Judgment Dev Darshan Sud, J. 1. This petition has been preferred by the respondent-tenant against concurrent findings of the two Courts below allowing the petition of the landlord, respondent herein, instituted under Section 24 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the `Act’) ordering ejectment of the tenant, petitioner herein, from the suit premises. 2. The respondent, who was the landlord, preferred the petition on the pleadings that the petitioner herein was the tenant in the premises, in House No.152, Ward No.II, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur, consisting of three rooms, kitchen, bathroom, varandha. These were rented out to late Shri Kamal Thakur (who is now represented in appeal by his legal heirs) in the year 1972 for a monthly rent of Rs.35/- per month by the predecessor-in-interest of the landlord. The pleading was that the landlord requires these premises for his own bonafide use and occupation. The second allegation was that the tenant was in arrears of rent since 1.4.1997 at the rate of Rs.46/- per month. This amount was claimed on the pleading that since the tenancy was created in the year 1972, on the basis of statutory increase permissible under the Rent Act, the arrear was to be calculated from the date as pleaded at the rate of 46/-per month. 3. The petitioner-landlord pleaded that he has not vacated any premises within a period of five years preceding the institution of the eviction petition and that these premises are required by him since he wants to settle there and requires it for his bonafide use and occupation. His grand-children are studying in Paonta Sahib and his son has also started business there. 4. The petition was resisted by the tenant, petitioner herein, on the ground that the landlord does not require these premises bonafide. Earlier another petition had been instituted by the landlord, respondent herein, for eviction which was dismissed and which order was upheld by this Court. On the pleadings, two issues were settled. First was on the question of arrears of rent and the second on the question of bonafide use. Both issues were taken up and decided together by the learned Rent Controller holding in favour of the petitioner-landlord. 5. On the evidence, identity and area of the premises was not disputed. On the pleadings, two issues were settled. First was on the question of arrears of rent and the second on the question of bonafide use. Both issues were taken up and decided together by the learned Rent Controller holding in favour of the petitioner-landlord. 5. On the evidence, identity and area of the premises was not disputed. The pleading of the petitioner-landlord was that he had six sons namely, Sant Ram, Deepak, Daulat Ram, Ramesh, Raju Ram constituting a joint family. In evidence he states that he was residing at Paonta Sahib after taking premises on rent from one Promila Sharma at the rate of Rs.1500/-per month. He stated that he required this accommodation as his grand-daughters and grand son are studied in DAV and Government Girls Senior Secondary School, Paonta Sahib. Both the grand-daughters Bindu and Anju were residing with him. His grandson was also residing with him and was admitted in DAV School. He stated that earlier he had filed an eviction petition which was dismissed on technical grounds. PW-4 Sant Ram son of the petitioner stated that he was carrying on the business of selling vegetables etc. Anju Bala, his daughter, is studying in plus two in Government Girls School and residing with the grand-father (petitioner-landlord). PW-5 Deepak Sharma (son of the landlord) stated that the petitioner’s family was joint of which the petitioner was the head. His daughter Kiran Sharma was studying in Government Girls School, Paonta Sahib in plus two section and was residing with the petitioner-landlord. PW-2 Siya Ram Sharma stated that petitioner and his wife were residing as tenants with them at a rental of Rs.1500/-per month. He proved on record Ex.PW-2/A, which is the rent deed. PW-1 Shri J.P. Sharma, who was the Principal, proved on record Ex.PW-1/A and Ex.PW-1/B certificates testifying that Anju Bala and Bindu were studying in the Government Girls Senior Secondary School in Paonta Sahib. PW-6 Vivek Aggarwal stated that Arun Sharma son of Sant Ram was studying in DAV School, Paonta Sahib. He proved on record certificate Ex.PW-6/A stating that Master Arun Sharma was student of second standard. 6. The respondent examined himself and submitted his affidavit Ex.R-1. He stated that the earlier eviction petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed and the certificates showing that the grand children of the landlord were studying in the School were manipulated. He denied that no rent etc. 6. The respondent examined himself and submitted his affidavit Ex.R-1. He stated that the earlier eviction petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed and the certificates showing that the grand children of the landlord were studying in the School were manipulated. He denied that no rent etc. had been paid. He stated in his affidavit that the earlier petition was moved at a stage when the petitioner was not its owner, he is a contractor and having permanent business in Jubbal, his land and shops are situated in village Kando Bhatnol, where he was residing with his