JUDGMENT 1. The revision and the writ petition are between the same parties and in relation to the same dispute. Hence, they are disposed of through a common judgment. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to, as arrayed in the writ petition. 2. The 1st respondent is a Government Owned Petroleum Company. Earlier it was known as ESSO Standard Easternin Corporate Oil Company. After nationalisation, it is known with the present name. The Company took on lease, a site owned by Sha Sulthana, shown as 2nd respondent herein, now represented by her legal heirs, respondents 3 and 4, and established an outlet at Sanathnagar, Hyderabad. Sri Mahaveer Prasad Agarwal, the father of the petitioner was appointed as dealer to run the petroleum outlet. An agreement, granting licence from time to time, is entered into between the 1st respondent and the dealer. The last of such agreements was executed on 16-08-2006, to be in force for 10 years. Mahaveer Prasad died on 05-12-2009, and the petitioner is said to be his legal heir. 3. The owners of the land, i.e. respondents 2, 3 and 4 filed O.S.No.5497 of 2003 in the Court of XVI Junior Civil Judge-cum-IV Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad, against the 1st respondent for eviction from the premises, after issuing a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The suit was later on re-numbered as 313 of 2007. The trial Court decreed the suit on 22-12-2008. A.S.No.44 of 2009 filed by the 1st respondent herein, in the Court of X Additional Chief Judge (Fast Track Court), City Civil Court, Hyderabad was dismissed on 19-10-2010. Second Appeal No.1192 of 2011 filed before this Court was also dismissed on 09-09-2011. Six months time was granted to the 1st respondent for vacating the premises. 4. The decree-holders i.e. respondents 2, 3 and 4 filed E.P.No.12 of 2011 for execution of the decree, pleading that the 1st respondent did not vacate the premises as directed in the decree and within the time stipulated by this Court. The Executing Court issued delivery warrant against the 1st respondent. At that juncture, the petitioner filed E.A.No.16 of 2012, under Rule 58 of Order XXI C.P.C., and E.A.No.17 of 2012, for stay of the execution of the decree. The Executing Court issued delivery warrant against the 1st respondent. At that juncture, the petitioner filed E.A.No.16 of 2012, under Rule 58 of Order XXI C.P.C., and E.A.No.17 of 2012, for stay of the execution of the decree. On finding that there was no attachment of the property, the petitioner filed E.A.No.18 of 2012 to amend E.A.No.16 of 2012, so as to bring it within the purview of Rules 97 to 101 of Order XXI C.P.C. 5. The Executing Court took up E.A.No.16 of 2012 on 12-04-2012 for hearing. It considered the objection raised by the 1st respondent as to the maintainability of the E.A. On that day, it passed two orders, viz., a docket order, directing that the further proceedings in the E.P.No.12 of 2011 be stayed, and a detailed order rejecting the objection as to maintainability and holding that the E.A. is maintainable. 6. Respondents 2 to 4 filed C.R.P.No.2555 of 2012 against the order dated 12-04-2012 through which the Executing Court rejected their objection as to maintainability. Petitioner filed W.P.No.17689 of 2012 for a Writ of Mandamus, to direct the 1st respondent to resume supply, complaining that the 1st respondent stopped supply of petroleum products on the ground that execution proceedings are initiated. 7. The petitioner contends that he was not a party in the suit, the Appeal or the Second Appeal, much less the execution proceedings, and the decree was obtained by respondents 2, 3 and 4 in collusion with the 1st respondent. He submits that his father, during the lifetime, and thereafter, himself, are the lessees of the premises and any decree obtained without notice to them, is not binding upon him. He contends that the 1st respondent ought to have insisted that the dealer is made a party to the suit or appeals, since the immediate impact is felt by the dealer, in such proceedings. He contends that there was absolutely no justification for the 1st respondent in abruptly stopping the petroleum products. As regards the revision, his case is that, once an application under Rule 58 or 97 or 99 C.P.C is filed, the Executing Court is under obligation to decide the same on merits, and that the Executing Court has taken the correct view of the matter as regards the maintainability. 8. Counter-affidavit is filed in the writ petition by the 1st respondent. 