deemed to be- (a) Where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to Government, or forms part of such an estate and is recorded in the Deputy Commissioner’s register as separately assessed with such revenue and such revenue is permanently settled-twenty-five times the revenue so payable: (b) Where the land forms an entire estate, or a definite share of an estate, paying annual revenue to government, or forms part of such estate and is recorded as aforesaid, and such revenue is settled, but not permanently-twelve and a half times the revenue so payable; (c) Where the land pays no such revenue, or has been partially exempted from such payment, or is charged with any fixed payment in lieu of such revenue, fifteen times the net profits if any from the land during the year before the date of presenting the plaint of thirty times the revenue payable on the same extent of similar land in the neighbourhood, whichever is lower; (d) Where the land forms part of an estate paying revenue to Government, but is not a definite share of such estate and is not separately assessed as above mentioned or the land is a garden or the land is a house site whether assessed to full revenue or not, or is land not falling within the foregoing description-the market value of the land. Explanation: The word “estate”, as used in this section means any land subject to the payment of revenue, for which the proprietor or farmer or raiyat shall have executed a separate engagement to Government, or which in the absence of such engagement, shall have been separately assessed with revenue. 11(s) Petition to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ other than the writ of Habeas Corpus, or a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Rule 7 and 36 of The Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977 7. Procedure for filing common or joint petitions: (1) Several persons having similar but separate and distinct interest in the subject matter of controversy involving common questions of law and facts may file a common petition but each petitioner shall pay a separate Court Fee. For all other purposes, it shall be treated as a single petition and the office shall assign one number. Such common Writ Petition shall be in Form No.III appended to these Rules and shall be supported by an affidavit of any one of the petitioners as in Form No.II. For such common petition one Vakalat with one set of Court Fee stamp shall be sufficient. 36. Appeal against common order on several writ petitions:-The provisions of rule 7 shall, mutatis mutandis apply to appeals filed from a common order. 11. Co-ordinate Bench of this Court while over-ruling similar office objection in W.P.7085/96 and W.P.1744/2006 has relied upon the judgment of Division Bench in the case of Ananthapadmanabaiah R. Vs Tahsildar and Ex.MAG. T.Narsipur reported in 1981 (1) KLJ 505 to hold that the Trade Union had raised a dispute and there was no separate or distinct claim made by the Trade Union in respect of its workmen and as such payment of court fee in respect of each workmen on whose behalf the union espouse the cause does not arise. Hence, it would be useful to refer to the judgment of Ananthapadmanabaiah at the first instance itself. “13. In the present case, what has been impugned in the writ petition, is the order of the Executive Magistrate. Hence, it would be useful to refer to the judgment of Ananthapadmanabaiah at the first instance itself. “13. In the present case, what has been impugned in the writ petition, is the order of the Executive Magistrate. Even if the concept of cause of action should be imported into writ petitions, the cause of action in the present writ petition is the passing of the impugned order by the Executive Magistrate and the main relief sought for in the writ petition, is quashing of that order. The other relief, namely issuing a mandamus to the Executive Magistrate to dispose of the petitioner’s application in accordance with law, is only a consequential relief. Assuming for the sake of argument that sub-section (3) of Section 6 of the Court Fess Act, is applicable to petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution, that sub-section has no application to the present writ petition, because there is only one cause of action therein and only one main relief is sought for therein. 15. Even if ten distinct and separate transactions between the petitioner and respondents -2 to 11 constituted distinct and separate causes of action for the application made by the petitioner before the Executive Magistrate and ten distinct and separate reliefs against those respondents were sought for in that application, so far as the writ petition is concerned, there is only one cause of action, namely the passing of the impugned order by the Executive Magistrate, and seeking only one main relief based on such cause of action. Hence there is no liability to pay anything more than the court fee payable on one writ petition only”. 12. As seen from the above Judgment the order of Executive Magistrate dated 07.08.1978 was impugned in the writ petition. In the said case an application was made by the petitioner under the Karnataka Debt Relief Act, 1976 seeking declaration that mortgages executed by him in favour of respondents 2 to 11 as having stood redeemed and for putting him possession of the mortgaged properties came to be dismissed by the impugned order. Said order came to be challenged before this court and registry raised an objection stating that court fee of Rs.100/-paid on the writ petition was not sufficient and petitioner had to pay additional court fee of Rs.900/-because he had sought for relief in respect of 10 separate mortgage transactions. Said order came to be challenged before this court and registry raised an objection stating that court fee of Rs.100/-paid on the writ petition was not sufficient and petitioner had to pay additional court fee of Rs.900/-because he had sought for relief in respect of 10 separate mortgage transactions. The Division Bench held that so far as the writ petition is concerned there is only one cause of action namely the passing of the impugned order by the Executive