JUDGMENT Saha, J. 1. This appeal is filed by the sole appellant, Hriday Lal Kaipeng, against the judgment and order, dated 6-8-2007, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur in ST 48 (ST/A) 2006 whereby and whereunder, the appellant was convicted under Section 302, IPC and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/-, in default, to suffer further one year R.I. Heard Mr. P.K. Ghosh, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. D. Sarkar, learned P.P. appearing for the State respondent. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is as follows: On 18/19-3-2006, at about 1.00 a.m., the victim Nerdhan Lien Kaipeng came to his elder brother's house with bleeding injuries. Having seen him, the informant, Rampak Kaipeng (P.W. 1), the elder brother of the victim, enquired how he had sustained the bleeding injuries. Then, the victim stated that the accused appellant Hriday Lal Kaipeng and one Lalshu Mukta Kaipeng had injured him in the house of one Surjya Lien Kaipeng (P.W. 2) with a broken bottle. Subsequently, the victim succumbed to the injuries. 3. Thereafter, P.W. 1, Rampak Kaipeng lodged a complaint written by one Dhanman Lal Kaipeng (P.W. 4) before the Officer In-charge, Taidu police station. 4. On receipt of the said complaint, Taidu PS. case No. 3/06 was registered under Section 302, read with Section 34, IPC, as a cognizable offence was disclosed thereof. On completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against the appellant. 5. Upon receipt of the charge sheet, the case was committed to the Court of the Sessions Judge, South Tripura, Udaipur and ultimately, the charge was framed against the accused appellant under Section 302 of the IPC to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. For better appreciation, the charge framed against the accused appellant is reproduced hereunder : That you on 18-3-06 at about 23 hours at Dhanlekha Kaipang para (in the house of Surjya Lian Kaipang) under P.S. - Taidu, Sub-Division-Amarpur, committed murder by causing the death of Nerdhan Lian Kaipang by a wine's bottle, and you thereby committed an offence punishable u/s. 302 of I.P.C. and within my cognizance. And I hereby direct that you be tried on the said charge by this Court. 6. And I hereby direct that you be tried on the said charge by this Court. 6. To prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses including the official witnesses and also produced some documents including post-mortem report which were exhibited. The prosecution also proved some articles which were marked as Ext. M.O. 1 and M.O. 2. 7. The defence case, so far from the trend of cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and also on the examination of the accused under Section 313, Cr.P.C., is of total denial. The appellant neither produced any witness nor adduced any documentary evidence in support of his case. 8. The trial Court heard the parties and mainly relying upon the deposition of Sri Surjya Lien Kaipeng (P.W. 2), Trinath Kaipeng (P.W. 5) and Dr. Digbijay Krishna Debbarma (P.W. 12), who has done autopsy, convicted the appellant under Section 302, IPC and sentenced to suffer R.I. for life with a fine of Rs. 5,000/-. 9. Having heard the learned Counsel of the parties, it would be proper on our part to first deal with the evidence of P.Ws. 2, 5 and 12 and thereafter, we will deal with the evidence of other related witnesses. 10. P.W. 2, Sri Surjya Lien Kaipeng alias Surjya, an eye-witness, in whose house the incident took place, in his deposition stated that on the date of incident, Nirdhan Lal Kaipeng (victim), Lalshu mukta Kaipeng, Hriday Lal Kaipeng (accused appellant), Trinath Kaipeng (P.W. 5), Dipti Kumar Kaipeng, Jurkahao Kaipeng came to their house after purchasing meat. After completion of cooking meat, they consumed alcohol (country liquor) and meat. After consuming alcohol, the accused appellant Hridaya Lal had dealt a blow on the head of the victim causing serious bleeding injuries to him. He also stated that the accused appellant gave blows thrice on the victim with an empty bottle. Then the victim rushed to his elder brother's house and died there. In his cross, he stated that he made statement to the I.O. of the case that the accused appellant had dealt blows thrice on the head of the victim with bottle. But the said statement was not found in the previous statement as recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. of the said witness. 11. In his cross, he stated that he made statement to the I.O. of the case that the accused appellant had dealt blows thrice on the head of the victim with bottle. But the said statement was not found in the previous statement as recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. of the said witness. 