1. Petitioner filed writ petition on 12th January, 2011 seeking restraint on respondents for re-tendering the Plantation Beat Gagerdoub Ghat Narbal and also a writ of mandamus commanding respondents to issue formal allotment order in favour of petitioner for Plantation Beat Gagerdoub Ghat Narbal in terms of notification dated 15th December, 2010-Annexure A to the writ petition. 2. Writ petition came up for consideration on 13th January, 2011 when a notice was issued and respondents were also directed not to go for fresh auction. 3. Respondents have filed reply and stated therein that nodoubt the petitioner has figured as highest bidder but the said auction was cancelled because representation was received from public that the wealth of Panchayat Halqa Narbal has been handed out against peanuts and accordingly order was made dated 7th January, 2011. 4. Petitioner was constrained to seek permission to amend the writ petition which was granted on 20th December, 2011. Accordingly, the amended writ petition came to be filed on 2nd March, 2012. Petitioner has sought writ of certiorari for quashment of the cancellation order dated 7th January, 2011 issued by respondents 3 and 4 and has also sought two more reliefs. 5. Respondents have filed reply and resisted the petition on the ground that as per the law, respondents were within their powers to cancel the bid. It is stated that as per the provisions of Panchayat Raj Act, respondents had to wait for 10 days after closure of bid. And after due consideration it was found that of course the petitioner is the highest bidder but since there were representations from the public against the said bid, therefore, it had to be cancelled-Annexure R1. The petitioner was offered to take back the security deposit of Rs. 1.00 lac, but he refused to accept it. 6. The core question for consideration is, as to whether the respondents were within their rights to cancel the bid of highest bidder? 7. In terms of the auction notice-proclamation-annexure A which was made public by issuing a proclamation that in the premises of Block Office Narbal, an auction of trees as per the schedule and particulars given in the proclamation was to be conducted and all those persons who were interested to participate had to deposit 1/4th of the auction amount. And the successful bidder had to deposit the entire amount in full. 8. And the successful bidder had to deposit the entire amount in full. 8. In terms of the provisions of Act, bid was to be kept open for 10 days with a condition that the bid could be allotted to a person who may offer 10% more than the highest bid. It is specific case of the petitioner that he figured as highest bidder and nobody appeared within ten days and offered more than 10%, thus offer made by the petitioner was final and contract was concluded. 9. The respondents have admitted in reply filed to amended writ petition in paragraph 3 that "inspite of waiting for ten days no further bidder came for bid". Thus the respondents have admitted that nobody appeared and offered more than 10% within ten days, meaning thereby that the offer and the contract was concluded, therefore, they had no option but to issue allotment order in favour of the petitioner. The cancellation order is not in accordance with their stand. The impugned order came to be passed without hearing the petitioner. 10. The provisions of the Act nowhere provide that respondents are within their powers to cancel the concluded contract that too without hearing the highest bidder. It is apt to record herein that respondents in paragraph 3 of their reply have admitted that none has appeared with an offer to given 10% more. 11. It is apt to reproduce Rule 59 of the Panchayati Raj Rules, herein: 59. Mode of contract (1) The Panchayat shall be responsible to get the contract auctioned at highest possible amount by all its means. (2) The auction shall be concluded by Sarpanch or Naib Sarpanch, Secretary and other three or more Panches authorized by the Panchayat and while closing the bid all such record their signatures on the bid sheet, which should also invariably bear the signatures of the bidders. After the close of the bid the Panchayat shall announce by beat of drums and issue a notice indicating that the bid can be reopened within ten days of the close of the bid; provided the bid is increased by 10% more in each case of the respective previous bid and display the same at least at 5 conspicuous places in its area. (3) No auction of the Panchayat shall be sanctioned in favour of the Panch, Secretary, Officer, Servant of the Panchayat or other public servant. (3) No auction of the Panchayat shall be sanctioned in favour of the Panch, Secretary, Officer, Servant of the Panchayat or other public servant. (4) When the bid is closed under sub-rule (2) above it can in no case be reopened unless the closed bid is increased by an amount not less than 10% in each case or the respective previous highest bid and after the fresh bidder or bidders also deposit 10% and 25% of their respective bid/bids with the Panchayat in lieu of the security and first installment of the auctioned respectively on the very day of his/their bid/bids: Provided no increase shall be allowed beyond 10 days of the date of closing the bid under sub-rule (2) above...." 12. In the given circumstances, the impugned order merits to be quashed and is quashed as such with the direction to respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for issuance of formal allotment order in his favour for Plantation Beat Gagerdoub Ghat Narbal as per the law applicable within two months from the date of copy of the order is served upon them. 13. Disposed of. 1. It is contended that petitioner-Corporation engaged respondent No. 2 along with other workmen for the Project Construction Corporation at Navigation Lock Project, Sopore, District Baramulla, which was completed in the year 1987. The services of respondent No. 2 were required by the Corporation-petitioner for completion of said project. That, 470 workmen included respondent No. 2 were retrenched. The matter was agitated before the court of law and workman was directed to approach Central Government. Thereafter settlement was arrived at and accordingly respondent No. 2. as per the terms of settlement, was reinstated and was directed to join at Khuga Manipur, but he did not turn up and instead raised dispute in which Award came to be passed. The Award was challenged by the petitioner-corporation through the medium of writ petition before this court which was dismissed. 2. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner-corporation questioned both the Award and the order of writ court by the medium of LPA, which was allowed, setting aside the Award as also the writ court order. 3. The order of the LPA Bench was challenged in Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court, which was dismissed. 4. 2. Feeling aggrieved the petitioner-corporation questioned both the Award and the order of writ court by the medium of LPA, which was allowed, setting aside the Award as also the writ court order. 3. The order of the LPA Bench was challenged in Special Leave Petition before the Apex Court, which was dismissed. 4. Thereafter SRO No. 435 dated 26th December, 2003 was issued which refers to the controversy detailed above and respondent No. 2 again agitated the matter before the Tribunal and an Award came to be passed. The petitioner-corporation is aggrieved of said Award, hence the writ petition. 5. It is contended that matter was already decided and concluded by the Division Bench of this court and upheld by the Supreme Court, so the Award passed by the Tribunal is bad in law and is hit by doctrine of res judicata. Petitioner questioned the same by the medium of writ petition on various grounds. 6. Respondent resisted the petition by filing the counter. 7. Mr. Iqbal Dar restricted his attack to the impugned award only to the extent that the matter was decided by this court, by the Division Bench of this court in LPA No. 468/99, Decided on 12th July, 2000 titled as National Projects Construction Corporation Ltd. v. Mashoor Singh Bali and ors. 8. Mr. Shah argued that it is a fact that writ petitioner had filed a writ petition No, 2-B/1996 before this court which was disposed of vide order dated 15th July, 1999, was subject matter of LPA No. 468/99. The LPA was allowed on a technical ground that the Central Govt. has the power to make the reference and not the State Govt. The reference made by the State Govt. on the basis of Award passed was incompetent rendering the award as infructuous and accordingly held that the doctrine of resjudicata is not applicable. It is apt to reproduce para 18 and the operative part of the judgment herein:- "18. So our conclusions are: i) that the reference was incompetent because in view of the law laid down in "Air India Statutory Corporation etc. It is apt to reproduce para 18 and the operative part of the judgment herein:- "18. So our conclusions are: i) that the reference was incompetent because in view of the law laid down in "Air India Statutory Corporation etc. v. United Labour Union and others" AIR 1997 SC 645 The appropriate government under section 2(a) of the Act is Central Government and not the State Government; ii) the settlement was arrived in between the NPCC Staff Association of which the petitioner was a member with the Management of NPCC all proceedings before the Labour Court were incompetent and the award was rendered infructuous in view of the law laid down in 'Sirsilk Ltd v. Govt. of A.P.', AIR 1964 SC 160 and reiterated in 'National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan'. (2000) 2 SCC 371 (supra), and iii) that the writ petition was wrongly entertained before the workman had exhausted alternate remedy which is quite efficacious and very effective as well. In view of the above this appeal is allowed and the judgment impugned is set aside. However, Mr. Gupta learned counsel appearing for the appellant, has made a statement that the offer made to the writ Petitioner-respondent for his reinstatement on the terms & conditions stated therein is still open provided he is willing to accept the same. In view of this concession, we direct that if the writ petitioner-respondent reports at the head office of the appellant at Raja House, Nehru Place, New Delhi within a period of one month, the Management will reinstate him on the same terms and conditions as mentioned in letter. We make the order accordingly," 9. In the first Award which was subject matter of the LPA, it was held that under Section 2A of the Act, the appropriate Govt. is Central Govt. and not the State Govt. and proceedings drawn before the trial court were incompetent and Award was rendered infructuous. 10. It appears that Central Govt. issued a S.O. No. 556E and provided that State Govt. is also the appropriate Govt. for making reference and in terms of S.O. 556E of 1998, the circumstances have changed and the Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir is the appropriate Govt. to have the powers to make the reference. And accordingly, State Govt. in terms of SRO 435 dated 26th December, 2003 made a reference to the labour court. is also the appropriate Govt. for making reference and in terms of S.O. 556E of 1998, the circumstances have changed and the Govt. of Jammu and Kashmir is the appropriate Govt. to have the powers to make the reference. And accordingly, State Govt. in terms of SRO 435 dated 26th December, 2003 made a reference to the labour court. Thus the State Govt. exercised the powers in terms of S.O. 556 (E) of 1998. The earlier order was not acted upon and was rendered infructuous on the ground that the State Govt. is not competent to make reference because Central..Govt. has not delegated the same, therefore, principle of resjudicata is not applicable. 