Magistrate and seeking only one main relief based on such cause of action and hence there is no liability to pay more than one set of court fee on one writ petition only. 13. A division Bench of this court in the case of Mithila Bai and others Vs KSRTC reported in 1996 (5) KLJ 161 DB has held where common appeal is against an interim or final order and if that covers more than one person having similar but separate and distinct interest in the subject matter of controversy involving common questions of law and fact then separate court fee has to be paid. It has been held by the Division Bench as under: “3. A conjoint reading of the said rules clearly indicates that where the common appeal is against an interim or a final order and if that covers more than one person having similar but separate and distinct interest in the subject-matter of controversy involving common questions of law and facts, then parties challenging such an interim or final order will have to file separate appeals paying separate Court fee; however, they may file the same on one set of papers and may also file only one certified copy of the impugned order and get the other copies dispensed with. Therefore, the office will have to treat these appeals as five appeals and the appellants will be required to pay Rs.500/-Court fee in all. Court fee of Rs.100/-has already been paid and the balance Court fee of Rs.400/-shall be paid within a week from today. 14. The concept of levy of fee is essentially for services rendered and as such there is an element of quid pro quo between the person who pays the fees and the authority which imposes it. Court fee of Rs.100/-has already been paid and the balance Court fee of Rs.400/-shall be paid within a week from today. 14. The concept of levy of fee is essentially for services rendered and as such there is an element of quid pro quo between the person who pays the fees and the authority which imposes it. When the legislature decides to render any specific service to any area or to any class of persons, it is not to open to the said area or said class of persons to plead they do not want their service and therefore should be exempted from payment of such fees. In regard to fees there is co-relation between the fee collected and the service intended to be rendered. This traditional view has undergone transformation as held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of The City Corporation of Calicut Vs Thachambalath Sadasivan and others reported in AIR 1985 SC 756 whereunder it has been held as under: “7. It is thus well-settled by numerous recent decisions of this Court that the traditional concept in a fee of quid pro quo is undergoing a transformation and that though the fee must have relation to the services rendered, or the advantages conferred, such relation need not be direct, a mere casual relation may be enough. It is not necessary to establish that those who pay the fee must receive direct benefit of the services rendered for which the fee is being paid. If one who is liable to pay receives general benefit from the authority levying the fee the element of service required for collecting fee be satisfied. It is not necessary that the person liable to pay must receive some special benefit or advantage for payment of the fee”. 15. The concept of levy of fee is intended or envisaged as a quid pro quo to class of persons or indirectly beneficial to the general public also oscillated with different views and came to be settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P.M.Aswathnarayan Shetty Vs State of Karnataka and others reported in AIR 1989 SC 100 whereunder it came to be held as follows:- 14. Re: Contention (a): The concept of a ‘fee’ as distinct from that of a ‘tax’ in the Constitutional scheme has been considered in a series of pronouncements starting from The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, [1954] SCR 1005; ( AIR 1954 SC 282 ) upto Om Prakash Agarwal v. Giri Raj Kishori, AIR 1986 SC 726. Of ‘Fees and Taxes’ a learned author, {first Principles of Public Finance, by De Marco 78} says: “Levies are divided into two large categories: fees and taxes. To this division corresponds the differentiation of public services as special or general”. “A. Fee” says another author, public Finance, (Third Ed., by Fuehler, 519): “Is a charge for a particular service of special benefit to individuals or to a class and of general benefit to the public, or it is a charge to meet the cost of a regulation that primarily benefits society.” “Fees must be paid to secure the enjoyment of a particular government service such as the provisions for patents, copyrights, or the registration of mortgages, and the services of a court or a public official”. (Public Finance, Third Edn., p.51). Another review of all the earlier pronouncements of this court on the conceptual distinction between a ‘fee’ and a ‘tax’ and the various contexts in which the distinction becomes telling is an idle parade of familiar learning and unnecessary. What emerges from these pronouncements is that if the essential character of the impost is that some special service is intended or envisaged as a quid pro quo to the class of citizens which is intended to be benefited by the service and there is a broad and general correlation between the amount so raised and the expenses involved in providing the services, the impost would par-take the character of a ‘fee’ notwithstanding the circumstance that the identity of the amount so raised is not always Kept distinguished but is merged in the general revenues of the State and notwithstanding the fact that such special services, for which the amount is raised, are as they very often do, incidentally or indirectly benefit the general public also. The test is the primary object of the levy and the essential purpose it is intended to achieve. The test is the primary object of the levy and the essential purpose it is intended to achieve. The correlationship between the amount raised through the ‘fee’ and the expenses involved in providing the services need not be examined with a view to ascertaining any accurate, arithmetical equivalence or precision in the correlation; but it would be sufficient that there is a broad and general correlation. But a fee loses its character as such if it is intended to and does go to enrich the general revenues of the State to be applied for general purposes of Government. Conversely, from this latter element stems the sequential proposition that the object to be served by raising the fee should not include objects which are, otherwise, within the ambit of general governmental obligations and activities. The concept of fee is not satisfied merely by showing that, the class of persons from whom the fee is collected also derives some benefit from those activities of Government. The benefit the class of payers of fee obtain in such a case is clearly not a benefit intended as special service to it but derived by it as part of the general public. 