JUDGMENT [Hon’ble B.S. Verma, J. (Oral)] (Stay Application No. 9651 of 2012) Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the record. 2. By means of this writ petition, the petitioners have sought a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated 28-9-2011 passed by the Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge (Senior Division) Dehradun (for short the Prescribed Authority) in P.A. Case No. 31 of 2009, Smt. Bhana Devi Vs. Sri Ramesh Kumar Kanaujiya and another, whereby the application moved under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings ( Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short the Act) by the landlady-respondent herein was allowed. The petitioners have also assailed the judgment and order dated 6-8-2012 passed by the appellate Court, whereby the appeal preferred by the tenant-petitioners has been dismissed. 3. Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the landlady-respondent moved an application for release of the disputed shop no. 48/1 situate at Nachghar, Kaulagarh Road, Dehradun, under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act alleging therein that the disputed shop was given on monthly rent of Rs. 250/- to the petitioner no.1. In addition to the rent, the tenant was required to pay taxes; that the tenant has been engaged in permanent employment in Opto Electronic Factory Raipur Road, Dehradun, but despite that the tenant-petitioner no.1 started sending rent on behalf of the petitioner no.2, who is his wife. It has been pleaded that since the landlady requires the disputed shop to engage her husband in the employment, therefore, the landlady has bona fide requirement for the disputed shop. It has also been pleaded that the tenant-petitioner no.1 has already got employment, therefore, he has not need for the disputed shop. It has also been alleged that in case the release application is rejected, the landlady would suffer greater hardship. Hence, the application for release was filed. 4. The application was resisted by the opposite parties filing their written statement/objection (paper no. 14A). It has been admitted that the applicant is the landlady of the disputed shop, but alleged that the opposite party no.1 is not the tenant rather opposite party no.2 is the tenant in the disputed shop and the opposite party no.2 has been paying the rent to the landlady. 14A). It has been admitted that the applicant is the landlady of the disputed shop, but alleged that the opposite party no.1 is not the tenant rather opposite party no.2 is the tenant in the disputed shop and the opposite party no.2 has been paying the rent to the landlady. The landlady has refused to accept the rent since December 2008, therefore, the opposite party no.2 started depositing the rent under Section 30 of the Act. It has been denied that the husband of the landlady has retired from O.N.G.C. and the disputed shop is required to engage him in the business. The bona fide need of the applicant landlady was disputed. It has been pleaded that if the release application is allowed, the opposite party no.2 would suffer greater hardship. 5. Both the parties led documentary evidence in support of their respective contentions before the learned Prescribed Authority. 6. The learned Prescribed Authority after hearing both the parties and on perusal of the evidence on record has elaborately recorded a finding that in the affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite parties, it has been stated that earlier the father of the opposite party no.1 was a tenant in the disputed shop and after his death, the opposite party no.1 became a tenant in the disputed shop and that there is no contract between the applicant and opposite party no.2 that of landlady and tenant. The learned Prescribed Authority at page no. 7 has held that in view of the rent note dated 10-11-1989, the disputed shop was let out on monthly rent of Rs. 250/- in addition to taxes to the opposite party no.1, therefore, relationship of landlady and tenant between the landlady and the opposite party no.1 has been established and that the opposite party no.2 cannot be said to be a tenant in the disputed shop only by depositing the rent. 7. On the point of bona fide need, the learned Prescribed Authority has considered the evidence led by the parties at page nos. 7 to 12 of the impugned judgment and order dated 28-9-2011 and has held that the husband of the landlady has already retired from service of O.N.G.C. on 30-6-2003 and that the landlady has bona fide requirement for disputed shop to engage him in the business. 7 to 12 of the impugned judgment and order dated 28-9-2011 and has held that the husband of the landlady has already retired from service of O.N.G.C. on 30-6-2003 and that the landlady has bona fide requirement for disputed shop to engage him in the business. The learned Prescribed Authority has also held that the opposite party no.1 has got employment in the Government Service. 8. On the point of comparative hardship, the learned Prescribed Authority has observed that since the opposite party no.1-tenant has been employed in the Government Service, therefore, there is no question of hardship being caused to the tenant if the release application is allowed. Ultimately, by a detailed judgment and order dated 28-9-2011, the release application moved under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act by the landlady was allowed. 9. Aggrieved by the said order, the opposite parties preferred an appeal, which was registered as Rent Control Appeal No. 114 of 2011 before the District Judge, Dehradun. The learned appellate Court also recorded its independent findings on the points of bona fide need of the landlady as well as on the point of comparative hardship. Besides, the learned appellate Court has also recorded a finding of fact that there was relationship of landlord and tenant only between the landlady and the opposite party no.1 (petitioner no.1 herein) and there was no contract of landlord and tenant between the applicant-landlady and opposite party no.2. The learned appellate Court ultimately by judgment and order dated 6-8-20 12 dismissed the appeal by upholding the judgment and order under appeal. 