Heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. The appellant, Assistant Engineer in the Irrigation Department was apprehended in a case of Prevention of Corruption Act and thereafter, on th May, 2008 an order was passed under Rule 99 of the Jharkhand Service Code suspending the writ petitioner-appellant from the date when he was arrested i.e., from 18.3.2008. The appellant was released on bail on 19.5.2008. The appellant's contention is that this order suspending the appellant was specifically passed under Rule 99. According to the appellant, suspension under Rule 99 comes to an end automatically upon accused employee released on bail and in view of the judgment of the Patna High Court delivered in the case of Satyanarayan Prasad Shrivastava Vs. State of Bihar and others, reported in 1978 BBCJ 208, delivered in the case of Sidhinath Jha Vs. State of Bihar, reported in 1988 PLJR 1129 and delivered in the case of Vidya Singh Vs. State of Bihar , reported in 1994 BBCJ 64, the authorities if wish to suspend the appellant, they are required to pass fresh order under Rule 100. 3. The appellant's above contention was rejected by learned Single Judge, holding that in the order of suspension Rule 99 has wrongly been mentioned and in fact suspension order is under Rule 100 of the Jharkhand Service Code. Hence petitioner-appellant has preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. 4. It is submitted that the said order dated 9.5.2008 suspending the appellant was passed by giving reasons for passing the order under Rule 99 and therefore, it cannot be treated to be the order passed under Rule 100. It is also submitted that the order of suspension was passed as far back as on 9th May, 2008 and thereafter, in view of the direction issued by the court in the writ jurisdiction, the respondents were directed to complete the departmental proceeding wherein inquiry has already been completed and inquiry officer gave report exonerating the petitioner-appellant. However, departmental proceeding has not been dropped. It is submitted that other persons who were similarly situated have been allowed to join the duties and their suspension has been revoked. 5.
However, departmental proceeding has not been dropped. It is submitted that other persons who were similarly situated have been allowed to join the duties and their suspension has been revoked. 5. We have considered the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant and perused the Rule 99 and Rule 100 of the Jharkhand Service Code, which are as under:- “Rule 99: -A servant of government against whom proceedings have been taken either for his arrest for debt or on a criminal charge or who is detained under any law providing for preventive detention should be considered as under suspension for any periods during which he is detained in custody or is under going imprisonment, and not allowed to draw any pay and allowances(other than any subsistence grant that may be granted in accordance with principles laid down in Rule 96) for such periods, until the termination of the proceedings taken against him or until he is released from detention and allowed to rejoin his duties as the case may be. An adjustment of his allowances for such period should therefore, be made according to the circumstances of the case, the full amount being given only in the event of the Government servant being acquitted of blame or (if the proceeding taken against him, were for his arrest for debt) of its being proved that the Government servant's liability arose from circumstance beyond his control or detention, being held by any competent authority to be unjustified....” “Rule 100: -A Government servant against whom a criminal charge or a proceeding for arrest for debt is pending should also be placed under suspension detained in custody or imprisoned (e.g. while released on bail) if the charge made or proceeding taken against him is connected with his position as a Government servant or is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties as such or involved moral turpitude. In regard to his pay and allowances the provisions of Rule 99 shall apply....”. 6. Rule 99 is only enabling provision by which it has been declared that a person arrested on a criminal charge and is detained under any law providing for preventive detention should be considered as under suspension for any periods during which he is detained in custody or is under going imprisonment .
6. Rule 99 is only enabling provision by which it has been declared that a person arrested on a criminal charge and is detained under any law providing for preventive detention should be considered as under suspension for any periods during which he is detained in custody or is under going imprisonment . Rule 99 requires no specific order of the authority and in a case where a person is detained in custody and cannot join the duty, that period has been declared to be the period of suspension for such employees. Rule 100 is very specific rule, which provides that a government servant should be suspended against whom criminal charge or proceeding for arrest for debt is pending. In Rule it has been specifically mentioned that, even if such employee is on bail which is clear from the language“.... or imprisoned ( e.g. while released on bail....)” he can be suspended. Rule 100 cannot be read to mean that during period of custody no order of suspension can be passed under Rule 100 nor Rule 99, even if, read with Rule 100, it cannot be inferred that even if, order of suspension has been passed for an employee who is in custody, such order, which is not required by Rule 99, be read or understood to have been passed under Rule 99 requiring another order of suspension after the release of such employee on bail. 7. In view of the above it cannot be held that a person, who is deemed to have been suspended under Rule 99, even if served with the order of suspension which is required under Rule 100, then in that situation also a fresh order of suspension is required after such person is released on bail. Such is not provided under Rule 99 nor under Rule 100. In view of the above, mentioning of Rule 99 in the impugned order of suspension was rightly held to be only wrongly mentioning of the relevant rules in the order. 8. So far as the petitioner's contention that the inquiry report has come in his favour exonerating him is concerned, that is one of the aspect, but neither the Disciplinary Authority exonerated the appellant nor in criminal case appellant has been discharged or acquitted, therefore, there is sufficient ground for continuation of suspension under Rule 100 of the Jharkhand Service Code.
So far as the petitioner's contention that the inquiry report has come in his favour exonerating him is concerned, that is one of the aspect, but neither the Disciplinary Authority exonerated the appellant nor in criminal case appellant has been discharged or acquitted, therefore, there is sufficient ground for continuation of suspension under Rule 100 of the Jharkhand Service Code. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that similarly situated persons have been reinstated in service after revoking their suspension is not relevant matter where the petitioner is facing trial under Prevention of Corruption Act. 9. Therefore, the L.P.A having no merit is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.