11. P.W. 5, Trinath Kaipeng, is one of the star witness as well as eye-witness of the incident and also a member of the group who took alcohol with the victim and the accused appellant in the house of P.W. 2. He in his deposition stated that on the date of incident, the victim and Lalshu Mukta Kaipeng were taking country liquor in the house of P.W. 2 in one group and he along with two others, namely, Jarokahao and Dipti Kumar Kaipeng was taking country liquor in other group in the same hut. 12. This witness further stated that the accused Hriday asked the victim to bring more country liquor for their consumption, but the victim disagreed to do so. Then the accused appellant became furious and dealt blows on the head of the victim with an empty bottle. This witness also confirmed that the accused dealt 2/3 blows on the head of the victim on the left side with an empty bottle. Being seriously injured, the victim left the place of occurrence and ran towards the house of his elder brother (PW 2) and the accused followed him. He also stated that he had heard the shouting of the victim "save me, save me" and subsequently, he came to know that the victim succumbed to his injuries on the same night. 13. In his cross-examination, he stated that the accused and his associates had consumed more liquor for which the accused appellant had no control over him. He further stated that the victim told the accused appellant that he had exceeded the limit. Attention of the Court was drawn regarding the said statement, inter alia, that the accused had given 2/3 blows on the head of the victim, as the same was not found in the previous statement as recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. 14. P.W. 12, Dr. Attention of the Court was drawn regarding the said statement, inter alia, that the accused had given 2/3 blows on the head of the victim, as the same was not found in the previous statement as recorded under Section 161, Cr.P.C. 14. P.W. 12, Dr. Digbijay Krishna Debbarma, who was, at the relevant time, working as Medical Officer at Ampinagar Rural Hospital, in his deposition, has stated that he had conducted the post-mortem over the dead body of the victim in connection with Taidu P.S. Case No. 03 of 2006. He also stated that on examination of the body of the victim, he found the following injuries: 3 over the scalp, one over the forehead and one over the face below left ear. The size of the following 3 injuries are as follows : (a) Three incised looking lacerated wound over the scalp. 2 inch x 1 inch over left parietal eminence. 1 inch x 0.5 inch over the coronal suture. 3 inch x 2 inch over right temporal bone. (b) 3 inch x 1.5 inch incised looking lacerated wound over forehead crossing left frontal eminence, down towards nasion. (c) Deep incised wound measuring 5 inch x 2 inch x 1 inch extending from left ramus of mandible to Maxillaro prominence exposing the left masseter and cutting the underlying major blood vessels and the parotid gland. This witness also stated that the cause of death of the victim is suneope, due to acute haemorrhage shock. The nature of weapon was sharp cutting weapon and nature of death was homicidal. 15. P.W. 1, Sri Rampak Kaipeng, the elder brother of the victim in his deposition stated that his deceased brother Nerdhan had consumed alcohol in the house of Surjya Lean Kaipeng (PW-2). At that time, the accused appellant Hriday Lal Kaipeng dealt a blow on the head of his brother with an empty bottle. Being seriously injured, his brother then rushed to his house and narrated the facts to them. Thereafter, he succumbed to his injuries. Subsequently, one Dhanman Lal Kaipeng (P.W. 4) wrote the ejahar on his behalf and according to his statement. Then he (P.W. 4) read over and explained the contents to him (P.W. 1) written therein and he put his thumb impression. 16. P.W. 3, Sri Kushi Lien Kaipeng, is a seizure witness, in whose presence, some portion of broken bottle was seized. Then he (P.W. 4) read over and explained the contents to him (P.W. 1) written therein and he put his thumb impression. 16. P.W. 3, Sri Kushi Lien Kaipeng, is a seizure witness, in whose presence, some portion of broken bottle was seized. In his deposition, he stated that on query, he came to learn from P.W. 2, that the accused Hriday Lal Kaipeng had assaulted the victim. 17. P.W. 4, Sri Dhanman Lal Kaipeng, is the scribe of the ejahar and also a witness regarding inquest, i.e., surathal report. 18. P.W. 7 Amrit Kaipeng, is a seizure witness of empty bottle of alcohol. 19. P.W. 9, Sri Samir Lashkar, who went to the police station hearing the news regarding arrest of the accused appellant and found that the police officer was enquiring about the reason of murder and on query of the police, the accused appellant told them that he would be able to show the weapon of commission of murder. Thereafter, he along with police came to the place of occurrence and ultimately, the accused appellant brought a broken portion of bottle which he had kept earlier near a latrine. The said broken bottle was seized by the police in his presence and he put his signature in the seizure list which was marked as Ext. 5/1. He identified the said broken bottle (Ext. M.O.