Judgment R.C. Mishra, J.- By this common order, the following interlocutory applications based on identical facts and involving common question of law are being disposed of - (i) I.A. No.740/11 in EA. No.206/92 and LA. No.741/11 in F.A. No.252/ 92 under Order XXII Rule 4 & 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'the Code') for substitution of legal representatives of respondent nos.2 to 5 and also for deletion of respondent no.1, who has died issueless. (ii) I.A. No.745/11 in EA. No.206/92 and I.A. No.742/11 in F.A. No.252/ 92 under Order XXII Rule 9 read with Section 151 of the Code for setting aside abatement and (iii) I.A. No.747/11 in F.A. No.206/92 and I.A. No.743/11 in EA. No.252/ 92, under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for condonation of delay in filing the aforesaid IAs. 2. These appeals are interlinked as preferred against a common judgment and decree passed on 22.10.92 by First Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Sehore at Ashta in Civil Suit Nos.1-A/83 and 5-A/82. By that judgment - (a) Civil Suit No.1-A/83 instituted as early as on 7.4.69 by appellant no.1 Misriya (since dead) & others against the Chouthibai & others for declarations that (i) the property in suit was their joint family property and (ii) the sale-deed executed on 15.2.69 by Chouthibai in favour of Daryao Singh, Ranjit Singh, Ajju Khan and Jorawar Singh (impleaded in both the appeals as respondent nos.2 to 5 respectively) was null and void, was dismissed and (b) Civil Suit No.5-A/82 filed as early as 26.4.68 by Chouthibai and others against Misriya and others for possession and mesne profits was decreed and the appellants were directed to hand over possession of the lands to Daryao Singh, Ranjit Singh, Ajju Khan and Jorawar Singh and to pay mesne profits @ Rs.4,000/- per month w.e.f. 17.9.75. 3. According to the appellants - Although, the counsel representing the respondents communicated information regarding deaths of respondent nos.1 to 5 by way of application (I.A, No.12725/08 in F.A. No.206/92) cm 7.11.08 yet, copy thereof was served upon their counsel on 5.1.11 only. Being rustic villagers, they had no information regarding deaths of respondents, who were not their co-villagers and further, they had no knowledge of the Court's procedure. 4. Being rustic villagers, they had no information regarding deaths of respondents, who were not their co-villagers and further, they had no knowledge of the Court's procedure. 4. Prayers for condonation of delay and setting aside the abatement have been vehemently opposed on the ground of absence of sufficient cause. The proposed legal representatives of respondent no.2 have further pointed out that being natives of nearby village, the appellants are not expected to be ignorant about death of as many as 5 respondents during a considerable period of 12 years. According to them, the assertion that copy of the I.A. containing information regarding deaths of respondent nos.1 to 5 was supplied to the previous counsel, even if assumed to be true, would not be of any significance in absence of declaration that entire file of the case was not handed over to the present counsel. 5. No dispute has been raised by the appellants in respect of the contents of I.A. No.l2725/08.suggesting that - (a) Respondent no.1 Kishandas expired in the year 1999. (b) Respondent no.2 Daryao Singh died on 21/5/1999. (c) Respondent no.3 Ranjit Singh died on 8/8/1999. (d) Respondent no.4 Ajju Khan died in the year 2004. (e) Respondent no.5 Jorawar Singh died in the year 2000. Consequently, the appeals stood automatically abated as against the respective respondent upon expiry of period of 90 days from the date of his death. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants has urged that in the facts and circumstances of the case, ignorance of the deaths of the respondents should be held as sufficient cause. Placing reliance on decision of Supreme Court in Sital Prasad v. Union of India ( AIR 1985 SC 1 ) and that of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Dolatram v. Kishan 1999 (2) MPLJ 620 , he has strenuously contended that the expression 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act and in sub-Rule (3) of Rule 9 of Order 22 of the CPC should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice particularly when the appellants had given a reasonably plausible explanation for the delay. 7. 7. In response, learned counsel for the proposed legal representatives has submitted that the appellants have not been able to furnish satisfactory explanation for such an inordinate delay in making a prayer for setting aside the abatement of appeals even after being informed about the deaths of respondents by way of I.A. No.12725/08 as back as on 7.11.08. He is further of the view that since a valuable right has accrued to the legal representatives due to negligence or inaction on the part of the appellants, it should not be defeated by condoning delay in a causal manner. To buttress the contention, reference has been made to the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh AIR 2010 SC 3043 and re-affirmed in Lanka Venkateswarlu v. State of U.P. AIR 2011 SC 1199 to the effect that even though the Courts have power to condone the delay, condonation without any justification would result in rendering the provisions contained in the Limitation Act redundant and inoperative. 