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2012 DIGILAW 562 (MAD)

Mannathan v. Chinnu @ Pachiappan

2012-02-03

V.PERIYA KARUPPIAH

body2012
Judgment :- 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court made in A.S.No.29 of 2002 dated 26.11.2002 in dismissing the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court in O.S.No.17 of 1987 dated 20.09.2001. 2. The appellants are the plaintiffs and the respondent is the defendant before the Trial Court. 3. The case of the plaintiffs as stated in the plaint before the Trial Court would be as follows The plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the suit properties. Originally the suit properties were belonging to the plaintiffs who have mortgaged the suit properties with the defendant on 20.09.1967. Subsequent to the mortgage, the plaintiffs father Kolundha Gounder died in the year 1976 leaving behind the plaintiffs as his heirs to succeed the estate. The mortgage was an usufructory mortgage and the defendant was given possession of the suit properties in liew of interest and the amount borrowed and secured by the suit property was Rs.1500/-. The plaintiffs are entitled to the benefits of Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act. As per the provisions of debt relief Act, the mortgage debt shall be deemed to have been wholly discharged as the defendant was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property for more than 10 years. Therefore the plaintiffs need not pay the mortgage amount to the defendant and the defendant is liable to deliver possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs. However, the plaintiffs have given property the money to the defendant for redeeming the mortgage but the defendant was very particular about the properties. Lastly, on 01.12.1986, the plaintiff moved the defendant with some mediators to hand over the money to the defendant and to deliver possession of the properties. But the defendant refused to receive the money and proclaimed that he would not hand over the possession at any cost. Therefore, the plaintiffs have filed the suit for redemption of mortgage and for delivery of possession. Therefore, the plaintiff prays for handing over of possession of suit properties to the plaintiffs failing which the defendant may be ejected from the suit properties through due process of law and put the plaintiffs in possession of the suit properties and for costs. 4. Therefore, the plaintiff prays for handing over of possession of suit properties to the plaintiffs failing which the defendant may be ejected from the suit properties through due process of law and put the plaintiffs in possession of the suit properties and for costs. 4. The contentions raised by the defendant in the written statement would be thus The averment of the plaintiff that they along with the father had mortgaged the suit property to the defendant on 20.9.1967 was false. The said document was a conditional sale. The said condition mentioned therein was an important one. According to the stipulation the plaintiffs ought to have paid the money within the time mentioned in the document and got back the sale deed. But the plaintiffs and their father failed to pay the amount and get the sale deed within the time stipulated in the document and therefore, the plaintiff cannot have any right over the suit property. The plaintiffs are not alone heirs of the deceased Kulandha Gounder, but, his wife and daughter are also alive and they are also necessary parties to the suit. The documents dated 20.9.1967 is not a mortgage and therefore, the particulars of mortgage are not correct. The plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefit of Tamil Nadu Debt Relief Act. The mortgage debt would not have been deemed as discharged merely because, the defendant was in possession and enjoyment of the property for more than 10 years. The defendant improved the land by spending more than Rs.7000/-. The defendant also laid pipe line and reclaimed the land by spending huge amount. The averment that the plaintiffs asked the defendant to hand over the possession of the property on so many occasions with the help of panchayatars, are not correct. The plaintiff never asked so. The plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief as sought for by them. There is no cause of action and therefore, the suit may be dismissed with costs. 5. The trial court had framed necessary issues and entered trial. After appraising the evidence adduced by both parties, the trial court had come to the conclusion to dismiss the suit by holding that the transaction had in between parties was not an usufructory mortgage but a conditional sale and also on the ground that the plaintiffs did not implead necessary parties. 6. After appraising the evidence adduced by both parties, the trial court had come to the conclusion to dismiss the suit by holding that the transaction had in between parties was not an usufructory mortgage but a conditional sale and also on the ground that the plaintiffs did not implead necessary parties. 6. Aggrieved upon the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the plaintiffs preferred an appeal before the First Appellate Court in A.S.No.29 of 2002. The First Appellate Court heard both parties and came to the conclusion of reversing the finding that the transaction was only a usufructory mortgage and not a conditional sale but had confirmed the finding of the trial Court that necessary parties were not impleaded and the plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefits of Debt Relief legislations and therefore, confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court. 7. Aggrieved by the findings reached by the First Appellate Court, and the judgment and decree passed by it, the plaintiff have preferred the present appeal before this Court. 8. At the time of admission, this Court formulated the following questions of law to be decided in this appeal. "When in lieu of interest, possession of the property was handed over to the mortgagee under Ex.A1 of the year 1967, have the Courts below committed an error of law in not applying the relevant principles of Debt Relief Act applicable to the case on hand, while non-suiting the plaintiff?" 