Judgment : 1. The instant Appeal is directed against the Judgment and order dated 06/07/1998 passed by the learned 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Wardha in Sessions Case No. 03 of 1994 Whereby the Appellant was found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer R.I. for three months. The appellant was also convicted for the offence punishable under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer R.I. for three months. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. The facts, briefly stated, are thus:- That the first informant namely Lankabai Mhaiskar, on 4/12/1993, had lodged the FIR (Ex.21) against the appellant (the accused), who was residing at village Kurli, Taluka Samudrapur, District Nagpur. It was alleged that, on 03/12/1993, at about 4.00 p.m., the bullocks of the Appellant were grazing in her field situated at Umari. She questioned the accused about it. On that, the accused abused her in filthy language. The first informant drove away the cattle of the accused from her field. The accused caught hold of her hands, twisted them and pushed her on the ground. Her bangles got broken. It is also alleged that the accused had abused the victim on her caste. The appellant was charge-sheeted on the ground that he committed the offences punishable under Sections 354, 294, 506, 323 of the Indian Penal Code as also under Section 3(i)(xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. The case of the accused was heard by the learned Special Judge hearing cases under the Act, in Sessions Court, Wardha. The trial Court concluded the proceedings holding that the accused had assaulted the first informant intending to outrage her modesty and he had caused hurt to her and was convicted accordingly. The accused was, however acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 294, 506 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 3(i) (xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. 3. The accused was, however acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 294, 506 of the Indian Penal Code and also under Section 3(i) (xi) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. 3. Shri A.B.Patil, learned amicus curiae (appointed) criticized the impugned judgment and order and submitted that sole testimony of the first informant Lankabai ought not to have been relied upon when there were discrepancies in the evidence of the first informant as, in the F.I.R., she stated that the accused lifted and thrown her on the ground; while, in the evidence before the Court, she stated that the accused twisted her left arm and pushed in the ground. She also stated in the F.I.R. that the purpose of her presence in the field was to pluck cotton in her field; while in her evidence there was no any reference regarding the cotton grown in her field. The first informant stated that the bullocks belonging to one Baliram were tied in the field. But Baliram was not examined and it has come in the evidence that Baliram was cultivating field of Ramabai and the bullocks were in the field of Baliram. She also referred to presence of Ramabai in the Cotton field, but Ramabai is not examined for the reasons best known to prosecution. Furthermore, no broken bangles were seized, which could have lent corroboration to the version of the alleged incident and the trial Court ought to have appreciated the evidence very cautiously. The Medical Officer deposed that the injury observed by him was possible due to fall on the ground. 4. Learned A. P. P., in reply, contended that much weight age can not be given to the minor discrepancies in the evidence in comparison to the F.I.R. According to him, broken Bangles can also result in injuries. He supported the impugned Judgment and order . 5. Shri Patil, learned Amicus Curiae placed reliance upon the ruling in the case of Divender Singh and another vs. Hari Ram, 1990 Cr. L J. 1845 (Para 4). It is observed by the Himachal Pradesh High Court thus- “In none of these statements commission of offence under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code is alleged. It was not the Case of the complainant in the original complaint. L J. 1845 (Para 4). It is observed by the Himachal Pradesh High Court thus- “In none of these statements commission of offence under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code is alleged. It was not the Case of the complainant in the original complaint. As a matter of fact, the allegations related to the going of the accused to the School, beating of Kumari Veena and snatching of her watch. In case, during this case, the body of Kumari Veena was touched by the petitioners with no intention except for the purpose of beating her, an offence under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out and the assertion of Shri D.D.Sood, appearing for the respondent, complaining this, cannot be said to be legally sustainable. In order to prove a case under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code, it is not enough that the woman was pushed or given beatings. It has to prove that the push or the beatings were given with intent to outrage the woman's modesty or with the knowledge that it would be outraged (See: AIR 1954 SC 711 : (1954 Cri LJ 1793), Ram Das v. State of West Bengal).” 6. Relying upon the ruling aforementioned, learned amicus curiae Mr Patil submitted that there was no any evidence of an intention of the accused to commit any obscene act punishable under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code. Merely touching the woman’s body unintentionally would not amount to an offence punishable under section 354 of the Indian Penal Code. 7. I have examined the submissions made by the respective Counsel with reference to the evidence led and the ruling cited. The submission that broken bangles can also result in injury if considered coupled with the admission by the Medical Officer in his cross-examination that the injuries to the complainant could have been caused by fall on the ground really speaking may negative the possibility of the accused causing hurt to the first informant. The discrepancies pointed out, it appears, were ignored by the trial Court. The evidence nowhere appears credible enough to believe that the accused had an intention to outrage modesty of the first informant. The independent witnesses like Baliram and Ramabai, who were around at the time of incident, ought to have been examined to inspire confidence in judicial mind to conclude conviction with reasonable certainty. The evidence nowhere appears credible enough to believe that the accused had an intention to outrage modesty of the first informant. The independent witnesses like Baliram and Ramabai, who were around at the time of incident, ought to have been examined to inspire confidence in judicial mind to conclude conviction with reasonable certainty. Furthermore, there is no plausible explanation for delay in lodging the F.I.R. when the incident had occurred on the earlier day. For all these reasons, the impugned Judgment and order is not sustainable in law. In the result, the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court was without a sound basis as the prosecution failed to lead evidence beyond reasonable doubt to establish the guilt in this case. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned judgment and order is set aside. The conviction given by the impugned order is set aside. The Appellant is acquitted of all the charges which were held proved by the learned trial Judge. Appellant's bail bonds shall stand discharged. The amount of fine deposited, if any, be refunded to the appellant/accused. 8. The able assistance readily provided by Mr.A.B.Patil, learned amicus curaie is highly appreciated with gratitude. His professional fees are quantified in the sum of Rs. 2500/-, which shall be paid to him by the High Court Legal Services Sub-Committee.