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2012 DIGILAW 548 (KER)

P. D. Chacko v. Jayaraj T. Joseph

2012-06-18

K.VINOD CHANDRAN, THOTTATHIL B.RADHAKRISHNAN

body2012
Judgment:- Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J. 1. MFA.No.38 of 2011 is by the first opposite party and MFA.No.242 of 2010 by the second opposite party in a workmen's compensation case. 2. No issue relatable to the quantum of compensation fixed arises for decision, at any rate, as a substantial question of law. Similarly, the plea as to liability to pay interest from the date of accident at 12% has only to be answered in favour of the workman in terms of Section 4A of the Workmen's Compensation Act as dilated upon by the Division Bench of this Court in the judgment in MFA.No.59 of 2011 assimilating the law laid in that regard by the Apex Court. That issue also does not survive. 3. The appellant in MFA.No.242 of 2010, a retired school teacher, whom we refer to as the "owner", started construction of a commercial building which is leased out now to different institutions or establishments, including a bank. For the purpose of that construction, he entered into a contract with the appellant in MFA.No.38 of 2011, whom we refer to as the "contractor". By that, the owner agreed to supply materials at site and the contractor was to supply labour, supervise and finish the work in terms of the agreement within the stipulated time. The claimant was a workman brought by the contractor. He suffered injuries leading to amputation of his right forearm. The plea as between the owner and the contractor is as to who among them is liable in terms of law. Going by Section 12(2) of the Act, the owner of the building would be the principal employer and his liability for being compensated by the contractor could be considered by the Commissioner either in terms of any clause of the agreement between the parties, if there is any; or otherwise, that issue has to be settled by the Commissioner. Sub-section 3 of section 12 of the Act would show that notwithstanding the provisions in sub-section 2, the injured workman can make the claim against the contractor. Now, the learned counsel for the owner argued that his client's obligations under the contract are clearly segregable and the liability to supply labour and have the work completed is with the contractor and therefore, the contractor has to be treated as the principal employer. Now, the learned counsel for the owner argued that his client's obligations under the contract are clearly segregable and the liability to supply labour and have the work completed is with the contractor and therefore, the contractor has to be treated as the principal employer. To answer this, we refer to clause (e) of section 2(1) of the Act which, as it stood at the time of the accident, states, among other things, that when the services of a workman are temporarily lent or let on hire to another person by the person with whom the workman has entered into a contract of service or apprenticeship, the term "employer" means such other person while the workman is working for him. Hence, even if the workman concerned was an employee of the contractor, the jural relationship between the contractor and the owner would make the owner liable 'as an employer' for the purpose of the Act. Therefore, we are unable to accept the plea of the owner that he cannot be treated as the employer. 4. Now, there is nothing in the agreement between the parties dealing with liabilities to pay compensation to workman. Therefore, the Commissioner was within jurisdiction to settle that issue inter se the owner and the contractor. The prerogative of the Commissioner to do so has to be exercised on the basis of equity, justice, good conscience and having in view the social purpose for which the legislation is in place. The support of the State system as emanating out of the Directive Principles of State Policy in the Constitution stands to advise the authority of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner to decide even such issues because, ultimately, the beneficiary of an order that the Commissioner would issue, to the extent it relates to grant of compensation, would be the victim of the accident or his/her dependants. On the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, balancing the different relevant scales on facts, the Commissioner, in our view, has come to a just and reasonable decision by fixing a ratio of 50-50%, i.e., directing the owner and the contractor to share the liability equally, i.e., one half each. We do not find any legal infirmity in the Commissioner having done so. In the result, the appeals fail. They are accordingly dismissed. No costs.