-2 series) in his cross. But he denied the suggestion of the defence that the accused had not told to the I.O. that he would be able to hand over the weapon of commission of murder to the I.O. of the case from the place of occurrence. He also did not admit that the accused appellant had not produced Ext. M.O. 2 series to the police officer. 20. P.W. 10, Sujit Sarkar, accompanied P.W. 9 and narrated the story in the same line as narrated by P.W. 9. He was also one of the seizure witnesses regarding Ext. M.O. 2 series. 21. P.W. 13, Sri Pannalal Sen, was the Officer In-charge of Taidu P.S. at that time who received the complaint on 19-3-2006 and registered the same as Taidu P.S. case No. 03/06 under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC and took up the investigation of the case in due course. 22. M.O. 2 series. 21. P.W. 13, Sri Pannalal Sen, was the Officer In-charge of Taidu P.S. at that time who received the complaint on 19-3-2006 and registered the same as Taidu P.S. case No. 03/06 under Section 302 read with Section 34, IPC and took up the investigation of the case in due course. 22. P.W. 14, Satya Ranjan Das, was a Sub-Inspector of Police in Taidu P.S., who had received the case records from P.W. 13 and ultimately filed the charge-sheet. 23. Mr. P.K. Ghosh, learned Counsel for the appellant submits that (a) the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence on record; (b) the learned Trial Court ignoring the existence of vital discrepancies and contradiction available in the deposition of the prosecution witnesses convicted the appellant under Section 302, IPC which is improper. (c) even if, the entire evidence of the witnesses are taken in toto, then also no case is made out against the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC as the prosecution failed to prove that there was an intention on the part of the appellant to commit the alleged murder. At best, it can be said that the prosecution established a case under Section 304, Part-II, IPC. 24. The learned Counsel further submits that if that was considered, the finding would have been that the accused had no intention or knowledge to murder or to cause death of the deceased, thus, he could not be convicted under Section 302, IPC. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Patel Rasiklal Becharbhai and Ors. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1992 SC 1150 , wherein the Apex Court noted that there should be an intention on the part of the accused to cause that particular injury which was proved in an objective manner, i.e., the prosecution has to further prove that such an injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death by medical evidence. 25. In Patel Rasiklal Becharbhai ( AIR 1992 SC 1150 ) (supra), the Apex Court while setting aside the conviction under Section 302, IPC and convicting the appellant of that case under Section 304, Part II, IPC, also noted that the Agricultural implement only was used which he was having with him for the use in agricultural purposes. Suddenly a quarrel took place. Suddenly a quarrel took place. The deceased rebuked A-3 which infuriated him and he gave a blow on the deceased but unfortunately it landed on the neck of the deceased. The medical evidence also shows that he did not cause any injury to any vital organ and there is no fracture of the internal bones. The external carotid artery and external jugular vein got injured and that resulted in profuse bleeding. The Apex Court did not propose to say that such an injury, if caused, would not attract the provisions of Section 302, I.P.C. but circumstances which are peculiar to the facts of this case would show that there is a reasonable doubt whether the accused intended to cause that particular injury in which case the offence is one punishable under Section 304, Part II, IPC, since the accused must be attributed knowledge that he was likely to cause the death. The Apex Court accordingly set aside the conviction of the appellant (Accused No. 3) under Section 302, Part-II, IPC and sentence him to undergo 7 years Rigorous Imprisonment. 26. The learned Counsel for the appellant also submits that the evidence, as found was sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of the nature, was not at all established and in support of his aforesaid submission, he has placed reliance on the circumstances that the whole incident took place while the appellant was in inebriated condition with others including the deceased and admittedly he was not in a position to control himself as would be evident from the cross-examination of P.W. 5. 