9. Heard, Mr.Kalyanaraman, learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff and Mr.J.Ramakrishnan, learned counsel for the respondent/defendant. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant / plaintiff would submit in his argument that the defendant did not prefer any appeal or raise any cross-objection in this appeal regarding the finding of the First Appellate Court that the transaction between the plaintiffs and their father with the defendant on 20.9.1967 was only an usufructory mortgage transaction and not a conditional sale. He would further submit that the said finding became final. He would also submit that the lower appellate Court had followed the decisions reported in AIR 1957 Kerala 175, AIR 1970 Kerala 81 and AIR 1985 MP 1 and also the provisions of Section 60 of Transfer of Property Act to arrive to such finding. He would further submit that the said finding became final. He would also submit that the lower appellate Court had followed the decisions reported in AIR 1957 Kerala 175, AIR 1970 Kerala 81 and AIR 1985 MP 1 and also the provisions of Section 60 of Transfer of Property Act to arrive to such finding. He would also submit that it was considered by the First Appellate Court that the condition for selling the property in default to redeem the mortgage within the stipulated time would be amounting to a clog under Section 60 of the Transfer of Property Act and such a stipulation is not valid in law. He would also bring it to the notice of this Court in a judgment of Division Bench of this Court reported in AIR 1972 MAD 185 between Dhanalakshmi Ammal v. G.Anthuraj in support of his arguments. He would therefore, request the Court to confirm the finding reached by the First Appellate Court regarding the character of transaction had in between parties on 20.9.1967 as usufructory mortgage only. He would further submit in his argument that the lower appellate court had failed in its attempt to appreciate the contention of the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs are the successors of the plaintiffs father, one of the mortgagors and the plaintiffs represented the estate of the deceased father and the evidence given by the other heirs namely daughter of the deceased father that they are not interested in the property. He would further submit that the said circumstances would render the plaintiffs to continue the suit on behalf of the estate of father and the provisions of Order 34 Rule 1 CPC were complied with by the presence of the plaintiffs. He would further submit in his argument that the presence of the plaintiffs as legal representatives would be sufficient to represent the estate of the deceased father on behalf of the legal heirs, dehors they relinquished their right in the property. He would further submit in his argument that the requirement of the presence of all the legal heirs under Order 34 Rule 1 of CPC is too technical especially the plaintiffs themselves are coming under the status of legal heirs of their father to represent other legal heirs. He would further submit in his argument that the requirement of the presence of all the legal heirs under Order 34 Rule 1 of CPC is too technical especially the plaintiffs themselves are coming under the status of legal heirs of their father to represent other legal heirs. He would further submit in his argument that the dismissal of the suit merely because other legal heirs were not impleaded would make the defendant unjustly enriched himself and the statutory right of the redemption would be defeated merely because the other heirs were not impleaded. He would further submit in his argument that the absence of other legal heirs when they relinquish their right in favour of the plaintiffs will not in any way vitiate the right of redemption under Order 34. He would further submit in his argument that the plaintiffs who are the agriculturists and the properties mortgaged were also agricultural lands and they are claiming the benefits of Debts Relief Act and it is for the defendant to show that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefits of Debts Relief Act and they failed to prove the same. He would further submit that under the provisions of Debts Relief Act, if the defendants was in possession as usufructory mortgagee and was receiving usufructs from the said property, for a period of 10 years, the mortgage debt shall be deemed to have been wiped off. Therefore, the First Appellate Court had also erred in law in coming to the conclusion of confirming the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in dismissing the suit for non-joinder of parties and in not finding that the plaintiffs are entitled to the benefits of Debts Relief Act and were not liable to pay the mortgage money to the defendant. He would therefore, request the Court to interfere and set aside the judgment of both the Courts below in dismissing the redemption suit and to decree the suit as prayed for by the plaintiff. He would therefore, request the Court to allow the second appeal. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent/defendant would submit in his argument that the transaction had in between the plaintiffs and their father with the defendant on 20.9.1967 was only a conditional sale and the finding of the First Appellate Court can also be agitated while addressing the case of the respondent in this appeal. 