15. Nor does the concept of a fee – and this is important-require for its sustenance the requirement that every member of the class on whom the fee is imposed, must receive a corresponding benefit or degree of benefit commensurate with or proportionate to the payment that he individually makes. It would be sufficient if the benefit of the special services is available to and received by the class as such. It is not necessary that every individual composing the class should be shown to have derived any direct benefit. A fee has also the element of a compulsory exaction which it shares in common with the concept of a tax as the class of persons intended to be benefited by the special services has no volition to decline the benefit of the services. A fee is, therefore, a charge for the special services rendered to a class of citizens by Government or Governmental agencies and is generally based on the expenses incurred in rendering the services”. 16. Thus, it has been held the test is the primary object of the levy and the essential purpose it is intended to achieve. A fee is, therefore, a charge for the special services rendered to a class of citizens by Government or Governmental agencies and is generally based on the expenses incurred in rendering the services”. 16. Thus, it has been held the test is the primary object of the levy and the essential purpose it is intended to achieve. There has been held that the concept of fee is not satisfied merely by showing that, the class of persons from whom the fee is collected also derives some benefit from those activities of Government. It would be sufficient if the benefit of the special services is available to and received by the class as such. 17. Schedule II Article 11(s) of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 prescribes that a petition filed to the High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India or a petition Article 227 of Constitution of India, fee payable is Rs.100/-. Under Rule 7 of The Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, where several persons having similar but separate and distinct interest in the subject matter of controversy involving common question of law are entitled to file a common petition and in such circumstances, the court fee payable on such Writ Petition would be the same as payable on the number of Writ Petitions when filed separately. However, for purposes of issue of notice etc., it would be treated as one Writ Petition. Sub Rule (2) of Rule 7 provides for filing a single petition by several persons having common or joint interest but not seeking any individual relief. At this juncture, it would be of benefit to note that Rule 7 and Rule 36 of the Writ Proceeding Rules came up for consideration before Division Bench of this Court in the case of Venugopal Vs State of Karnataka reported in ILR 1993(2) KAR 1312 whereunder it was held each petitioner having distinct and separate cause of action, court fee is payable as if separate petitions said ruling reads as under: “6. In Ramesh Pande’s case (supra), Rule 7 of the Rules, has been interpreted and it has been specifically laid down that in a case where each of the petitioners will have only a separate and distinct interest in the subject matter of the controversy in the Writ petition, though the injury suffered by each would be similar; and the common interest is not the same as similar interest; therefore the petitioners would be entitled to present a single writ petition by reason of the Explanation to Rule 7(2) of the Rules. It is also further held that in a case where each of the petitioners will have his own distinct and separate cause of action, the writ petition embraced more than one cause of action and separate reliefs, the petition would be chargeable with the aggregate amount of court fee, as if separate petitions are presented by each of the petitioners, as required by section 6(3) and (4) of the Court fees Act. 7. As already pointed out in the instant case also, each of the petitioners in the writ petitions has distinct and separate interest and not a common or joint interest in the subject matter of the writ petitions and as such, they are entitled to file a common writ petition. However, they are liable to pay the separate court fee and accordingly, they have paid a separate Court Fee. Whereas, in Ananthapadmanabhaiah’s case (supra), the petitioner therein was only one, who had several mortgages in his favour, which were considered by the Executive Magistrate under the Debt Relief Act, and a common order was passed. The petitioner had challenged the same in the writ petition. The office raised an objection that the petitioner was required to pay a court fee in respect of each of the mortgages because the cause of action was distinct and the petitioner had clubbed several causes of action in one petition. The division bench over-ruled the office objection and held that it would be open to the petitioner to include several causes of action in one petition and in that event it would not be necessary for him to pay a separate court fee on each cause of action. The division bench over-ruled the office objection and held that it would be open to the petitioner to include several causes of action in one petition and in that event it would not be necessary for him to pay a separate court fee on each cause of action. It was further held that Rule 7 of the Rules, dealt with common and joint petitions filed by several persons and it had not dealt with petitions filed by the same person, but based upon different causes of action and prayed for different reliefs upon such causes of action. Thus, it is clear that the decision in Ananthapadmanabhaiah’s proceeded on a different set of facts and as such, it was held that Rule 7 of the Rules, was not attracted. 