family members permanently. He was cross-examined at length. The point urged before the learned Rent Controller was that the petition was barred by the principles of res judicata as the earlier petition on the same ground was rejected by learned Rent Controller and judgment affirmed by this Court. It was urged that the requirement was not bonafide but it was mere whim of the landlord. The learned Rent Controller relying upon the decision of N.R. Narayan Swamy v. B.Francis Jagan, (2001)6 SCC 473 , held that the petition was maintainable and was not barred by the principles of res judicata. In order to arrive at this conclusion, the learned Court relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Narayan Swamy’s case and of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Textile Trading Syndicate vs. G.Lakshminarayana and others, 2002(1) RCR 489. The Court also held on the precedent in Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar (Mrs.) vs. Traders & Agencies and another, (1996)5 SCC 344 and Raghunath G.Panhale (Dead) by LRs vs. Chaganlal Sundarji and Co., (1999)8 SCC 1 that requirement of the landlord was bonafide and was not a mere whim. 7. Appeal preferred by the tenant against the order of eviction was on two counts (a) arrears of rent up to 30.11.2002 and (b) bonafide requirement. On the first issue learned appellate Court held that no order could be passed. On the second aspect, the learned appellate Court held against the tenant holding that the petition was not barred by the principle of res judicata and on the evidence on record it was established that the petitioner-landlord required the premises bonafide for his occupation as his grand daughters and grand son were studying in Paonta Sahib and the landlord was residing in tenanted premises. The tenant is now in revision before this Court. 8. The tenant is now in revision before this Court. 8. It is urged by learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-tenant that the principles of res judicata were squarely applicable to the facts of the present case and that the petition was barred. 9. Adverting to the judgment of this Court in CR No.331 of 1998, decided on 16th March, 2001, which had been preferred by the landlord against the present petitioner for ejectment, the petition was instituted in September 2, 1996 on the grounds that (i) he required the disputed premises for his own occupation, (ii) there was non-payment of rent by the tenant and (iii) the tenant (Petitioner herein) had effected alterations in the suit premises without the consent of the landlord materially impairing the value of the property. On the question of alterations, there was no evidence on the record and ejectment decree was not granted. On the other two grounds, that is, bonafide requirement and arrears of rent, the learned Rent Controller held that the requirement of the landlord was bonafide and that he wanted the suit premises for his own residence so that he can get his grand children admitted in School(s). The learned Rent Controller also held against the landlord on the question of arrears of rent. 10. In the appeal preferred, the appellate Authority, on re-appreciating the material on record, held that the evidence was not sufficient to establish the bonafide requirement of the landlord on the ground that his grand children and six sons were residing with him or they were depending upon him and concluded that the requirement of the landlord was not such which would entitle him for an order of eviction under subsection 3 of Section 14. The age of the sons, grandson and daughters was also not established on the record on which ground the petition was dismissed being devoid of evidence on the issue. 11. In revision before this Court, it was urged that the petition was required to be dismissed outright in terms of the ratio of the judgment in Vijay Kapoor and another vs. Maya Ram, (1997)2 Sim.L.J.1174, wherein it was held that there was no full and fair disclosure of all material particulars on record. Hon’ble the Chief Justice Shri C.K. Thakkar, rejected this contention holding that there is difference between material facts’ and `material particulars’. Hon’ble the Chief Justice Shri C.K. Thakkar, rejected this contention holding that there is difference between material facts’ and `material particulars’. Hon’ble Chief Justice then held that the appellate Authority was correct in observing that the requirement of the landlord will include the requirement of family members. However, on merits it was held that the evidence did not establish age of the grand children, the fact that of the School(s) where they were studying in Paonta Sahib and whether they were residing with the landlord. The revision petition was, therefore, dismissed holding that it was a mere desire on the part of the landlord. This is the judgment which is now pressed to support the ground of res judicata. 