JUDGMENT Hon’ble B.S. Verma, J. (Oral) Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the record. 2. By means of this writ petition, the petitioners have sought a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned orders dated 29.4.2011 passed by the Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge (Junior Division) Ranikhet (for short the Prescribed Authority) in Rent Case No. 02 of 2007, Devendra Prasad and othrs Vs. Mohammad Tahir and others, whereby the application moved under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (for short the Act) by the landlords-respondents herein was allowed. The petitioners have also assailed the judgment and order dated 19-3-2012 passed by the appellate Court in Rent Control Appeal No. 2 of 2011, whereby the appeal preferred by the tenant-petitioners has been dismissed. 3. Brief facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that the applicants-respondents herein moved an application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act claiming themselves owner of House No. 163 situate at Khari Bazar, Ranikhet for release of the premises in dispute which is in occupation of the petitioners at the top storey of the said house. The said house was purchased by the applicants for their residential use on 8-11-2001. the opposite party-tenants despite request to vacate having been made did not vacate and deliver vacant possession of the premises in dispute to the landlords. According to the landlords, the premises in dispute fell to the share of applicant no. 1 Devendra Prasad by oral compromise between them. The applicant no.1 has bona fide need for the said accommodation to live in along with his family comprising his wife, three daughters, his mother and he himself. Applicant nos. 2 and 3 also intend to live freely and independently in the portion of the house, which came to their share. Hence, the application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act was moved for release of the premises in dispute. 4. The opposite-parties (petitioners herein) resisted the application by filing their written statement (paper no. 17-C). They denied the allegations made in the application and contended that the applicants have purchased House No. 163, 163A and 163B and that they are residing at 1 63B portion of that house and the accommodation consists of two rooms, one small kitchen as well as one small toilet, which was forcibly demolished by the landlords-applicants. 17-C). They denied the allegations made in the application and contended that the applicants have purchased House No. 163, 163A and 163B and that they are residing at 1 63B portion of that house and the accommodation consists of two rooms, one small kitchen as well as one small toilet, which was forcibly demolished by the landlords-applicants. It has been denied that applicant no.3 requires the premises in dispute, because he herself had been allotted a Bungalow at Government Girls Inter College Ranikhet being Principal thereof and she has been residing in the said bungalow. It has also been contended that applicant no.2 Shankar Lal being employed in government service at Almora I.T.I. has been allotted government residence, where he is living with his family and his children are getting education there. The release application has been moved on false grounds just to harass the opposite parties and to evict them. It has also been contended that that the tenancy of the opposite parties is 60-65 years old; that the applicant Devendra Prasad has his own house in Indra Basti at Ranikhet town, which is lying vacant for the last three months. It has also been contended that in case the release application is allowed, the opposite parties would suffer greater hardship. It has further been contended that despite best efforts having been made, the opposite parties could not get any suitable accommodation. 5. Both the parties have filed affidavits as well as documentary evidence to substantiate their respective claims before the Prescribed Authority. 6. The Prescribed Authority after hearing learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the evidence led before him has recorded a clear cut finding that the applicant Devendra Prasad has a bona fide requirement for premises in dispute to live in as claimed in the release application and has held that the applicants have established the bona fide need for the premises in dispute. On the point of comparative hardship, it was contended on behalf of the applicants that despite six months’ notice having been given to the opposite parties, no effort was made to search alternate accommodation. The applicant Devendra Prasad also offered his house at Indra Basti to the opposite parties as alternate accommodation. On the point of comparative hardship, it was contended on behalf of the applicants that despite six months’ notice having been given to the opposite parties, no effort was made to search alternate accommodation. The applicant Devendra Prasad also offered his house at Indra Basti to the opposite parties as alternate accommodation. The learned Prescribed Authority after elaborate discussion and considering the fact that alternative accommodation has been offered by the applicants to the opposite parties as per their own free will, has held that the balance of hardship also tilted in favour of the applicants. Consequently, by order dated 29-4-2011, the application for release was allowed and the opposite parties were directed to vacate the premises in dispute and to deliver its vacant and peaceful possession to the applicants within a period of one month and the applicant Devendra Prasad was directed to make available his house at Indra Basti as alternate accommodation to the opposite parties, if they so like. 7. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order, the petitioners preferred an appeal before the District Judge, Almora, which was registered as Rent Appeal No. 2 of 2011. 8. Before the appellate Court it was contended by the appellants-petitioners that no mandatory notice of six months was given to them, therefore, the release application moved by the respondents was not maintainable. It appears that no such legal issue was raised before the learned Prescribed Authority. The learned appellate Court at page 7 of the judgment has dealt on this point and did not find favour with the contention on the point of six months’ mandatory notice. The learned appellate Court after recording its independent findings on the point of bona fide need and comparative hardship on the appraisal of the evidence ultimately dismissed the appeal by judgment and order 19-3-20 12, which gave rise to the present writ petition. 9. In this writ petition, the learned counsel for the petitioners has assailed the impugned judgment and orders mainly on the legal ground that no notice was given to the present opposite parties and the notice which was given to Smt. Sabbeen would not serve the legal requirement as envisaged by first proviso appended to Section 21(1) of the Act. 10. In this writ petition, the learned counsel for the petitioners has assailed the impugned judgment and orders mainly on the legal ground that no notice was given to the present opposite parties and the notice which was given to Smt. Sabbeen would not serve the legal requirement as envisaged by first proviso appended to Section 21(1) of the Act. 10. At the outset it may be mentioned that this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction cannot sit like a court of appeal and cannot re-appreciate or reevaluate the evidence so as to arrive at a different conclusion. Only perversity in the impugned order can be seen to find out whether there is a case of mis-reading of evidence by the courts concerned. 11. In the case “Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash” [(2004) 3 S.C.C. page 682], the Apex Court has observed inter alia in paragraph 4 of the judgment that “An error which needs to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments or by indulging in a long-drawn process of reasoning, cannot possibly be an error available for correction by writ of certiorari. If it is reasonably possible to form two opinions on the same material, the finding arrived at one way or the other, cannot be called a patent error. As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal.” 12. The Apex Court in the case of Shamshad Ahmad and others Vs. Tilak Raj Bajaj (Deceased) through L.Rs. and others [(2008) 9 Supreme Court Cases, 1] while dealing with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has observed as under: “38. Though powers of a High Court under Articles 226 and 227 are very wide and extensive over all courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, such powers must be exercised within the limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a court of appeal or a court of error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts and inferior tribunals within the limits of law.” 13. In paragraph no. 6 of the release application, the applicants have specifically pleaded that since the opposite parties have been living in the premises in dispute prior to purchase of the building, therefore, they have already been given six months’ notice to vacate on 28.10.2002. 14. In the case at hand, it has not been disputed by the petitioners that the house in question was purchased by the applicants on 8.11.2001. It is also not disputed that a period of more than three years have already elapsed when the release application was filed before the Prescribed Authority. From a bare perusal of the release application, which has been annexed by the petitioners, it is obvious that the release application was moved on 3-7-2007, which is much after expiry of period of three years from the date of purchase of the house in question. 15. It is significant to mention here that the learned appellate Court has at first paragraph of page 7 of its judgment has specifically noticed the contents of paragraph no.6 of the written statement filed by the opposite parties, wherein they have admitted the notice having been received by them but have denied its facts. It is well settled that when a fact is admitted by the other party, such a fact need not be proved under Section 58 of the Evidence Act. 16. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. T.A.Khan appearing on behalf of the petitioners has pressed into service that no notice was given to the petitioners, rather it was given to the Smt. Sabbeeran. 17. 16. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. T.A.Khan appearing on behalf of the petitioners has pressed into service that no notice was given to the petitioners, rather it was given to the Smt. Sabbeeran. 