27. He has also placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Joseph v. State of Kerala, AIR 1994 SC 34 , particularly, para-3 of the said report. The relevant portion of para 3 is reproduced here under: ...The whole occurrence was a result of trivial incident and in those circumstances the accused dealt two blows on the head with a lathi, therefore, it cannot be stated that he intended to cause the injury which is sufficient at the most it can be said that by inflicting such injuries he had knowledge that he was likely to cause the death. In which case the offence committed by him would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 28. In which case the offence committed by him would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder. 28. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court ultimately set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 302, I.P.C. and sentence of imprisonment for life awarded thereunder. Instead the appellant was convicted under Section 304, Part-II, IPC and sentenced him to five years R.I. 29. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has further placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Jagpati v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1993 SC 1360 , particularly, paras 2, 5 and 6 which read as follows : 2. Before the Courts below it was also submitted that even if the prosecution case is to be accepted, even then an offence under S. 302, IPC read with S. 34, IPC is not made out. Coming to the nature of the offence, we find it difficult to hold that an offence under S. 302, IPC read with S. 34 is made out. There was no previous enmity. There was a scuffle and a sudden quarrel that preceded the occurrence. No doubt the witnesses say that 15-20 minutes later the accused Jagpati accompanied by his brother, Ram Krishna came to the scene of occurrence. It can be seen that because of the trivial incident the subsequent occurrence appears to have taken place. 3. **** 4. **** 5. Having given our earnest consideration, we think that it is not a case where S. 302, IPC is attracted. However, in causing those two injuries, one swelling and one skin deep injury the accused must be attributed the knowledge that they were likely to cause death. In such an event, the offence committed by them would be one punishable under S. 304, Part II read with S. 34, IPC. 6. Accordingly, we set aside the convictions and the sentence of Jagpati (appellant in Crl. A. 795 of 1980) and of Ram Krishna (appellant in Crl. A. No. 49 of 1981) under S. 302 read with S. 34, IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life. Instead we convict them under S. 304, Part II, IPC read with S. 34, IPC and sentence each of them to undergo seven years' rigorous imprisonment. 30. A. 795 of 1980) and of Ram Krishna (appellant in Crl. A. No. 49 of 1981) under S. 302 read with S. 34, IPC and the sentence of imprisonment for life. Instead we convict them under S. 304, Part II, IPC read with S. 34, IPC and sentence each of them to undergo seven years' rigorous imprisonment. 30. He again submits that though the P.W. 5 while deposing stated that the accused appellant dealt 2/3 blows on the head of the deceased with an empty bottle, but in his cross, while his contention was drawn to the previous statement as recorded under Section 161, Cr. P.C., it was found that there is no such statement that the accused gave 2/3 blows on the head of the victim. Thus, the story of 2/3 blows is subsequent development, therefore, it would not be proper to rely upon such statement. And if the story of 2/3 blows on the head of the victim is disbelieved, then it would be a case of single blow and that also while the appellant was not in a position to control himself. More particularly, from the evidence, it appears that when the victim declined to bring more country liquor for their consumption, the accused appellant became furious and dealt blows on the head of the victim with an empty bottle. Thus, it can be safely said that there was a quarrel and the whole incident was the outcome of the quarrel and there was no evidence on part of the accused appellant for killing the victim, rather there may be some knowledge on the part of the accused appellant that the injury would cause death. Therefore, the prosecution failed to establish a case under Section 302, IPC, at best, it can be said that the prosecution proved a case under Section 304, Part-II IPC. 31. In support of his aforesaid contention, he has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Mavila Thamban Nambiar v. State of Kerala, AIR 1997 SC 687 , particular, para 10 of the said report, wherein the Apex Court noted, inter alia, "...after giving our careful