Judgment : VIKRAMAJIT SEN, C.J. 1. This appeal assails the Order of the learned Single Judge dated 08.11.2011 allowing Interlocutory Application No.10 of 2011 in W.P.No.37490/2010 & 40967-41032/2010 and directing the appellant to pay the wages last drawn by the Respondent-Workmen under Section -17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 (for the short ‘ID Act’), with effect from 30 days after publication of the Award impugned before him. 2. Learned counsel for the Appellant has placed reliance on the Division Bench Judgment rendered by the High Court of Kerala in Commandant, Defence Security –vs-Secretary, 2001 (2) KLT 104 . However, we are of the considered opinion that this decision is of no avail to the case proffered by the petitioner/appellant since the Division Bench was seized and placed in the position where the learned Single Judge who had allowed the writ petition filed by the Management in which the remonstration was that the writ petitioner was neither an industry nor were the respondents its workmen. It was in that context that the Division Bench disagreed with the Judgments of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. –Vs- Petitioner. Lab. Court, Madras, 1992 (2) LLJ-201 and the Division Bench Judgment of the Bombay High Court in Elpro International Ltd –Vs- K.B. Joshi, (1987) (2) LLJ-210; and a Single Judge Bench Judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Large-sized Co-op. Credit Society –Vs-Lab. Court 1997 (2) LLJ 442. The above three decisions indicated that it was open to the High Court to depart from the mandate of Section 17-B of the ID Act wherever if felt expedient to do so. Instead, the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court had applied the ratio in Dena Bank –Vs- Kiritikumar T. Patel, (1999) 2 SCC 106 ; AIR 1998 SC 511 (Dena Bank-I) as well as Bharat Singh –Vs- Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre, 1986 (2) LLJ 217 . The Division Bench in Commandant, Defence Security was not concerned with the arguments that have been addressed before us, namely, that under Section 17-B of the ID Act, the Court can order payment of last drawn wages effective only from the date on which an affidavit had been filed by the concerned workmen stating that he was not gainfully employed in any establishment. 3. 3. At the outset, it is just and necessary to note that under sub-section (1) of Section 17, every award of a Labour Court shall be published in such a manner as the appropriate Government thinks fit, within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the Award by the Government. Sub-section (2) of Section 17 states that subject to the provisions of Section 17-A, the Award published under sub-section (1) shall be final and not be called in question by any Court in any manner whatsoever. Sub-section (1) of Section 17-A states that Award shall become enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17 unless, the appropriate Government or as the case may be, the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette declares that the award shall not become enforceable on the expiry period of 30 days. If such a declaration is made, then within 90 days from the date of publication of the Award under Section-17, the appropriate Government or Central Government may make an order rejecting or modifying the Award and lay the Award together with the copy of the Order before the Legislature of the State or the Parliament, as the case may be. If an award rejected or modified is lad before the Legislature of State or before the Parliament, such an award shall become enforceable on the expiry of 15 days from the date on which, it is so laid. Sub-section (4) of Section 17-A states that the award shall be enforceable in terms of sub-section (1) of sub-section (3) of Section 17-A but the award shall come into operation with effect from such date, as may be specified therein, but where no date is so specified, it shall come into operation on the date when the award becomes enforceable under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) as the case may be. Since an award after publication attains finality, the Act does not provide for assailing the same by way of an appeal or revision. Section 17-B however, takes note of the fact that such an award can be assailed before a High Court or the Supreme Court. Since an award after publication attains finality, the Act does not provide for assailing the same by way of an appeal or revision. Section 17-B however, takes note of the fact that such an award can be assailed before a High Court or the Supreme Court. Under Section 17B in the I.D. Act the Parliament intended to ensure that the workman should get the last drawn wages till the challenge to the Award is finally decided in order to alleviate his penury. Furthermore Section 17-B does not preclude the High Court from granting better benefits than contemplated by that provision to a workman if circumstances so dictate. 4. It should not be forgotten that there is no inherent right of appealing/assailing an order/judgment/award and that this remedy is granted only by legislation. In fact even in fiscal matters, the spectrum of statutes insists on the predeposit of tax. It has been argued, but without success till date, in the context of all such taxing statutes that if the predeposit is to be made, the right of appeal is rendered illusory. In the context of property taxation under the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, and the New Delhi Municipal Council Act, 1994, this very argument was repelled in Shyam Kishore Vs Municipal Corporation of Delhi. This decision was then brought before the Apex Court which upheld the majority view in Shyam Kishore Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, AIR 1992 SC 2279 . This precedent has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the course of it reiterating that the deposit of the impugned tax can be insisted upon as a