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2012 DIGILAW 566 (KAR)

Vydehi Institute of Medical Sciences and Research Centre v. Union of India

2012-07-12

ASHOK B.HINCHIGERI

body2012
ORDER Ashok B. Hinchigeri, J.—The petitioner, a non-aided minority private educational institution imparting medical education, has approached this Court with the grievance that its scheme seeking the increase in the intake capacity from 150 to 250 seats for M.B.B.S. Course has remained unconsidered. This Court, by its interim order, dated 12-6-2012, directed the respondent 2 to consider the petitioner"s scheme as expeditiously as possible and in any case within an outer limit of three weeks. Meanwhile, that is, on the very next day itself (13-6-2012), the respondent 2 issued a communication (Annexure-H) intimating that the petitioner-College is not eligible for the increase of M.B.B.S. seats. On the receipt of the said communication, the petitioner filed IA No. 1 of 2012 for amendment for incorporating the challenge to the said communication. This Court by its order, dated 4-7-2012 allowed the said I.A. 2. Sri Madhusudan R. Naik, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri Abhishek Mali Patil of M/s. Naik and Naik Law Firms for the petitioner submits that the respondent 2 has held that the petitioner does not satisfy the qualifying criteria for two reasons: (a) It does not have ten years standing. (b) Its increase of seats from 100 to 150 itself is not recognised. He would contend that both the reasons are not tenable. 3. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the petitioner established its hospital in September 2000 itself. The Rajiv Gandhi University of Health Sciences (RGUHS) granted the affiliation and the Government of Karnataka issued the essentiality certificate around October 2000. The petitioner submitted the scheme for the increase in the intake capacity in October 2010. The second respondent"s Board of Governors, in its meeting held on 10th and 11th January, 2011 approved the recommendations of the Undergraduate Committee to return the petitioner"s scheme, as it has not fulfilled the qualifying criteria of 1100 teaching beds with a standing of not less than 10 years. The petitioner submitted a fresh scheme on 30-9-2011. Thereafter the petitioner requested the respondent 2 to carry out the inspection vide its letter, dated 16-2-2012 (Annexure-D). On the respondents" showing the inaction in the matter, this petition is filed. 4. The learned Senior Counsel complains of the failure on the part of the respondents to carry out the statutory functions/duties in considering the scheme. Thereafter the petitioner requested the respondent 2 to carry out the inspection vide its letter, dated 16-2-2012 (Annexure-D). On the respondents" showing the inaction in the matter, this petition is filed. 4. The learned Senior Counsel complains of the failure on the part of the respondents to carry out the statutory functions/duties in considering the scheme. He submits that the scheme cannot be rejected without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, as per the mandatory requirement contained in Section 10-A(4) of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 ("I.M.C. Act" for short). He submits that from 30-9-2011 till 12-6-2012, the respondents showed total inaction in the matter and on 13-6-2012 the respondents hastily rejected the petitioner"s scheme. 5. As the delay in considering the petitioner"s scheme is attributable only to the respondents, the respondents cannot be permitted to take the stand that no consideration of the scheme is permissible after 30-6-2012 in violation of the time-schedules, so submits the learned Senior Counsel. 6. In support of his submission, he has also relied on the Apex Court"s judgment in the case of Priya Darshni Dental College and Hospital v Union of India and Others (2011)4 SCC 623 : 2011 AIR SCW 2383. 7. He submits that the second reason that the increase in the intake capacity from 100 to 150 is not recognised is no reason at all. Neither in the M.C.I. Act nor in the Regulations framed thereunder such an insistence can be made. He also complains of the hostile discrimination. He cites an example of Moulana Azad Medical College, New Delhi where further increase in the intake capacity from 200 to 250 for the academic year 2012-2013 is granted to the earlier increase of seats from 180 to 200 seats. He submits that the yardstick cannot be different for different institutions. 8. Per contra, Sri Zulfikir Kumar Shan, the learned Counsel for the respondent 2 submits that the grant of affiliation, the issuance of the essentiality certificate etc., are merely the statutory accompaniments of the scheme. For computing the 10 years standing, what matters is the date of granting the permission. 9. 8. Per contra, Sri Zulfikir Kumar Shan, the learned Counsel for the respondent 2 submits that the grant of affiliation, the issuance of the essentiality certificate etc., are merely the statutory accompaniments of the scheme. For computing the 10 years standing, what matters is the date of granting the permission. 9. Sri Kumar submits that as per the Apex Court"s judgment in the case of Mridul Dhar (Minor) and Another v Union of India and Others AIR 2005 SC 666 : (2005) 2 SCC 65 : 2005 AIR SCW 471, the last date for the grant of permission for increasing the intake capacity for the academic year 2012-2013 is 30th June and that therefore the granting of the permission for the increase in the intake capacity thereafter is not possible for the academic year 2012-2013. 10. The learned Counsel submits that the petitioner"s scheme is rightly rejected, as the petitioner does not meet the bare eligibility criteria for seeking 250 seats. He submits that amended Regulation 3.6 of Part II of the Opening of a New or Higher Course of Study or Training (including Post-graduate Course of Study or Training) and Increase of Admission Capacity in any Course of Study or Training (including a Post-graduate Course of Study or Training) Regulations, 2000 reads as follows.