JUDGMENT Mr. Satish Kumar Mittal, J.: - This Letters Patent Appeal has been directed against the judgment dated 18.8.2011 passed by the learned Single Judge, whereby the writ petition (CWP No.11329 of 2009) filed by the appellants challenging the order of their eviction from the land in question passed by the Collector under Section 7 of the Punjab Village Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’); and the order of the Commissioner upholding the said order in appeal, has been dismissed. The said order of eviction was passed on an application filed by the Gram Panchayat. 2. Though this appeal is barred by limitation, and along with the appeal, the appellant has filed an application (CM No.6419 of 2011) for condonation of 16 days’ delay in filing the appeal, yet without taking the said delay into consideration, we have heard the learned counsel for the appellants on merits and gone through the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. 3. The aforesaid orders of eviction were passed against the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants, namely, Harbhajan Singh, after the Collector had found his possession as illegal and unauthorized. 4. Before the learned Single Judge, learned counsel for the appellants raised the sole plea that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings before the Collector, Harbhajan Singh had expired and later on the ejectment order was passed without hearing the appellants. The learned Single Judge, after perusing the original record, which was directed to be brought by the District Development and Panchayat Officer-cum-Collector, Nawanshahr, rejected the contention of the appellants on the ground that immediately after the death of Harbhajan Singh, the appellants moved an application on 3.11.2005 for impleading them as parties, and thereafter, they were impleaded as parties, and after giving opportunity of hearing to them, the order of eviction was passed by the Collector on 11.9.2006. It has also been held that before his death Harbhajan Singh had already appeared as a witness in support of his defence and was further cross-examined by the counsel for the Gram Panchayat. 5. During the course of hearing of this appeal, learned counsel for the appellants could not controvert the aforesaid factual position. Thus it cannot be said that before passing the ejectment order, the appellants were not heard and not provided the opportunity of hearing. 6. 5. During the course of hearing of this appeal, learned counsel for the appellants could not controvert the aforesaid factual position. Thus it cannot be said that before passing the ejectment order, the appellants were not heard and not provided the opportunity of hearing. 6. Faced with this situation, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the land in question does not fall under the ambit of Section 2(g) of the Act and, therefore, the same does not vest in the Gram Panchayat. As such, the appellants could not have been evicted from the land in question in the proceedings filed by the Gram Panchayat under Section 7 of the Act. 7. The aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is wholly devoid of merit. In the Jamabandi for the year 1955-56, the land in question was recorded as Shamlat Deh Hasab Rasad Zar Khewat Wa Sanai Mahajrin and according to Section 2(g)(i) read with Section 4 of the Act, such land vests in the Gram Panchayat. Further, after coming into force of the Act, the land in question was mutated in the name of the Gram Panchayat. In the Jamabandi for the year 2001-02, the Gram Panchayat has been recorded as owner of this land. The Collector as well as the Commissioner have recorded a finding of fact that the land in question was part of the Shamlat Deh and it vested in the Gram Panchayat. This finding was not challenged before the learned Single Judge and the sole argument raised was that the appellants were not provided opportunity of hearing by the Collector before passing the order of eviction. This contention was found factually incorrect, as discussed above. 8. In view of the above, we do not find any ground to interfere in the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge. Hence, the appeal is dismissed. ------------------