18. As such office objection came to be upheld and the decision rendered by the Division Bench in W.P.1877-1887/1986 decided on 22.07.1986 and the decision rendered in W.A.1910-1913/1992 was held to be per in curiam and not taken note of respectively as also the decision rendered in K.M. Nagaraj’s case. The Division Bench in Venugopal’s case referred to the judgment of another Division Bench in the case of Ramesh Pande and others Vs. State of Karnataka and others reported in 1982 (1) KLJ 466 whereunder it was held as follows: 16. Petitioners is the present writ petition, do not claim to have nay common interest in the subject matter of controversy as members of a class or community or residents of a locality or the like. Each of them carrying on his individual business of vending liquor has joined in the present writ petition, for challenging the impugned taxing provision. Each of them has so joined as he stands to suffer an individual injury under the impugned taxing provision. The injury which each of them suffers, can only be regarded as a separate and distinct injury though it may be similar to the one suffered by other/s. Hence, each of the petitioners has only a separate and distinct interest and not common or joint interest, in the subject matter of controversy in the writ petition, that is, the impugned taxing provision. Thus, though on the authority of the decided cases and on principle, the interest of each of the petitioners in the subject matter of controversy in the writ petition, should be regarded as separate and distinct and not common, the Explanation to sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 of the Rules speaks to the contrary. Shri. Kashinathrao contended that if the impugned taxing provision is declared to be unconstitutional in a writ petition presented by one of them, that provision cannot be enforced against other petitioners even if they had not joined as petitioners because of the deemed meaning given by the Explanation to contend that the petitioner should be regarded as having a common interest in the subject matter of controversy in the writ petition and that hence they are entitled to present a single writ petition. 17. But, what was argued by the learned Additional Government Advocate was this: Even if the deemed meaning given to common interest in the Explanation to sub-rule (2) of the Rule 7 of the Rules, has enabled the present petitioners to present a single or common or joint writ petition under sub-rule (2) thereof, challenging the impugned taxing provision, it does not, by itself, relieve them of their liability to pay the aggregate amount of the court fees payable by each of the petitioners on that petition as required under sub sec (3) read with sub-sec (4) of S.6 of the Act. The argument of the le learned Additional Government Advocate in our view merits acceptance. “(3) Where a suit embraces two or more distinct and different causes of action and separate reliefs are sought based on them, either alternatively or cumulatively, the plaint shall be chargeable with the aggregate amount of the fees with which plaints would be chargeable under this Act if separate suits were instituted in respect of the several causes of action. (The proviso is omitted, as it is not relevant for the present purpose) (4) The provisions of this section shall apply mutatis mutandis to memoranda of appeals, applications, petitions, and written statements.” (The explanation is omitted as it is not relevant for the present purpose). 18. (The proviso is omitted, as it is not relevant for the present purpose) (4) The provisions of this section shall apply mutatis mutandis to memoranda of appeals, applications, petitions, and written statements.” (The explanation is omitted as it is not relevant for the present purpose). 18. As already pointed out by us, each of the petitioners has a separate and distinct interest in the subject matter of controversy in the writ petition, that is, the taxing provision impugned therein, because of the individual injury which each of them stands to suffer under the impugned taxing provision. From this, it follows that each of the petitioners has a separate and distinct cause of action in respect of the impugned taxing provision. Therefore, if a writ petition embraces two or more separate and distinct interest (causes of action) of several petitioners, who seek separate reliefs based on those interests (causes of action), it (the writ petition) becomes liable to be charged with the aggregate amount of court fees with which petitions would be chargeable under the Act if separate writ petitions had been presented in respect of the several separate and distinct interest (causes of action), as provided for in sub-sec.(3) read with sub-sec.(4) of S.6 of the Act. 19. The question whether it can be said that a common writ petition embraces two or more causes of action as would make the petitioners therein liable for payment of separate court fees as if each of them had presented separate writ petitions, having come up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Mohan Singh V. State of Haryana (5), it has answered that question thus: “Having regard to the nature of these cases where every owner of a truck plying his truck for transport of goods has a liability to pay tax impugned in the petition, each one has his own independent cause of action. But it is too much to expect that different truck owners having no relation with each other either as partners or any other legally subsisting jural relationship of association of persons would be liable to pay only one set of court-fee simply because they have joined as petitioners in one petition. But it is too much to expect