-- 3.6. The maximum number of admissions in MBBS Course shall not exceed 250 annually provided that the eligibility criteria for fixing upper ceiling of annual intake to 200/250 admissions annually shall be as under: (a) For annual intake capacity of 200.- (i) Number of teaching beds not less than 900 with standing of not less than 10 years. (ii) OPD strength per day not less than 2000. (iii) Bed occupancy: Average not less than 75%. (iv) The hospital must be unitary, (b) For annual intake capacity of 250.-- (i) Number of teaching beds not less than 1100 with standing of not less than 10 years. (ii) OPD strength per day not less than 3000. (iii) Bed occupancy: Average not less than 75%. (iii) The hospital must be unitary. 11. As per the afore-extracted Regulations, the petitioner does not possess the eligibility criteria, as it has come into existence only with effect from 8-8-2002. As the eligibility criteria itself is not satisfied, the petitioner"s scheme is not Registrable at all. He submits that there cannot be any departure from the prescribed standards. 12. (iii) The hospital must be unitary. 11. As per the afore-extracted Regulations, the petitioner does not possess the eligibility criteria, as it has come into existence only with effect from 8-8-2002. As the eligibility criteria itself is not satisfied, the petitioner"s scheme is not Registrable at all. He submits that there cannot be any departure from the prescribed standards. 12. To buttress his submission that the words "teaching beds" clearly indicate that they have the reference to the hospital established along with the college and not to the hospital which has come into existence earlier in point of time, he relies on the Division Bench judgment dated 14-6-2012 passed in W.A. No. 1100 of 2011 in the case of Board of Governors v Shree Balaji Medical College and Hospital and Others, the High Court of Judicature, Madras. Para 19 of the said judgment read out by him is as follows.- 19. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent is that the aforesaid two conditions should be read separately. A careful reading of the said clause, in our opinion, does not mean that the College can rely upon the compliance of teaching beds in a hospital started by them prior to the establishment of Medical College. Since the Medical College is seeking permission to impart education to 250 students, it should have not only 1100 teaching beds, but should have a standing of not less then ten years. The College cannot rely upon the requirement of 1100 teaching beds alone without satisfying the further requirement of that it should have not less than 10 years of standing. The word "Teaching beds" clearly indicates that it has reference to the hospital established along with the college and not earlier in point of time. In any case, this issue requires detailed consideration on merits. We cannot express any definite opinion at this stage. Our finding on this issue is prima facie and tentative for the purpose of deciding the legality and correctness of the interim direction given by the learned Single Judge. 13. In any case, this issue requires detailed consideration on merits. We cannot express any definite opinion at this stage. Our finding on this issue is prima facie and tentative for the purpose of deciding the legality and correctness of the interim direction given by the learned Single Judge. 13. In the course of rejoinder, Sri Madhusudan R. Naik, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the Division Bench of Madras High Court of Judicature in the case of Board of Governors does not finally or decisively lay down the position that the insisting of the teaching beds is interlinked with the establishment of the M.B.B.S. Course as such. He brings to my notice the last portion contained in para 19 of the said judgment which states that the view expressed is only prima facie and tentative for the purpose of deciding the legality and correctness of the interim direction given by the learned Single Judge. As the matter required detailed consideration, it was sent back to the learned Single Judge. 14. The first question that falls for my consideration is whether the scheme could have been rejected without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. To answer this question, it may be necessary to refer to the proviso to Section 10-A(4) of the I.M.C. Act. It reads as follows.- 10-A. Permission for establishment of new medical college, new course of study, etc.--..... (4) The Central Government may, after considering the scheme and the recommendations of the Council under subsection (3) and after obtaining, where necessary, such other particulars as may be considered necessary by it from the person or college concerned, and having regard to the factors referred to in sub-section (7), either approve (with such conditions, if any, as it may consider necessary) or disapprove the scheme, and any such approval shall be a permission under sub-section (1): Provided that no scheme shall be disapproved by the Central Government except after giving the person or college concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard. 15. When the statute prescribes a particular manner for doing a particular act, that act must be done in that manner alone. 15. When the statute prescribes a particular manner for doing a particular act, that act must be done in that manner alone. In saying so, I am fortified by the Apex Court"s judgment in the case of Kunwar Pal Singh (dead) by L.Rs v State of Uttar Pradesh and Others AIR 2007 SC 1675 : (2007)5 SCC 85 : 2007 AIR SCW 2571. 