17. A reference to the first proviso appended to Section 21(1)(a) of the Act is necessary, which reads as under: “Provided that where the building was in occupation of a tenant since before its purchase by the landlord, such purchase being made after the commencement of this Act, no application shall be entertained on the grounds, mentioned in clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such purchase and the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application, and such notice may be given even before the expiration of the aforesaid period of three years:“ 18. The learned appellate Court has dealt with this argument in the impugned judgment at page no.7. It finds place to mention here that in the written statement filed on behalf of the opposite parties, it has no where been asserted that any such notice was given to Smt. Sabbeeran. Learned appellate Court in spite of the fact that the opposite parties have admitted the service of notice as contended in paragraph no.6 of the written statement has observed that when the notice was issued to the mother of the petitioner-opposite parties was alive. It is not disputed that the father of the petitioners, namely Mohd. Hussain had predeceased his wife Smt. Sabbeeran. Since the service of notice had been willfully and without any specific assertion was admitted, therefore, the learned Appellate Court. Even otherwise, it is not the case of the petitioners that when the alleged notice was received by Smt. Sabbeeran, the petitioners had no concern with her. She was a tenant in the premises in question till she was alive. 19. So far as the intention of the legislature for giving six months’ notice as prescribed under the First Proviso appended to Section 21(1)(a) of the Act is concerned, in my considered view, the purpose of such notice is just to provide protection against the eviction of the tenants prior to expiry of a period of three years from the date of purchase of the premises in dispute. There is no legal impediment in case the notice was given before the expiry of aforesaid period of three years. In the case at hand, as discussed by the learned Appellate Court in its judgment, service of notice is undisputedly admitted and therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioners that the alleged notice having been already given to Smt. Sabbeeran wife of late Sri Mohd. Hussain would not serve the legal requirement, especially when the application under Section 21(1 )(a) of the Act had been filed much after the expiry of a period of three years from the date of purchase and when there is no denial of service of notice. I do not find that there was any legal impediment or defect if the notice was given even before the expiry of aforesaid period of three years. The petitioners were fully aware of the legal notice, therefore, they have not disputed its service, as discussed by the learned appellate Court. Moreover, this Court cannot appreciate the evidence of the parties like a court of appeal in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 20. Having heard the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as by a perusal of the entire material placed before this Court including the counter affidavit, I am of the considered view that there is concurrent finding of fact on the point of bona fide need and comparative hardship. Both the courts below have discussed the entire controversy in detail. The evidence relating to bona fide need and comparative hardship cannot be reappreciated in exercise of writ jurisdiction, like an appeal, since it is a finding of fact. The release application was moved much after expiry of the period of three years from the date of purchase of the house in question and a legal notice was served upon the petitioners as admitted by them. The legal obligation as envisaged by First Proviso appended to Section 21(1)(a) of the Act has been fully complied with as has been discussed by the learned Appellate Court. The release application has been rightly allowed by the Prescribed Authority and the appeal has been rightly dismissed by the appellate Court. I do not find any perversity or manifest error of law in the impugned orders. There is no merit in this writ petition, which is liable to be dismissed outright at admission stage. 21. The release application has been rightly allowed by the Prescribed Authority and the appeal has been rightly dismissed by the appellate Court. I do not find any perversity or manifest error of law in the impugned orders. There is no merit in this writ petition, which is liable to be dismissed outright at admission stage. 21. The writ petition is dismissed. Costs easy. However, to do complete justice, the petitioners are granted one year’s time to vacate the premises in dispute from today provided the petitioners furnish a written undertaking before the Prescribed Authority within a period of eight weeks to the effect that they shall vacate the premises in dispute before the expiry of the aforesaid period of one year and shall deliver its vacant and peaceful possession to the respondent-landlords. It is further provided that the petitioners shall pay/deposit monthly rent regularly by the seventh day of each succeeding month for the previous month. In case of default, the landlord-respondents would be at liberty to get the premises in dispute vacated in accordance with law.