JUDGMENT : This revision, under section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (for short 'the Code'), has been preferred against the order dated 5-4-2011 passed by 12th Addl. Sessions Judge, Jabalpur in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 11/2010, affirming the order dated 12-7-2006 passed by 3rd Civil Judge Class I, in Execution Case No. 229-A/94. 2. By the order dated 12-7-2006 (supra), the objection raised by the petitioner, under Order 21, Rule 97 read with section 105 of the Code, against execution of decree dated 24-10-1994 passed by Civil Judge Class I in Civil Suit No. 229-A/94 in favour of respondent No. 1, Sahab Singh (for short 'R1') and against the respondent No. 2, Beni Prasad (hereinafter referred to as 'R2'), was rejected. It was a decree for specific performance of a contract for sale of suit land whereas the objection was raised inter alia on the ground that the petitioner had been in a lawful possession thereof since 1979. 3. At the outset, it may be pointed out that the petitioner had preferred a second appeal contending that there was a mistake on the part of the Counsel to prefer an appeal, under Order 43, Rule 1(ja) of the Code, against the order dated 12-7-2006 and on the part of the Appellate Court as well in treating the same as a miscellaneous appeal. However, in view of the embargo created by section 104 of the Code, the second appeal was rejected, vide order dated 13-7-2011 passed in Second Appeal No. 516/11, as not maintainable. The review application registered as R.P. No. 361/11 was also dismissed, vide order dated 18-8-2011 and the SLP (Civil) No. 27741/11 preferred against that order has also been dismissed by the Apex Court vide order dated 1-1-2011. 4. According to the petitioner, he had purchased the plot of land in dispute and the kuchha house constructed thereon from R2 on 1-1-1979 by way of a mutual settlement (Annexure A-1). Thereafter, on 16-1-1979, R2 had also executed an agreement to sell the property (Annexure A-2). However, R1, knowing fully well about the aforesaid transaction, filed the suit without impleading him as party and obtained the decree in question despite the fact that in the meanwhile, he had constructed house and shops over the plot after securing the loan from bank and obtaining building permission from the Municipal Corporation. However, R1, knowing fully well about the aforesaid transaction, filed the suit without impleading him as party and obtained the decree in question despite the fact that in the meanwhile, he had constructed house and shops over the plot after securing the loan from bank and obtaining building permission from the Municipal Corporation. After coming to know about the judgment and decree dated 24-10-94 passed in favour of R1, he instituted a suit registered as Civil Suit No. 9-A/98 for a declaration that the same were not binding upon him. But, the suit was dismissed, vide order dated 22-11-2001 passed in Civil Suit No. 9-A/1998, as not maintainable in view of the provisions of Order 21, Rule 97 of the Code. Ultimately, on 11-3-2002, R2 executed registered sale-deed relating to the suit property in his favour. 5. The order dated 12-7-2006 (above), rejecting the objection as collusive, was based on the following fact findings - (i) The objector, the petitioner here, who is none other than the brother-in-law of R2, was well aware of the civil suit wherein the decree in question was passed. (ii) In order to deprive R1 of the fruits of the decree, the judgment debtor, viz. R2 had handed over the possession of the suit property to the petitioner and had also permitted him to raise construction. 6. A bare perusal of the appellate order passed on 5-4-2011 (supra), would reveal that all the material aspects of the matter, whether legal or factual, have already been considered in a right perspective. While concurring with the findings of facts, learned ADJ also highlighted the admissions made by the petitioner to the effect that (a) the petitioner used to come to the Civil Court to attend the dates of hearing in the suit, and (b) no consideration was paid by the petitioner to R2 at the time of execution of the sale deed on 11-3-2002. Accordingly, in the light of the ratio laid down in Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. vs. Rajiv Trust, AIR 1998 SC 1754 that has been re-affirmed in Usha Sinha vs. Dina Ram, 2008(4) MPLJ (SC) 141 = AIR 2008 SC 1997 , the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner, being a transferee pendents lite, had no right to raise objection or to offer resistance to the execution of the decree, by virtue of Rule 102 of Order 21 of the Code. 7. It is well settled that the revisional jurisdiction cannot embark upon re-appreciation of evidence unless the finding of fact is, on the face of it, illegal or perverse. However, the factual findings in question cannot be said to be, in any way, uncalled for not based on relevant evidence. 8. Still, learned Counsel for the petitioner has strenuously contended that both the Courts below had committed a serious error in jurisdiction in holding that agreement dated 16-1-1979 was not admissible in evidence whereas despite being insufficiently stamped as well as an unregistered document, it could legally be received as evidence of part performance of contract for the purposes of section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act, 1882. According to him, the petitioner is entitled to raise the substantial question of law pertaining to admissibility of the document at any stage of the proceedings. To buttress the contention, reliance has been placed to the following observations made by the Supreme Court in a recent decision rendered in National Textile Corpn. Ltd. vs. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad, (2011) 12 SCC 695 :- "There is no quarrel to the settled legal proposition that a new plea cannot be taken in respect of any factual controversy whatsoever, however, a new ground raising a pure legal issue for which no inquiry/proof is required can be permitted to be raised by the Court at any stage of the proceedings." 9. Attention has also been invited to the following decisions of various High Courts :- (i) Damodar Narayan Singh vs. Sardar Hira Singh, (2003) 1 Cal. LT 237 (HC), wherein it was held that Revisional Court has the jurisdiction to decide any question of law that goes into the root of the matter, despite the fact that no arguments were advanced on the point before the Court below. (ii) Thiru P. Mani, Prop. Sri Shanmugha vs. The Secretary, Regional, decided on 30-10-2003, wherein following observations made in V. B. Kalingarayar vs. Rajam, were quoted with approval -"a point involving pure question of law even not raised in the written statement can be entertained when record is sufficient for its decision". (ii) Thiru P. Mani, Prop. Sri Shanmugha vs. The Secretary, Regional, decided on 30-10-2003, wherein following observations made in V. B. Kalingarayar vs. Rajam, were quoted with approval -"a point involving pure question of law even not raised in the written statement can be entertained when record is sufficient for its decision". (iii) Church of South India Trustees vs. M. P. Saleena Daniel @ Baby, CRP No. 725/2005, decided on 15-7-2010, wherein it was observed that while exercising revisional jurisdiction, the High Court has to decide whether the Tribunal or the Appellate Authority had either decided erroneously or failed to consider any question of law. (iv) Further, decision of Chhattisgarh High Court in Ram Kumar Tiwari vs. Deenanath, 2001(1) BLJ 210 = AIR 2002 Chhattisgarh 1, has been cited to support the contention that the objection to the effect that the petitioner had purchased the property prior to institution of the suit would not be hit by section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. 10. Per contra, learned Counsel for R1 has submitted that after rejection of the second appeal, the petitioner, under the garb of revision, cannot be permitted to raise substantial question of law, as contemplated by section 100 of the Code. Inviting attention to the findings recorded by learned Civil Judge and affirmed by learned ADJ and making reference to the decision of this Court in Hamid Khan Ansari vs. Lilabai, 2004(2) MPLJ 310 = 2004(2) M.P.H.T. 58, he has urged that the objection was rightly rejected as collusive and frivolous. According to him, the documents (Annexures A1 and A2) were also brought into existence with a mala fide intention to deny R1 the fruits of the decree. 11. In response, learned Counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that on the date of its execution, i.e., 16-1-1979, the agreement to sell, acknowledging delivery of possession of the suit property to him on 1-1-1979, was not compulsorily registrable and, therefore, the Executing Court was empowered to pass an order of impounding in terms of section 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899. However, fact of the matter is that the petitioner, who was not allowed to tender the agreement in evidence, did not prefer to challenge, in accordance with law, the corresponding order passed by learned Civil Judge as early as on 13-8-2004. However, fact of the matter is that the petitioner, who was not allowed to tender the agreement in evidence, did not prefer to challenge, in accordance with law, the corresponding order passed by learned Civil Judge as early as on 13-8-2004. This apart, it is well settled that an unstamped or under-stamped deed shall not be admissible for a collateral purpose. For this, reference may be made to the decision in Avinash Kumar Chauhan vs. Vijay Krishna Mishra, 2009(3) MPLJ (SC) 289 = AIR 2009 SC 1489 , wherein following the decision of Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Ram Rattan vs. Parmanand, AIR 1946 PC 51 , the Apex Court has explained that:- "Section 35 of the Stamp Act, 1899 rules out applicability of provision under section 49 of Registration Act, 1908, as it is categorically provided therein that a document of this nature, viz., unregistered sale deed shall not be admitted for any purpose whatsoever. If all purposes for which the document is sought to be brought in evidence are excluded the document would not be admissible for collateral purposes." 12. Thus, the agreement to sell sought to be exhibited in evidence could not be admitted for any purpose and as observed by Their Lordships in Privy Council, the words 'for any purpose' should be given their natural meaning and effect and would include a collateral purpose. 13. For these reasons, no interference with the impugned orders is called for under the revisional jurisdiction. 14. The Supreme Court in Sardar Estates vs. Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd., (2009) 6 SCC 609 , has deprecated the widespread practice of starting another round of litigation on similar grounds once first round of litigation was over and has also laid emphasis on imposition of appropriate costs in suitable cases reflecting abuse of the process of Court. In the present case, the objection was obviously raised by the petitioner at the instance of R2 with the sole object of denying the fruits of decree to Rl. This type of cantankerous litigation, causing delay in execution of decree, can only be discouraged by imposing exemplary costs. 15. Consequently, the revision stands dismissed with exemplary costs of Rs. 5,000/- and R-2 Beni Prasad is also directed to pay Rs. 5000/- as cost to R-1 Sahab Singh. Revision dismissed.