Judgment:- B.P. Ray, J. 1. These petitions under Section 482 Cr. P.C. were filed against the order dated 16.7.2006 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Kuthuparamba in CMP Nos.1327/95, 2712/95 & 5731/95 wherein cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 120B read with Section 34 I.P.C. has been taken and process has been issued against the petitioner and three others. Petitioner has invoked the inherent power of this Court to quash the impugned order of cognizance on the ground inter alia: a) Act or omission committed by the petitioner does not constitute any of the offences alleged; b) There is no material to show that the petitioner had shared the common intention to commit an offence. Cognizance taken with the aid of Section 34 I.P.C. is bad; c) The petitioner was deputed for maintenance of law and order. Since the occurrence took place while the petitioner was discharging his official duty, prosecution is barred without a valid sanction; d) The alleged incident was enquired into through a judicial commission which exonerated the petitioner. Proceeding on the selfsame occurrence is wholly unwarranted; e) Petitioner was earlier arrayed as accused on the basis of the police report. The proceedings having been quashed by the High Court and confirmed by the Hon'ble Apex Court, no further prosecution can be launched; f) The prosecution being a vexatious one, continuation of the same would be a sheer abuse of process of court. In order to secure ends of justice, the proceeding is liable to be quashed. 2. The case has been instituted on the basis of a complaint petition. Allegations briefly are as follows: 3. One Mr. M.V. Raghavan was a Minister under the UDF Government in the State. Earlier he was an MLA from the CPI(M). On 25.11.1994, Mr. Raghavan was scheduled to visit Kuthuparamba for inaugurating the evening branch of Kuthuparamba Cooperative Urban Bank. DYFI, the students wing of CPI(M) decided to stage a demonstration before the Minister. At 12 noon, on the arrival of the Minister, there was a demonstration by the workers of DYFI. It is alleged that first accused talked with accused 2 to 5 and thereafter lathicharge was begun. DYFI, the students wing of CPI(M) decided to stage a demonstration before the Minister. At 12 noon, on the arrival of the Minister, there was a demonstration by the workers of DYFI. It is alleged that first accused talked with accused 2 to 5 and thereafter lathicharge was begun. At that time, the fifth accused, a police constable, fired his gun at Rajeevan, Vice President of DYFI, Kannur district who happens to be the brother of the complainant in Crl.M.C.2146/2004, as a result of which he died. The complainant filed a complaint on 24.3.1995 which was registered as CMP No.1327/95. The learned Magistrate, Kuthuparamba conducted enquiry under Section 202 and by order dated 16.7.2004 took cognizance of the offence punishable under Sections 302, 307 and 120B read with Section 34 I.P.C. and issued process against the petitioner and others which is being impugned here. 4. This case has a long history and chequered career. Before initiation of the proceedings, two F.I.Rs were lodged by the police against the CPI(M) and DYFI workers and some unidentifiable miscreants. Crime No.353/94 was registered under Sections 143, 147, 148, 332, 363, 324 and 307 read with Section 149 I.P.C. and Section 3(2)(e) of P.D.P.P. Act and Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act and Crime No.354/94 was registered under Sections 143, 147, 148, 427 and 307 read with Section 149 I.P.C. and under Section 3(2)(c) of the P.D.P.P. Act. Since the incident gave rise to public uproar and demand for judicial enquiry, the Government agreed to it and a commission of enquiry was set up. On 27.5.1997, after a detailed enquiry, commission submitted its report against three erring officials who were found responsible for the police firing. However, the petitioner was exonerated from all the accusations. The report of the commission was accepted by the Government and it was decided to take legal action against the delinquents. On the orders of the Director General of Police, the Inspector General of Police registered a case under Section 302 I.P.C. and other sections against three persons, namely, Mr. Raghavan, the Minister, Mr. Hakim Bathery, Superintendent of Police and Mr. T.T. Antony, the Deputy Collector-cum-Executive Magistrate. The case was registered as Crime No.268/97 and the DIG of Police was entrusted with the investigation. Raghavan, the Minister, Mr. Hakim Bathery, Superintendent of Police and Mr. T.T. Antony, the Deputy Collector-cum-Executive Magistrate. The case was registered as Crime No.268/97 and the DIG of Police was entrusted with the investigation. On 29.9.1998, the DIG filed an interim report before the learned Magistrate against 19 persons where the petitioner figured as one of the accused at Serial No.10. Later on, some time in 1999, two cases vide Crime Nos.353/94 and 354/94 registered earlier were closed. 5. Petitioner, assailing his implication, preferred O.P.24401/98. A learned single Judge of this Court by order dated 29.11.1999, while rejecting the prayer for quashing the FIR as well as the proceedings, allowed the alternative relief directing enquiry by the CBI. 6. The order of the learned single Judge was challenged by the petitioner in W.A.8/2000 before the Division Bench. The State also filed W.A.No.2709/99 against the petitioner. Besides these, two other accused persons also filed W.A.Nos.52/2000 and 200/2000. The Division Bench by the order dated 29.2.2000 quashed the FIR and the proceedings as against the petitioner. However, so far as the other accused persons are concerned, the direction was issued for a fresh investigation by any other senior police officer named in the judgment. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment of the Division Bench, three Special Leave Petitions were filed. Crl. Appeal Nos.690 and 691/2001 were preferred by the State against the petitioner, Crl. Appeal No.689/2001 and Crl. Appeal No.4066/2001 were preferred by the Deputy Collector cum Executive Magistrate and constables against whom fresh investigation was ordered. The Honourable Supreme Court by order dated 12.7.2001 confirmed the order of the Division Bench so far as the petitioner is concerned and accordingly the appeals filed by the State were dismissed. As regards the appeals relating to other accused persons, the judgment of Court was set aside and proceedings in Crime No.268/97 was quashed as the investigation in that case was illegal. It was further directed that the investigation in Crime Nos.353/97 and 354/97 be reopened and commence with leave of the Court and report under Section 173(8) Cr. P.C. be filed if it was warranted. 8. The petitioner in the above premises has invoked the extraordinary power of this Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash the order taking cognizance and issue of process against him. 9. P.C. be filed if it was warranted. 8. The petitioner in the above premises has invoked the extraordinary power of this Court under Section 482 Cr. P.C. to quash the order taking cognizance and issue of process against him. 9. From the evidence available on record, it is revealed that on 25.11.1994 there was Minister's programme which was scheduled to take place at Kuthuparamba. State had made security arrangements apprehending serious law and order situation on account of demonstration and agitation by the CPI(M) and DYFI workers. Petitioner who was the Assistant Superintendent of Police was deputed for the purpose. Superintendent of Police himself was also there. The Executive Magistrate was present at the spot to tackle any untoward situation. On the arrival of the Minister, there was hue and cry. The workers of DYFI present there started slogan and gradually it swelled into a huge congregation. It is alleged that at that time, police started lathicharge and subsequently there was firing. It appears from the impugned order that Cws.2, 4 and 16 have stated that accused 2 to 4 had given direction to the police to commence firing at the workers. There is no material to arrive at the conclusion as to who gave the firing order. There is absolutely no evidence from which it can be inferred that the order of firing was given by the petitioner. Be that as it may, the petitioner was deputed to the spot for maintaining law and order and for the safety and security of the Minister. His presence at the place of occurrence was on account of his official duty. The alleged action of the police was in discharge of his public duty. The alleged occurrence and the official duty are closely intertwined and are reasonably connected with each other. The petitioner is therefore protected under Section 197 Cr. P.C. 10. Admittedly, there is no sanction from the competent authority to launch prosecution against the petitioner. In the absence of a valid sanction, prosecution is hit under Section 197 Cr. P.C. The learned Magistrate has erred in holding that there was no material to show that the prosecution was not maintainable for lack of sanction. This finding is wholly erroneous. Once it is found that the petitioner was discharging his public duty, any action taken in course of the same is protected under law. P.C. The learned Magistrate has erred in holding that there was no material to show that the prosecution was not maintainable for lack of sanction. This finding is wholly erroneous. Once it is found that the petitioner was discharging his public duty, any action taken in course of the same is protected under law. The primary object of the legislation behind Section 197 is to protect the public officer who have acted in discharge of their duty. Legislature in their wisdom have put the embargo so that a public servant should not be put to vexatious criminal prosecution without the sanction from the competent authority. The Honourable Supreme Court in the decision reported in K.Kalimuthu v. State A.I.R. 2005 S.C.2257 has held that the bar enacted in Section 197 Cr. P.C. is absolute and complete. The mandatory character of the protection afforded to a public servant is brought out by the expression "no court shall take cognizance". Use of words "No" and "shall" make it clear that bar is absolute and also complete. The Honourable Apex Court in the decision reported in P. Arulswami v. State of Madras AIR 1967 S.C. 776 has laid down the above proposition. The only exception is, if the act complained of is too remote and totally unconnected with the official duties, the bar under Section 197 would not be attracted. The alleged occurrence, by no stretch of imagination, can be held to be unconnected with the official duty of the petitioner. 11. The act done even negligently would not cease to be an official act so as to deprive the public servant of the protection engrafted in Section 197 Cr. P.C. Even if a public servant acts in excess, yet there exists a reasonable connection with the official duty, the law protects him from the prosecution. It has been already held that the petitioner was deputed to the place of occurrence being entrusted with the official duty to maintain law and order and provide security to the Minister. This is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak (Kalimuthu v. State -A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 2257). 12. It is contended by the respondent that Section 197 does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed but it is only one of the defence available to the accused which he can raise at the appropriate time. 12. It is contended by the respondent that Section 197 does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed but it is only one of the defence available to the accused which he can raise at the appropriate time. This argument has been repelled by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case reported in Sankaran Moitra v. Sadhna Das (A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 1599) and held that prosecution hit by the provision cannot be launched without the contemplated sanction. 