8. The first question to be considered is as to whether the appellants were prevented by any sufficient cause from continuing the suit ? 9. A bare perusal of the records would expose the following features - (a) A period of more than 11 years has expired after the deaths of respondent nos.1 to 3 and 5 whereas death of respondent no.4 had taken place in the year 2004. (b) Both the appeals, registered as F.A. Nos.206/92 and 252/92, were dismissed on 29/8/2005 for want of prosecution and EA. No.252/92 was restored vide order-dated 6/1/2006 passed in MCC No.2518/05 and the other one was restored vide order-dated 28/6/2008 passed in MCC No.2031/05. Both the restoration applications were presented and argued by the present counsel. Although none of the Vakalatnamas bears any date yet, the aforesaid facts clearly suggest that the present counsel were engaged by the appellants somewhere in the year 2005. (c) In accordance with the prevailing practice, I.A. No. 12725/08 appears to have been presented on 7.11.08 only after serving copy thereof on the opposite counsel and the corresponding acknowledgment was made by the present counsel and not by the earlier advocate appointed by the appellants. (d) On 4/9/2008, observing that none of the parties was represented in EA. (c) In accordance with the prevailing practice, I.A. No. 12725/08 appears to have been presented on 7.11.08 only after serving copy thereof on the opposite counsel and the corresponding acknowledgment was made by the present counsel and not by the earlier advocate appointed by the appellants. (d) On 4/9/2008, observing that none of the parties was represented in EA. No.206/92, direction was given to issue SPCs to them for final hearing on a date to be fixed by the office and the SPCs issued to respondent nos.2 to 5 were returned unserved on 03.11.2008 with the report that they had expired: 10. In Sital Prasad's case (supra), Mahendra Kumar claiming to be one of the, sons of late Sital Prasad Saxena, who had expired in the year 1976, had moved the application for setting aside the abatement along with an ' application for condonation of delay in filing the same in the year 1978 Observing that in a traditional rural family the father may not have informed his son about the litigation and further that rules of procedure are designed to advance justice and should be so interpreted and not to make them penal statutes for punishing erring parties, the Supreme Court proceeded to set aside the order passed by the High Court. Following the ruling, a single Bench of this Court in Daulat Ram's case (above) condoned the delay in moving application for setting aside the abatement, considering the facts that (a) for the first time, the appellant had come to know about the requirement of law to bring the LRs of the deceased-respondents, who had expired on 27.7.93 and 8.8.93, by way of a letter sent to him by his counsel on 30.7.96 and (b) the application was filed on 3.8.96. 11. However, the facts of the present appeals are clearly distinguishable. In the light of the circumstances as highlighted above, it can safely be presumed that the information with regard to deaths of respondent nos.l to 5 had come within the knowledge of the appellants in the year 2008 whereas applications for condonation of delay and setting aside the abatement have been filed on 14.01.2011. 12. In the light of the circumstances as highlighted above, it can safely be presumed that the information with regard to deaths of respondent nos.l to 5 had come within the knowledge of the appellants in the year 2008 whereas applications for condonation of delay and setting aside the abatement have been filed on 14.01.2011. 12. While construing the words 'sufficient cause', Raghubar Dayal J., speaking for a three-Judge Bench in Union of India v. Ram Charan AIR 1964 SC 215 , made the following illuminating observations - "Of course, the Court, in considering whether the appellant has established sufficient cause for his not continuing the suit in time or for not applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time, need not be over-strict in expecting such proof of the suggested cause as it would accept for holding certain fact established, both because the question does not relate to the merits of the dispute between the parties and because if the abatement is set aside, the merits of the dispute can be determined while, if the abatement is not set aside, the appellant is deprived of his proving his claim on account of his culpable negligence or lack of vigilance. This, however, does not mean that the Court should readily accept whatever the appellant alleges to explain away his default. It has to scrutinize it and would be fully justified in considering the merits of the evidence led to establish the cause for the appellant's default in applying within time for the impleading of the legal representatives of the deceased or for setting aside the abatement. It is true that it is no duty of the appellant to make regular enquiries from time to time about the health or existence of the respondent, but it does not mean that the mere fact of the appellant's coming to know