that different truck owners having no relation with each other either as partners or any other legally subsisting jural relationship of association of persons would be liable to pay only one set of court-fee simply because they have joined as petitioners in one petition. Each one has his own cause of action arising out of the liability to pay tax individually and the petition of each one would be a separate and independent petition and each such person would be liable to pay the legally payable court-fee on his petition. It would be a travesty of law if one were to hold that as each one uses the highway, he has common cause of action with the rest of truck pliers.” The above pronouncement of the Supreme Court in our view, puts it beyond doubt that each of the petitioners in the present writ petition, has his own distinct and separate cause of action arising out of his liability to pay the tax individually under the impugned taxing provision. Since the present writ petition embraces more than one of such causes of action and separate reliefs sought therein, namely, to restrain the respondents from enforcing the impugned taxing provision against each of the petitioners. Are based on them (such causes of action), it (the present writ petition) is chargeable with the aggregate amount of the court fees with which the petitions would be chargeable under the Act, if separate writ petitions have been presented in respect of several causes of action, as required by sub-sec.(3) r/w Sub-sec. (4) or S.6 of the Act. 20. Hence, we uphold the contention of the learned Addl. Government Advocate under clauses (s) of Art. I of Sch.-II the Karnataka Court fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958, read with sub-secs.(3) and (4) of S.6 of that Act, each of the petitioners in the present writ petition, is liable to pay thereon a separate court fee of Rs.100, as if he had presented a separate writ petition. Consequently, we uphold the ruling of the learned single judge, as regards the aggregate amount of court fees payable on the present writ petition.” 19. Consequently, we uphold the ruling of the learned single judge, as regards the aggregate amount of court fees payable on the present writ petition.” 19. Thus it has been held that where petitioners had only separate and distinct interest and not a common or joint interest in the subject matter of controversy and proceeded to distinguish between common interest to similar interest, after analysing Rule 7 of the Writ Proceeding Rules. 20. Thus, it boils down to the fact as to whether Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 7 is to be applied universally or it has to be applied on case to case basis depending on the relief claimed in each case. In this background the interpretation made in the above judgment will have to be looked into. 21. Thus, where a Writ Petition is filed by a Union representing its members and espousing their cause collectively which ultimately may result in benefits flowing to each of its members since their claim is distinct and separate. The following illustrations would clarify the issue: Illustration No.1: For instance Union representing its members were to raise a dispute with regard to termination of service of its workmen by the management and an award is passed either in favour of the workmen or in favour of the management and if either party chooses to challenge the said award necessarily the court fee has to be paid in respect of each workmen though common interest would be there since the cause of action in respect of each workmen is distinct and separate. Illustration No.2: A Trade Union on behalf of the workers were to make a claim before the competent authority for grant of Minimum Wages on account of refusal by the management. If an order is passed by the said competent authority ordering payment of Minimum Wages and the management if aggrieved were to challenge the same by paying only one set of court fee it would be impermissible both under sub rule (1) and sub rule (2) of Rule 7 of the Writ Proceedings Rules, in as much as workmen in whose favour the order is passed will be having separate and distinct interest in the subject matter of controversy namely the ultimate benefit would flow to each of the workman. Likewise, if the order is passed against the workmen by the competent authority and in such a situation the Trade Union which had espoused the cause on behalf of the workmen, may prefer a Writ Petition by paying one set of court fee only, which is impermissible since its members would be having a common interest but not similar interest. Each one of the workmen has his own cause of action arising out of the liability to pay Minimum Wages by the management and as such, the petition of each one would be separate and independent petition and would be liable to pay individually the court fee. Illustration No.3: In a given case, if a Trade Union were to raise a dispute on behalf of its workmen claiming certain amounts due and payable by the management to its workmen, by filing a claim application under section 33-C(1) or 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, such claim though would be common but it would not be similar and in such circumstances, court fee would be payable individually. Sub Rule (2) of Rule 7, permits several persons having common or joint interest but not seeking any individually relief to file a single petition, which means that the relief that may be granted would be a joint relief and not resulting in individual benefit. Say for instance, the Trade Union raises a Charter of Demands like providing canteen facilities, payment of Washing allowance etc., in such circumstances, the Trade Union would be espousing the cause of several persons having common or joint interest and if such relief is granted it would not be an individual relief but a relief in common. Hence, this scuttled difference will have to be looked into by the Registry to collect the court fee when petitions are filed seeking relief though claimed as common but in effect, it would be individual interest. Hence, I am of the considered view that office objections raised deserves to be upheld.