1. This civil 2nd appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the 1st appellate court in an appeal titled as Manzoor Ahmad Mir and ors v. Ghulam Nabi War dated 30th April, 2010, whereby judgment and decree passed by the trial court viz. Sub Judge (Chief Judicial Magistrate) Srinagar, was upheld. 2. The following substantial question of law has been framed vide order dated 28th May, 2012:- "Whether a party dispossessed from the subject matter of injunction suit during pendency of the suit, can press into service Section 9 of J&K Specific Relief Act for recovery of the possession?" 3. Respondent-plaintiff Ghulam Nabi War filed a suit for prohibitory injunction against the defendants-appellants from causing any kind of interference in the peaceful possession of the plaintiff-respondent over the suit property i.e. land measuring 3676 sqft over which two sheds were constructed for storing timber situated at Khewan Narwara, Srinagar and ad-interim relief was granted restraining the defendants-appellants from causing any kind of interference. 4. During the pendency of the suit, plaintiff-respondent moved an application for amendment and sought relief for recovery of possession on the ground that petitioner was dispossessed from the suit property, which was granted vide order dated 30th November, 1993. 5. Defendants have not questioned the same, and the amended writ petition was brought on record. 6. Defendant filed written statement. Issues were framed on 16th October, 1995. Trial court dismissed the suit vide judgment dated 11th February, 2006, was subject matter of appeal preferred by the plaintiff-respondent before Principal District Judge, Srinagar. 7. In appeal the trial court judgment was set-aside and suit was remanded back for disposal, vide judgment dated 6th November, 2007. 8. Trial court decreed the suit for recovery of possession in terms of Section 9 of J&K Specific Relief Act, for short as Act, vide judgment dated 16th May, 2009. 9. Feeling aggrieved, appellants questioned the same by the medium of appeal which was dismissed by the impugned judgment and decree. 10. Trial court as well as the Appellate Court after scanning the evidence held that plaintiff-respondent was dispossessed during the pendency of the suit and directed recovery of possession. 11. I have gone through the record and judgments. The trial court has recorded finding on facts and that is upheld by the appellate court. 10. Trial court as well as the Appellate Court after scanning the evidence held that plaintiff-respondent was dispossessed during the pendency of the suit and directed recovery of possession. 11. I have gone through the record and judgments. The trial court has recorded finding on facts and that is upheld by the appellate court. The findings returned on the basis of cogent evidence cannot be said to be perverse in any way. 12. The substantial question framed is not at all involved in this lis for the simple reason that the plaintiff filed suit for prohibitory injunction, obtained interim restraint relief, was dispossessed and immediately moved an application for amendment, which was granted. This development was not challenged by the defendants till today. So it was simply a suit for recovery of possession. The trial court as well as the appellate court held that the right of recovery is based on prior possession, so the question of title was not involved and accordingly decreed the suit in terms of Section 9 of the Act. If at all the defendant was aggrieved, he should have questioned the permission to amend the suit. 13. This Court in a case titled as Sudershan Singh v. Mohan Lal reported as 1981 KLJ 252 has discussed the scope of Section 9. Apex Court also in case reported as AIR 1989 SC 2097 titled as Krishna Ram Mahale (dead) by his LRs., v. Mrs. Shobha Venkat Rao, has held that a suit under Section 9 of the Act, can be brought on the basis of possession even against the licencer who has unlawfully dispossessed the licencee before the expiry of licence notwithstanding the fact that the period of licence has expired long back during the pendency of legal proceedings. It is apt to reproduce Para 8 and 9 herein:- "8. Mr. Tarkunde, learned Counsel for defendant No. 3, the appellant herein, rightly did not go into the appreciation of the evidence either by the Trial Court or the High Court or the factual conclusions drawn by them. It was, however, strongly urged by him that the period of licence had expired long back and the plaintiff was not entitled to the renewal of licence. It was, however, strongly urged by him that the period of licence had expired long back and the plaintiff was not entitled to the renewal of licence. It was submitted by him that in view of the licence having come to an end, the plaintiff had no right to remain in charge of the business or the premises where it was conducted and all that the plaintiff could ask for was damages for unlawful dispossess ion even on the footing of facts as found by the High Court. We find ourselves totally unable to accept the submission of Mr. Tarkunde. It is a well-settled law in this country that where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. If any authority were needed for that proposition, we could refer to the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Lallu Yeshwant Singh v. Rao Jagdish Singh and Ors., this Court in that judgment cited with approval the well-known passage from the leading privy Council case of Midnapur Zamindary Company Limited v. Naresh Narayan Roy 51 I.A. 293 at p. 299 where it has been observed (p-208): "In India persons are not permitted to take forcible possession; they must obtain such possession as they are entitled to through a Court." 