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2012 DIGILAW 580 (JHR)

Makruddin Ansari @ Makruddin Mia v. State of Jharkhand

2012-04-16

H.C.MISHRA

body2012
Judgment Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel for the State. 2. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 31.08.2010 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, F.T.C.-II, Dhanbad in S.T. No. 314 of 2009 whereby, the application filed under Section 227 of Cr.P.C. by the petitioner for discharge was rejected by the Court below and the petitioner was directed to be present in the Court for framing of the charge. 3. It appears that the petitioner has been made accused for the offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code in Tundi P.S. Case No. 64/2006 corresponding to G.R. No. 3050/2006, and there is direct allegation against the petitioner and the other accused to have committed gang rape upon the informant. In the F.I.R. itself, it is mentioned that prior to the occurrence, there was some altercation between the parties also due to which this occurrence had taken place. However, the fact remains that the alleged occurrence is of the night of 17.09.2006 whereas, the fardbeyan about the occurrence was given on 26.09.2006. It also appears that for the earlier occurrence also, information was given in the police station. The impugned order shows that after investigation the police had submitted the chargesheet against the accused persons only for the offences under Sections 323, 324, 452, 354/34 of the Indian Penal Code and had not submitted the chargesheet for the offence under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and the cognizance was also taken by the Court below accordingly, and the trial was conducted in the Court of Magistrate. It appears that in course of the trial, three witnesses were examined who were the victim, the husband of the victim and the mother-in-law of the victim and all of them deposed in their evidence that rape was committed upon the victim by the accused persons, whereupon, the case was committed to the Court of Session. The petitioner filed application under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., for discharge which was rejected by the Court below by the impugned order dated 31.08.2010. 4. The petitioner filed application under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C., for discharge which was rejected by the Court below by the impugned order dated 31.08.2010. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned order passed by the Court below is absolutely illegal, inasmuch as, the court below has not taken into consideration the fact that after investigation the charge sheet was filed only for the offence under Sections 323, 324, 452, 354/34 of the Indian Penal Code and only on the basis of the evidence adduced by the victim, mother-in-law of the victim and her husband, the Court has found the material against the petitioner for framing the charge under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and has rejected the prayer. 5. Leaned counsel for the petitioner has placed the reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Dilawar Babu Kurane V. Sate of Maharashta, reported in AIR 2002 SC 564 , wherein it has been held that the Court cannot act merely as a post office and mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of evidence and documents produced before Court, but at the same time, should not make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if it was conducting a trial. 6. Learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Bhaiyamiyan @ Jardar Khan & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in AIR 2011 SC 2218 , wherein after full-fledged trial, in the facts of the case where there was delay of 60 hours in lodging the F.I.R. by the prosecutrix, it was found that the explanation for delay was not believable, and accordingly, the accused was acquitted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in the present case the delay is of nine days in lodging the F.I.R. which has not been explained and accordingly, in view of the law laid down in Bhaiyamiyan @ Jardar Khan’s case (supra), the case of the prosecution cannot succeed and, accordingly, it is a fit case for discharge, but the Court below without considering these aspects has illegally dismissed the application filed under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C. 7. After having heard learned counsel for the petitioner and upon going through the record, I find that the decision cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Bhaiyamiyan @ Jardar Khan’s case (supra), is not at all applicable to this case at this stage, inasmuch as, in the said case after full-fledged trial, the Apex Court had come to the conclusion on the basis of the evidence available, that the prosecution had not been able to explain for delay and had acquitted the accused. But in the present case the petitioner has not faced the trial and at this stage, without looking at the evidence which may come in trial, it cannot be said that the delay in lodging the F.I.R. is fatal to the prosecution in the present case also. The stage of applying the precedence in Bhaiyamiyan @ Jardar Khan’s case (supra), to the facts of this case, has not yet reached in the present case. 8. From the impugned order it appears that the Court below has taken into consideration the allegation in the FIR, material available in the case diary and the evidence of the three witnesses recorded by the learned Magistrate in the Court and has rejected the application filed by the petitioner under section 227 of the Cr.P.C., as there were materials to show that rape was committed on the victim by the petitioner also, and the petitioner was directed to appear in the Court for framing of the charge. 9. I do not find any illegality and/or irregularity in the impugned order worth interference in the revisional jurisdiction. There is no merit in this petition and the same is hereby, dismissed.