Judgment 1. Petitioners have approached this Court challenging the re-investigation/further investigation ordered by the learned Magistrate. Originally the first respondent herein filed a complaint against these petitioners alleging commission of offences under Secs.120B, 405, 420 and 468 r/w 34 IPC. After conducting investigation, final report was filed by the police against four accused alleging offence under Sec.420 r/w 34 IPC. Before taking cognizance, another complaint was filed by the first respondent herein alleging that proper investigation was not conducted and that re- investigation/further investigation is to be conducted in the matter. That complaint was forwarded by the learned Magistrate under Secs.156(3) and 173(8) of Cr.P.C. This order is challenged by the person shown as accused in the final report filed earlier by the Investigating Officer. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that no re-investigation can be ordered by the court suo motu or even at the instance of the complainant. If at all what can be ordered is only further investigation and that too only when a petition is filed under Sec.173(8) of the Code by the Investigating Officer and not by filing a complaint like this, where the request was to forward the same under Sec.156(3) and 173(8) of the Code. It is also submitted by the learned counsel that after receipt of the complaint (Annexure IV), the Investigating Officer filed a report as if he understood it as a direction to conduct re-investigation. Annexure III is the FIR submitted by the police officer before the learned Magistrate. There also, it was mentioned that the complaint filed under Secs.156(3) and 173(8) for re-investigation/further investigation, which was forwarded by court, was received. In Annexure IV, it was reported by the Circle Inspector of Police, Fort Kochi that in the light of the complaint received and the allegations mentioned therein a detailed re-investigation is required. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that even the Investigating Officer has understood that the order passed by the learned Magistrate is for re-investigation and not for further investigation. 3. Therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that even the Investigating Officer has understood that the order passed by the learned Magistrate is for re-investigation and not for further investigation. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that on getting the final report, before ordering further investigation even if it is permissible, the learned Magistrate hould have applied his mind and for that purpose final report filed by the police should have been gone into and the complaint subsequently filed by the complainant also should have been gone into, to verify and find whether in fact a further investigation is required, whereas the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate would only show that the order was passed mechanically without applying his mind. 4. The learned counsel for the respondent would submit that the request was only for further investigation though the word re-investigation was also wrongly mentioned in the complaint. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, the 'prospective' accused can have no say in the matter and as such the learned Magistrate was not expected to hear the 'prospective' accused while ordering further investigation. According to the learned counsel, the accused would get right only after cognizance is taken and not at the pre-cognizance stage. The decision in Narendra G. Goel V. State of Maharashtra [(2009) 6 SCC 65] has been cited by the learned counsel for the complainant in support of his submission that the accused has no right to be heard at the stage of investigation for, according to the learned counsel, the learned Magistrate has not taken cognizance based on the final report which was filed by the Police. Following the decision in Sri.Bhagwan Samardha Sreepada Vallabha Venkata Vishwanandha Maharaj V. State of A.P. [(1999) 5 SCC 740], it was held in Narendra Goel thus: "There was nothing in Section 173(8) to suggest that the court is obliged to hear the accused before any such direction is made. Casting of any such obligation on the court would only result in encumbering the Court with the burden of searching for all the potential accused to be afforded with the opportunity of being heard." 5. Section 173(8) of the Code enables an officer in charge of the Police Station to carry on further investigation even after a report under section 173(2) is submitted to the Court. Section 173(8) of the Code enables an officer in charge of the Police Station to carry on further investigation even after a report under section 173(2) is submitted to the Court. The power of the Magistrate under section 156(3) to direct further investigation is clearly an independent power.That power, according to the learned counsel for the complainant, can be exercised by the Magistrate even after submission of a report by the Investigating Officer. In this connection, the learned counsel relied upon the decision in State of Bihar and Another V. J.A.C.Saldanna and Others 1979 STPL(LE) 9843 SC [AIR 1980 SC 326]. There it was held: "The power of the Magistrate under s.156(3) to direct further investigation is clearly an independent power and does not stand in conflict with the power of the State Government. The power conferred upon the Magistrate under s.156(3) can be exercised by the Magistrate even after submission of a report by the investigating officer which would mean that it would be open to the Magistrate not to accept the conclusion of the investigating officer and direct further investigation. This provision does not in any way affect the power of the investigating officer to further investigate the case and even after submission of the report as provided in s.173(8). Therefore, the High Court was in error in holding that the State Government in exercise of the power of superintendence under s.3 of the Act lacked the power to direct further investigation into the case." 6. There, it was the State Government which directed further investigation. But even in such a case it was held by the apex Court that the power conferred under section 156(3) can be exercised by the Magistrate even after the report was filed by the Investigating Officer. In the aforesaid case it was held by the apex Court: "The power of the Police to investigate into a cognizable offence is ordinarily not to be interfered with by the Judiciary. There is a clear cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department, the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. There is a clear cut and well demarcated sphere of activity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment. Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the executive through the police department, the superintendence over which vests in the State Government. The executive which is charged with a duty to keep vigilance over law and order situation is obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to have been committed it is its bounden duty to investigate into the offence and bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds an offence having been committed it is its duty to collect evidence for the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completed and the investigating officer submits report to the Court requesting the Court to take cognizance of the offence under s.190 of the Code its duty comes to an end subject to the provision contained in S.173(8)." 7. It is not disputed by both sides that once final report is filed by the Police, Magistrate cannot order re-investigation. But it is submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the defacto complainant that it was only an incorrect expression used by the Court presumably because the learned counsel who filed that petition before the Court below also used the expression 're-investigation/further investigation'. It is true that the learned Magistrate has not stated the reasons for ordering further investigation. Since the petition was filed under sections 156(3) and 173(8) of the Code, the learned Magistrate forwarded the same under sections 156(3) and 173(8) Cr.P.C. Because the word 're-investigation/further investigation' was mentioned, the same expression was used by the Investigating Officer also. But there is nothing to show that de novo investigation was conducted in this case. What was conducted by the police officer is only a further investigation. Therefore, decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Ashok Kumar Todi reported in [2007 SC 758] and other decisions have no application to the facts of this case. 8. But there is nothing to show that de novo investigation was conducted in this case. What was conducted by the police officer is only a further investigation. Therefore, decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Ashok Kumar Todi reported in [2007 SC 758] and other decisions have no application to the facts of this case. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the decision Reeta Nag V. State of West Bengal and Others [(2009) 9 SCC 129] where it was held : "What emerges from the abovementioned decisions of this Court is that once a charge-sheet is filed under Section 173(2) CrPC and either charge is framed or the accused are discharged, the Magistrate may, on the basis of a protest petition, take cognizance of the offence complained of or on the application made by the investigating authorities permit further investigation under Section 173(8). The Magistrate cannot suo motu direct a further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC or direct a reinvestigation into a case on account of the bar of Section 167(2) of the Code." The learned counsel for the de facto complainant would submit that decision in Reeta Nag has no application to the facts of this case since that was a case where the charge sheet was filed by the Police under section 173(2), cognizance was taken and even charges were framed against some of the accused. Besides, Investigating authorities had not applied for further investigation. Not only that, the learned Magistrate in fact, directed re-investigation on the application made by the defacto complainant. Here, though the words 're-investigation' was wrongly mentioned by the learned counsel appearing for complainant, before the Court below, and the same was used by the Court below also, it is seen that, in fact, only a further investigation was conducted under section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. In view of the facts stated above the decision in Reeta Nag is not applicable to the facts of this case. 9. The learned counsel for the defacto complainant points out the reasons for requesting further investigation. According to the complainant so many materials were omitted to be collected earlier by the Investigating Officer. Those materials were to be brought to the notice of the Investigating Officer. It is contended by the complainant that Police had unearthed certain materials to incorporate sections 120(B), 504, 420 and 468 of IPC. According to the complainant so many materials were omitted to be collected earlier by the Investigating Officer. Those materials were to be brought to the notice of the Investigating Officer. It is contended by the complainant that Police had unearthed certain materials to incorporate sections 120(B), 504, 420 and 468 of IPC. The charge sheet was earlier laid only under sections 465 and 461. 10. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the complainant that based on the final report filed by the police under Section 173(2), cognizance was not taken by the learned Magistrate. The allegation made in this petition is that Section 120-B of IPC was incorporated in the complaint subsequently filed by the complainant only to rope in the first petitioner. Whereas the complainant contends that the nexus between the petitioners and the criminal conspiracy hatched up among them for committing criminal breach of trust and to cheat the first respondent-company can be unearthed from the records produced by the complainant along with the complaint. The bank accounts operated by the petitioners in various banks in the name of fictitious sub-contractors would also come to light only if investigation in that line is conducted. The impugned complaint was filed with a request to conduct investigation under Sections 156(3) and 173(8). The investigating officer proceeded to conduct further investigation since in respect of the very same incident crime was registered and investigation was conducted and as such there was no necessity to register a second FIR. The learned counsel for the complainant would submit that the second complaint was also independently maintainable since in the first report filed by the police, all the offences like 120-B and other serious offences were not incorporated and the role of the first petitioner was also not investigated. In respect of that complaint, the complainant was entitled to adduce evidence and it was possible for him to proceed