12. On the first point urged of res judicata, the Supreme Court in Narayan Swamy’s case holds:- “6. In our view, the High Court ought to have considered the fact that in eviction proceedings under the Rent Act the ground of bona fide requirement or non-payment of rent is a recurring cause and, therefore, landlord is not precluded from instituting fresh proceeding. In an eviction suit on the ground of bona fide requirement the genuineness of the said ground is to be decided on the basis of requirement on the date of the suit. Further, even if a suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement is filed and is dismissed it cannot be held that once a question of necessity is decided against the landlord he will not have a bona fide and genuine necessity ever in future. In the subsequent proceedings, if such claim is established by cogent evidence adduced by the landlord, decree for possession could be passed. (Re: K.S. Sundararaju Chettiar v. M.R. Ramachandra Naidu, (1994)5 SCC 14 (para 10) and Surajmal v. Radhe Shyam, (1988) 3 SCC 18: 10.The aforesaid rule would have no application in a proceeding initiated for recovering the suit premises on the ground of bona fide requirement which is a recurring cause. Order XXIII, Rule 1(4)(b) precludes the plaintiff from instituting any fresh suit in respect of such subject matter or such part of the claim which the plaintiff has withdrawn. In a suit for eviction of a tenant under the Rent Act on the ground of bona fide requirement even though the premises remains the same, the subject matter which is cause of action may be different. In a suit for eviction of a tenant under the Rent Act on the ground of bona fide requirement even though the premises remains the same, the subject matter which is cause of action may be different. The ground for eviction in the subsequent proceedings is based upon requirement on the date of the said suit even though it relates to the same property. Dealing with similar contention in Vallabh Das v. Dr.Madanlal, (1970) 1 SCC 761 this Court observed thus: (SCC p.763 para 5) "The expression "subject-matter" is not defined in the Civil Procedure Code. It does not mean property. That expression has a reference to a right in the property which the plaintiff seeks to enforce. That expression includes the cause of action and the relief claimed. Unless the cause of action and the relief claimed in the second suit are the same as in the first suit, it cannot be said that the subject-matter of the second suit is the same as that in the previous suit." 11. The Court further observed that the mere identity of some of the issues in two suits would not bring about identity of the subject matter in two suits. 12. In this view of the matter, in our view it is not necessary to decide the further contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the Rent Act is a self-contained Code and the provisions of CPC as a whole are not applicable to the proceedings under the Rent Act.” (pp.475-477) 13. In Pawan Kumar Gupta vs. Rochiram Nagdeo, (1999)4 SCC 243 , the Supreme Court ruled:- 10. The reasoning adopted by the learned single Judge for rejecting the plea of res judicata is the following : "Since the suit itself was dismissed, the appellant was not aggrieved and he had no right of appeal. Under such circumstances there could be no question of application of principles of res judicata. A successful defendant is not bound by any adverse finding against him in a suit, for the reason, it cannot file an appeal against that finding. This principle is firmly in the saddle." 11.To reach the said conclusion learned single Judge relied on the decisions in Waris Khan v. Ahmadullakhan, AIR 1952 Nag 238 and Firm Kanhaiyalal Mohanlal Somani v. Paramsukh, AIR 1956 Nag 273. This principle is firmly in the saddle." 11.To reach the said conclusion learned single Judge relied on the decisions in Waris Khan v. Ahmadullakhan, AIR 1952 Nag 238 and Firm Kanhaiyalal Mohanlal Somani v. Paramsukh, AIR 1956 Nag 273. 16.The rule of res judicata incorporated in S. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) prohibits the Court from trying an issue which "has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties," and has been heard and finally decided by that Court. It is the decision on an issue, and not a mere finding on any incidental question to reach such decision, which operates as res judicata. It is not correct to say that the party has no right of appeal against such a decision on an issue though the suit was ultimately recorded as dismissed. The decree was not in fact against the plaintiff in that first suit, but was in his favour as shown above. There was no hurdle in law for the defendant to file an appeal against the judgment and decree in that first suit as he still disputed those decisions on such contested issues. 19.Thus the second legal position is this : If dismissal of the prior suit was on a ground affecting the maintainability of the suit any finding in the judgment adverse to the defendant would not operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit. But if dismissal of the suit was on account of extinguishment of the cause of action or any other similar cause a decision made in the suit on a vital issue involved therein would operate as res judicata in a subsequent suit between the same parties. It is for the defendant in such a suit to choose whether the judgment should be appealed against or not. If he does not choose to file the appeal he cannot thereby avert the bar of res judicata in the subsequent suit. (pp.247-250) 14. Adverting to the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Textile Trading’s case (supra), (considered by two Courts below), the Court holds:- “8. … … … … …The main