JUDGMENT Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Talapatra 1. Heard Mr. S.K. Datta, learned counsel, appearing for the appellant as well as Mr. P. Goutam, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent No. 2. None appears for the respondent No. 1, even though the notice was issued by the registered post on 15.11.2011, neither the registered post was returned undelivered nor the A.D was received. In view of this, the service is deemed to have completed. 2. The grievance of the appellant that by the impugned Judgment and Order dated 21.07.2010, the learned Tribunal has without recording any evidence dismissed the claim but holding that claimant has failed to substantiate the claim. 3. Mr. S.K. Datta, learned counsel for the appellant making a reference to the finding of the learned Tribunal submits that the impugned order is perverse and the impugned order stands contrary to the object of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. 4. Mr. P. Goutam, learned counsel resisted such proposition and referring to the Paragraph 7 of the impugned order where it has been recorded that as many as 13 dates were posted for adducing evidence, but the claimant did not produce any evidence, submits that the learned Tribunal is not supposed to afford endless opportunity for adducing the evidence in support of the claim. The impugned order is not flawed by illegality or irregularity. 5. Be that as it may, even if the claimants-appellants had not adduced the evidence on having provided with sufficient opportunities, the learned Tribunal ought not have dismissed the claim on merit rather would have adjourned the case sine die. The subject matter of the M.V. Act, 1988 and its own terms are so distinct from the general provisions of the C.P.C. 6. The general maxim is, generalia specialbus non derogant i.e. general provisions will not abrogate special provisions. In Baker v. Edger (1898) A.C. 748, 754 (PC) it is held : When the legislature has given its attention to separate subject and made provision for it, the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provision unless it manifests the intention very clearly. Each enactment must be construed in that respect according to its own subject matter and its own terms. Each enactment must be construed in that respect according to its own subject matter and its own terms. Crais on Statute law (7th Sweet & Maxwell Edition, 1971) observes: In Garnett vs. Bradly (1878) 3 AC 944, 950 after discussing and approving the opinion of Turner L.J upon the same subject, given in Hawkins v. Gathercole (1855) 6 De G.M. and G.I), Lord Haterley put the rule thus : 'An Act directed towards a special object or special class or objects will not be repealed by subsequent general Act embracing its generality those particular objects, unless some reference be made, directly or by necessary inference, to the preceding Special Act. Section 140, 163A or 166 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 have been designed to benefit a special category of persons who are victims of accident occurred from use of the motor vehicle. The object is obviously to ensure benefits in the form of compensation, not to deprive that benefit. Any construction to circumvent the object, would only frustrate the very purpose of the enactment. The subject-matter of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 and its terms are construed differently. Order XVII, Rule 3 C.P.C. stipulates : 3. Court may proceed not withstanding either party fails to produce evidence, etc. - where any party to a suit whom time has been granted fails to produce his evidence, or to cause the attendance of his witnesses, or to perform any other act necessary to the further progress of the suit, for which time has been allowed. The Court not withstanding such default - (a) If the parties are present, proceed to decide the suit forthwith, or (b) If the parties are, or any of them is, absent proceed, under Rule 2. 7. By the provisions of Rule 2, Order XVII C.P.C., the Court may proceed to dispose of the suit in one of the modes directed in that behalf by order IX or make such other Order as it think fit. 8. The Tribunal may also compel attendance of the claimant/s in appropriate cases, as the witnesses rather posting dates in the routine manner. In extreme cases, adjournment since die would be availed of as the alternative possible step. Disposal on merit without recording the evidence is contrary to the M.V. Act, 1988, the C.P.C. being the general law cannot eclipse the provisions of a special enactment like the M.V. Act, 1988. In extreme cases, adjournment since die would be availed of as the alternative possible step. Disposal on merit without recording the evidence is contrary to the M.V. Act, 1988, the C.P.C. being the general law cannot eclipse the provisions of a special enactment like the M.V. Act, 1988. Provisions of Order 17, Rule 3, CPC will not apply, as those do not fit in the scheme of the M.V. Act, 1988, in the tribunal proceeding initiated for adjudicating the claims of those category of persons as stated. 9. In view of the above, the impugned judgment and order is set aside. 10. It is made clear that the learned Tribunal after receipt of this order shall fix the date for recording of the evidence for the claimant as well as for the opposite parties in the proceeding being T.S. (MAC) 284 of 2006. 11. The claimant-appellant shall adduce their evidence on that day without any fail. 12. The appeal is allowed. 13. No order as to cost. Appeal allowed