thought to the nature of the offence, we are of the considered view that the offence of the appellant would more appropriately fall under Section 304, Part II of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant had given one blow with a pair of scissors on the vital part of the body of Madhavan and, therefore, it would be reasonable to infer that he (appellant) had knowledge that any injury with the pair of scissors on the vital part would cause death though he may not have intended to commit the murder. We accordingly alter the conviction of the appellant from 302, IPC to one under Section 304, Part II of the IPC." 32. He also placed reliance on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Gita Rani Ghosh & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal, 2012 Cri. L.J. 794, particularly, paras-26, 27 and 29, which read as follows: 26. It would be appropriate to refer the Section 304 of I.P.C. to appreciate the issue properly: Section 304 : Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; Or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. 27. Taking everything into consideration we are of the view that the order of conviction is sustainable in law but not under Section 302, IPC. In our estimate, the accused persons committed the offence punishable under Section 304-Part II of the IPC and are liable to be punished for that. 28. **** 29. As far as the appellant Lakshman is concerned the case is abated against him. We find that the appellants Nitai and Subroto have already undergone rigorous imprisonment for more than 12 years in connection with this case. We have already found that they committed offence punishable under Section 304, Part II of the IPC and not an offence under Section 302 of IPC. Considering the period of their detention, we reduce their sentence to the period already undergone by them in connection with this case. We have already found that they committed offence punishable under Section 304, Part II of the IPC and not an offence under Section 302 of IPC. Considering the period of their detention, we reduce their sentence to the period already undergone by them in connection with this case. As far as appellants Gitarani and Kamakhya are concerned, we find that although they share common intention with co-accused in committing the offence, they did not assault any of the members of Ghosh family. They were in custody for about two months in connection with this case and were granted bail by this Court. Considering the entire facts and circumstances, we reduce their sentence to the period they were in custody in connection with this case. However, they are sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 15,000/- each which is to be disbursed equally to the injured persons as compensation. In case of their failure to pay the fine amount within thirty (30) days from the date of passing of this order, they should undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years. 33. The learned Counsel further submits that the accused appellant is in custody since the date of conviction and sentence, i.e., 6-8-2007 and he was also in custody as an under trial prisoner for 208 days, i.e., more than five years. Thus, it would be proper for the Court to release him modifying the order of conviction from under S. 302, IPC to one under S. 304, Part, II IPC and sentencing him to the period already undergone. 34. Mr. Ghosh has also placed reliance on other judgments. We thought it fit not to refer those cases as that would be mere repetition. 35. Mr. D. Sarkar, learned P.P., while supporting the impugned judgment and resisting the submission of Mr. Ghosh, would contend that there was no quarrel prior to the alleged incident, as would be evident from the evidence of the eye-witness, P.W. 2, in whose house the incident took place. He also placed reliance to the evidence of P.W. 2, inter alia, "after consuming alcohol accused Hriday Lal had dealt blow on the head of Nirdhan for which he had sustained serious bleeding injuries. The accused dealt blows on the victim thrice with a broken bottle." Placing reliance on the evidence of P.W. 5, Mr. He also placed reliance to the evidence of P.W. 2, inter alia, "after consuming alcohol accused Hriday Lal had dealt blow on the head of Nirdhan for which he had sustained serious bleeding injuries. The accused dealt blows on the victim thrice with a broken bottle." Placing reliance on the evidence of P.W. 5, Mr. Sarkar further submits that mere decline to bring more country liquor for consumption cannot be considered as quarrel. According to him, it is the accused appellant who became furious and dealt blows on the head of the victim with an empty bottle and due to two/three blows on the head of the victim with broken bottle, the victim sustained three incised lacerated wound over the forehead crossing frontal eminence, down towards nasion and another wound which extended from left ramus of mandible to Maxillaro prominence exposing the left masseter and cutting the underlying major blood vessels and the parotid gland. 