contention of the tenants which found favour by the learned Rent Controller was the maintainability of the second eviction petition in view of the bar imposed under Section 16 of the Act. … … … … …The main contention of the tenants which found favour by the learned Rent Controller was the maintainability of the second eviction petition in view of the bar imposed under Section 16 of the Act. Section 16 of the Act dealing with decision which have become final not to be reopened reads as follows:- “The Controller shall summarily reject any application under sub-section (2), or subsection (3) of Section 10 or under Section 12 which raises between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, substantially the same issues as have been finally decided or as purport to have been finally decided, in a former proceeding under this Act or under any law corresponding thereto in force at the relevant time prior to the commencement of this Act.” In the decision referred (1) supra, it was held that the test to determine whether a issue was directly or substantially in issue in earlier proceeding or collateral or incidental is that if the issue was necessary to be decided for adjudicating on the principal issue and so decided, it would have to be treated as directly and substantially in issue and if it is clear that the judgment was in fact based upon that decision, then it would be res judicata in a latter case. It is not in dispute that there is sufficient gap of time between the disposal of the first eviction petition and the present eviction petition and by passage of time there will be several changed circumstances as had been deposed by the Ist landlord on behalf of his family. It is no doubt ture there is no evidence available on record, but the best person to speak about the bona fide personal requirement of the family including that of his sons will be the father and hence the Courts below on appreciation of evidence and taking into consideration several aspects like sons getting experience and undergoing training for running cloth business, felt that the bona fide personal requirement of the landlords had been established. … … …” … … …(pp.492-493) 15. … … …” … … …(pp.492-493) 15. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the case was clearly barred by the principle of res judicata and the second petition for eviction could not be instituted for the reasons that the petitioner herein was re-agitating a case on facts which had already been determined and had attained finality interse between the parties and which could not be again re-agitated. She places reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Nooman and others vs. Mohd.Jabed Alam and Others, (2010)9 SCC 560 in support of her contention. In this case, the question formulated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court for decision was:- “1.A finding on the question of title recorded in a suit for eviction would how far be binding in a subsequent suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession between the same parties? This is the question that arises for consideration in this appeal. The answer to the question would depend on, in what manner the question of title was raised by the parties and how it was dealt with by the court in the eviction proceedings. Ordinarily, it is true, in a suit for eviction even if the court goes into the question of title, it examines the issue in an ancillary manner and in such cases (which constitute a very large majority) any observation or finding on the question of title would certainly not be binding in any subsequent suit on the dispute of title. But there may be exceptions to the general rule and as we shall find presently, the case in hand seems to fall in that exceptional category of very limited number of cases. 15. It is, thus, to be seen that in the second suit too both parties went to the court with the same stories as in the previous suit, though, it is true that this time each side led some additional evidence in support of its case, for example, the plaintiff relied upon and produced a copy of the judgment in the earlier suit in which her claim of title over the suit property was upheld. 19. The High Court noted that the earlier suit (for eviction) and the later suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession were between the same parties and were contested on exactly the same claims raised by the two sides. 19. The High Court noted that the earlier suit (for eviction) and the later suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession were between the same parties and were contested on exactly the same claims raised by the two sides. The plaintiff on each occasion was claiming title to the suit premises on the basis of a sale deed executed by Sulakshana in her favour in the year 1950. The defendant on each occasion alleged that the sale deed was sham, fake and fabricated and set up a rival claim of title on the plea that his mother Sulakshana had made an oral gift of the suit premises in his favour in the year 1950 and since then he was coming in possession over it. The premises, when it was given to him in gift, was a vacant land over which he had constructed a house after obtaining sanction from the municipality. The High Court, therefore, observed as under: "9... The facts of the earlier Title Suit No.36 of 1973, which was between the same parties and present Title Suit No.16 of 1978 also between the same parties, show that the plea taken by both the parties regarding title in both the Title Suits are same. 10. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment and decree regarding title passed in Title Suit No.36 of 1973 (Ext.15) shall operate as res judicata between the parties on the question of title." 24. In Pardip Singh vs. Ram Sunder Singh, AIR 1949 Pat.510, Meredith J., speaking for the Division Bench of the Court observed as follows: (AIR p.511, para 3) "3 … … … …The decision in a rent suit is not res judicata on the question of title unless the question of title had to be decided, was expressly raised, and was expressly decided between the parties and in each case it is necessary to examine carefully the decision in the rent suit before any opinion can be formed as to whether it operates as res judicata on the question of title or not. Ordinarily the decision would be res judicata only with regard to the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant. Ordinarily the decision would be res judicata only with regard to the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant. The difference in the two classes of cases is very well illustrated in two Privy Council decisions, namely, Run Bahadoor Singh v. Luchoo Koer, (1884-85)12 IA 23, where it was held that the decision was not res judicata as the question of title had been gone into only incidentally and collaterally, and Radhamadhub Holdar v. Monohur Mookerji, (1887-88)15 IA 97, where the question of title was directly decided in a rent suit, and the decision was held to be res judicata." We respectfully concur with the view expressed in the decision in Pardip Singh”. (pp.561,564-566) 16. On the question of res judicata all I need say is that in the previous litigation between the parties, this Court in the Civil Revision as disposed of by His Lordship Hon’ble the Chief Justice has clearly held; (a) that the requirement of the landlord would also include the requirement of his family; (b) that the landlord did not bring on record sufficient evidence to prove the facts which he pleaded as being sufficient to entitle him to an order for eviction. also note that as held by the Supreme Court in N.R. Narayan Swamy’s case (supra) bonafide requirement inter alia is a recurring cause. 17. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, it is clear from the settled law that bonafide requirement is a genuine need of the landlord and cannot be whimsical but will have to be considered in the light of the factual matrix of the pleadings and evidence of the parties. In the previous litigation between the parties what I notice is that though the evidence to establish the age of the sons, grand children of the landlord and the fact that they were actually staying with him and studying in Paonta Sahib having not been proved and that it is in this eventuality that the petition filed by the landlord was dismissed. In the present petition on the proved facts it was established that (a) three grand children of the landlord were staying in Paonta Sahib and depended upon their grandfather for residence etc. In the present petition on the proved facts it was established that (a) three grand children of the landlord were staying in Paonta Sahib and depended upon their grandfather for residence etc. (b) the fact that they were admitted in School was proved on record by two of the witnesses, principals of the two Schools PW-6 Shri Vivek Aggarwal of DAV School and PW-1 Shri J.P. Sharma from the Government Girls Senior Secondary School, Paonta Sahib, (c) that the landlord was residing in rented premises was also established and proved by PW-2 Shri Siya Ram Sharma. Shri Sant Ram PW4 son of the petitioner stated that he was carrying on his business there and was staying with his father. PW-5 Deepak Sharma son of the petitioner also steps into the witness box to corroborate the evidence of his father and brother. It is only in the statement of the tenant Shri Kamal Thakur (since deceased) that it was stated that the requirement was not bonafide. More especially when the evidence of the landlord has remained unrebutted. I am unable to accept the submissions of the petitioner that the petition was barred by the principle of res judicata. 18. Adverting to the principle of bonafide requirement, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner relies upon the decisions in Ram Dass vs. Ishwar Chander and Others, (1988)3 SCC 131 , and Kedar Nath Agrawal (Dead) and another vs. Dhanraji Devi (Dead) by LRs. and another, (2004)8 SCC 76 . In these decisions, all that the Court holds is that the requirement must be bonafide, established by the evidence on record and should not be a mere desire or wish of the landlord to occupy the premises. On the evidence considered on record, I do not find that the eviction petition is a mere camouflage for securing possession and to oust the tenant. It is also urged that since the landlord is dead, his requirement extinguishes with him. I cannot accept this submission. In Kedar Nath Agrawal’s case (supra), the Supreme Court holds:- “16. In our opinion, by not taking into account the subsequent event, the High Court has committed an error of law and also an