precondition for the entertainment of an appeal. Of many precedents we shall specifically mention only the pithy observations in Ganga Bai –Vs- Vijay Kumar, AIR 1974 SC 1126 where it was opined that: “there is a basic distinction between the right of a suit and the right of an appeal. There is an inherent right in ever person to bring a suit of a civil nature, but the right of appeal inheres in none and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law.” These observations apply with added force when the extraordinary writ jurisdiction is invoked. There is an inherent right in ever person to bring a suit of a civil nature, but the right of appeal inheres in none and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law.” These observations apply with added force when the extraordinary writ jurisdiction is invoked. Accordingly, there would not have been any departure from law if a precondition of payment of wages as prerequisite for the entertainment of a challenge to an industrial award even in the form of a writ petition had been statutorily established. Obscurity is removed no sooner it is recalled that the provision enabling an appeal under the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 was repealed by the amendments effected by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956. Once the right to file and appeal stands withdrawn, it is only to be expected that the Legislature would indicate stringent, onerous and deterring conditions for the entertainment of writ petitions, such as one contained in Section 17-B of the I.D. Act. Although it is not possible to alter the ambit and sweep of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of High Courts, there appears to us to be sound reason for giving effect to Section-17B of the I.D. Act in the widest amplitude. Appeals in fiscal matters generally emanate from a decision taken by the concerned Department itself, with its designated officer exercising quasi-judicial powers. Even in such cases, where it is palpable that the propensity of the Department would be to impose and thereafter uphold the greatest amount of taxation, predeposit of the assailed tax has received legislative as well as jural sanction. A fortiori, where a totally independent person such as a Labour Court/Tribunal has adjudicated on a dispute, and where the right to file an appeal has been specifically withdrawn, the advantage that the successful workman has gained should not be dissipated by even a meager measure. Managements have the financial strength and general capacity to protract litigation. If a narrow interpretation is given to Section 17-B of the I.D. Act, the efficacy of an Industrial Award is endangered and encouragement to continue and prolong litigation is given to the usually indefatigable management. 5. Managements have the financial strength and general capacity to protract litigation. If a narrow interpretation is given to Section 17-B of the I.D. Act, the efficacy of an Industrial Award is endangered and encouragement to continue and prolong litigation is given to the usually indefatigable management. 5. Vishveswaraya Iron and Steel Ltd. –Vs- M. Chandrappa, 1994 (84) FJR 46, has been held to have been wrongly decided in Dena Bank-I, it needs clarification that this was so observed by the Apex Court only in the context of the grant of ‘yearly increments and the dearness allowance to be worked out till the date of the award’, since this is how the court had summarized it in paragraph 19 of its Judgment. The Apex Court had simultaneously overruled Elpro International Ltd but also on the same point. In this very case, the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court had adverted to Section 10A of the Industrial Employment (Standing) Act, 1946 and had observed that since subsistence allowances are neither refundable nor recoverable irrespective of the result of the enquiry, the same situation should hold under Section 17-B of the ID Act. In Dena Bank-I the Hon’ble Court has similarly opined that payments made pursuant to orders passed under Section 17-B are not recoverable. The ratio of Dena Bank-I, it appears to us, is that the wages to be granted would include all the allowances etc., payable to the workman at the time of his dismissal in contradistinction to the time of the Section 17-B application, and not wages and allowances as incremented thereafter. 6. In Dena Bank-I the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not favoured the view that ‘full’ can be read as indicative of the wages currently payable contemporaneously with the filing of the application under Section 17-B of the I.D. Act. The words employed must be given their plain meaning and every word must be taken to have been purposefully and not superfluously used; this is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation. Since the definition of ‘wages’ appears to be all encompassing, the role ascribable to the word ‘full’ seems to then enjoin that the wages should be for the full period in question. Section 33-C (1) of the I.D. Act already provides for an execution procedure if the Award is not implemented. Since the definition of ‘wages’ appears to be all encompassing, the role ascribable to the word ‘full’ seems to then enjoin that the wages should be for the full period in question. Section 33-C (1) of the I.D. Act already provides for an execution procedure if the Award is not implemented. Full wages last drawn can therefore only mean all the wages that have fallen due at least from the date of the Award. This interpretation appears to us as it is pragmatic. It is of importance to bear in mind that Apex Court did not set aside the observations in paragraph-7 of the Judgment in Visveswaraya Iron and Steel Ltd Vs M. Chandrappa, (1994) 1 LLJ 555 (supra) that although “in Section 17-B of the I.D. Act the words “from the date of the award” are not found, having regard to the Objects and Reasons stated for inserting this provision, we can, without any difficulty, come to the conclusion that the date from which the full wages last drawn to be paid should be from the date of the award till disposal of the proceedings”. 