36. He further contended that the petitioner had given blows on the vital part of the body of the victim with an intention to kill him and such intention of the appellant was established by the prosecution through its evidence. Thus, the trial Court rightly convicted the appellant under Section 302, IPC and sentenced him to suffer R.I. for life with fine. 37. To convince us, he also placed reliance on Ext. 1, the seizure list of twelve small pieces of glass which are said to be of broken bottle and also the evidence of P.W. 12, the doctor who did autopsy. 38. We have carefully considered the submission of the learned Counsel for the parties as well as the evidence on record from which it appears that admittedly the appellant was in drunken condition when the aforesaid unfortunate incident happened, as would be evident in the cross-examination of P.W. 5 that the appellant was not in a position to control himself and he had consumed alcohol with the victim, and others in the house of P.W. 2. 39. 39. On further scrutiny of the evidence, it also appears that though the P.W. 2 in his chief has stated that the accused appellant dealt blows on the victim thrice with a broken bottle, but at the same he has also stated that the accused appellant had asked the victim to bring more country liquor (alcohol) for their consumption and the victim declined to do so to which the accused appellant became furious and dealt blows on the head of the victim with an empty bottle for which the victim sustained serious bleeding injuries. 40. Thus, the statement of P.W. 2 is corroborated by P.W. 5, Trinath Kaipeng. In his deposition, he has stated that along with two others, he himself also had taken country liquor (alcohol) in the hut where incident took place. This witness has stated that the accused appellant asked the victim to bring more country liquor for their consumption, but as the victim declined to do so, the accused appellant became furious and dealt blows on the head of the victim with empty bottle. This witness has also stated that the accused appellant dealt 2/3 blows on the head of the victim with an empty bottle. 41. The evidence of the aforesaid two witnesses also support the injuries sustained by the victim which were found by the doctor, P.W. 12 as stated supra. 42. To appreciate the arguments of the learned Counsel for the parties, it would be proper on our part to consider the meaning of 'intention' and 'knowledge' as the intention means to do a certain thing, purpose, design; contemplating in result and 'knowledge' means acquaintance with fact or truth or mental impression or belief. 43. The expression 'causing death' in Section 299, means putting an end to a human life, and all the three intentions mentioned in the section must be directed either deliberately to putting an end to a human life or to some act which, to the knowledge of the accused, is likely to eventuate in the putting an end to a human life. The knowledge must have reference to the particular circumstances in which an accused is placed. The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in light of what he supposed to be in the circumstances. The knowledge must have reference to the particular circumstances in which an accused is placed. The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in light of what he supposed to be in the circumstances. A man is not guilty of culpable homicide if his intention was directed to what he supposed to be a lifeless body. (See AIR 1920 Mad. 862). 44. In Rajinder v. State of Haryana, 2006 AIR SCW 2987, the Apex Court discussed about the culpable homicide and murder as well as distinction between the aforesaid two offence. In para-16 of the said report, the Apex Court held as under: 16. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'culpable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the Legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute abstractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreciating the points of distinction between the two offences: Section 299 Section 300 A person commits culpable homicide if the Act by with the death is caused is done. Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done. INTENTION (a) With the intention of causing death; or (b) With the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or (1) With the intention of causing death; or (2) With the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (3) With the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or KNOWLEDGE (c) With the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. (4) With the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause that or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death of such injury as is mentioned above. 