error of jurisdiction. It is also urged that since the landlord is dead, his requirement extinguishes with him. I cannot accept this submission. In Kedar Nath Agrawal’s case (supra), the Supreme Court holds:- “16. In our opinion, by not taking into account the subsequent event, the High Court has committed an error of law and also an error of jurisdiction. In our judgment, the law is well settled on the point, and it is this: the basic rule is that the rights of the parties should be determined on the basis of the date of institution of the suit or proceeding and the suit/action should be tried at all stages on the cause of action as it existed at the commencement of the suit/action. This, however, does not mean that events happening after institution of a suit/proceeding, cannot be considered at all. It is the power and duty of the court to consider changed circumstances. A court of law may take into account subsequent events inter alia in the following circumstances: (i)the relief claimed originally has by reason of subsequent change of circumstances become inappropriate; or (ii)it is necessary to take notice of subsequent events in order to shorten litigation; or (iii)it is necessary to do so in order to do complete justice between the parties. (Re Shikharchand Jain v. Digamber Jain Praband Karini Sabha, SCC p. 681, para 10.)” (p.82) 19. The Supreme Court on the precedent cited before it held (supra):- “31. In view of the settled legal position as also the decisions in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu and Hasmat Rai, in our opinion, the High Court was in error in not considering the subsequent event of death of both the applicants. In our view, it was power as well as the duty of the High Court to consider the fact of death of the applicants during the pendency of the writ petition. Since it was the case of the tenant that all the three daughters got married and were staying with their in-laws, obviously, the said fact was relevant and material. The ratio laid down by this Court in Rameshwar would not apply to the facts of this case as it related to agrarian reforms. Likewise, Gaya Prasad does not carry the matter further. There during the pendency of proceedings the son for whom requirement was sought had joined government service. The ratio laid down by this Court in Rameshwar would not apply to the facts of this case as it related to agrarian reforms. Likewise, Gaya Prasad does not carry the matter further. There during the pendency of proceedings the son for whom requirement was sought had joined government service. In the instant case, the requirement was for the applicants, who died during the pendency of writ petition. Gaya Prasad is thus clearly distinguishable.” (p.86) 20. Learned counsel for the respondent has also relied upon the decision in Gaya Prasad vs. Pradeep Shrivastava, (2001)2 SCC 604 , wherein a suit for eviction was instituted by the landlord on the ground of bonafide requirement for use as a clinic by his son. The petition was allowed by the learned Rent Controller and decision affirmed by the appellate Authority. During the pendency of the petition in the High Court, the son joined medical service. It was urged before the High Court that the landlord did not require the tenanted premises any more in which event it requires dismissal. The tenant appealed to the Supreme Court, it was held (Gaya Prasad’s case):- “10. We have no doubt that the crucial date for deciding as to the bona fides of the requirement of the landlord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach the said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bona fides of the requirement pleaded by the landlord there would perhaps be no end so long as the unfortunate situation in our litigative slow process system subsists. During 23 years after the landlord moved for eviction on the ground that his son needed the building, neither the landlord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest, joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the peril of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. If a young entrepreneur decides to launch a new enterprise and on that ground he or his father seeks eviction of a tenant from the building, the proposed enterprise would not get faded out by subsequent developments during the traditional lengthy longevity of the litigation. His need may get dusted, patina might stick on its surface, nonetheless the need would remain intact. All that is needed is to erase the patina and see the gloss. It is pernicious, and we may say, unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation, merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period”. (p.609) 21. From the facts of the present case what I find is that the landlord has pleaded requirement on two counts; (i) that he wanted to settle himself personally in Panota Sahib which of-course has ceased with his death and (ii) that he requires it for his sons as also grand children who were studying there. The petitioner has not placed any material on the record that in view of the subsequent events the requirement has ceased to be bonafide or that any effect establishes that eviction proceedings were now be a mere abuse of the process of law. There is, thus, no merit in this petition which is dismissed. No order as to costs.