8. Counter-affidavit is filed in the writ petition by the 1st respondent. The gist thereof is that there is no lease or sub-lease in favour of the petitioner or his father, and it was only a licence, that was granted to the dealer to run the petroleum outlet. It is urged that after the death of the father of the petitioner, no transfer of dealership has taken place, and as the things stand now, the petitioner has no right, whatever, vis-à-vis the 1st respondent. It is also urged that assuming that the petitioner stepped into the shoes of his father and there exists any sub-lease in his favour, it does not outlive the lease, that existed between the 1st respondent, on the one hand, and respondents 2, 3 and 4, on the other hand. The 1st respondent has also pleaded that E.A is not maintainable in law, since the petitioner is claiming rights through the judgment-debtor therein. 9. The arguments on behalf of the petitioner are advanced by Sri K.N. Jwala, learned Senior Counsel. He submits that not being a party to the decree, the petitioner herein is not bound by it, and that the Executing Court cannot evict the petitioner from the premises. Learned Senior Counsel submits that once an application is filed by a third party, the Executing Court is under obligation to decide the same on merits, as though the claim petition is a suit; and till the claim petition is disposed of, the execution of the decree cannot be taken up. He further submits that, being a State-owned Company, the 1st respondent answers the description of a State, and it is under obligation to act fairly and reasonably and to follow the principles of natural justice, while undertaking its activities. 10. It is pleaded that once the execution is stayed, and the petitioner is continued in possession of the premises, the 1st respondent is under obligation to continue the supply of petroleum products. He further submits that the Executing Court has taken the correct view of the matter and no interference is warranted with the order under revision. Learned Senior Counsel placed reliance upon certain judgments of the Supreme Court, in support of his contention. 11. On behalf of the 1st respondent, Sri M. Ravindranath Reddy appeared, and on behalf of the respondents 3 and 4, Sri M.V.S. Suresh Kumar advanced arguments. Learned Senior Counsel placed reliance upon certain judgments of the Supreme Court, in support of his contention. 11. On behalf of the 1st respondent, Sri M. Ravindranath Reddy appeared, and on behalf of the respondents 3 and 4, Sri M.V.S. Suresh Kumar advanced arguments. They flatly denied the allegation of collusion in filing the suit or obtaining the decree therein. They submit that the petitioner is not even a sub-lessee and the only relationship between the 1st respondent and the father of the petitioner was of a licensee and licensor. They contend that licensee does not have right to possession, and even where licensor dispossesses him, the only remedy for the licensee is to file a suit for damages. Learned counsel further submit that even if the petitioner answers the description of a sub-lessee, he cannot resist the execution of the decree, notwithstanding the fact that he is not a party to the proceedings. They too relied upon certain precedents. 12. The petitioner claims to have succeeded his father, as a dealer of the 1st respondent. However, as of now, no former dealership agreement is entered into in his favour, nor he is formally recognised as the legal heir of a deceased dealer. However, this Court treats him as a dealer, in the limited context of these proceedings. The agreement in favour of the dealer is valid up to the year 2016. It is a matter of record that the petroleum outlet was established on the land owned by the deceased-2nd respondent, and the lease was between the 2nd respondent, on the one hand, and the 1st respondent, on the other hand. Though the petitioner claims the status of lessee, he did not file any document to substantiate the same. 13. The 1st respondent suffered a decree of eviction in the hands of respondents 2, 3 and 4. After the decree became final, with the dismissal of the Second Appeal, respondents 2 and 3 filed the E.P., for enforcement of the same. It is at the stage of delivery of possession, that the petitioner filed different applications in the E.P. and obtained order of stay of execution of the decree. After the decree became final, with the dismissal of the Second Appeal, respondents 2 and 3 filed the E.P., for enforcement of the same. It is at the stage of delivery of possession, that the petitioner filed different applications in the E.P. and obtained order of stay of execution of the decree. As the things stand now, the application filed by the petitioner is the one, under Rule 58 of Order XXI C.P.C. It is stated that steps have been taken by him to get the same amended, to be the one under Rules 98 and 99 of Order XXI C.P.C. Even this fact is assumed in his favour, and the application is treated to be otherwise, in order. 