ORDER G.D. Saxena, J. 1. This revision petition under section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 has been filed against an order dated 18th November 2011 in Sessions Case No. 5/2011 by the Additional Judge to the Court of First Additional Sessions Judge, Jora, district Morena framing thereby charges against the accused for commission of offence punishable under section 306 of I.P.C. 2. The facts, in short, just for the decision of this case is that on 9th August 2010 at about 1-20 p.m., at Police Station Jora, the complainant Rakesh lodged the report to the effect that his cousin brother Badam Singh committed suicide and died after hanging himself from a tree, situated in the agricultural field. On his report, a Dehati Nalish was written. After inquiry, the FIR was lodged and the investigation was set in motion. After investigation the charge-sheet for offences under section 306/34 of I.P.C. was filed against the petitioners/accused. After committal to Sessions Court, the charges have been framed against the petitioners by the order impugned, hence, this revision. 3. The contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is that no ingredients of the offence punishable under section 106 and section 306 of I.P.C. are made out from the evidence collected during investigation by the police. It is contended that on perusal of Dehati Nalish lodged by the complainant himself no report about manhandling compelling the deceased to commit suicide just before the incident was lodged by anybody including the complainant nor such things so reflected in his earlier statement to demonstrate that the accused compelled the deceased to do wrong. On the basis of the above, it is prayed that by allowing this revision petition, the charge framed against the petitioners may be quashed. 4. The learned Public Prosecutor for the respondent/State, on the other hand, supported the impugned order and prayed for dismissal. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the case-diary and the law governing the situation. 6. The question for consideration before this Court is whether the petitioners/accused instigated the deceased to commit suicide and as a result of such instigation the deceased committed suicide and whether the petitioners/accused on causing such instigation are liable to be prosecuted under section 306 of I.P.C. ? 7. 6. The question for consideration before this Court is whether the petitioners/accused instigated the deceased to commit suicide and as a result of such instigation the deceased committed suicide and whether the petitioners/accused on causing such instigation are liable to be prosecuted under section 306 of I.P.C. ? 7. A plain reading of the provisions of section 306 of I.P.C. makes it clear that before a person can be charged of abetting the suicide of any other person, it must be established that such other person committed suicide. Thus, where the evidence is insufficient to show suicide, section 306 of I.P.C. goes out of the way but where the facts and circumstances spell out a suicide and there is evidence prima facie against the accused-petitioners for proceeding against them, provisions are attracted. 8. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) ( AIR 2010 SC 1446 ), the Hon. Apex Court has held under:- “In the present case, the charge against the appellant is that he along with other two accused “in furtherance of common intention”, mentally tortured Jitendra Sharma (the deceased) and abetted him to commit suicide by the said act of mental torture. It is trite that words uttered on the spur of the moment or in a quarrel, without something more cannot be taken to have been uttered with mens rea. The onus is on the prosecution to show the circumstances which compelled the deceased to take an extreme step to bring an end to his life. In the present case, apart from the suicide note, extracted above, statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation, tend to show that on account of business transactions with the accused, including the appellant herein, the deceased was put under tremendous pressure to do something which he was perhaps not willing to do. Prima facie, it appears that the conduct of the appellant and his accomplices was such that the deceased was left with no other option except to end his life and, therefore, clause firstly of section 107 of the IPC was attracted. Briefly dealing with the material available on record, in the order directing framing of charge against the appellant, the learned trial Court has observed as under : “In the present case the evidence shows threatening given to the deceased. Briefly dealing with the material available on record, in the order directing framing of charge against the appellant, the learned trial Court has observed as under : “In the present case the evidence shows threatening given to the deceased. One witness called Kartar Singh says that C. K. Chopra was heard saying to the deceased that the deceased had become dishonest because he was refusing to sign a paper in which the share in some joint property was shown to be 10%. On another occasion Chopra was heard by this witness to say that Chopra would ruin the deceased if he did not give up his claim for 25% and did not agree to accept 10%. Witness Padam Bahadur has stated inter alia that he overheard Jahoor and Mahavir telling the deceased that Chopra had asked them to say that this was the last opportunity to sign the document and that if he wanted to live in the society he should sign the agreement or should die by taking poison. Soon thereafter the deceased committed suicide. Thus the evidence is not of a mere quarrel in which one person told the other go and die without actually suggesting that the opponent should commit suicide. In the present case the evidence collected by the investigation suggest that the deceased had been actually pushed to the wall and the escape by committing suicide was suggested by the accused persons.” In the light of the material on record, in our judgment, it cannot be said that the trial Court was in error in drawing an inference that the appellant had “instigated” the deceased to commit suicide and, therefore, there was ground for presuming that the appellant has committed an offence punishable under section 306 read with section 34, IPC. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the Court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. For this limited purpose, the Court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, the Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for “presuming” that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction.” Earlier in Som Nath Thapa and Ors. (1996 AIR SCW 1977) (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court explained the meaning of the word “presume”. Referring to dictionary meanings of the said word, the Court observed thus : “...if on the basis of materials on record, a Court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the Court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage”. In view of the settled legal position, noted above, we are convinced that the trial Court was correct in law in coming to the conclusion that a case for framing charge against the appellant had been made out. Similarly, the scope of revisionary powers of the High Court under Section 401 of the Code being limited, the High Court was justified in dismissing the Revision Petition, preferred by the appellant. 9. In Padal Venkantrama Reddy Vs. Kovvuri Saryanarayana Reddy ¼2011½ 12 SCC 437 it is held:- “there is no need to analysis each and every aspect meticulously before trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal . The complaint has to be read as whole . The statements of witnesses made on oath to be verified in full and materials put forth in the charge sheet ought to be taken note of as a whole before arriving at any conclusion . The complaint has to be read as whole . The statements of witnesses made on oath to be verified in full and materials put forth in the charge sheet ought to be taken note of as a whole before arriving at any conclusion . It is the material concluded during the investigation and evidence led in Court which decides the fate of the accused.” 10. On coming to the factual aspect which appears from the charge-sheet filed alongwith the evidence collected during investigation it has come on the record that on 9th August 2010 at about 5-30 p.m., the complainant Rakesh Kushwah, while returning back from his agriculture fields to his residence, saw that the crowd was gathered near the mango trees. When he reached near to the place, he saw that his cousin brother Badam, son of his uncle Badri Kushwah was hanging from the branches of mango tree after tyeing his neck with the lady saree. He informed the incident on the same day to police Jora district Morena. He also mentioned that the deceased was in the habit of taking liquor and was living separately from his parents and brothers in Morena Town. Marg report was written and inquired into. On his request, postmortem was done by the team of doctors. It appeared from postmortem report of the deceased that the cause of death was asphyxia as a result of hanging. On perusal of the case-diary statements of the witnesses including the complainant, it appeared that the witnesses disclosed that the deceased was scolded for theft of the chappals and was beaten by the accused. The deceased just during the incident being felt ashamed, committed suicide by hanging himself. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence or offences. For this limited purpose, the Court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. For this limited purpose, the Court may sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept as gospel truth all that the prosecution states. At this stage, therefore this Court has to consider the material only with a view to find out if there is ground for “presuming” that the accused has committed an offence and not for the purpose of arriving at the conclusion that it is not likely to lead to a conviction. 11. Consequently, in view of the above discussions on legal and factual aspects of the matter, there seems to be no substance to quash the charge framed by the trial Judge which is based on the evidence collected during investigation. No illegality, irregularity of law and facts appeared in the impugned order. 12. Hence this revision petition is dismissed.