of the respondent's death belatedly will, by itself, justify his application for setting aside the abatement. That is not the law. Rule 9 of 0. XXII of the Code requires the plaintiff to prove that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from continuing the suit. The mere allegation about his not coming to know of the death of the opposite party is not sufficient. That is not the law. Rule 9 of 0. XXII of the Code requires the plaintiff to prove that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from continuing the suit. The mere allegation about his not coming to know of the death of the opposite party is not sufficient. He had to state reasons which, according to him, led to his not knowing of the death of the defendant within reasonable time and to establish those reasons to the satisfaction of the Court, specially when the correctness of those reasons is challenged by the legal representatives of the deceased who have secured a valuable right on the abatement of the suit. (Emphasis supplied) 13. Adverting to the facts of the case, it is difficult to conceive that the appellants were not in touch with their present advocates from 2008 onwards. If not every week, they were expected to contact their lawyers once in a year. There is nothing on record to indicate as to when the intimation given by learned counsel for the respondents regarding the deaths was communicated by the appellants by their Counsel. It is also well settled that ignorance of legal consequence without something more would be not sufficient to condone such a huge delay (Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao AIR 2009 SC 2907 relied on). 14. Upon conspectus of all the leading decisions on the subject, the Supreme Court, in Balwant Singh's case (supra), has opined - "delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory provisions mandate that applications for condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner". In that case, the Court quoted with approval the following observations made in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361 - . Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner". In that case, the Court quoted with approval the following observations made in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR 1962 SC 361 - . "It is however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be-dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration;..." Reiterating the principle in Lanka Venkateswarlu's case (supra), which related to delay attributable to inefficiency and ineptitude of Government pleaders, the Supreme Court has observed that - "Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court do not enjoy unlimited, and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially , judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay". 15. The true legal position, therefore, is that the words "sufficient cause" in Section 5 of Limitation Act and Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice only when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant. 16. 16. In Balwant Singh's case (ibid), the ground raised for condonation of delay of over two years in applying for setting aside the abatement was found not only insufficient but also unbelievable. Similar is the situation here. 17. Conduct of the appellants in not taking timely steps for bringing the legal representatives of the respondent nos.2 to 5 within a reasonable period after their, respective deaths as well as in not bothering to move applications for condonation of delay & for setting aside the abatement is sufficient to infer gross negligence and deliberate inaction on their part. 18. Thus, viewed from any angle, the explanation given for the delay in filing the applications for setting aside the abatement does not deserve acceptance. The question formulated above is answered in the negative. 19. Now, the other aspect that has to be considered is whether each one of the appeals has abated as a whole on the deaths of the respondents as their legal representatives were not brought on record in time ? 20. In appeal, nature of abatement will have to be decided not upon the nature of relief involved in the suit but upon the nature of relief awarded by the decree appealed against. 21. As indicated already, these appeals have been preferred against a common judgment dismissing the Civil Suit filed by Misriya and others for declaration of title in respect of the suit lands and annulment of sale-deed in question and decreeing the suit filed by Chouthibai and others for possession and mesne profits in favour of respondent nos.2 to 5 (since dead). In such a situation, both the appeals must be held to have abated in-toto (Babu Sukhram Singh v. Ram Dular Singh AIR 1973 SC 204 followed). 22. In the result, the applications for condonation of delay as well as the applications for setting aside the abatement are hereby dismissed. The other I.As for substitution of legal representatives of respondent nos.2 to 5 also stand rejected as rendered redundant. 23. As an obvious consequence, both the appeals are hereby dismissed as abated. However, in the facts of the case, there shall be no orders as to costs. . 24. A copy of this order be retained in the connected appeal. Appeal dismissed.