14. The respondents raised an objection as to the maintainability of E.A.No.16 of 2012. According to them, the petitioner is not even a sub-lessee and being a licensee, he cannot offer resistance for recovery of possession. On behalf of the 1st respondent, it was pleaded that it is under obligation to put the respondents 3 and 4 in possession as per the directions issued by this Court in the Second Appeal No.1192 of 2011. The Executing Court heard the parties on the question of maintainability of the E.A. For all practical purposes, it took up the exercise akin to the one, under Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C. or framed a preliminary issue and dealt with it. After noting the contentions of the parties, the Executing Court took the view that the various aspects of the matter need to be examined at the stage of trial and final hearing of the E.A., and it cannot be said that the application is not maintainable. 15. Two questions arise for consideration, viz., 1. what is the status of the petitioner, in the context of the execution proceedings; and 2. whetherhe can resist the proceedings. 16. In the claim statement as well as in the writ petition, the plea of the petitioner is that his father, and thereafter himself are lessees of the premises. However, no document whatever was filed in support of the same. This question assumes significance, in view of the fact that the 1st respondent was recognised and treated as a lessee, and respondents 2, 3, and 4 as lessors of the premises. However, no document whatever was filed in support of the same. This question assumes significance, in view of the fact that the 1st respondent was recognised and treated as a lessee, and respondents 2, 3, and 4 as lessors of the premises. If the petitioner fails to prove at least the basic facts as to the status of lessee, the very foundation for his application becomes shaky. 17. This Court made an effort to ascertain from the petitioner himself, by posing questions to his counsel, as to what his relationship, vis-à-vis the 1st respondent, i.e. the judgment-debtor is. However, no specific answer is forthcoming. A submission to the effect that the question must be decided in the E.A., itself, as required under Order XXI C.P.C., meaning thereby, that full-fledged trial must be conducted. 18. The status of a person assumes significance, in the context of making application under Rules 58, 97, 98 or 99 of C.P.C. Here itself, it needs to be made clear that as in the case of determining an application under Rule 11 of Order VII C.P.C., the contents of the pleadings or version of the person making the application has to be taken on its face value, without the requirement of recording of evidence. Any contention to the contrary raised by the opposite side also must be ignored, for this purpose. 19. The rights and obligations of the judgment-debtor in a decree, vis-à-vis the decree-holder already stand determined under the judgment, that gave rise to the decree. Though any question raised by him in the execution needs to be determined in the same proceedings, as ordained under Section 47 C.P.C., he cannot be permitted to assail the decree on merits. The objections, if any, can be other than in relation to the aspects, that are covered by the decree and judgment. He cannot be permitted to open a second front, in the matter. 20. Persons who are not parties to the decree, generally known as third parties; however, stand on a different footing. Since they did not have any opportunity to ventilate their grievances or to substantiate their claims and rights, law requires that their claims must be determined on trial, as in a suit, and the application filed by them shall be treated as a plaint. The remedy provided for under Rule 58 or 99 C.P.C is in favour of persons, such as third parties. The remedy provided for under Rule 58 or 99 C.P.C is in favour of persons, such as third parties. 21. While this dichotomy exists between the judgment-debtor, on the one hand, and a stranger, or third party to a decree, on the other hand, an altogether different class also exists, namely, persons not parties to the decree, but claiming through the judgment-debtors. Though a person claiming through the judgment-debtor may not be a party to the proceedings and thereby can be treated as a third party in the common parlance, he cannot be extended the same benefit or conceded the same rights as can be done to a person, who has no relation, whatever, either with the decree-holder or judgment-debtor. A person claiming rights through a judgment-debtor cannot be conferred with the right to oppose the decree by raising separate grounds nor can he insist on independent trial in the execution proceedings. The reason is that he must stand or fall with the judgment-debtor, and his rights and interests, if any, are deemed to have been taken care of by the judgment-debtor. If he has any independent right in him, vis-à-vis the judgment-debtor, he has to work out the same separately, but cannot resist the execution of a decree obtained by the decree-holder. 