10. At the outset it may be mentioned that this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot sit like a court of appeal and cannot re-appreciate or reevaluate the evidence so as to arrive at a different conclusion. Only perversity in the impugned order can be seen to find out whether there is a case of mis-reading of evidence by the courts concerned. 11. In the case “Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash” [(2004) 3 S.C.C. page 682], the Apex Court has observed inter alia in paragraph 4 of the judgment that “An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. In the case “Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash” [(2004) 3 S.C.C. page 682], the Apex Court has observed inter alia in paragraph 4 of the judgment that “An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal.” 12. The Apex Court in the case of Shamshad Ahmad and others Vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) through L.RS. and others [(2008) 9 Supreme Court Cases, 1] while dealing with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has observed as under: “38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law.” 13. In the case at hand, the opposite party no.1 Ramesh Kumar Kanaujiya was the tenant of the disputed shop after the death of his father and opposite party no.2-Smt. Rani Devi is his wife. The application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act has been filed for release a commercial accommodation, i.e. dispute shop. 14. In the case at hand, the opposite party no.1 Ramesh Kumar Kanaujiya was the tenant of the disputed shop after the death of his father and opposite party no.2-Smt. Rani Devi is his wife. The application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act has been filed for release a commercial accommodation, i.e. dispute shop. 14. By a perusal of the judgment and order dated 28-9-2011, passed by the Prescribed Authority, it is obvious that the point of bona fide need of the landlady has been elaborately discussed in the light of the evidence led by both the parties. The Prescribed Authority on appraisal of the evidence led by the parties has come to the conclusion that the applicant-respondent herein has bona fide need for the disputed shop to settle her husband in the business. It has not been stated anywhere by the opposite parties that besides the disputed shop, the landlady has any other vacant shop to settle her husband, who is a retired person, in the business. 15. In this appeal, it has been argued on behalf of the petitioners that the learned Prescribed Authority has failed to consider the meaning of ‘tenant’ as contained in Section 3(a) of the Act. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is not acceptable for the simple reason that ‘tenant’ in relation to a building means a person by whom its rent is payable. It does not make any difference by whom the rent is paid. If a tenant of a property asks any other person to pay rent on his behalf, the said person paying the rent does not become a tenant of that property. In the case at hand, it appears that with ulterior motive, the opposite party no.2-petitioner no.2 had paid rent on behalf of the opposite party no.1 -petitioner no.1 and for this reason, the landlady has arrayed the wife of the opposite party no.1, as opposite party no.2 to the proceedings. Moreover, when the opposite parties have disputed a particular fact that opposite party no.2 alone was the tenant of the disputed shop and not the opposite party no.1, the burden to prove that fact shifted on the opposite parties. Moreover, when the opposite parties have disputed a particular fact that opposite party no.2 alone was the tenant of the disputed shop and not the opposite party no.1, the burden to prove that fact shifted on the opposite parties. From a perusal of the entire material placed before this Court, it cannot be said that any such evidence was led by the opposite parties either before the Prescribed Authority or before the appellate Court to substantiate their claim on this point that the opposite party no.2 wife of the Opposite Party No.1 was tenant in independent capacity. Wife paid rent on behalf of her husband who is tenant in the tenement in question. Moreover, this Court cannot appreciate the evidence of the parties like a court of appeal in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 16. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as by a perusal of the entire material placed before this Court, I am of the considered view that there is concurrent finding of fact on the point of bona fide need and comparative hardship. Both the courts below have discussed the entire controversy in detail. The evidence relating to bona fide need and comparative hardship cannot be reappreciated in exercise of writ jurisdiction, like an appeal, since it is a finding of fact. The release application has been rightly allowed by the Prescribed Authority and the appeal has been rightly dismissed by the appellate Court. I do not find any perversity or manifest error of law in the impugned orders. There is no merit in this writ petition, which is liable to be dismissed outright at admission stage. 17. The writ petition is dismissed in limine. Costs easy. However, to do complete justice, the petitioners are granted time up to 31-12-2013 to vacate the disputed shop from today provided the petitioners furnish a written undertaking before the Prescribed Authority within a period of eight weeks to the effect that they shall vacate the shop in question before the expiry of the aforesaid period and shall deliver its vacant and peaceful possession to the respondent-landlady. It is further provided that the petitioners shall pay/deposit monthly rent regularly by the seventh day of each succeeding month for the previous month. In case of default, the landlady-respondent would be at liberty to get the shop in dispute vacated in accordance with law. It is further provided that the petitioners shall pay/deposit monthly rent regularly by the seventh day of each succeeding month for the previous month. In case of default, the landlady-respondent would be at liberty to get the shop in dispute vacated in accordance with law. The petitioners shall be entitled to compensation as directed by the learned Prescribed authority. 18. A certified copy of this order be issued to the learned counsel for the petitioners by tomorrow (13-9-2012) on payment of usual charges.