separately. But in order to collect all the material documents, oral and documentary, the help of the investigating agency was required and that was whey the complaint was filed for causing investigation. The contention that if any of the accused was omitted to be included in the final report filed earlier, the complainant could have filed an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. also cannot be countenanced. The contention that if any of the accused was omitted to be included in the final report filed earlier, the complainant could have filed an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. also cannot be countenanced. The scope of impleadment of an accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is limited and that can be done only after evidence is let in and not prior to that. The learned counsel appearing for the complainant has pointed out various aspects mentioned in the counter affidavit which were the matters to be further investigated under Section 173(8) and those matters were not within the knowledge of the investigating agency before it was specifically pointed out to them. Therefore, the question of the investigating officer requesting the court on his own to conduct further investigation was practically nil. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the complainant that subsequently it has come out in evidence that none of the subcontracting firm really existed and that all those firms were binami or fictitious, run by the petitioners using their own PAN. No effort was also made by the investigating agency earlier to find that the petitioners/accused were themselves operating the bank accounts of the fictitious firm nor did the investigating agency seized the original partnership deed of those firms based on which the accused had operated the bank accounts. These are matters which were to be unearthed during the further investigation, the complainant contends. In this connection, the learned counsel for the complainant has relied upon a three Judges bench decision of the apex court in State of Bihar v. J.A.C.Saldanna (AIR 1980 SC 326) where it was held: "The power of the Magistrate under S.156(3) to direct further investigation is clearly an independent power and does not stand in conflict with the power of the State Government as spelt out hereinbefore. The power conferred upon the Magistrate under S.156(3) can be exercised by the Magistrate even after submission of a report by the investigating officer which would mean that it would be open to the Magistrate not to accept the conclusion of the investigating officer and direct further investigation. The power conferred upon the Magistrate under S.156(3) can be exercised by the Magistrate even after submission of a report by the investigating officer which would mean that it would be open to the Magistrate not to accept the conclusion of the investigating officer and direct further investigation. This provision does not in any way affect the power of the investigating officer to further investigate the case even after submission of the report as provided in S.173(8)." It is not disputed that the Magistrate cannot suo motu direct further investigation under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. Here, in fact the complainant requested to have investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to find out the role of A1 and also to collect evidence and materials which were not collected earlier which were actually necessary to show the complicity of A1 or to prove the alleged criminal conspiracy. Whether the allegations made by the complainant are true or not are matters to be investigated and found out. As stated above in the complaint and in the order it was incorrectly noted as 'reinvestigation' also besides using the expression 'further investigation'. In fact only further investigation was conducted by the investigating officer and since it was not done suo motu by the court, it cannot be said that the further investigation conducted in this case is liable to be set aside. 11. It is also argued by the learned counsel for the complainant that it was held by the apex court in Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. [2008 (1) KLT 724 (SC) ] that the Magistrate has power to monitor investigation. The above decision was doubted by the apex court in a subsequent decision. But it is submitted by the learned counsel for the complainant that Sakiri Vasu v. State of U.P. (supra) has not been overruled so far. 12. It is also argued by the learned counsel for the complainant that if the Magistrate is not given the power to monitor the investigation or to give such directions as may be necessary for a proper investigation of the case, even in matters, where because of the influence exerted by the accused, the investigation proceeds in a lopsided or slipshod manner, the remedy, if any, open to the complainant would be to approach the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in which case the High Court may be entitled to direct further investigation. But so far as a complainant who cannot afford to approach the High Court, if he is denied the right to point out such factors to the learned Magistrate, it would be a negation of justice to a poor complainant and so the power of the Magistrate to issue such orders as are necessary for the conduct of a proper investigation cannot be curtailed. So far as the case on hand is concerned, the petition filed by the complainant is actually to have an investigation under Section 156(3) and under Section 173(8). Section 173(8) was incorporated since the investigation into that crime was conducted earlier and report was filed. Section 156(3) has been incorporated because the complaint was intended to show the complicity of A1 and to show the required materials which are to be unearthed during the investigation. Therefore, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the order passed by the court below for a further investigation is illegal. The facts of this case are entirely different from the facts dealt with in Reeta Nag v. State of W.B. [(2009) 9 SCC 129] and other cases cited supra. 13. In these circumstances, I am not inclined to invoke the jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to set aside the impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate or to stop the further investigation already commenced in the aforesaid crime. The petitioners are at liberty to raise all such contentions at the appropriate stage. In view of what is stated above, this Crl.M.C. is dismissed.