11. This question was also raised by the writ petitioner before the Tribunal which was decided in favour of respondent No. 2 and against the petitioner vide order dated 19th October, 2004, constraining the petitioner to file a writ petition by the medium of OWP No. 01-J/2005, was disposed of vide judgment dated 31st August, 2006 and it was held that the reference in no circumstances fall within the ambit of judgment dated 12th July, 2000. It is apt to reproduce relevant portion of the judgment herein:- "Since the S.O. has been issued in the year 1998 the same was not in existence at the time the first reference was made due to which the Division Bench found that the reference made by the State Government was not competent as the State Government was not an appropriate Government to make reference. The circumstances have now changed in view of S.O. 556(E) of 1998. The State Government of Jammu & Kashmir is now the appropriate Government to whom the powers have been delegated by the Central Government U/s 39 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. The State has now by means of SRO 435 dated 26.12.2003 made a fresh reference which in no circumstances can fall within the findings returned by the Division Bench of this Court in LPA (SWP) 468 of 1999." 12. Thus this matter has already been clinched by this court vide judgment supra. Even otherwise there was no judgment on merits. The earlier Award was held to have been rendered infructuous in view of the fact that the reference was incompetent. Thus there is no judgment rendered on the question that whether respondent No. 2 was entitled to relief sought or otherwise. Even otherwise there was no judgment on merits. The earlier Award was held to have been rendered infructuous in view of the fact that the reference was incompetent. Thus there is no judgment rendered on the question that whether respondent No. 2 was entitled to relief sought or otherwise. The said Award was set-aside by the LPA Bench only on the count that the reference was incompetent. 13. I have gone through the impugned Award, the trial court-Tribunal has gone through the entire record and decide the issue No. a and b in favour of respondent No. 2. It is apt to reproduce relevant part of the judgment herein:- "From the above discussion it is evidence that all the witnesses including the petitioner have fully supported the petition of the petitioner and in the absence of any rebuttal to the evidence adduced by the petitioner, there is no reason to disbelieve the same. It established from the evidence adduced by the petitioner that the petitioner was appointed by the respondent on 21.4.1977 and he worked with the respondent corporation continuously till 03.01.1985 without any break. It has also come in the evidence of the petitioner that he worked in the respondent corporation continuously till his termination. It is crystal clear from the above discussion that the petitioner was in continuous service of the respondent from 21.04.1977 to 03.01.1985 and his subsequent appointment as Field Assistant by the management on 03.01.1985 has to be treated as continuous service in the respondent corporation Issue No 'a' is as such decided in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent. Issue No. 'b': If so, whether the retrenchment of the aforesaid employee by the management is illegal? With regard to this issue the petitioner has submitted that his termination is illegal, arbitrary and unwarranted and as such cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed. It is clear from the discussion made in the above paras that no notice was served to the petitioner on his termination from the service. With regard to this issue the petitioner has submitted that his termination is illegal, arbitrary and unwarranted and as such cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed. It is clear from the discussion made in the above paras that no notice was served to the petitioner on his termination from the service. Even no enquiry was conducted against the petitioner and no show cause notice was given to the petitioner by the respondent and termination of an employee from his service without adopting principles of natural justice cannot be sustained in law and such termination deserves to be quashed Even the conditions of Section 25-F of this ID Act have not been fulfilled by the respondent before the termination of the petitioner and as such the termination/retrenchment of the petitioner is not in consonance with Section 25-F. No compensation was paid to the petitioner at the time of his retrenchment. It is also proved in the evidence that the petitioner was paid less than that to his colleagues who were working with him in Iraq as such the petitioner is entitled to arrears of deficiency of his pay. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, the retrenchment of the petitioner by the respondent is void abinitio and invalid. The retrenchment of the petitioner from his service by the respondent is illegal and voilative of the provisions of law and as such deserves to be quashed and the same is quashed. The petitioner is held entitled to be treated in continuous service of the respondent corporation and he is also entitled to reinstatement along with all packages and other service benefits. Petitioner also deserves costs of litigation which is assessed at Rs. 7000/- which shall also be paid by the respondent to the petitioner An ex-parte award is accordingly passed in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent. Copy of this award be sent to the appropriate Government for necessary action as warranted under the I.D. Act." 14. Having glance of the above discussion, I am of the considered opinion that petitioner has failed to make out a case for interference. The Award made by the Labour Court is held to be in accordance with law and based on evidence. 15. For all what has been stated hereinbefore, the writ petition is dismissed and the impugned Award is upheld. Interim direction, if any, shall stand vacated.