ORDER 1. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the award dated 21.11.2009 and review order dated 31.8.2010 passed by First Additional Member, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Damoh in M.V.C No. 9/2009. 2. The claim case was at the instance of respondent emanating from motor accident whereon Motor Vehicle Maruti Alto bearing registration No. MP EA 6738 turned turtle resulting in injury to the respondent/claimant who was the owner of the said vehicle. The claim as apparent from the application was under section 163 A of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Objections were raised by the petitioner/respondent as to maintainability of the said claim application under section 163 A at the instance of owner of the vehicle for compensation to the injuries received by her. 3. That, on 31.8.2010 on the basis of compromise arrived at before Lok Adalat the compensation of Rs.1,35,000/was awarded to the respondent/claimant. 4. Later on, when the award was put to execution, as contended by the petitioner, it was revealed that inadvertent mistake has crept in as despite of the fact that the claim application under section 163 A of 1988 Act was not tenable at the instance of injured owner of offending vehicle, an application was preferred by the petitioner Insurance Company seeking review of the order. 5. The Trial Court vide order dated 31.8.2010; however, rejected the application on the ground that the compromise in Lok Adalat was arrived at with open eye. The petitioner Insurance Company is aggrieved by the said order has filed this petition. 6. Relying on the decisions in Dhanraj v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd [¼2004½ 8 SCC 553] and Ningamma and another v. United India Insurance Company Ltd. [¼2009½ 13 SCC 710], it is contended by learned counsel for the petitioner that law having been laid down by the Apex Court that in case wherein the victim died or where he/she was permanently disabled and if it is proved that the driver is the owner of the motor vehicle, in that case the owner could not himself/herself be a recipient of compensation under section 163 A of 1988 Act. It is urged that the said being the law, the claim petition filed by respondent/owner for compensation in lieu of injuries sustained by her while driving her own vehicle was not tenable in the eyes of law and because of objection of tenability any compromise entered into before Lok Adalat, being de hors law was not tenable. In Dhanraj (supra) it is observed by their Lordships: “10. In this case, it has not been shown that the policy covered any risk for injury to the owner himself. We are unable to accept the contention that the premium of Rs.4,989/paid under the heading “Own damage” is for covering liability towards personal injury. Under the heading “Own damage”, the words “premium on vehicle and non-electrical accessories” appear. It is thus clear that this premium is towards damage to the vehicle and not for injury to the person of the owner. An owner of a vehicle can only claim provided a personal accident insurance has been taken out. In this case, there is no such insurance. In Ningamma (supra) it is observed by their Lordships: 22. In a case wherein the victim died or where he was permanently disabled due to an accident arising out of the aforesaid motor vehicle in that event the liability to make payment of the compensation is on the insurance company or the owner, as the case may be as provided under section 163A. But if it is proved that the driver is the owner of the motor vehicle, in that case the owner could not himself be a recipient of compensation as the liability to pay the same is on him. This proposition is absolutely clear on a reading of section 163A of the MVA. Accordingly, the legal representatives of the deceased who have stepped into the shoes of the owner of the motor vehicle could not have claimed compensation under section 163A of the MVA. 23. When we apply the said principle into the facts of the present case we are of the view that the claimants were not entitled to claim compensation under section 163A of the MVA and to that extent the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the said provision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 7. 7. The question is as to whether in the light of above proponement of law qua claim putforth by owner of vehicle in lieu of injury sustained while driving her own vehicle being not tenable, whether no compromise could have been arrived at before the Lok Adalat as the same would be in derogation to law laid down by the Apex Court. 8. Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 stipulates that the consideration and object of an agreement is lawful, unless it is forbidden by law; or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defeat the provisions of any law; or is fraudulent; or involves or implies, injury to the person or property of another; or the Court regards it as immoral, or opposed to public policy. In each of these cases, the provision stipulates that the consideration or object of an agreement is said to be unlawful and agreement of which the object or consideration is unlawful is void. 9. In view whereof we have no hesitation in holding that the compromise arrived at before the Lok Adalat in a Claim Petition under section 163 A, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which in turn was at the instance of the Driver/Owner claiming compensation to the injuries sustained was de hors the law and being void is hereby set aside. Consequently, the impugned order dated 20.8.2008 is also set aside. The matter is remanded to the Trial Court for its decision on merit. 10. We observe that the Trial Court shall dispassionately without being influenced with the observations should decide the Claim petition in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of six months from the date of communication of this order. 11. Petition is allowed to the extent above. Parties to bear their own costs.