11. The learned counsel for the respondent/defendant would submit in his argument that the transaction had in between the plaintiffs and their father with the defendant on 20.9.1967 was only a conditional sale and the finding of the First Appellate Court can also be agitated while addressing the case of the respondent in this appeal. He would further submit that the evidence of PW1 would go to show that the transaction on the failure of the mortgagors to redeem the mortgage within the stipulated time would be a conditional sale. He would further submit in his argument that the First Appellate Court was perfectly alright in dismissing the suit for non-joinder of necessary parties as required under Order 34 Rule 1 CPC. He would further submit in his argument that the mere evidence of PW2, one of the daughters of the plaintiffs father that the daughters had relinquished their shares and were having no interest in the property in favour of the plaintiff would not improve the case of the plaintiffs who are to comply with the provisions of Order 34 Rule 1 CPC. He would further submit in his argument that the plaintiff must depose that he is entitled under Debt Relief Act and in which provision the entire mortgage amount need not be paid on the lapse of 10 years period. He would further submit that there was no such specific evidence given by the plaintiff and therefore, both the Courts are correct in coming to the conclusion that the plaintiff are not entitled to the benefits of Debts Relief Act. He would further submit in his argument that the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court even though one of the findings was reversed by the First Appellate Court, were confirmed by the First Appellate Court and the judgment of First Appellate Court is perfectly alright and in accordance with law and there was no wrong perception or biased attitude in the judgment of the First Appellate Court and therefore, he would request the Court that the second appeal may be dismissed. 12. I have given anxious thoughts to the arguments advanced on either side. 13. The plaintiffs are the sons of Kulandha Gounder and the said Kulandha Gounder along with plaintiffs executed an usufructory mortgage by mortgaging the property with the defendant on 20.9.1967 towards the borrowal of Rs.1500/-. 12. I have given anxious thoughts to the arguments advanced on either side. 13. The plaintiffs are the sons of Kulandha Gounder and the said Kulandha Gounder along with plaintiffs executed an usufructory mortgage by mortgaging the property with the defendant on 20.9.1967 towards the borrowal of Rs.1500/-. Admittedly, on the basis of the said transaction, the possession of the suit property was handed over to the defendant and the defendant was permitted to be in possession and enjoyment of the property in lieu of the interest for the said amount. The contentions of the defendant was that the said usufructory mortgage should have been redeemed within 7 years by paying the money and in default, it would become a sale and therefore, the entire documents as per its construction would be a conditional sale and not mere an usufructory mortgage. It is very clear to see in the judgment of First Appellate Court that Section 60 of Transfer of Property Act would be applicable to the present case. Following the judgment of the High Courts of Kerala and Madhya Pradesh, the First Appellate Court had come to the conclusion that the condition imposed for selling the mortgaged property in default to redeem the same within the stipulated time is a clog and Section 60 of Transfer of Property Act would be applicable and such condition of sale would not enure to the defendant. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs would also cite a judgment of this Court reported in AIR 1972 Mad 185 in between Dhanlakshmi Ammal v. G.Anthuraj in support of the finding reached by the First Appellate Court and the relevant portion would be thus:- "..... The deed provided for 30 years for redemption. It contained a further provision that if there was default in payment of the transaction should be regarded as an absolute sale. We may immediately remark that this operated as a clog and this clause will be of no effect." 14. The judgment of Division Bench of this Court would support the argument of the plaintiffs counsel that such conditional sale in default of redemption of mortgage within such period would be a clog and is not valid in law. We may immediately remark that this operated as a clog and this clause will be of no effect." 14. The judgment of Division Bench of this Court would support the argument of the plaintiffs counsel that such conditional sale in default of redemption of mortgage within such period would be a clog and is not valid in law. Therefore, I could see that the document dated 20.09.1967 produced as Ex.A1 would not be a conditional sale but it is only an usufructory mortgage and the provisions of Order 34 CPC would be applicable for redemption of mortgage. 15. Nextly, the finding of the Trial Court was to the effect that the plaintiffs did not implead the legal representatives of the deceased father, Kulandha Gounder as parties to the suit and therefore, Order 34 Rule 1 CPC was not complied with and therefore, the suit was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. It has been strenuously argued by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the plaintiffs are the co-mortgagers along with their father and the plaintiffs themselves are also the legal representatives of their father, representing the estate of the father and the other legal representatives namely, the sisters of the plaintiffs are not interested in the property since they relinquished their shares in favour of plaintiffs and the evidence of PW2 would go to prove the same. Whether the evidence of PW2 would be accepted and the presence of the plaintiffs as legal heirs would be sufficient to represent the estate of the deceased father? Order 34 Rule 1 CPC would run thus:- "Parties to suits for foreclosure, sale and redemption -Subject to the provisions of this Court, all persons having an interest either in the mortgage security or in the right of redemption shall be joined as parties to any suit relating to the mortgage." 16. According to the said provisions, persons having interest either in the mortgage security or in the right of redemption shall be joined as parties to any suit relating to the mortgage. It applies to both mortgagor and mortgagee of any mortgage. 17. According to the said provisions, persons having interest either in the mortgage security or in the right of redemption shall be joined as parties to any suit relating to the mortgage. It applies to both mortgagor and mortgagee of any mortgage. 