9. This proposition was also accepted by a Division Bench of this Court in Rant Rattan and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The Division Bench comprising of three learned Judges held that a true owner has every right to dispossess or throw out a trespasser while he is in the act or process of trespassing but this right is not available to the true owner if the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing his possession to the knowledge of the true owner. In such circumstances, the law requires that the true owner should dispossess the trespasser by taking recourse to the remedies under the law. In the present case, we may point out that there was no question of the plaintiff entering upon the premises as a trespasser at all, as she had entered into the possession of the restaurant business and the premises where it was conducted as a licensee and in due course of law.. In the present case, we may point out that there was no question of the plaintiff entering upon the premises as a trespasser at all, as she had entered into the possession of the restaurant business and the premises where it was conducted as a licensee and in due course of law.. Thus, defendant No. 3 was not entitled to dispossess the plaintiff unlawfully and behind her back as has been done by him in the present case. It was pointed out by Mr. Tarkunde that some of the observations referred to above were in connection with a suit filed under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 or analogous provisions in the earlier Specific Relief Act, 1877. To our mind, this makes no difference in this case as the suit has been filed only a few weeks of the plaintiff being unlawfully deprived of possession of the said business and the premises and much before the period of six months expired. In view of the aforesaid conclusions arrived at by us, we do not propose to consider the question whether the agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 amounted to a licence or a sub-lease." 14. In this regard, reliance can also be placed on AIR 1979 SC 846, AIR 1972, Pat, 138. This court again in case titled Munshi Ram v. Balwant Singh & Ors, reported as 1993 SLJ, P. 13, held that Section 9 of the Act, enables a person to recover possession of immoveable property if he has been dispossessed otherwise in due course of law not withstanding any title set up by other side. It is apt to reproduce Section 9 of the Act herein: "9. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property,- If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit. Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof. No suit under this section shall be brought against the Government. No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed." 15. No suit under this section shall be brought against the Government. No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed." 15. It provides that if a person is dispossessed from the suit property, he can file suit for recovery of possession in terms of Section 9 of the Act. 16. I earned counsel for appellant was not able to marshal out and explain why suit for recovery of possession in terms of Section 9 of the Act cannot be pressed into service when the claim is based on prior possession. Thus one can safely hold that the plaintiff can amend the suit if dispossessed during the pendency of suit and pray for recovery of possession. Even otherwise it is the duty of the court to see that possession is restored to the person dispossessed from the suit property in disregard to the process established under law in this behalf. 17. Appellants have not carved out any substantial question of law which is involved in this appeal. Even otherwise in terms of Section 9 of the Act, no appeal can lie from any order or decree passed in a suit for recovery of possession. Nor shall any review of such order or decree can be made. 18. Having regard to the discussion made hereinbefore, the appeal merits to be dismissed. 19. It pains me to write that defendants/appellants have dragged the plaintiff/respondents in the litigation right from 1993 till today without any justification or reason. Thus I deem it proper to dismiss the appeal with costs which are quantified at Rs. 10,000/- payable to the plaintiffs/respondents. 20. Appeal dismissed as indicated above.