22. Coming to the facts of the case: The 1st respondent specifically pleaded that the father of the petitioner was only a licensee. A copy of the agreement dated 16-08-2006 is made available by the petitioner himself. From a perusal of the same, it is evident that the dealer was just granted leave, licence and permission to use the premises. Nowhere he was treated as a sub-lessee, much less, lessee. On the other hand, he was prohibited from claiming such a status. The relevant paragraph reads: “The Corporation do hereby grant to the dealer leave and licence and permission for the duration of this agreement to enter on the said premises and to use the premises and outfit for the sole and exclusive purpose of storing, selling and handling the products purchased by the dealer from the Corporation. The relevant paragraph reads: “The Corporation do hereby grant to the dealer leave and licence and permission for the duration of this agreement to enter on the said premises and to use the premises and outfit for the sole and exclusive purpose of storing, selling and handling the products purchased by the dealer from the Corporation. Save as aforesaid, the Dealer shall have no right, title or interest in the said premises or outfit and shall not be entitled to claim the right of lessee, sub-lessee, tenant or any other interest in the premises or outfit, it being specifically agreed and declared in particular that the dealer shall not be deemed to be in exclusive possession of the premises.” 23. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim the status of a sub- lessee. At the same time, he is not a third party to the proceedings. The expression third party employed in Rule 58 or 99 C.P.C., obviously refers to such persons, who do not derive any rights or claim through the judgment-debtor. Except that the petitioner is a licensee, and was permitted to run the petroleum outlet, he has no other relation, vis-à-vis the suit schedule property, much less there existed any independent arrangement between himself and the owner of the land, i.e. the respondents 2, 3 and 4. As long as he claims rights through the decree-holder, he cannot be permitted to make an independent claim. Hence, the answer to the first question is that the petitioner is not a third party, within the meaning of Rule 58 or 99 C.P.C., and that he is claiming rights only through the judgment debtor, i.e. the 1st respondent. 24. Now comes the second question, viz., whether the petitioner can offer resistance. In NOORDUDDIN v. DR. K.L. ANAND (1995) 1 SCC 242 , BABULAL v. RAJ KUMAR AND OTHERS (1996) 3 SCC 154 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court took the view that all questions that are raised in a claim petition filed under Rule 58 or 97 or 99 C.P.C must be determined after trial, and they cannot be rejected at the threshold. Those, however, are the cases where the persons, who filed applications, were altogether strangers to the decrees. Those, however, are the cases where the persons, who filed applications, were altogether strangers to the decrees. It is only in applications filed under Rule 58 or 98 of Order XXI C.P.C., that are found to be otherwise in order, that the questions raised therein must be determined, on merits, after trial, to be conducted in those very proceedings. In NATIONAL TEXTILE CORPORATION (MAHARASHTRA SOUTH) LTD. V. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK AND ANOTHER (2000) 10 SCC 592 , it was held that the writ petition is not a remedy for any person, who is aggrieved by a decree obtained between strangers to him. Other judgments are also cited, to convince this Court, as the only alternative for the person aggrieved by a decree, to file an application under Rule 97 or 99 of Order XXI C.P.C. There is no quarrel with the proposition. The question is much about the status of the person, who presents the application. 