7. Earlier, in Bharat Singh their Lordships had opined that the power to grant back wages was possessed and employed by the High Courts and the Supreme Court even prior to Section 17-B of the I.D. Act, which therefore merely codified the law. The Hon’ble Court had observed that “the conferment of a new jurisdiction can take effect only prospectively except when a contrary intention appears on the face of the statute. Section 11-A plainly indicates its prospective operation. This is made clear in the proviso to the Section when it says ‘provided that in any proceedings under this Section’. This can only mean something relatable to a stage after the Section came into being. That is not the case with Section 17-B. Here it is not the conferment of a new jurisdiction but the codification in statutory form of a right available to the workmen to get back wages when certain given conditions are satisfied. There are no words in Section to compel the Court to hold that it cannot operate retrospectively. Before Section 17-B was introduced there was no bar for Courts for awarding wages. Of course the workmen had no right to claim it. This Section recognizes such a right. There are no words in Section to compel the Court to hold that it cannot operate retrospectively. Before Section 17-B was introduced there was no bar for Courts for awarding wages. Of course the workmen had no right to claim it. This Section recognizes such a right. To construe it in a manner detrimental to workmen would be to defeat its object.” This further fortifies the view that the wages to be granted in this Section can be from the date of the Award especially since the ‘Objects’ of the amendment clearly indicate/specify so. In Dena Bank –Vs- Ghandhayam, JT 2001 (Suppl.1) SC 229; AIR 2011 SC 2270; (2001) 5 SCC169 (Dena Bank-II), the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered its previous view in Dena Bank-I and observed that “the import of Section 17-B admits of no doubt that Parliament intended that the workman should get the last drawn wages from the date of the Award till the challenge to the Award is finally decided….”. On first principles, the Apex Court has held that Orders under Section 17-B of the I.D. Act should commence with effect from the date of the Award, thus leaving no scope any longer for debate. 8. We may also refer to Judgments of the two Division Benches of the Delhi High Court which prescribe that Orders made under Section 17-B of the ID Act will relate back and be effective from the date of the passing of the Award. Secondly, they held that the amounts over and above the wages last drawn can also be ordered under Section 17-B of the ID Act with the rider that the workmen should be required to furnish a personal bond to the effect that the amounts over and above the wages last drawn would be refunded if the workmen loses his case. Dena Bank-II was applied by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Ashok Hotel –Vs- Govt. of NCT of Delhi [LPA 1619/2005 decided on 22.07.2005] and in Indira Perfumery Company –VS- Presiding Officer, (2004) II LLJ-413 Delhi. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has also drawn our attention to the Record of Proceedings in Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation –Vs- K.B. Singh to be found in (2005) 11 SCC-449, which for that reason does not partake of the character of stare decisis. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant has also drawn our attention to the Record of Proceedings in Uttaranchal Forest Development Corporation –Vs- K.B. Singh to be found in (2005) 11 SCC-449, which for that reason does not partake of the character of stare decisis. Even so, we may clarify that those proceedings pertains to separate petitions filed by several workmen. It seems to us that the words “the respective dates” employed in the Record of Proceedings relates to the date of passing of the Awards and not the filing of the affidavits under Section 17-B of the ID Act. The decision in Dena Bank-II was not even referred to, since only interlocutory Orders were proposed to be passed. With our profound respects, we are unable to subscribe the view articulated in Kodungaloor Town Co-Operative Bank Ltd –Vs- Surendra Babu, 2007-II-LLJ 337 (Kerala). As was contended by the learned counsel before that Division Bench, the matter stood concluded by Dena Bank-II. We think it advantageous reproduce the relevant extract from Dena Bank-II which forecloses any High Courts from taking a different opinion. “The Statement of Objects and Reasons for inserting the said provision indicates that when Labour Courts pass awards of reinstatement, they are often contested by employers in the Supreme Court and High Courts. To mitigate the hardship that would be caused due to delay in implementation of the award, it was proposed to provide for payment of wages last drawn by the workman concerned from the date of the award till the dispute between the parties is finally decided in the High Courts or the Supreme Court”. (emphasis added to by us). 10. The learned Single Judge, at the very commencement of the impugned Order has referred to the dictum in Dena Bank-II and has also reproduced therefrom these words “to relive the hardship that would be caused to a workman on account of delay in implementation of the Award as a result of pendency of the proceedings in the High Court or this Court”. We completely and comprehensively uphold the approach of the learned Single Judge. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that wages under Section 17-B of the I.D. Act has to be paid by the employer from the date the affidavit is filed is wholly without basis. Therefore, the appeal is wholly meritless. The appeal is dismissed with costs of Rs.25,000/-.