45. Now the question which is to be decided by us is as to whether the appellant acted with intention or knowledge or with both. In the case of Nayab Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2007 (2) Crimes 663 : (2007) Cri LJ (NOC) 515 (Raj), their Lordship of Rajasthan High Court held that intention is the subjective element which reflects from the conduct of the accused and it must be coupled with some idea of killing, whereas knowledge is the awareness of the consequence of the act "obviously degree of knowledge which any particular person can be assumed to possess must vary." The distinction of knowledge and intention are essential questions of the fact. Normally if the injury is inflicted on the vital part of the body with deadly weapon it can be categorized as intentional act of man slaughter or killing. But if it is inflicted under abnormal circumstances, then it may fall under the category of knowledge for causing such bodily injury. 46. In State of U.P. v. Indrajeet, (2000) 7 SCC 249 : ( AIR 2000 SC 3158 ), the Apex Court held as follows : 7....Absence of intention to cause death coupled with the lack of knowledge that death would be inevitably caused on account of the injury would make the offence fall only under Section 304, Part II, IPC and not under Section 302, IPC.... 47. In Satish Narayan Sawant v. State of Goa, (2009) 17 SCC 724 : (AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 2635), the Apex Court again held : 41....It is trite law that Section 304, Part II comes into play when the death is caused by doing an act with knowledge that it is likely to cause death but there is no intention on the part of the accused either to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. 48. In the instant case, injury was though inflicted on the vital part of the body with an empty bottle; but the empty bottle is not considered usually as weapon. 49. 48. In the instant case, injury was though inflicted on the vital part of the body with an empty bottle; but the empty bottle is not considered usually as weapon. 49. It also appears from the evidence of P.W. 2 and 5 that the appellant was in inebriated condition while he was causing injury bodily on the vital part of the victim. Not only that, the same was resulted as the victim declined to bring another bottle of alcohol as asked by the accused appellant. Thus, it can be said that there was no prior motive on the part of the appellant for killing or causing death of the victim as the appellant was to that extent provoked by the victim. Therefore, in our view, this is a case which falls under the category of clause (c) of Section 299 and not Section 300, IPC. 50. It further appears from the record that there was no prior enmity between the appellant and the victim and the appellant was also not prepared with any weapon for assaulting the victim prior to consuming alcohol for causing bodily injuries to the victim as is likely to cause death of him. 51. There is distinction between culpable homicide amounting to murder as laid down under Section 300, IPC and culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 299, IPC. For the offence, the 'intention' and 'knowledge' are the important features to be taken into consideration by the Court of Law based on certain circumstances of each case. 52. In the instant case, all these facts are found established from the record. The incident took place without any premeditation of the appellant; rather it happened in a sudden spurt of passion. Both the appellant and the victim were consuming alcohol in the same hut and the appellant got infuriated when the victim declined to bring more liquor as per his dictate. Therefore, we do not think that the learned trial Court has properly appreciated this aspect of the prosecution case when he found the appellant guilty of murder and punished him under Section 302, IPC. In view of our foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant is guilty of an offence punishable under Section 304, Part II, IPC, not under Section 302, IPC. In view of our foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the appellant is guilty of an offence punishable under Section 304, Part II, IPC, not under Section 302, IPC. Hence, we set aside the impugned conviction and sentence of imprisonment for life rendered by the learned trial Court under Section 302, IPC. Instead, we convict the appellant under Section 304, Part II, IPC and sentence him to R.I. for the period already undergone with a fine of Rs. 5000/-. In default of payment, he shall further suffer R.I. for three months. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. Appeal partly allowed. Appeal allowed.