17. In a judgment of Honble Apex Court reported in AIR 2008 SC 1462 in between Mohd.Hussain v. Occhavlal it has been held thus:- "(12.) For the reasons aforesaid, we , therefore, of the view that the High court had failed at the second appellate stage by dismissing the suit of the plaintiffs/appellants on the ground of non-joinder of parties because, in our view, the two sons of late Nandram duly, substantially and in a bona fide manner represented the interest in the estate, if there be any, of the two married daughters, in the absence of any case made out of fraud or collusion between the plaintiffs/appellants and the two sons of late Nandram. The defendants/respondents all throughout denied the claim of the plaintiffs/appellants made in the suit and contended, inter alia, that the suit premises was sold to them and it was not a case of mortgage. In fact, a case of adverse possession was made out by them i.e. It was contended that the defendants/respondents had acquired title to the suit premises by virtue of adverse possession. That apart, from the findings arrived at by the appellate court, as noted herein earlier, which were not challenged before us by the learned counsel for the respondents, it is clear that i) one of the daughters viz., Annapurna was already dead; ii) the other daughter viz., Pyaribai had no interest in the suit premises as she was not residing with late Nandram at the time of his death and iii) reliance was placed on the deposition of D.W.1 -Occhavlal who deposed that there was a partition of the suit premises which fell in his share and therefore, it was concluded that the two married daughters were not necessary parties. That being the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below, it was not open to the High court at the second appellate stage to hold that the suit was not maintainable in law as the two married daughters of Nandram were not made parties to the suit for redemption." 18. That being the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below, it was not open to the High court at the second appellate stage to hold that the suit was not maintainable in law as the two married daughters of Nandram were not made parties to the suit for redemption." 18. In the aforesaid judgment of the Honble Apex Court, it has been discussed that the non-inclusion of some of the legal representatives when the other legal representatives are present in the suit for redemption of mortgage, to represent the estate of the deceased mortgagor or mortgagee, the suit should not be dismissed merely for nonjoinder of such parties as necessary parties. 19. The said dictum laid down by the Honble Apex Court is squarely applicable to the present case and the non-inclusion of the daughters of the deceased Kulandha Gounder is not a material one since the plaintiffs themselves are present as legal representatives of the deceased father Kulandha Gounder to represent his estate. Further more, the evidence of PW2, one of the daughters would go to show that she had relinquished her share in the said property in favour of the plaintiffs and other daughters have also relinquished similarly. Therefore, I find that the finding of the First Appellate Court that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties is not in accordance with law and as per the dictum laid down by the Honble Apex Court as stated above. 20. Lastly, when we go into the question of the applicability of Debts Relief Act, no doubt, the land mortgaged itself is an agricultural land and the defendant was continuously in possession of the property for more than 10 years. Therefore, it is for the defendant to say that the plaintiffs are not entitled to the benefits of Debts Relief Act. However, the plaintiffs have not specifically pleaded under which Act, the lapse of 10 years would dis-entitle the mortgagee to get back his money. There is certainly lack of evidence in respect of the claim of benefits under Debts Relief Act. Therefore, the plaintiffs cannot be awarded with the benefits of Debts Relief Act for want of evidence before the trial Court. Since the benefits claimed under Debts Relief Act is a statutory benefit there is no estoppel for the plaintiff to claim the same at any stage, with definite pleadings and evidence. 21. Therefore, the plaintiffs cannot be awarded with the benefits of Debts Relief Act for want of evidence before the trial Court. Since the benefits claimed under Debts Relief Act is a statutory benefit there is no estoppel for the plaintiff to claim the same at any stage, with definite pleadings and evidence. 21. For the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered view that the suit for redemption filed by the plaintiffs ought not have been dismissed by the trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court for mere non-joinder of necessary parties, when the estate of the deceased one of the mortgagors was represented sufficiently by the plaintiffs. However, the mortgaged money for a sum of Rs.1500/-was said to have been offered on several occasions by the plaintiffs to the defendant through mediators but it was not accepted by the defendant. In the said circumstances, I find that the plaintiffs are entitled to redeem the mortgage dated 20.9.1967 on deposit of a sum of Rs.1500/-into Court within one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and decree. On such deposit, the defendant is liable to hand over the possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs along with documents. 22. Accordingly, the judgment and decree passed by the First Appellate Court and the trial Court are set aside and the suit filed by the plaintiffs is preliminarily decreed for redemption with costs. Time for deposit of mortgage money of Rs.1500/- is one month from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment and decree. On such deposit, the defendant shall bring into Court all the documents in his possession or power relating to the mortgaged property, plaint mentioned, and deliver up those documents to the plaintiffs, quiet and peaceable possession of the said property. 23. Accordingly, the second appeal is allowed with costs.