13. The facts in the reported case are almost identical to that of the present one. There a police officer in the course of his official duty went to the polling booth where voting was going on for the State Assembly. There was breach of law and order. Some miscreants were creating situation in the booth. In order to make the polling free and fair and prevent booth capturing, lathicharge was resorted to. Consequently, a person died. It was contended that the deceased was picked up and chosen for assault. He was beaten up at the instance of the accused. The Hon'ble Apex Court held that even if it would be held to be an offence still it was committed during the course of the performance of official duty and it would attract sanction. If in all cases one has to establish the necessity of sanction in the trial the provision would loose its effectiveness and purpose, thereby it would be reduced to mere dead letters. There being no sanction the impugned order taking cognizance is bad in law and is liable to be quashed. 14. Validity and prosperity of the order can be considered from the other perspective also. Admittedly, there is no accusation against the petitioner to have committed any overt act which constitute the offence of murder punishable under Section 302 or attempt to commit murder as defined under Section 307 IPC. All that the learned Magistrate has concluded that the evidence adduced by the complainant is to the effect that accused 2 to 5 had given direction to fire. There is no material to show that the petitioner has directed for firing. In the absence of such evidence, none of the offences are made out against the petitioner. In order to rope in the accused prosecution has taken the aid of Section 34 IPC. There is no material to show that the petitioner has directed for firing. In the absence of such evidence, none of the offences are made out against the petitioner. In order to rope in the accused prosecution has taken the aid of Section 34 IPC. There is no oral or documentary, direct or circumstantial evidence to infer common intention to commit the offences. It is well settled in law that mere presence along with others certainly not adequate to hold that he shared the common intention. Agitators, more particularly the victim, were not known to the petitioner. As there was no animosity, why the petitioner would intend to commit murder of anybody? Why he would aid in commission of the said offence? There is no evidence on this score, consequently the learned Magistrate has not whispered a word as to how the complicity of the petitioner in the commission of the murder in prima-facie established. 15. The petitioner hails from Andhra Pradesh and had joined the service only two days prior to the occurrence, thus he had no acquaintance with anybody. In obedience to the order of the superior authorities he had gone to the spot, therefore, the allegation that he connived with anybody or shared the common intention to commit murder is only a figment of imagination. Taking cognizance is not an empty formality but a sacrosanct act. Court has to apply his judicial mind in order to ascertain as to whether any offence is constituted or not. It appears from the impugned order that when Mr. Raghavan, the accused No.1, reached Town Hall talking with accused Nos. 2 to 5 and gave some direction and thereafter lathi charge was started. There is no evidence as to what was the subject matter of the talk and what direction he had stated to have given. Bald statement that accused No.1 talked with accused Nos. 2 to 5 and lathi charge was made is as vague as anything. From this statement no culpability can be attached to the petitioner for commission of any offence far less to array him for committing murder. If at all, first accused directed accused 2 to 5 and lathi charge was resorted to, how the complaint could be dismissed as against first accused? The learned Magistrate has categorically concluded that there was no conspiracy and therefore no offence under Section 120-B IPC was made out. If at all, first accused directed accused 2 to 5 and lathi charge was resorted to, how the complaint could be dismissed as against first accused? The learned Magistrate has categorically concluded that there was no conspiracy and therefore no offence under Section 120-B IPC was made out. There is no whisper that any direction was given by the petitioner for firing. Taking the entire evidence available on record into consideration, the conclusion is irresistible that no offence whatsoever is made out against the petitioner. The impugned order is the outcome of non application of mind. Order being devoid of any merit, the same should be quashed. 16. Immediately after the occurrence a judicial commission was set up to probe into the matter. During the course of enquiry, no evidence showing the involvement of the petitioner could be unearthed. The commission recorded a categorical finding in favour of the petitioner and accordingly he was given a clean chit. Subsequently, the DIG who was investigating the crime against the other persons filed an interim report before the learned Magistrate implicating the petitioner. The FIR and the proceedings were challenged before this Court. A Division Bench of this Court quashed the proceedings. State carried the matter to the Hon'ble Supreme Court, but the Hon'ble Apex Court upheld and confirmed the order quashing the proceedings. It is true that, while considering the legality of the order, taking cognizance of the material available in this proceedings should only be looked at. But, in the instant case, the judgment of this Court and of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cannot be ignored. This Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that the proceedings relating to the self same allegation with regard to the very same occurrence has been quashed. In my considered opinion, continuation of the proceedings against the petitioner would be an abuse of process of Court. In that view of the matter, these petitions are allowed quashing the complaints, orders and all further proceedings as against the petitioner in C.P.Nos.112, 113 & 115/2004 pending on the file of the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, Kuthuparamba.