16. The applicant-institution develops the infrastructure incurring enormous expenditure. That is why, the legislature, in exercise of its wisdom, has prescribed that no decision shall be given against the applicant-institution without affording him of a reasonable hearing opportunity. The administrative decision-making, if it involves civil consequences; itself must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. The Apex Court has this to say in the case of S.L. Kapoor v Jagmohan and Others AIR 1981 SC 136 : (1980)4 SCC 379 : ...."Well, even if the case had been properly conducted, the result would have been the same". That is mixing up doing justice with seeing that justice is done (per Lord Widgery, C.J. at p. 1375). 17. Even the issues of what constitutes ten years standing and from what date it is to be reckoned are debatable. The respondent 2 is not justified in reaching the unilateral conclusion on these contentious issues without hearing the petitioner. On the short ground of the noncompliance with the requirement contained in the First Proviso to Section 10-A(4) and the non-compliance of the principles of natural justice, the impugned order is liable to be quashed and accordingly it is quashed. 18. The conduct of the respondents is also required to be examined. Admittedly, the scheme was submitted on 30-9-2011. It did not make any progress till 13-6-2012. The respondent 2 did not call for any more information/documents. The petitioner"s letter, dated 16-2-2012 seeking the inspection of its infrastructure also did not evoke any response from the respondent 2. 19. If the respondent 2 was of the view that the petitioner"s scheme is liable to be rejected in limine without being registered, it is not knowable as to why the respondent 2 kept it in the cold storage from September 2011 till June 2012. Even now, the fee of Rs. 4.00 lakhs paid by the petitioner to the respondent 2 towards registration, technical scrutiny, contingency charges and three inspections is not returned to the petitioner. 20. Even now, the fee of Rs. 4.00 lakhs paid by the petitioner to the respondent 2 towards registration, technical scrutiny, contingency charges and three inspections is not returned to the petitioner. 20. The respondent 2 is also not justified in raising the objections piecemeal. While rejecting the petitioner"s first claim vide its letter, dated 5-2-2011, the respondent 2 did not raise the issue of non-granting of the recognition to the petitioner"s earlier increase in the intake capacity. But the same is raised for the first time in the impugned order while rejecting the petitioner"s second scheme. 21. There is no doubt that the scheme cannot be granted based on the legitimate expectation. But what cannot be lost sight of is that the respondent 2, while rejecting the petitioner"s earlier scheme, never mentioned as to when the petitioner would acquire the eligibility to seek the increase in the intake capacity. On the other hand, impliedly it gave an impression that the scheme could be submitted next year. The relevant portion of the second respondent"s letter dated 5-2-2011 containing its approval of the Undergraduate Committee"s recommendations reads as follows.- In view of the above, the Committee decided to recommend the Board of Governor to return the application as disapproval of the scheme for increase of MBBS seats from 150 to 250 at Vydehi Institution of Medical Sciences and Research Centre, Bangalore, as there is no provision in the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 or Regulations framed thereunder to keep the application pending with the Council for the next academic year. 22. And in the next academic year, the petitioner has submitted the scheme. If the respondent 2, while rejecting the petitioner"s scheme submitted in 2010, were only to indicate or specify as to when the petitioner would acquire the eligibility, the petitioner would not have made the further investment or incurred further expenditure on the creation of the infrastructure. 23. I also see considerable force in the submissions urged on behalf of the petitioner that there is no provision in the Medical Council of India or the Regulations framed thereunder to insist that the recognition for the previous increase in the intake capacity has to be obtained before applying for further increase in the intake capacity. Further, an institution, namely, Moulana Azad Medical College, New Delhi was permitted to raise its intake capacity from 180 to 200. Further, an institution, namely, Moulana Azad Medical College, New Delhi was permitted to raise its intake capacity from 180 to 200. When the process for such an increase in the intake was still under way, the respondents permitted the renewal of permission for the increase of intake from 200 to 250 for the same academic year (2012-2013). It is trite that all the institutions seeking the increase in their intake capacities are to be treated on an equal and uniform footing. Similarly placed institutions cannot be treated dissimilarly. 24. I am also not impressed of the stand taken by the respondent 2 that the petitioner"s scheme cannot be re-considered, as the last date for doing so has expired on 30-6-2012 for the current academic year. The respondent 2 cannot show inaction in the matter and then plead that the time-schedule is coming in the way of reconsideration. The Apex Court in Priya Darshni"s case has held that the increase in the intake capacity can be granted even after the expiry of the last date for considering the scheme under three circumstances: (a) Where the last date for the admission is not over. (b) Where the delay is not attributable to the institution. (c) Where the delay is wholly attributable to the regulatory body. 25. For all the aforesaid reasons, I allow this petition by quashing the impugned order dated 13-6-2012 (Annexure-H) and by directing the respondent 2 to consider the petitioner"s scheme for the increase in the intake capacity from 150 to 250 for M.B.B.S. Course for the academic year 2012-2013 and pass fresh orders. The process of holding of the inspection, affording of the opportunity of hearing, concluding the hearing and passing the orders thereon shall be completed by 23-7-2012. No order as to costs.