25. It is only after a great deal of trial and arguments, that a decree comes out of a suit, and assumes finality, after the remedies that are available in law; are exhausted. The execution of the decree takes places at that stage. Valuable rights that have accrued to a decree-holder after such a long drawn ordeal cannot be treated as momentary or perfunctory. A person who is not a party to the decree and is a stranger to the judgment-debtor, decree-holder can certainly maintain application, if his independent rights are adversely affected on account of it. Where, however, the person derives his right from the judgment-debtor, the resistance if offered by him, cannot be entertained. 26. It has already been mentioned that the status of the petitioner is that of a licensee, vis-à-vis the 1st respondent, who suffered the decree of eviction. Even if the eviction of the petitioner is by the 1st respondent himself, the only remedy for the petitioner is, to file a suit under Section 40 of the Indian Easements Act. The reason is that a licensee cannot be said to be having right of possession over any property. 27. Assuming that the petitioner answers the description of a sub-lessee, he does not get any independent right to continue in possession, once the lessee suffered a decree. The reason is that a licensee cannot be said to be having right of possession over any property. 27. Assuming that the petitioner answers the description of a sub-lessee, he does not get any independent right to continue in possession, once the lessee suffered a decree. The legal rights of a sub-lessee were explained at length, by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in RUPCHAND GUPTA v. RAGHUVANSHI (Pvt.) LIMITED AIR 1964 SC 1889 . It was held that if a lessee suffers a decree for possession, the sub-lessee cannot object to the execution of decree, notwithstanding the fact that he was not a party to the suit. It was held that the decree in such a suit would bind the sub-lessee also. This principle was reiterated in BURMAH SHELL OIL DISTRIBUTING NOW KNOWN AS BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED v. KHAJA MIDHAT NOOR AIR 1988 SC 1470 . A Division Bench of this Court, in C.M.A.No.339 of 2009 dealt with this very question, and through its judgment dated 17-02-2010, held that the dealer of a petroleum outlet is only a licensee of the petroleum company, and he does not have any independent right to remain in possession. When such is the material status of the petitioner, he cannot offer resistance to the execution of the decree. In a way, it would amount to scuttling the process of law and preventing the execution of the decree, which has assumed finality in the hands of this Court. 28. Another ground urged by the petitioner in offering the resistance to the decree was that the execution of the decree was obtained by fraud. Rule 10 of Order VI C.P.C. insists that, wherever a plea of malice fraud or other similar plea is raised, full particulars thereof must be stated in the plaint itself. This is an exception to the general rule that only the broad facts, but not the details or evidence must be stated in the pleadings. Except making a bald allegation that the decree was obtained by fraud, the petitioner did not allege in his petition as to what are the facts that constitute fraud and collusion. Further, the very fact that the 1st respondent challenged the decree passed by the trial Court by filing appeal and thereafter the Second Appeal would belie the contention of the petitioner. 29. Further, the very fact that the 1st respondent challenged the decree passed by the trial Court by filing appeal and thereafter the Second Appeal would belie the contention of the petitioner. 29. Viewed from any angle, the order passed by the Executing Court in E.A.No.16 of 2012 in E.P.No.12 of 2011 cannot be sustained. The C.R.P is allowed, the order under revision is set aside, and it is held that E.A.No.16 of 2012 filed by the petitioner is not maintainable. 30. The only basis for the petitioner in claiming the relief in W.P.No.17689 of 2012 is that the Executing Court granted an order of stay, and as long as the said order is in force, he is entitled to remain in possession of the premises, and the 1st respondent is under obligation to continue the supply of petroleum products. The plea of the 1st respondent is that, strictly speaking, there is no dealership in favour of the petitioner, and even otherwise, the licence stood cancelled with the expiry of the lease, between it and the owners of the land. Since this Court has taken the view that the petitioner does not have any independent right to remain in possession of the premises, no relief can be granted in the writ petition. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. 31. The miscellaneous petitions filed in the writ petition and the C.R.P. are also shall stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.